Arbitration in Smart Contracts – Code Naïve v Code-Savvy

Written by Hetal Doshi & Sankalp Udgata

Combining law, computer science and finance in unprecedented ways, “Smart Contract” is the latest addition to the unending list of Internet of Things. Unlike a traditional contract, which only lays out the terms of agreement for subsequent execution, a smart contract autonomously executes some or all of the terms of the agreement as it are usually based on Block-chain. It has the potential to reshape our understanding of contract and technology law. The shift from the code naïve to the code-savvy, has surfaced problems in dispute resolution beyond the existing legal perception which this article aims at analysing and resolving.

Working of the Smart Contract

By removing the need for direct human involvement, a smart contract is deployed on to a distributed Trustless Public Ledger. However, in order for the smart contract to work efficiently, exactly specified conditions for the execution of the contract are necessary, otherwise, it will be impossible to automate the process. Also, smart contracts receive information from outside block-chain platform through the use of Oracle programs that mediate with external databases and are entered into the block-chain technology.

A Hornet’s Nest

Smart contract come with their own sets of limitation and drawbacks. Following are few of the many problems, inevitable in resolving disputes over smart contracts. Interestingly however, although these problems may be encountered by an Arbitral Tribunal, arbitration (with requisite checks) is the most efficient mechanism to deal with such problems.

Enforceability Quandary

  1. A) Formal Enforcement

A very fundamental and critical impediment, Courts and Tribunals are consistently skeptical in enforcing such unconventional contracts. Although the use of automated communication or system to conclude contracts or make it binding on the parties has been long accepted by the business community, a Tribunal is often troubled with disparity in validity of smart contracts over conflicting jurisdictions.

Secondly, Article 2.1.1 of UNIDROIT (PICC) undoubtedly includes automated contracting. However, problems may arise in relation to codes meeting the in writing requirement of UNCITRAL and the New York Convention.

  1. B) Substantive Enforcement

The artificial nature of contracting deprives actions of the human touch. Complexities arise when there a subsequent smart contracts. For example, if there is a supplementary smart contract, consent for which is sought from the parent contract. Since it is the codes in the parent smart contract that initiate the subsequent contracts and transactions and the performance, can consent be said to have been given by a mere code and is such consent valid and enforceable against such code.

A Hitch in the Seat

Given the distributed nature of block-chain i.e. a ledger which is spread across the network among all peers in the network and the operation of Smart Contracts, it is important to agree a seat for the arbitration to avoid satellite disputes about the applicable seat and/or procedural law.

Problems in Execution- Irreversibility and Irremediability

Since they are theorized to be complete contract by focusing on ex ante rather than ex post, they eliminate the act of remediation, by admitting no possibility of breach. However, the DAO case was incomplete as it failed to anticipate the possibility that coding errors could result in unexpected wealth transfers. In addition, smart contract may deal with commercial scenarios so complex and unpredictable that the code will fail to embed all possible answers to all possible questions.

Further, if the smart contract contains a mistake, security flaw, or does not accurately capture the parties’ intent, the smart contracts will be difficult to modify or change, due to a block-chain’s resilient and tamper resistant nature. The program will continue to blindly execute its code, regardless of the intent of the parties or changed circumstances. When the transaction is more complex, involving multiple players (humans or machines), multi-component assets and diverse jurisdictions, computer code smartness may easily turn into plain dumbness.

Needless to mention, a Tribunal or a Court will encounter several problems in executing a decision vis-à-vis a smart contract such as:

  1. Lack of in-rem jurisdiction- Reversing a transaction on a decentralised ledger with several contributors that may not even be parties before the Tribunal.
  2. Excusing future performance or specific performance- Since they operate automatically and are not flexible.

The Truth about Consent

Contracting also has issues such as duress, fraud, forgery, lack of legal capacity and unconscionability which require human judgement and cannot be scrutinised by a smart contract which simply functions on a series of binary inputs. Moreover, though it provides guarantee of execution to certain extent, it cannot verify whether the contracting parties have the legal capacity to get into legal relationships or business capacity to make an agreement.

It also does not care whether there truly exists consensus as idem between contractual parties, there is no possibility for the contract to be void or voidable. However, although codes are not natural language that might be vague or ambiguous, leaving space for interpretation. For a consensual dispute resolution mechanism like arbitration, the indispensable requirement of free consent and the evaluation of intention of parties cannot be comprehended by a smart contract that stands deprived of reason and morale.

