Coronavirus, force majeure certificate and private international law

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Coronavirus outbreak and force majeure certificate

Due to the outbreak, China has adopted a number of public health measures, including closing schools and workplaces, limiting public gatherings, restricting travel and movement of people, screening , quarantine and isolation. At least 48 cities were locked down by 14 Feb 2020. (here) More than two thirds of China’s migrant workers were unable to return to work, (see here) leaving those firms that have restarted operation running below capacity.  

Coronavirus and the emergency measures significantly affect economic activates in China. The China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), a quasi-governmental entity, issued 3,325 force majeure certificates covering the combined contract value of $38.5bn to exempt Chinese companies from their contractual obligations.

Issuing force majeure certificates is a common practice of trade councils or commercial chambers in the world. These certificates are proof of the existence of relevant events that may constitute force majeure and impinge the company’s capacity to perform the contract. The events recorded in the certificates would include the confirmation of coronavirus outbreak, the nature, extent, date and length of governmental order for lockdown or quarantine, the cancellation of any transportation, etc. These certificate, however, are not legal documents and do not have direct executive or legal effects. They only attest the factual details instead of certifying those events are indeed force majeure in law. They are also called ‘force majeure factual certificate’ by the CCPIT. The CCPIT states in its webpage that:

The force majeure factual certificate is the proof of objective, factual circumstances, not the ‘trump card’ to exempt contractual obligations. The CCPIT issues relevant force majeure factual certificates to Chinese enterprises that are unable to perform contracts due to the impact of the new coronavirus epidemic. The certificate can prove objective facts such as delayed resumption of work, traffic control, and limited dispatch of labour personnel. An enterprise can request for delaying performance or termination of the contract based on this certificate, but whether its obligation can be fully or partially exempt depends on individual cases. The parties should take all the circumstances and the applicable law into consideration to prove the causal link between ‘the epidemic and its prevention and control measures’ and the ‘failure to perform’.

Force Majeure in Different Governing Law

The force certificate is thus mainly used to demonstrate to the other party the existence of certain factual difficulties that hamper performance and seek understanding to privately settle the dispute. If the disputes are brought to the court, the court should consider whether the outbreak and the relevant emergency measure constitute force majeure events pursuant to the governing law, treating the force majeure certificate as evidence of fact. There is no international uniform doctrine of force majeure and different countries adopt different doctrines to allocate contractual risk in unforeseeable change of circumstances. China is a member of the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), which shall apply if the other party has its place of business in another contracting state, or the parties choose CISG by agreement. Article 79 of the CISG provides that a party is exempted from paying damages if the breach is due to an impediment beyond its control, and either the impediment could not have been reasonably foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, or the party could not reasonably avoid or overcome the impediment or its consequences. Although the disease outbreak is unforeseeable, it can only be an impediment if it makes performance impossible. Therefore, if the outbreak only makes production more difficult or expensive, it is not an impediment. There is no consensus as to whether an event that makes performance excessively burdensome can also be counted as an impediment in CISG. In addition, the impediment must uncontrollable. If a Chinese firm could not perform its contractual obligation due to the compulsory lockdown ordered by its local government, this event is out of control. The same applies if a firm manufacturing facial masks cannot deliver on time due to government  requisition. On the other hand, when the Chinese State Council announced the extension of the Chinese New Year holiday to 2 Feb 2020, it was not a compulsory ban and if a firm ‘chose’ not to operate during the extension without additional compulsory order from any  authorities, substantive risk of infection in its place of business, or irreparable labour shortage, the impediment may not be considered as uncontrollable. For the same reason, if a company decided to lock down after a worker tested positive for coronavirus in order to reduce the risk of spreading the disease among its workers, without the high risk and with alternative and less extreme prevention measures available, the impossibility to perform may be considered ‘self-inflicted’ instead of ‘uncontrollable’. Consideration should always be given to the necessity and proportionality of the decision. Furthermore, if the local government imposed compulsory prohibition for work resumption to prevent people gathering, a firm cannot claim uncontrollable impediments if working in distance is feasible and possible for the performance of the contract.

If the other party is not located in a CISG contracting state, whether the coronavirus outbreak can exempt Chinese exporters from their contractual obligations depends on the national law that governs the contracts. Most China’s major trade partners are contracting states of CISG, except India, South Africa, Nigeria, and the UK. Chinese law accepts both the force majeure and hardship doctrines. The party that breaches the contract may be discharged of its obligations fully or partially if an unforeseeable, uncontrollable and insurmountable causes the impossibility to perform. (Art 117 of the Chinese Contract Law 1999) The party can also ask for the alternation of contract if un unforeseeable circumstance that is not force majeure makes performance clearly inequitable. (Art 26 of the SPC Contract Law Interpretation (II) 2009) The ‘force majeure factual certificate’ can also be issued if CCPIT considers a event not force majeure but unforeseeable change of circumstances in Art 26 of the Interpretation (II). For example, in Jiangsu Flying Dragon Food Machinery v Ukraine CF Mercury Ltd, CCPIT issued the certificate even after recognising that the poorly maintained electricity system of the manufacturer that was damaged by the rain was not a force majeure event.  In contrast, other national law may adopt a more restrictive standard to exempt parties their obligations in unforeseeable circumstances. In England, for example, the court will not apply force majeure without a force majeure clause in the contract. A more restricted ‘frustration’ may apply instead.

Jurisdiction and Enforcement

In theory, a Chinese court should apply the same approach as other jurisdictions to apply the governing law and treat the force majeure certificates issued by CCPIT as evidence of fact. in practice, Chinese courts may prefer applying Chinese law if the CISG does not apply and the parties do not choose the law of another country, grant more weight to the CCPIT certificate than other courts, and be more lenient to apply the force majeure criteria to support Chinese companies’ claim in relation to the coronavirus outbreak.

Finally, if the dispute is heard in a non-Chinese court or international arbitral tribunal, the judgment holding the Chinese company liable need to be enforced in China unless the Chinese company has assets abroad. Enforcing foreign judgments in China is generally difficult, though there are signs of relaxation. If judgments can be enforced pursuant to bilateral treaties or reciprocity, they may be rejected based on public policy. The question is whether the coronavirus outbreak and the government controlling measures can be public policy. According to the precedents of the Supreme People’s Court, (eg. Tianrui Hotel Investment Co., Ltd. (Petitioner) v. Hangzhou Yiju Hotel Management Co., Ltd. (Respondent), (2010) Min Si Ta Zi 18) breach of mandatory administrative regulations per se is not violation of public policy. But public policy undoubtedly includes public health. If Chinese courts consider the Chinese company should not resume production to prevent spread of disease event without compulsory government order, the public policy defence may be supported.

