Fourth Issue of 2007’s Revue Critique de Droit International Privé

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The last issue of Revue Critique de Droit International Privé for 2007 was just released. It contains two articles dealing with conflict issues.
Fourth issue for 2007

The first is authored by Fabien Marchadier who lectures at the Law Faculty of Limoges University. It discusses the Contribution of the European Court of Human Rights to the Efficacy of the Hague Conventions on Judicial and Administrative Cooperation (La contribution de la CEDH à l’efficacité des conventions de La Haye de coopération judiciaire et administrative). The English abstract reads:

The first encounters between the Hague Conventions and European human rights law have revealed in particular that there is an issue of compatibility of transnational cooperation with the ECHR. While the Hague Conventions aim to implement various rights and freedoms of which the Court of Strasbourg is the guardian, they are exposed at the same time to requirement of conformity, thereby providing the Court with the opportunity of ensuring the respect by national public authorities both of their reciprocal obligations to cooperate and of individual fundamental rights. Thus, the Court participates in the efficiency and effectiveness of the Hague Conventions by exercising an international control, otherwise lacking, over the compulsory nature of the cooperation and its effective implementation.

The second article is authored by Maria Lopez de Tejada (Paris II University) and Louis D’Avout (Lyon III University). It is a study of Regulation 1896/2006 creating a European order for payment procedure (Les non-dits de la procédure européenne d’injonction de payer). Here is the English abstract:

After evoking successively the genesis of the Regulation which introduces into the Common judicial area an injunction to pay, the needs which this procedure is intended to cover and the means it has chosen to attain procedural uniformity, the study of this novelty, on the one hand, highlights the inadequate content of the new instrument, which rests on rules which are both incomplete and insufficiently attentive to the protection of the addressee of the injunction as far as notification and jurisdiction ar concerned, and on the other hand, detects a number of deficiencies affecting the use of this procedure, linked to the defective definition of its scope or a short-sighted view of its practical follow-up.

Nova Scotia Court of Appeal on Substance-Procedure Distinction

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In Vogler v. Szendroi (available here) the plaintiff, resident in Nova Scotia, was injured in a car accident in Wyoming.  Three years later he issued legal process in Nova Scotia.  This was inside the four-year Wyoming limitation period, which applied as part of the substantive law applicable to the claim (under the place of the tort rule in Tolofson v. Jensen).  However, he did not serve the defendant for another three years. 

Under Wyoming law, an action is commenced by filing process with the court (the same is true in Nova Scotia), but if service is not made within 60 days of filing, the action is not considered to have been commenced until the date of service (Nova Scotia has no similar provision). 

The issue therefore was whether the specific rule of Wyoming law focusing on the date of service was substantive, and so applied in the Nova Scotia litigation, or procedural, and so did not apply.  The lower court held that the rule was “integral” to the Wyoming limitations rule and was therefore substantive.  But the Court of Appeal reversed and characterized it as procedural.

The court’s analysis is quite lengthy – longer than necessary for this issue.  But it does contain some useful comments about the substance-procedure distinction (at paras. 17-22 and 26).  It also relies on a useful academic source on this specific issue by Professor Janet Walker (at paras. 37-39).  Ultimately the court concludes the Wyoming rule is not bound up in its limitations rule, and is rather a separate procedural rule.

International Reach of French Attachments

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Can attachments reach foreign bank accounts? For the French, the answer had always been clearly negative, until the French supreme court for private matters (Cour de cassation) held in a judgment of 14 February 2008 that a French attachment could reach a bank account in Monte Carlo.

Out of reach?

In this case, a creditor had carried out an attachment on the bank account of its debtor, Société Exsymol. The account had been opened at the Monte Carlo branch of French bank BNP Paribas, but the creditor chose to carry out the attachment in Paris. The issue arose as to whether the attachment had reached the Monte Carlo account. The Cour de cassation held that it had.

French saisies attribution

The attachment was a saisie attribution. It is only available to creditors who have enforcement titles such as judgments or arbitral awards declared enforceable. Such attachments purport to transfer the property of the monies from the debtor to the creditor. They thus clearly belong to the enforcement of decisions. They are no freezing orders.

It should also be underlined that they are available to judgment creditors without any judicial intervention or even leave. Any French judgment creditor may directly hire an enforcement officer (huissier de justice) who will carry out the attachment on his behalf.

Give me this money, please.

Scope of the rule

The Court insisted that the French saisie had reached the foreign account because it was held by a branch of the bank. It is ruled that the rationale of the solution is that saisies reach all assets owned by the corporate entity, irrespective of their location. It seems clear thus, that they would not reach assets held by a foreign subsidiary of the bank. But it also seems to follow that whether the bank had its headquarters in France is irrelevant.

Was European law relevant?

The judgment does not mention the Brussels I Regulation. Was it indeed irrelevant? I think so. I would argue that the regulation governs the jurisdiction of courts, not the power (jurisdiction?) of other state bodies such as enforcement officers to act internationally.

Additionally, Monte Carlo does not belong to the European Union. In enforcement matters, wouldn’t the regulation apply only to the enforcement on the territories of member states? Would the enforcement here be the action of the French huissier in Paris or the transfer of ownership of the assets, thus taking place outside of the EU?

Is enforcement strictly territorial?

BNP Paribas is The bank for a Changing World. Changing it is indeed! In French legal circles, enforcement had always been regarded as strictly territorial. It was argued that it would be an infringment of the sovereignty of the foreign state to carry out enforcement on assets situated on its territory. It seems that the Cour de cassation is not convinced anymore.

All comments welcome! I would also love to hear from similar experiences in other jurisdictions.