This may be an issue in circumstances where the Smart Contract is entered into by a computer, is in code and/or and does not create legally binding contractual obligations under the applicable law. The solution to this can be that the Arbitration clause can become part of the Ricardian contract which like any other similar contract is a hybrid form of smart contract which is partly in human readable form.

The Catch in Imputing Liability in a Dispute

The code smart is sadly not insusceptible to security vulnerabilities and exploits like forking, which could cause a smart contract to operate unexpectedly and invalidate transactions, or worse, enable a third-party to siphon digital currency or other assets from contracting parties accounts. Scary, isn’t it?

However, since a Tribunal is only an in personam jurisdiction, it can barely inspect or issue directions against such third parties. Such vulnerabilities might also jeopardise the secrecy that arbitration aims to achieve.

It is not unjust to say that such a contract is dangerous enough to attract strict liability in case of any harm caused due to an error in coding. That, juxtaposed with the existence of foreseeable risk in execution of smart contracts poses a potentially huge hurdle to the exponentially growing use of block-chain technology.

Furthermore, disputes, to summarize, may arise:

  1. between the parties of a smart contract, or
  2. between two conflicting smart contracts.

Since the code smart is a form of artificial intelligence replacing human involvement, it is the second set of disputes where a Tribunal or Court will be troubled with the attachment of liability.

Cutting the Gordian knot – checks and suggestions

Given our shift from not so smart contracts, we must keep an eye for the following checklist while dealing with dispute resolution in smart contracts.

Formality requirements

Parties should therefore ensure the arbitration agreement meets any formality requirements under the governing law of the arbitration agreement and Smart Contract, the law of the seat and wherever the award is likely to be enforced.

Choice of seat

Parties should base check whether in their chosen seat,

  1. Domestic law does not render a Smart Contract illegal or unenforceable
  2. The disputes likely to arise are arbitrable
  3. The codified arbitration agreement in question will be upheld and enforced by the supervisory courts.

Tribunal with specialist technical knowledge

Some Smart Contract disputes will be fairly vanilla contract law disputes, but others will be of a highly technical nature, for example, where the code does not operate as expected. Pursuant to the novel nature of the smart contract the importance of having a tribunal familiar with the technology against the importance of having the dispute decided by experienced arbitrators becomes crucial.

Severable arbitration clause

Although the doctrine of separability protects the validity of an arbitration clause, the dispute resolution clause should always be kept independent of any smart codes.

Localised Termination Clause

Given the automated and perpetual nature of smart contracts, there should be an option to terminate the contract. Although non-amenability is an essential feature of a smart contract, the option to cede away from the distributed ledger (terminate the contract) should be sole switch available the each of the contributors. The code may prescribe conditions for pulling the plug, i.e. create joint switches. Therefore, a party shall not be able to terminate its obligations without assent from any of its debtor on the ledger. As a result, once the debt is settled either by payment of dues or by an award of a Tribunal, the parties may pull the plug.

Power of Pardon

Each party to a smart contract should be at liberty to excuse payment by a debtor in under a direction by a tribunal or a Court in case of a force majeure or any other scenario where performance is liable to be excused.

This list, although non-exhaustive, will certainly sustain best practices in arbitration until the next great invention in the sphere of technology and business will live to fight another day.

 

 




Three Tickets, One Seat – A Methodological Anatomy Of The Indian Practice Of Determination Of Seat Of Arbitration

Written by Sankalp Udgata & Hetal Doshi, National Law University (NUSRL), Ranchi

The choice of arbitration as the default system of resolution of commercial disputes, which was initially restricted to the foreign parties is now being reciprocated by even the Indian parties, thus setting the stage for India being a global hub for commercial arbitration. Surprising as it is, commercial agreements worth billions have but a succinct recording of a seat of arbitration. Sloppy as they are, these poorly drafted dispute resolution clauses open the doors to a tsunami of litigation which simply intervene and delay the entire resolution process thereby defeating the very virtue arbitrations proclaim to instil.

Since arbitrations are out-of-court proceedings, they do not by themselves command the authority of the sovereign. Therefore, every arbitration must be guided and overseen by a Court that has supervisory jurisdiction over it. This Court is the Juridical Seat of the arbitration as determined by the parties and the most important concept that the territorial situs of the Seat denotes. In absence of a positive determination by the parties in the arbitration agreement, the Tribunal or a Court whose supervisory jurisdiction is sought must first determine the Seat and consequently whether it has the jurisdiction, as the Juridical Seat, to hear the matter.