Indigenous Claims to Foreign Land: Update from Canada

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By Stephen G.A. Pitel, Faculty of Law, Western University

In 2013 two Innu First Nations sued, in the Superior Court of Quebec, two mining companies responsible for a mega-project consisting of multiple open-pit mines near Schefferville, Quebec and Labrador City, Newfoundland and Labrador. The Innu asserted a right to the exclusive use and occupation of the lands affected by the mega-project. They claimed to have occupied, since time immemorial, a traditional territory that straddles the border between the provinces of Quebec and Newfoundland and Labrador.  They claimed a constitutional right to the land under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The mining companies and the Attorney General of Newfoundland and Labrador each moved to strike from the Innu’s pleading portions of the claim which, in their view, concerned real rights over property situated in Newfoundland and Labrador and, therefore, fell under the jurisdiction of the courts of that province.

In Newfoundland and Labrador (Attorney General) v Uashaunnuat (Innu of Uashat and of Mani-Utenam), 2020 SCC 4, the Supreme Court of Canada held (by 5-4 majority) that the motion to strike failed and that the Quebec court had jurisdiction over the entire claim advanced by the Innu.

Quebec’s private international law is contained in Book Ten of the Civil Code of Quebec. Jurisdiction over the mining companies was based on their being domiciled in Quebec. However, as a special rule of jurisdiction, Division III governs what are called real and mixed actions (para. 18). The general rule is that Quebec has jurisdiction to hear a real action only if the property in dispute is situated in Quebec (art. 3152). In the case of a mixed action, Quebec must have jurisdiction over both the personal and real aspects of the matter: see CGAO v Groupe Anderson Inc., 2017 QCCA 923 at para. 10 (para. 57). These rules required the court to properly characterize the Innu’s action.

The majority held that the claim was a mixed action (para. 56). This was because the Innu sought both the recognition of a sui generis right (a declaration of Aboriginal title) and the performance of various obligations related to failures to respect that right. However, the claim was not a “classical” mixed action, which would require the court to have jurisdiction over both the personal and real aspects of the matter. Rather, this was a “non-classical” mixed action that involved the recognition of sui generis rights and the performance of obligations (para. 57).  Put another way, the nature of the indigenous land claims made them different from traditional claims to land. Accordingly, the claim did not fall within the special jurisdiction provisions in Division III and jurisdiction could simply be based on the defendants’ Quebec domicile.

The majority was influenced by access to justice considerations, being concerned about requiring the Innu to litigate in both Quebec and Newfoundland and Labrador. It noted that “[t]he Innu have argued that separating their claim along provincial borders will result in higher — perhaps prohibitive — costs caused by “piecemeal” advocacy, and inconsistent holdings that will require further resolution in the courts. … These are compelling access to justice considerations, especially when they are coupled with the pre-existing nature of Aboriginal rights” (paras. 46-47).

The dissenting reasons are lengthy (quite a bit longer than those of the majority). Critically, it held that “Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal or treaty rights are “real rights” for the purposes of private international law, which is to say that they resemble or are at least analogous to the domestic institution of real rights” (emphasis in original) (para. 140). Labeling them as sui generis was not sufficient to avoid the jurisdictional requirement for a mixed action that the land had to be in Quebec: “the fact that Aboriginal title is sui generis in nature does not mean that it cannot be a proprietary interest or a real right strictly for the purposes of private international law” (para. 155).

In the view of the dissent, ” if Quebec authorities were to rule directly on the title that the Innu believe they hold to the parts of Nitassinan that are situated outside Quebec, the declarations would be binding on no one, not even on the defendants … , precisely because Quebec authorities lack jurisdiction in this regard” (emphasis in original) (para. 189).

On the issue of access to justice, the dissent stated that “access to justice must be furnished within the confines of our constitutional order. Delivery of efficient, timely and cost-effective resolution of transboundary Aboriginal rights claims must occur within the structure of the Canadian legal system as a whole. But this is not to suggest that principles of federalism and provincial sovereignty preclude development by superior courts, in the exercise of their inherent jurisdiction, of innovative yet constitutionally sound solutions that promote access to justice” (emphasis in original) (para. 217). It went on to proffer the interesting procedural option that both a Quebec judge and a Newfoundland and Labrador judge could sit in the same courtroom at the same time, so that the proceedings were heard by both courts without duplication (para. 222).

There are many other issues in the tension between the majority and the dissent, including the role of Newfoundland and Labrador as a party to the dispute. It was not sued by the Innu and became involved as a voluntary intervenor (para. 9).

The decision is very much rooted in the private international law of Quebec but it has implications for any Indigenous claims affecting land in any legal system. Those systems would also need to determine whether their courts had jurisdiction to hear such claims in respect of land outside their territory. Indeed, the decision offers a basis to speculate as to how the courts would handle an Indigenous land claim brought in British Columbia in respect of land that straddled the border with the state of Washington. Is the court’s decision limited to cases that cross only internal federation borders or does it extend to the international realm? And does there have to be a straddling of the border at all, or could a court hear such a claim entirely in respect of land in another jurisdiction? The court’s decision leaves much open to interesting debate.

Dubious Cross-Border Insolvency Framework in India: The Need of a new Paradigm?

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By Gaurav Chaliya and Nishtha Ojha. The authors are third year students at the National Law University, Jodhpur, India.

Introduction

In 2018, around 47 entities forming the part of corporate groups were reported to be in debt which reflects the necessity of having an effective cross-border legal framework. The flexibility in the framework of cross border insolvency helps in overcoming the hurdles encountered in cross border disputes. This framework essentially girdles around the principle of coordination and cooperation and in consonance with these principles the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal [“NCLAT”] in Jet Airways case has extended these principles by providing sufficient rights to Dutch trustee and observed that–

 “as per law, he (Dutch Trustee) has a right to attend the meeting of the Committee of Creditors”

However, despite effective coordination and cooperation, the proceedings against one entity is questioned to be extended to others as first, the elemental issue concerned is that each entity is managed by its own interests and such extension may be prejudicial to the interest of other entities and second, the legal conundrum associated in determining the Centre of Main Interest [“COMI”] of an entity. With regards to the first question, it is imperative that extension of insolvency proceeding is not prejudicial to the interests of the other entities as it is only extended in case of existence of reasonable nexus between entities in terms of financial and commercial relationship which makes them interdependent on each other. The authors would elaborate upon the second question in the subsequent section.´

Deficient Regulatory Framework

Section 234 and 235 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 [“IBC”] governs the cross border disputes in India. Section 234 empowers the government to enter into bilateral agreements with another country and Section 235 provides that Adjudicating Authority can issue a letter of request, to a country with which bilateral agreement has been entered into, to deal with assets situated thereto.

