Views
Deference to Foreign Sovereign Submissions
As previously reported here, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision in 2016 reversing a $147.8 million price-fixing judgment against two Chinese manufacturers of Vitamin C. The plaintiffs alleged that the Chinese manufacturers engaged in price fixing and supply manipulation in violation of U.S. antitrust laws. In its first ever appearance as an amicus before a U.S. court, the Chinese government filed a formal statement asserting that Chinese law required the Chinese manufacturers to set prices and reduce the quantities of Vitamin C sold abroad. Relying on this statement, the Second Circuit held that because the Chinese manufacturers could not comply with both Chinese law and the U.S. antitrust laws, principles of international comity compelled dismissal of the case.
This case raises a host of interesting questions. First, did the Second Circuit reach the right result? Second, is this a comity case or a foreign sovereign compulsion case? Third, what level of deference is due to a foreign sovereign that appears in private litigation to explain their country’s laws? Fourth, should U.S. judges defer to such an explanation?
In June 2017, the United States Supreme Court called for the views of the United States. This past Tuesday, the Solicitor General (SG) filed this brief in response to the Court’s order.
In this submission, the SG explains that the Court should grant review of the Second Circuit’s decision in order to review the court of appeals’ holding that the Chinese government’s submission conclusively established the content of Chinese law. According to the SG, “a foreign government’s characterization of its own law is entitled to substantial weight, but it is not conclusive.” The SG argues that the case warrants the Court’s review because “[t]he degree of deference that a court owes to a foreign government’s characterization of its own law is an important and recurring question, and foreign sovereigns considering making their views known to federal courts should understand the standards that will be applied to their submissions.”
Should the Court grant review, the question of what standard should be applied to foreign sovereign submissions will be key. This is a question I have explored here.
It will be interesting to see whether the Court accepts the SG’s request to review the Second Circuit’s decision.
Jurisdiction, Conflict of Laws and Data Protection in Cyberspace
Report on the Conference held in Luxembourg on 12 October 2017, by Martina Mantovani, Research Fellow MPI Luxembourg
On 12 October 2017, the Brussels Privacy Hub (BPH) at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and the Department of European and Comparative Procedural Law of the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg held a joint conference entitled “Jurisdiction, Conflicts of Law and Data Protection in Cyberspace”. The conference, which was attended by nearly 100 people, included presentations by academics from around the world, as well as from Advocate General Henrik Saugmandsgaard Øe of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The entire conference was filmed and is available for viewing on the YouTube Channel of the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg (first and second parts) Read more
Chinese courts made decision taking into account of the Hague Choice of Court Convention
China has signed the Hague Choice of Court Convention on 12 September 2017, but has not yet ratified this Convention. The Hague Choice of Court Convention has not entered into force in China. However, Shanghai High Court has already relied on the Hague Choice of Court Convention to make decision.
In Cathay United Bank v Gao, Shanghai High Court, (2016) Hu Min Xia Zhong No 99, the appellant, a Taiwan commercial bank, and the respondent, a Chinese citizen resident in Shanghai, entered into a Guarantee contract. It included a clause choosing Taiwan court as the competent court to hear disputes arising out of the contract. This clause did not specify whether it was exclusive or not. Chinese law does not provide how to decide exclusivity of a choice of court agreement. Facing the legal gap, Shanghai High Court took into account Article 3 of the Hague Choice of Court Convention 2005 and decided that choice of court agreements should be exclusive unless the parties stated otherwise. The Shanghai High Court thus declined jurisdiction in favour of Taiwan Court.
This decision was made on 20 April 2017, even before China signed the Hague Choice of Court Convention. Since the Hague Choice of Court Convention has not entered into force in China, it should not be directly applied by Chinese courts in judicial practice. The question is whether Chinese courts could ‘take into account’ of international conventions not being effective in China to make decision. Although Article 9 of the Chinese Supreme Court’s Judicial Interpretation of Chinese Conflict of Laws Act allows the Chinese courts to apply international conventions, which have not entered into effect in China, to decide the parties’ rights and obligations, such an application is subject to party autonomy. In other words, parties should have chosen the international convention to govern their rights and obligations. Article 9 does not apply to international judicial cooperation conventions that do not deal with individuals’ substantive rights and are not subject to party autonomy. Perhaps, a more relevant provision is Article 142(3) of the PRC General Principle of Civil Law, which provides that international customs or practice may be applied to matters for which neither the law of the PRC nor any international treaty concluded or acceded to by China has any provisions. Arguably, the Hague Choice of Court Convention represents common practice adopted internationally and forms a source to fill the gap in the current Chinese law.
News
Book launch: Brooke Marshall, ‘Asymmetric Jurisdiction Clauses’
On behalf of our former editor Brooke Marshall, we are happy to share the invitation to the UNSW Law & Justice Book Forum, which will host the launch of her book on Asymmetric Jurisdiction Clauses.
The event will feature the following speakers:
- Professor Mary Keyes, Director of the Law Futures Centre; Professor, Griffith Law School, Griffith University
- Professor Caroline Kleiner, Professor, Centre for Business Law and Management (CEDAG), Faculty of Law, Université Paris Cité, Paris, France
- Chaired by Professor Justine Nolan, Director, Australian Human Rights Institute; Professor, UNSW Faculty of Law & Justice
It will take place in a hybrid setting on Wednesday, 5 July, at 4:30pm AEST = 8:30am CEST = 7:30am BST. You may register using this link.
Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 4/2023: Abstracts
The latest issue of the „Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax)“ features the following articles:
(These abstracts can also be found at the IPRax-website under the following link: https://www.iprax.de/en/contents/)
Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP) No 1/2023: Abstracts
The first issue of 2023 of the Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP, published by CEDAM) was just released. It features:
Francesco Salerno, (formerly) Professor at the University of Ferrara, L’impatto della procedura di interpretazione pregiudiziale sul diritto internazionale privato nazionale (The Impact of the Preliminary Rulings of the Court of Justice on National Private International Law; in Italian)
The European Court of Justice’s uniform interpretation of private international law concerns mainly – albeit not only – the EU Regulations adopted pursuant to Article 81 TFEU: in the context of this activity, the Court also takes into account the distinctive features of EU Member States. The increasing number of autonomous notions developed by the Court greatly enhanced the consistency and the effectiveness of the European rules. Against this background, the Italian judicial authorities implemented such a case-law even when it ran counter well-established domestic legal principles. Moreover, the European institutions rarely questioned the case-law of the Court of Justice, but when they did so, they adopted new rules of private international law in order to “correct” a well-settled jurisprudential trend of the Court.