However, arbitration in India has been a Hornet’s nest if not a Pandora’s box to say the least. Admittedly, the vast majority of problems associated with international commercial arbitrations taking place in India revolve around the uncertainty in the Courts’ approach to determination of the seat when the parties have failed to choose one. The Indian Courts, much rather the Supreme Court of India (“SCI”) has shown a consistent disparity in applying any particular method for determination of the Seat in such situations. This article aims to reconcile the various tests that the Supreme Court of India has applied over the years and attempts to plot their reasoning into three distinct methods for determination of a seat when the arbitration agreement fails to explicitly document one. This article also discusses the various factors relevant in each method with examples and can therefore serve as a catalogue for practitioners as well as valuable literature to the academia.

I. Seat <=> Venue Method

Representing the most widely accepted view, this method is applicable when parties have at least chosen a particular geographic location as the venue for the arbitration to take place without specifically designating a Seat. Finally, setting the clock straight and reconciling to the globally accepted rules, the SCI in Soma JV case held that the venue of arbitration shall be the default Seat in absence of any contrary indica. (¶63)

For it to be the default Seat, the venue must exist in absence of any of the following factors that, over the years, the Court has found to be contrary indications to venue being the Seat.

  • Designation of an alternate place as Seat

When there is an express designation of the arbitration venue, combined with a supranational body of rules governing the arbitration the venue shall be the seat unless the parties have designated any alternative place as the seat. (Shashoua, ¶34,42)

  • Existence of a national set of lex arbitri or proper law

Despite having designated London as the venue of arbitration, the SCI held Bombay to be the Seat in the 2014 Enercon Case. In making this determination, the Court was heavily swayed by the fact that the laws specifically chosen by the parties in the contract to apply to different aspects of the dispute were Indian laws.

  • Existence of an alternate place of making of award

Since it is necessary for the arbitral award to be made and signed at the place of arbitration as determined by Section 20 of the 1996 Arbitration Act (“Act”), an award made at one of the two designated venues resulted in the venue where the award was not signed was not the Seat in the Soma JV case.

  • Venue of an arbitration proceeding

The Court has on several occasions differentiated between the venue of arbitration proceedings from the venue of an arbitration proceeding for the later cannot be construed as anything but a convenient location for the conduction of a meeting. (2012 Enercon case)

II. Inverse Closest & Most Real Connection Method (“Inverse-CMRC”)

The globally acclaimed CMRC test is used to determine either lex arbitri or the proper law governing the arbitration agreement when the place of arbitration has been decided as the same would be the law most closely connected to the choice of place. While the English Courts in Peruvian Insurance Case applied the law of the place of arbitration as the lex arbitri, in the Sulamerica Case, applied it to the proper law governing the arbitration agreement as they had the most real connection to the place chosen by the parties. India has also used the test in a peculiar way to apply the lex arbitri to the whole of the agreement. This proximity is essentially based on the legal localisation of the place.

However, India has been applying the above test somewhat inversely based on the geographic localisation of the law instead. Bemusing everyone, the SCI in Enercon Case applied the Inverse CMRC Method to determine the Seat to be India as it was most closely and intimately connected to the lex arbitri and the proper law of the contract, both of which were Indian. The Indian model seems to presume that the parties could not have contemplated a delocalised lex arbitri or proper law. Be that as it may, where a supranational set lex arbitri or proper law exists, the first method will prevail as these laws will not be sufficient contrary indications.

III.  Cause of Action Method

This is an unsuitable method of determination of seat. In this case, if the arbitration agreement does not reveal a Seat then the Courts of the place where the cause of action arose will be considered as the Juridical Seat of the arbitration. This is derived from the definition of ‘Court’ under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act which also includes the Court that would have jurisdiction over the question if it formed the subject matter of a suit.

Understanding this to mean that the legislature has intended to give jurisdiction to both the Court of arbitration and the Court having territorial jurisdiction over the place where the cause of action arose, concurrently, the SCI has caused tremendous controversy by in Paragraph 96 of BALCO judgment. However, when read wholly and not in isolation, BALCO judgment very distinctly states that if concurrent jurisdiction were to be the order of the day, despite the seat having been located and specifically chosen by the parties, party autonomy would suffer and therefore Courts were intended to exercise supervisory jurisdiction to the exclusion of other Courts as provided under Section 42. (Soma JV case, ¶51)

Therefore, since the application referred to under Section 42 can only be legitimately made to the Court of the Seat, this method is only useful where seat could not be determined by any of the above methods maybe owing to lack of any territorial nexus.