As is evident, the impediments associated with this regulatory framework are: first, it does not provide for a legal framework for foreign representatives to apply to the Indian courts and most importantly these sections are not notified yet and second, the current legal framework under IBC provides for entering into bilateral treaties which is uncertain and in addition is a long term negotiation process. For instance, in Australia the regulatory framework therein was not sufficient to deal with the complexities associated with cross-border insolvencies as bilateral treaties can provide some solution but they are not easy to negotiate and have intrinsic intricacies. Consequently, it passed the Cross Border Insolvency Act, 2008 which provides adoption and enactment of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law [“Model law”]. In light of same, India should also consider the enactment of the Model law though with modifications, one of which is suggested and dealt in the next section.

Resolving the Complications

Complications in the field of International Insolvency are never-ending primarily due to the lack of a comprehensive legal framework. The Model Law seeks to alleviate these complications by providing a pragmatic legal framework. As asserted earlier, Jet Airways case acknowledges and applies the principles enshrined under the Model Law. The Model Law, unlike any treaty or convention, is a model form of legislation which is adopted by 46 nations till date.

The Model Law sets out the principle of Centre of Main Interest [“COMI”] for determining the jurisdiction of the proceedings. Interestingly, it does not define the COMI and therefore, determining COMI possesses the greatest challenge. Also, the principal concern that remains is that the debtor can escape its liability by changing its COMI according to its favourable outcome. However, the Model law safeguards the rights of the creditor by providing that first, as per Article 16 of the Model Law, COMI corresponds to the place where debtor has its registered office and second, COMI is dependent on many other factors viz. seat of an entity having major stake in terms of control over assets and its significant operations, which is basically dependent upon the transparent assessment by the third parties. Consequently, the debtor cannot escape its liability by changing COMI as determination of the same is dependent upon assessment by third parties. Hence, the Model Law addresses the prime issues which are present in the current regulatory framework. 

In India, the Report of Insolvency Law Committee [“ILC”] was constituted to examine the issues related to IBC, which recommended the impending need to adopt the Model Law. However, the proposed draft disregards the objective of coordination and cooperation among all nations by mandating the requirement of reciprocity. The authors subscribe to the view, that, until the Model Law has been adopted to a significant extent by other counties, the absolute requirement of reciprocity as postulated under the draft should be done away with and courts should be given the discretion on case to case basis. As such an absolute requirement of reciprocity i.e. entering into a treaty with other countries take us back to the present legal framework in India by limiting adjudicating authority’s power to only 46 countries. For instance, in case the corporate debtor has COMI in country A, which has adopted the Model Law, whereas his assets are located in country B, which has not adopted the Model Law. In such a situation, if the requirement of reciprocity is imposed then the administration of assets in country B would become difficult, as an entity in country B would always be reluctant to become a part of the insolvency proceedings relying on probable defences such as of lex situs and absence of bilateral agreements.

In essence, this whole process would be detrimental to the interest of the creditor as it would hamper the maximization of the value of assets. Moreover, in Rubin v. Eurofinance, the Supreme Court of U.K. has observed that the court is allowed to use the discretion provided to it by the system. Hence, by this approach courts are allowed to cooperate and coordinate with those countries that are acquiescent to return the favour. It is pertinent to clarify that by granting discretion to court, the authors do not concede to the practice of Gibb’s principle. Rather the said principle is inherently flawed as it does not recognise the foreign insolvency process preceding over English law per contra courts generally expects other jurisdictions to accept their judgements.

Concluding Remarks

After a careful analysis of present cross border legal framework in India, it can be ascertained that current system is highly ineffective and in light of instances provided, the adoption of the Model Law with modifications seems to be a better alternative. The Model Law provides an orderly mechanism as it recognises the interest of the enforcing country by taking into account its public policy and national interest. The Appellate Tribunal in Jet Airways case has attempted to extend the principles of the Model Law into domestic case laws therefore it is optimal time that India adopts such legislation. Though with regards to the problem of reciprocity as pointed earlier, the absolute requirement or non-requirement of the reciprocity would not solve the problem and according to Rubin’s case, discretion should be given to the courts which would widen the scope of the application of the law, thereby, being in consonance with the objectives of the principles i.e. of effective cooperation and coordination among all nations. Hence, the Model law contains enough of the measures to prevent any misuse of the process and adopting it with modifications would resolve the problem associated.

Claims Against Corporate Defendant Founded on Customary International Law Can Proceed in Canada

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By Stephen G.A. Pitel, Faculty of Law, Western University

Eritrean mine workers who fled from that country to British Columbia sued the mine’s owner, Nevsun Resources Ltd. They sought damages for various torts including battery, false imprisonment and negligence. They also sought damages for breaches of customary international law. Their core allegation was that as conscripted labourers in Eritrea’s National Service Program, they were forced to work in the mine in intolerable conditions and Nevsun was actively involved in this arrangement.

Nevsun moved to strike out all of the claims on the basis of the act of state doctrine. It also moved to strike out the proceedings based on violations of customary international law because they were bound to fail as a matter of law.

In its decision in Nevsun Resources Ltd v Araya, 2020 SCC 5, the Supreme Court of Canada has held (by a 7-2 decision) that the act of state doctrine is not part of Canadian law (para. 59) and so does not preclude any of the claims. It has also held (by a 5-4 decision) that the claims based on customary international law are not bound to fail (para. 132) and so can proceed.

Act of State Doctrine

Justice Abella, writing for five of the court’s nine judges, noted that the act of state doctrine had been heavily criticized in England and Australia and had played no role in Canadian law (para 28). Instead, the principles that underlie the doctrine were subsumed within the jurisprudence on “conflict of laws and judicial restraint” (para 44).

