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Nudging in Private International Law: The Design of Connecting Factors in Light of Behavioural Economics

Dr Johannes Ungerer (Lecturer, University of Oxford)

Cross-border disputes are particularly complex due to the challenges involved in understanding and deciding on the applicable law and international jurisdiction. Contrary to this reality, it is commonly assumed that all private parties are capable of rational choices in pursuit of efficiency, which however disregards the fact that humans are not always guided by rationality but can be affected by psychological biases. Acknowledging ‘bounded rationality’ in cross-border cases calls for reconsidering the way private international law determines which law shall apply and which court may hear the case. In particular, it requires analysing connecting factors from this new perspective, thus appreciating the significance of how bounded rationality affects private parties in choosing a law or court or abstaining from choice.

In an English paper published in RabelsZ volume 1/2022 of mine, such a new approach is pursued based on the insights of behavioural economics, which have been neglected in private international law to date. Looking at the existing EU instruments, the paper investigates how the connecting factors of the Rome and Brussels Regulations are designed to ‘nudge’ private parties towards a particular jurisdiction, both with regard to subjective and objective connecting factors. Special consideration is given to the requirements of nudging to justify its libertarian paternalism. Particularly illustrative is the application of behavioural insights to the paradigmatic area of consumer protection.

The paper finds that, amending the traditional economic analysis and its assumption of rational decision-making in pursuit of efficiency, behavioural economics contributes a more realistic understanding of private international law and its connecting factors. Objective connecting factors in the Rome and Brussels Regulations, such as the habitual residence or domicile of a particular party to the case in addition to more specific factors, are relied upon in the absence of a valid choice of law or court by the parties. These objective connecting factors can be understood as the lawmaker’s nudges towards a predetermined jurisdiction for the benefit of the parties, and not merely for the sake of individual efficiency. Behavioural economics appreciates that objective connecting factors are majoritarian default rules, but unlike the traditional economic understanding of this term and its hypothetical consensus explanation, the new perspective can openly acknowledge that default rules are set by the lawmaker, who is legitimised by the majority, as a form of libertarian paternalism. Yet, because of their characteristic as a safety net, which still allows the parties to make deviating arrangements, the objective connecting factors are defaults which serve as both choice-preserving and debiasing decisions without being coercive.

Subjective connecting factors, which enable and regulate party autonomy with regard to choice of law and court, are to be conceived as choice architecture from the perspective of behavioural economics. This understanding is to be preferred to previous explanations which draw on a naturalist or positivist reasoning in analogy to substantive private autonomy or which solely proclaim individualist freedom striving for efficiency. By ensuring a choice-preserving design which complements the default rules, the lawmaker can be understood to pursue nudging by providing for a suitable and legitimised choice architecture that steers the choice of law and court. From this perspective, the regulation and limitations of party autonomy are to be seen as measures of libertarian paternalism which intend to protect private parties from their own fallibility and from exploitation by others when making choices.

In response to existing criticism against nudging as a form of libertarian paternalism, the requirements of transparency and a choice-preserving design have proved particularly important. They are met by providing for specific and general defaults (sector-specific and residual objective connecting factors) alongside a choice architecture with clear validity

EAPIL founding conference: Aarhus, 2-4 June 2022

As many our readers know the first conference of the European Association of Private International Law (EAPIL), established in late 2019, had to be rescheduled (twice) due to the Corona pandemic. It will now (hopefully) take place from 2-4 June 2022 at the University of Aarhus (Denmark).

The conference will bring together academics and practitioners from all over Europe and provide a unique opportunity to talk and think about European Private International Law in a pan-European fashion. Topics to be discussed will include the effects and the challenges of digitalization, the problems of fragmentation as well as other challenges the discipline is currently facing. For more information please visit the conference website.

Registration is possible here. For questions, please get in touch with the local organizer, Morten M. Fogt (mmf@law.au.dk).

For more information about EAPIL (including about how to join and how to get involved) please visit the Association’s website at https://eapil.org.

Call for Abstracts: Climate Change and International Economic Law

The editors of the European Yearbook for International Economic Law (EYIEL) welcome abstracts from scholars and practitioners at all stages of their career for the focus section of the EYIEL 2022. This year’s focus will be on the impact of climate change on international economic law.

Abstracts may cover any topic relating to dispute settlement in the field of international economic law, though preference is given to topics focusing on the perspective from public and private international or EU law. We particularly welcome contributions addressing the following aspects:

  • Climate change in WTO and international trade law
  • Impact of investment protection treaties on energy transformation
  • Reform of the Energy Charter Treaty
  • Financial and monetary law aspects of climate change
  • Relationship between UNFCCC and Glasgow Climate Pact and international economic law
  • Climate change litigation in domestic and international courts
  • Liability for climate change in private (international) law

Abstracts should not exceed 500 words. They should be concise and clearly outline the significance of the proposed contribution. Abstracts may be submitted until 28 February 2022 via e-mail to eyiel@leuphana.de.

Successful applicants will be notified by 1 April 2022 that their proposal has been accepted. They are expected to send in their final contribution by 30 June 2021.

Final submissions will undergo peer review prior to publication. Given that submissions are to be developed on the basis of the proposal, that review will focus on the development of the paper’s central argument.

Submissions addressing particular regional and institutional developments should be analytical and not descriptive. Due to its character as a yearbook, EYIEL will not publish articles which will lose their relevance quickly. Submissions should not exceed 12,000 words (including footnotes and references), though preference may be given to shorter submissions. They should include an abstract and a biographical note. Submissions need to be in conformity with the EYIEL style guidelines.

The editors of the EYIEL welcome informal enquiries about any other relevant topic in the field of international and European economic law. In case you have an idea or proposal, please submit your enquiry via e-mail to eyiel@leuphana.de.