Conclusion

The contradictory judgments of the English and Indian Courts over the determination of Seat in the Enercon case caused a delay of two years and has painted a Medusa of how the incongruous views of Courts across jurisdictions terrorise the development of international commercial arbitration. Therefore, arbitrations anchored in India or involving Indian parties must be planned in a manner eliding with the recent set of “pro-arbitration” trends in determination of Seat.

Although there is no specific order of precedence for application of these methods, their very nature and the manner of their application till date suggest that the Seat-Venue method takes precedence over the other two owing to its strong territorial nexus. Ideally thus, upon failure of this method owing to the presence of a sufficient contrary indica, should the Inverse-CMRC method be applied followed by the Cause of Action method as the last resort in this three-fold method for determination of Seat.




Nottingham Arbitration Talk on Wednesday 18 March 2020

News item by Dr Orsolya Toth, Assistant Professor in Commercial Law, University of Nottingham

The University of Nottingham Commercial Law Centre will hold its inaugural Nottingham Arbitration Talk on Wednesday 18 March at 2 pm.  The Centre is delighted to welcome distinguished speakers to the event drawn from both academia and practice.  The Keynote address will be given by Professor Sir Roy Goode, Emeritus Professor of Law at the University of Oxford.  The speaker panel will host Angeline Welsh (Essex Court Chambers), Timothy Foden (Lalive) and Dr Martins Paparinskis (University College London).  

The theme of the
event will be ‘Procedure and Substance in Commercial and Investment Treaty
Arbitration’.  It will address current
and timeless issues, such as the influence of procedure on the parties’
substantive rights, the recent phenomenon of ‘due process paranoia’ in
arbitration and the current state of the system of investment treaty
arbitration.

 For
detailed programme and registration please visit https://unclcpresents.eventbrite.co.uk




Milan Investment Arbitration Pre-Moot – 14-15 February 2020

Following an earlier post, here’s a reminder of the First Edition of the Milan Investment Arbitration Pre-Moot.

Albert Henke prepared for this reason the following announcement:

On February, 14 and 15, 2020 will take place in Milan the First Edition of the Milan Investment Arbitration Pre-Moot, an event jointly organized by the Law Firm DLA Piper, Milan, Università degli Studi of Milan and the European Court of Arbitration (Italian section). The Pre-Moot will be a chance for ten University teams from all around the world to test their advocacy skills in moot arbitration hearings, in preparation for the Frankfurt International Arbitration Moot Competition, the oldest and most prestigious student competition in the area of investment protection law, scheduled for the beginning of March 2020 in Frankfurt (https://www.investmentmoot.org/news-2-2/). The Pre-Moot will be introduced by a Conference hosted by Università degli Studi on the topic: “Outstanding issues and recent developments in international investment arbitration”. All the information in the attached flyer




Investment Arbitration in Central and Eastern Europe

A collection of essays titled Investment Arbitration in Central and Eastern Europe, edited by Csongor istván Nagy (University of Szeged, Hungary), has recently been published by Edward Elgar. See here for more information on the book, its contents and contributors.

As noted in the publisher’s blurb, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) appears to be the testing ground for investment arbitration in Europe: the majority of the cases against EU Member States are proceedings launched against countries from the region. Despite their relevance, CEE experiences have not been analysed in a comprehensive manner. The book aims to fill this gap.

The introductory chapter, written by the editor, is titled Intra-EU BITs after Achmea: A Cross-Cutting Issue and can me downloaded via SSRN.




First Edition of the Milan Investment Arbitration Pre-Moot, February 14-15, 2020

The First Edition of the Milan Investment Arbitration Pre-Moot  will take place in Milan on February 14-15, 2020, within the frame of the Frankfurt Investment Arbitration Moot Court (FIAC).

For more information, click here.




The Hague Academy of International Law Centre for studies and research 2020 programme “Applicable law issues in international arbitration”

Prof. Jean-Marc Thouvenin, Secretary-General of The Hague Academy of International Law, kindly informs us about the Academy’s Centre for studies and research 2020 programme – highly recommended!

The Centre for studies and research of The Hague Academy of International Law welcomes applications for its 2020 programme on “Applicable law issues in international arbitration”.