In dissent, Justice Cote, joined by Justice Moldaver, held that the act of state doctrine is not subsumed by choice of law and judicial restraint jurisprudence (para. 275). It is part of Canadian law. She applied the doctrine of justiciability to the claims, finding them not justiciable because they require the determination that the state of Eritrea has committed an internationally wrongful act (para. 273).

This division raises some concerns about nomenclature. How different is “judicial restraint” from “non-justiciability”? Is justiciability an aspect of an act of state doctrine or is it a more general doctrine (see para. 276)? Put differently, it appears that the same considerations could be deployed by the court either under an act of state doctrine or without one.

The real division on this point is that Justice Cote concluded that the court “should not entertain a claim, even one between private parties, if a central issue is whether a foreign state has violated its obligations under international law” (para. 286). She noted that the cases Justice Abella relied on in which Canadian courts have examined and criticized the acts of foreign states are ones in which that analysis was required to ensure that Canada comply with its own obligations as a state (para. 304). In contrast, in this case no conduct by Canada is being called into question.

In Justice Abella’s view, a Canadian court can indeed end up determining, as part of a private civil dispute, that Eritrea has engaged in human rights violations. She did not, however, respond to Justice Cote’s point that her authorities were primarily if not all drawn from the extradition and deportation contexts, both involving conduct by Canada as a state. She did not squarely explain why the issue of Eritrea’s conduct was justiciable or not covered by judicial restraint in this particular case. Having held that the act of state doctrine was not part of Canadian law appears to have been sufficient to resolve the issue (para. 59).

Claims Based on Violations of Customary International Law

The more significant split relates to the claims based on violations of customary international law. The majority concluded that under the “doctrine of adoption”, peremptory norms of customary international law are automatically adopted into Canadian domestic law (para. 86). So Canadian law precludes forced labour, slavery and crimes against humanity (paras. 100-102). Beyond that conclusion, the majority fell back on the hurdle for striking out claims, namely that they have to be bound (“plain and obvious”) to fail. If they have a prospect of success, they should not be struck out. The majority found it an open question whether these peremptory norms bind corporations (para. 113) and can lead to a common law remedy of damages in a civil proceeding (para. 122). As a result the claims were allowed to proceed.

Four of the judges dissented on this point, in reasons written by Brown and Rowe JJ and supported by Cote and Moldaver JJ. These judges were critical of the majority’s failure to actually decide the legal questions raised by the case, instead leaving them to a subsequent trial (paras. 145-147). In their view, the majority’s approach “will encourage parties to draft pleadings in a vague and underspecified manner” which is “likely not to facilitate access to justice, but to frustrate it” (para. 261). The dissent was prepared to decide the legal questions and held that the claims based on violations of customary international law could not succeed (para. 148).

In the dissent’s view, the adoption into Canadian law of rules prohibiting slavery, forced labour and crimes against humanity did not equate to mandating that victims have a civil claim for damages in response to such conduct (para. 172). The prohibitions, in themselves, simply did not include such a remedy (para. 153). The right to a remedy, the dissent pointed out, “does not necessarily mean a right to a particular form, or kind of remedy” (para. 214).

Further, as to whether these rules can be directly enforced against corporations, the dissent was critical of the complete lack of support for the majority’s position: “[i]t cites no cases where a corporation has been held civilly liable for breaches of customary international law anywhere in the world” (para. 188). As Justice Cote added, the “widespread, representative and consistent state practice and opinio juris required to establish a customary rule do not presently exist to support the proposition that international human rights norms have horizontal application between individuals and corporations” (para. 269).

On this issue, one might wonder how much of a victory the plaintiffs have achieved. While the claims can now go forward, only a very brave trial judge would hold that a corporation can be sued for a violation of customary international law given the comments of the dissenting judges as to the lack of support for that position. As Justices Brown and Rowe put it, the sole authority relied on by the majority “is a single law review essay” (para. 188). Slender foundations indeed.

ERA: Recent European Court of Human Rights Case Law in Family Matters (conference report)

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Report written by Tine Van Hof, researcher at the University of Antwerp

On the 13th and 14th of February 2020, the Academy of European Law (ERA) organized a conference on ‘Recent ECtHR Case Law in Family Matters’. This conference was held in Strasbourg and brought together forty participants coming from twenty-one different countries. This report will set out some of the issues addressed at the conference.

The presentation, made by Ksenija Turkovi?, Judge at the European Court of Human Rights, focused on children on the move and more specifically on minors in the context of migration. On this topic the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has developed a child-specific human rights approach. This approach implies taking into account three particular concepts: vulnerability, best interests and autonomy. Judge Turkovi? pointed to the interesting discussion on whether vulnerability could only apply to young migrant children. On this discussion, there is now agreement that the vulnerability applies to all children under the age of 18 and regardless whether they are accompanied by adults. The ECtHR made very clear in its case law that migrant children are especially vulnerable and that this vulnerability is a decisive factor that takes precedence over the children’s migrant status. This vulnerability also plays a role in the cases on the detention of children. The more vulnerable a person is, the lower the threshold for a situation of detention to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), encompassing the prohibition of torture.

Family unification and the free movement of family status was the second topic of the day. Michael Hellner, professor at Stockholm University, discussed several cases of the ECtHR (Ejimson v Germany) and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) (K.A. v Belgium, Coman and S.M.). He concluded that family life does not automatically create a right of residence but it can create such a right in certain circumstances. In the Coman case for example, the CJEU decided that Romania had to recognize the marriage between the two men for the purpose of enabling such persons to exercise the rights they enjoy under EU law (i.e. free movement). Professor Hellner noted that it seems to be quite easy to circumvent national law in the future if one looks at the Coman case. He considered it positive if the consequence was that same-sex marriages and surrogacy arrangements created abroad were recognized. However, he made the interesting observation that it might be a very different story if one thinks about child marriages and the recognition thereof.

Maria-Andriani Kostopoulou, consultant in family law for the Council of Europe, thereafter shared her insights on parental rights, pre-adoption foster care and adoption. She discussed i.a. the evolution in the case law of the ECtHR on the representation of the child before the Court. In the Strand-Lobben case, the Court stated that the issue of representation does not require a restrictive or technical approach and thus made clear that a certain level of flexibility is necessary. In the Paradisio and Campanelli case, the ECtHR provided three criteria that should be taken into account for assessing the representation of the child: the link between the child and the representative, the subject-matter of the case and any potential conflict of interests between the interests of the child and those of the representative. The latest case, A. and B. against Croatia, introduced a security safeguard. In this case, the ECtHR asked the Croatian Bar Association to appoint a legal representative for the child for the procedure before the ECtHR since the Court was not sure that there were no conflict of interests between the child and the mother, who proposed to be the representative.

To end the first conference day, Dmytro Tretyakov, lawyer at the Registry of the ECtHR, enlightened us about the misconceptions and best practices of submitting a case to the Court. His most important tips for a submission to the Court are the following:

  • Use the current application form and not an old one;
  • Submit well in time and certainly within the six-month period;
  • Summarize the facts of the case on the three pages provided. This summary has to be clear, readable (for those that do it in handwriting) and comprehensible;
  • To state claims, refer to the relevant Article from the ECHR (do not cite it) and explain what the specific problem is with regard to that Article;
  • Support each claim with documents; and
  • Sign the form in the correct boxes and carefully look where the signature of the applicant and where the signature of the representative is required.

The second day of the conference started with the presentation of Nadia Rusinova, attorney-at-law and lecturer at the Hague University of Applied Science, on international child abduction. She discussed i.a. the issue of domestic violence in child abduction cases. Several questions can be raised in this regard, for example: what constitutes domestic violence? When should a court accept the domestic violence to be established? What is adequate protection in light of the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction (1980) and who decides on this? In the case O.C.I. and others v Romania, one of the questions was whether there is such a thing as light violence that does not amount to a grave risk in the sense of Article 13(1)(b) of the Hague Convention. The ECtHR approached this issue very critically and stated that no form of corporal punishment is acceptable. Regarding the adequate measures, the Court stated that domestic authorities have a discretion to decide what is adequate but the measures should be in place before ordering the return of the child. Another point raised by Ms. Rusinova is the time factor that is required. If one looks at Article 11(2) of the Hague Convention and at Article 11(3) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation together, six weeks is the required time period for the return proceedings. The Brussels IIbis Recast clarified that the procedure should take no more than six weeks per instance. However, according to Ms. Rusinova it is hardly possible to do the procedures in six weeks; it will only work when the proceeding is not turned into an adversarial proceeding in which all kinds of claims of both parents are dealt with.  

Samuel Fulli-Lemaire, professor at the University of Strasbourg, addressed the interesting evolution of reproductive rights and surrogacy. In the case of C. and E. v France, the French Court of Cassation asked the ECtHR for an advisory opinion on the question whether the current state of the case law in France was compatible with the obligations under Article 8 ECHR (the right to respect for private and family life). The status of the French case law was that the genetic parent was fully accepted but the other intended parent was required to adopt the child if he or she wished to establish parentage links. The ECtHR replied that the obligation under Article 8 entailed that there must be a possibility of recognition of the parent-child relationship but that it is up to the States to decide how to do this. Adoption is a sufficient method of recognizing such relationship, provided that it is quick and effective enough. The Court also refers to the possibility of transcription of the birth certificate as an alternative to adoption. However, professor Fulli-Lemaire pointed out that there is a misconception on what transcription means under French law. The mere transcription of the birth certificate does not establish legal parentage in France. The fact that the ECtHR says that an intended parent can adopt or transcribe the birth certificate is therefore tricky because under French law the effects of the two methods are not at all the same.

The very last presentation of the conference was given by Gabriela Lünsmann, attorney-at-law and member of the Executive Board of the Lesbian and Gay Federation in Germany. She spoke about LGBTQI rights as human rights and hereby focused i.a. on transsexuals’ gender identity and the case of X. v North-Macedonia. The question raised in that case is whether the state must provide for a procedure to recognize a different gender. The applicant had tried to change their gender but North-Macedonia did not offer any possibility to undergo an operation or to have medical treatment in that regard. The applicant then went abroad for treatment. Back in North-Macedonia, he had his name changed but it was not possible to change his officially registered gender. The applicant claimed that this amounted to a violation of Article 8 ECHR and specially referred to the obligation of the state to respect a person’s physical and psychological integrity. The Court found that there was indeed a violation. What is as yet unclear, and is thus an interesting point for reflection, is whether states are under an obligation to provide for a procedure for the recognition of a change of gender without the person having had an operation.

The author would like to thank ERA for the excellent organization of the conference and for the interesting range of topics discussed.

Same-sex parentage and surrogacy and their practical implications in Poland

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Written by Anna Wysocka-Bar, Senior Lecturer at Jagiellonian University (Poland)

On 2 December 2019 Supreme Administrative Court of Poland (Naczelny S?d Administracyjny) adopted a resolution of seven judges (signature: II OPS 1/19), in which it stated that it is not possible – due to public policy – to transcribe into the domestic register of civil status a foreign birth certificate indicating two persons of the same sex as parents. The Ombudsman joined arguing that the refusal of transcription infringes the child’s right to nationality and identity, and as a result may lead to infringement of the right to protection of health, the right to education, the right to personal security and the right to free movement and choice of place of residence. Interestingly, the Ombudsman for Children and public prosecutor suggested non-transcription. The background of the case concerns a child whose birth certificate indicated two women of Polish nationality as parents, a biological mother and her partner to a de facto union. Parents applied for such transcription in order to apply subsequently for the issuance of the passport for the child. 

The Supreme Administrative Court stated that in accordance with the law on civil status register, the transcription must be refused if contrary to ordre public in Poland. The public policy clause protects the domestic legal order against its violation. Such violation would result from the “recognition” of a birth certificate irreconcilable with fundamental principles of public policy. It was underlined that in accordance with Article 18 of the Constitution of Poland marriage is understood as a union between a man and a woman; family, motherhood and parenthood are under protection and guardianship of the State. In accordance with those principles and the whole system of family law, only one mother and one father might be treated as parents of a child. Any other category of “parent” is unknown. The Court underlined, at the same time, that transcription of the birth certificate into the domestic register should not be indispensable for a child to obtain a passport, as the child has, by operation of law, already acquired Polish nationality as inherited from the mother. However, in practical terms this would require challenging administrative authorities’ approach (requesting domestic birth certificate) in another court procedure. 

It should be explained here that the resolution was taken on the request of the panel of judges of the Supreme Administrative Court reviewing the cassation appeal brought by the parents, and therefore, in this particular case is binding. In other, similar cases panels of judges should, in general, follow the standpoint presented in such resolution. If the panel of judges is of a different view, it should request another resolution, instead of presenting a view contrary to the previous one. As a result, it might happen that there are two resolutions of seven judges presenting different views. Given the above, it can be said that the question of transcription is not as definitively answered as might seem at first glance. 

A similar justification based on the public policy clause in conjunction with Article 18 of the Constitution has already been presented before in other cases, for example one concerning children born in the US out of surrogacy arrangements with a married woman, whose birth certificates indicated two men as parents, a (biological) father and his partner (identical judgments of 6 May 2015, signature: II OSK 2372/13 and II OSK 2419/13). The implications of these judgments were quite different as the Court refused to confirm that children acquired Polish nationality by birth from their father. In the eyes of the Court and according to fundamental principles of Polish family law, children born out of surrogacy (which is not regulated in Poland) by operation of law have filiation links only with the (biological, surrogate) mother and her husband. The paternity of the biological father (only) might be (at least theoretically) established, once the paternity of the surrogate mother’s husband is successfully disavowed in a court proceeding. 

Here it should be added that opposite views were presented by the Supreme Administrative Court in other judgments. One of the cases concerned transcription of the birth certificate of a child born in India out of surrogacy arrangement. Such birth certificate indicates only the father (in this case a biological father) and do not contain any information about the (surrogate) mother. This was perceived as contrary to public policy by the administrative authorities, which underlined that in the Polish legal order establishing paternity is always dependent on the establishment of maternity. As a result, the lack of information about the mother raises doubts as to paternity of the man indicated on the birth certificate as father. Interestingly, based on the same birth certificate the acquisition of Polish nationality of the child was earlier confirmed by administrative authorities. In its judgment of 29 August 2018 (signature: II OSK 2129/16), Supreme Administrative Court criticized the way the public policy clause was so far understood. The Court (which hears the case after the refusal of administrative authorities of two instances and administrative court of the first instance – just as in all of the mentioned cases) underlined that this clause must be interpreted having regard to a broader context of the legal issue at hand, in particular it should take into account constitutional values (always prevailing best interest of a child) and international standards on protection of children’s rights and human rights. This allows for the transcription of the birth certificate into civil status records in Poland. 

Another interesting case concerned again the question of confirmation that the children acquired Polish nationality by birth after their father (four identical judgments of 30 October 2018, signatures: II OSK 1868/16, II OSK 1869/16, II OSK 1870/16, II OSK 1871/16). Four girls were born in US through surrogacy. The US birth certificates indicated two men as parents, one of them being a Polish national. The Supreme Administrative Court underlined that for the legal status of a child, including the possibility of confirming acquisition of Polish nationality, it should not matter that the child was born to a surrogate mother. What should matter is that a human being with inherent and inalienable dignity was born and this human being has a right to Polish nationality, as long as one of the parents is a Polish national.  

The above mentioned cases, where the Supreme Administrative Court presented a conservative approach and approved the refusal of the confirmation that children born out of surrogacy acquired Polish nationality by birth is now pending before European Court of Human Rights (Schlittner-Hay v. Poland). The applications raise violation by Poland of Article 8 (respect for private and family life) and Article 14 (discrimination on grounds of parents’ sexual orientation) of the European Convention on Human Rights. 

This shows that practical implications for children to same-sex parents and from surrogacy arrangements are of growing interest and importance also in Poland. The approaches of domestic authorities and courts seems to be evolving, but are still quite divergent. The view on the issue from the European Court of Human Rights is awaited.  

Common law recognition of foreign declarations of parentage

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This note addresses the question whether there is a common law basis for the recognition of foreign declarations of parentage. It appears that this issue has not received much attention in common law jurisdictions, but it was the subject of a relatively recent Privy Council decision (C v C [2019] UKPC 40).

The issue arises where a foreign court or judicial authority has previously determined that a person is, or is not, a child’s parent, and the question of parentage then resurfaces in the forum (for example, in the context of parentage proceedings or maintenance proceedings). If there is no basis for recognition of the foreign declaration, the forum court will have to consider the issue de novo (usually by applying the law of the forum: see, eg, Status of Children Act 1969 (NZ)). This would increase the risk of “limping” parent-child relationships (that is, relationships that are recognised in some countries but not in others) – a risk that is especially problematic in the context of children born by way of surrogacy or assisted human reproduction technology.

The following example illustrates the problem. A baby is born in a surrogacy-friendly country to a surrogate mother domiciled and resident in that country, as the result of a surrogacy arrangement entered into with intending parents who are habitually resident in New Zealand. The courts of the foreign country declare that the intending parents are the legal parents of the child. Under New Zealand law, however, the surrogacy arrangement would have no legal effect, and the surrogate mother and her partner would be treated as the child’s legal parents upon the child’s birth. Unless the foreign judgment is capable of recognition in New Zealand, the only way for the intending parents to become the child’s legal parents in New Zealand is to apply for adoption (see, eg, Re Cobain [2015] NZFC 4072, Re Clifford [2016] NZFC 1666, Re Henwood [2015] NZFC 1541, Re Reynard [2014] NZFC 7652, Re Kennedy [2014] NZFLR 367, Re W [2019] NZFC 2482, Re C [2019] NZFC 1629).

So what is the relevance of a foreign declaration on parentage in common law courts? In C v C [2019] UKPC 40, [2019] WLR(D) 622, the Privy Council decided that there was a basis in the common law for recognising such declarations, pursuant to the so-called Travers v Holley principle. This principle, which has traditionally been applied in the context of divorce and adoption, calls for recognition of foreign judgments on the basis of “jurisdictional reciprocity” (at [44]). The Privy Council applied the principle to recognise a declaration of parentage made in Latvia, in relation to a child domiciled and habitually resident in Latvia, for the purposes of maintenance proceedings in the forum court of Jersey. Lord Wilson emphasised that, although foreign judgments may, in some cases, be refused on grounds of public policy, recognition will not be refused lightly: “a court’s recognition of a foreign order under private international law does not depend on any arrogant attempt on that court’s part to mark the foreign court’s homework” (at [58]).

As a matter of policy, my first impression is that the Privy Council’s decision is to be welcomed. Common law jurisdictions have traditionally taken a conservative, relatively “closed” approach to the recognition of foreign laws and judgments on parentage (see Hague Conference on Private International Law A Study of Legal Parentage and the Issues Arising from International Surrogacy Arrangements (Prelim Doc No 3C, 2014)). Such an approach has become increasingly indefensible in a world that is witnessing unprecedented levels of cross-border mobility and migration. The conflict of laws should, as a matter of priority, avoid limping parent-child relationships: for example, a child who was declared by the courts of their place of birth to be the child of the intending parents, but who is nevertheless treated as the surrogate mother’s child under New Zealand law. The ability to recognise foreign judgments on parentage may not amount to much progress, given that it can apply only where the foreign court has, in fact, made a declaration of parentage: it would have no application where the relevant parent-child relationship simply arises by operation of law or through an administrative act (such as entry of the intending parents in the birth register). There is no doubt that an international solution must be found to the problem as a whole. But it is surely better than nothing.

Another question is what to make of the Privy Council’s reliance on the Travers v Holley principle. Based on the decision in Travers v Holley [1953] P 246 (CA), the principle enables recognition of foreign judgments by virtue of reciprocity: the forum court will recognise a foreign judgment if the forum court itself would have had jurisdiction to grant the judgment had the facts been reversed (ie had the forum court been faced with the equivalent situation as the foreign court). In the context of divorce, the principle has since been subsumed within a wider principle of “real and substantial connection” (Indyka v Indyka [1969] 1 AC 33 (HL)). In the context of adoption, the principle has been applied to recognise “the status of adoption duly constituted … in another country in similar circumstances as we claim for ourselves” (Re Valentine’s Settlement [1965] Ch 831 (CA) at 842).

Perhaps it is not a big step from adoption to parentage more generally. The Privy Council recognised that the latter primarily represents “a conclusion of biological fact”, while adoption “stamps a person with a changed legal effect” (at [39]). But the Privy Council did not seem to consider that this distinction should warrant a different approach in principle. In C v C, the issue of parentage involved a relatively straightforward question of paternity. Had the case involved a question of surrogacy or human assisted reproduction, the answer might well have been different. There is an argument that a parent-child relationship created under foreign law can only be recognised in the forum if the foreign law is substantially similar to forum law. Thus, in the context of adoption, it has been asked whether the concept of adoption in the foreign country “substantially conform[s] to the English concept” (Re T & M (Adoption) [2010] EWHC 964, [2011] 1 FLR 1487 at [13]). This requirement might not be made out where, for example, the law of the forum does not recognise parentage by way of surrogacy (as is the case in New Zealand).

The Privy Council cautioned that the Board did not receive full argument on the issue and that the reader “must bear the lack of it in mind” (at [34]). It seems especially important, then, for conflict of laws scholars to give the issue further consideration. This note may serve as a careful first step – I would be interested to hear other views. Perhaps the most encouraging aspect of the Board’s reasoning, in my mind, is its openness to recognition. The Board’s starting point was that the declaration could be recognised. Arguably, this was because counsel seemed to have largely conceded the point. But to the extent that it cuts through an assumption that questions of parentage are generally left to the law of the forum, it nevertheless strikes me as significant – even more so since the UK Supreme Court’s previous refusal to extend the Travers v Holley principle beyond the sphere of family law (Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46, [2012] 3 WLR 1019 at [110], [127]).

Recognition in the UK of a marriage celebrated in Somaliland

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Can a foreign marriage be recognised in the UK if the State where it was celebrated is not recognised as a State? This was the question which the High Court of Justice (Family Division) had to answer in MM v NA: [2020] EWHC 93 (Fam).

The Court distilled two questions: was the marriage validly celebrated and if so, can it be recognised in the UK? If the answers to both questions were affirmative, the court could give a declaratory order; if one of them were negative, the parties could celebrate a new marriage in the UK.

In assessing the first question, the court considered issues of formal and essential validity. It took account of the various systems of law in Somaliland: formal law (including the Somali civil code, which is still in force in Somaliland on the basis of its continuation under the Somaliland constitution), customary law and Islamic law. In matters of marriage, divorce and inheritance, the latter applies. On the basis of the facts, the Court came to the conclusion that the parties were validly married according to the law of Somaliland.

Although this would normaly be the end of the matter, the Court had to consider what to do with a valid marriage emanating from a State not recognised by the UK (the second question). The Court referred to the one-voice principle, implying that the judiciary cannot recognise acts by a State while the executive branch of the UK refuses to recognise the State. It then considered exceptions and referred to cases concerning the post-civil war US, post-World War II Eastern Germany, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Ciskei (one of the ‘States’ created by Apartheid-era South Africa), and Southern Rhodesia.

It also referred to the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971 on the continued presence of South Africa in Namiba, particularly its §125, which states:

“while official acts performed by the Government of South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termination of the Mandate are illegal and invalid, this invalidity cannot be extended to those acts, such as, for instance, the registration of births, deaths and marriages, the effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the inhabitants of the Territory.”

The Court found that an exception to the one-voice doctrine is acceptable in matters of private rights. The Court also explained that it had conferred with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the UK Government, who would not object to the recognition of a Somaliland marriage even though that State is not recognised.

It thus gave the declaration of recognition of the marriage.

(Thanks to Prakash Shah for the tip.)

Brexit & Lugano

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Written by Jonathan Fitchen

The UK’s intention to attempt to accede to the 2007 Lugano Convention is apparently proceeding apace. Though the events leading up to Friday 31st January, when the UK left the EU,  rather overshadowed this fact, the UK Government had already announced that its intention to accede by a posting on 28th January 2020 that may be found here https://www.gov.uk/government/news/support-for-the-uks-intent-to-accede-to-the-lugano-convention-2007   As will be remembered, the 2007 Lugano Convention is open to non-EU third States if the consent of all the existing Convention parties can be first secured. The UK Gov posting records that the UK has secured statements in support of it joining the 2007 Convention from the Swiss, the Norwegians and Iceland. So now all that is required is to secure the consent of the EU to this course of action. Assuming that such consent can be secured, the UK Gov posting records that it is the intention of the UK Government to accede to the 2007 Convention at the end of the transition period (currently scheduled / assumed for 23.00 GMT on 31st December 2020).

Brexit: No need to stop all the clocks.

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Written by Jonathan Fitchen.

‘The time has come’; a common enough phrase which may, depending on the reader’s mood and temperament, be attributed variously to Lewis Carroll’s discursive Walrus, to Richard Wagner’s villainous Klingsor, or to the conclusion of Victor Hugo’s epigrammatic comment      to the effect that nothing is as powerful as an idea whose time has come. In the present context however ‘the time has come’ refers more prosaically to another step in the process described as ‘Brexit’ by which the UK continues to disentangle itself from the EU.

On the 31st of January 2020 at 24.00 CET (23.00 UK time) the UK ceases to be an EU Member State. This event is one that some plan to celebrate and other to mourn. For those interested in private international law and the conflict of laws in the EU or in the legal systems of the UK, celebration is unlikely to seem apt. Whether for the mundane reason that the transition period of the Withdrawal Agreement preserves the practical application and operation of most EU law concerning our subject in the UK and within the EU27 until the projected end point of 31st December 2020, or for deeper reasons connected with the losses to the subject that the EU and the UK must each experience due to the departure of the UK from the EU. If celebration is not appropriate must we therefore opt to mourn? This post suggests that mourning is not the only option (nor if overindulged is it a useful option) and sets out some thoughts on the wider implications for the private international laws of the UK’s legal systems and the legal systems that will comprise the EU27 consequent on the UK’s departure.

This exercise is necessarily speculative and very much a matter of what one wishes to include in or omit from the equation under construction. If too little is included, the result may be of only abstract relevance; if too much is included, the equation may be incapable of solution and hence useless for the intended purpose of calculation. Such difficulties, albeit expressed in a non-mathematical form, are familiar to private international lawyers who while engaging with their subject routinely consider the macroscopic, the microscopic and many points in between. In what remains of this post I will offer some thoughts that hopefully will provoke further thoughts while avoiding useless abstraction and (at least for present purposes) ‘useless’ incalculability.

The loudest calls for the UK to leave the EU did not arise from UK private international law, nor from its practitioners; few UK private international lawyers appear to have wished for Brexit as a means of reforming private international law. Whatever appeals to nostalgia may have swayed opinions in other sectors of the UK and may have induced those within them to vote to leave, they were not expressed with reference to matters of private international law. Few who remember or know the law as it stood in any of the UK’s legal systems prior to the implementation of the UK’s accession to the Brussels Convention of 1968 would willingly journey back to the law as it then stood and regard it as an upgrade. Mercifully, aspects of this view are, at present, apparently shared by the UK Government and account for its wish, after ‘copying and pasting’ most EU law and private international law into the novel domestic category of ‘retained EU Law’, to then amend and allow that which does not depend on reciprocity to be re-presented as a domestic private international law to be applied within and by the UK’s legal systems: thus the Rome I and Rome II Regulations will be eventually so ‘imitated’ within the legal systems of the UK. Unfortunately, many other EU provisions do require reciprocity, and thus cannot be ‘saved’ in this manner; for these provisions the news in the UK is less good.  

There are however other available means of salvage. Because the UK will no longer be an EU Member State at 24.00 Brussels Time it may, but for the Withdrawal Agreement, thereafter participate more fully in proceedings and projects at the Hague Conference on Private International Law. The UK plans to domestically clarify the domestic understanding of certain existing Hague conventions, e.g. 1996 Parental Responsibility Convention, via the recently announced Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill 2019. Earlier in 2018 the UK deposited instruments of accession concerning conventions it plans to ratify at the end of the Withdrawal Agreement’s transition period to attempt to retain prospectively the salvageable aspects of certain reciprocity requiring EU private international law Regulations lost via Brexit: thus, the UK plans to ratify the 2005 Choice of Court Convention and the 2007 Maintenance Convention. After these ratifications it may be that the UK will also consider the ratification of the 2019 judgment enforcement convention, particularly it the EU takes this option too. In the medium and long term however, the UK, assuming it wishes to participate in an active sense, will have to accept the practical limitations of the HCCH as it (the UK) becomes accustomed to the differences, difficulties and frustrations of private international law reform via optional instruments that all the intended parties are entitled to refuse to opt-in to or ratify.

Over the medium term and longer term, it should additionally be noted that though the UK has left the EU it has not cast-off and sailed away from continental Europe at a speed in excess of normal tectonic progress: there may therefore eventually be further developments between the two. It may be that the UK can be induced at some point in the future, when Brexit has become more mundane and less politically volatile within the UK, to cooperate in relation to private international law in a deeper sense with the EU27; whether by negotiating to join the 2007 Lugano Convention or a new convention pertaining to aspects of private international law. If this last idea seems too controversial then maybe it would be possible for the UK to eventually negotiate with an existing EU Member State as a third country via Regulation 664/2009 or Regulation 662/2009 or perhaps via another yet to be produced Regulation with a somewhat analogous effect? Brexit, considered in terms of private international law, may well re-focus a number of existing questions for the EU27 pertaining to the interaction of its private international law with third States, whether former Member States or not.   

What is however unavoidably lost by Brexit is the UK’s direct influence on the development and particularly the periodic recasting of the EU’s private international law: this loss cuts both ways. For the EU27 the UK will no longer be at the negotiating table to offer suggestions, criticisms and improvements to the texts of new and recast Regulations. For the EU27 this loss is somewhat greater than it might appear from the list of Regulations that the UK did not opt-in to as the terms of the UK’s involvement in these matters permitted it to so participate without having opted-in to the draft Regulation.   

The suggested loss of influence will however probably be felt most acutely by the private international lawyers in the UK. Despite the momentary impetus and excitement of salvaging that which may be salvaged and ratifying that which may be ratified to mitigate the effect of Brexit on private international law, the reality is that we in the UK will have lost two of the motive forces that have seen our subject develop and flourish over decades: viz. the European Commission and the domestic political reaction thereunto. Post-Brexit, once the salvaging (etc.) is done, it seems unlikely that the UK Government will continue to regard a private international law now no longer affected by Commission initiatives or re-casting procedures as retaining its former importance or meriting any greater legislative relevance than other areas of potential law reform. The position may be otherwise in Scotland as private international law is a devolved competence that devolution entrusted to the Scottish Government. It may be that once the dust has settled and the returning UK competence related reforms have been applied that the comparatively EU-friendly Scottish Government may seek to domestically align aspects of Scots private international law with EU law equivalents. For he who would mourn for the effect of Brexit on the subject of private international law, it is the abovementioned loss of influence of the subject at both the EU level and particularly at the domestic level that most merits a brief period of mourning. After this, the natural but presently unanswerable question of, ‘What now?’ occurs. Though speculation is offered above, all in the short term will depend on the progress in negotiations over an unfortunately already shortened but technically still extendable transition period during which the EU and UK are to attempt to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement: thereafter for the medium term and long term all depends on the future political relationship of the EU and the UK.