International arbitration has long been the most successful method for settling all kind of international commercial disputes, and still is – notwithstanding the surrounding criticism – the leading method for settling disputes between foreign investors and the host state. One of the characteristics of international arbitration is that it to a large extent relies on an international or transnational legal framework. The effects of arbitration agreements and of arbitral awards, as well as the role of the courts regarding arbitration agreements and awards, are regulated in international conventions such as the New York or the ICSID Conventions. Furthermore, although there is room for specificities of national law, commercial arbitration acts are largely harmonised especially through the impact of the UNCITRAL Model Law. Similarly, even if arbitral institutions try to distinguish one from each other by providing for some specific tools, the essential content of arbitration rules does not vary. It can be said, consequently, that the transnational framework of arbitration is intended to create to the extent possible an autonomous system of dispute resolution, which can be applied in a uniform way irrespective of the country in which the proceedings take place or the award is sought enforced. The procedural autonomy of arbitration may also have an impact on how arbitral tribunals relate to the substance of the dispute.

As arbitral awards are final and binding, and domestic courts and ICSID annulment committees do not have the power to review them in the merits, arbitral tribunals enjoy a considerable flexibility in selecting and applying the rules of law applicable to the dispute, even though they are constrained to respect the will of the parties. Legal literature has strongly emphasized that this flexibility creates an expectation of delocalization: both from the procedural and from the substantive point of view, arbitration is described as a method for settling disputes that strives for uniformity on a transnational level and should not be subject to national laws. The autonomy and flexibility of arbitration, however, are not absolute. The international instruments that regulate arbitration either make, in some contexts, reference to national law or call for the application of (general or concrete) international law. Also, they do not cover all aspects of arbitration, thus leaving room for national regulation. Additionally, the restricted role that courts and ICSID ad hoc committees have in arbitration does not completely exclude that national law may have an impact. While court and committee control is not a review in the merits, application of the parameters for validity or enforceability of an award, even where these parameters are harmonised, may depend on national regulation.

Importantly, the definition of what disputes are arbitrable is left to national law. While the scope of arbitrability has been significantly expanded starting from the last two decades of the last century, there are signs now that it may be restricting. The scope of arbitrability may be looked upon as a measure of the trust that the legal system has in arbitration. From another perspective, it may represent the way in which States approach the settlement of international commercial disputes: intending to keep an exclusive power by means of the exclusion of private deciders, or adopting the role of controllers of the regularity of arbitration. As far as investment arbitration is specifically concerned, it is well known that States’ attitudes are diverse and may change from time to time. In both cases, States’ policy choices may have an impact on applicable law issues.

All the foregoing considerations, succinctly exposed, are the frame for the present topic. On such a basis, it is possible to develop two lists of issues to be individually addressed. The first list deals with the fundamental aspects of the topic. Among the issues included therein, some refer to all types of arbitration, while others are rather specific to either commercial or investment arbitration. The second list responds to the fact that the applicable law is not necessarily unitary. Indeed, according to the principle of severability, a different law may apply to the procedural aspects and to the substantive aspects of the dispute, and within these two categories there are further possibilities for severing the applicable law. Thus, one can wonder to which issues is it appropriate to apply international sources of law, to which issues is it appropriate to apply soft sources of law, to which is it appropriate to apply national sources of law, and to which issues is it appropriate to apply (or to create) transnational standards. Or a combination of these sources? On which basis may this selection be made, and what are its effects on the autonomy of arbitration, on the expectations of the parties and on the credibility and legitimacy of arbitration as an out-of-court judicial system that enjoys enforceability?

The general and specific above-mentioned questions may be discussed for each of the following issues:

I. General issues

  1. Available rules of law regarding substantive issues – The strength of soft sources
  2. Available rules of law regarding procedural issues – The scope and applicability of the lex arbitri
  3. Selection of the applicable law by the parties (???)
  4. How do arbitrators ascertain the rules of law applicable to the merits?
  5. Overriding mandatory rules of a law not chosen by the parties
  6. How do arbitrators interpret international contracts?
  7. How do arbitrators interpret international treaties?
  8. Effects of precedents in arbitration
  9. Iura novit arbiter
  10. Control by domestic courts of the law applied to the merits
  11. Control by means of procedural public policy
  12. Misapplication of the law as manifest excess of powers of the tribunal under ICSID Convention

II. Specific cases of determination of the applicable law

  1. Validity of the arbitration agreement and effects on non-signatories
  2. Assignment of contract containing an arbitration clause
  3. Qualification of the arbitrators
  4. Production and admissibility of evidence
  5. Legal privilege
  6. Emergency arbitrator: procedural and substantive issues
  7. Interim measures
  8. Legal capacity to sign the disputed contract
  9. Interests on the awarded amounts
  10. Arbitrability
  11. Res iudicata
  12. Liability of arbitrators

The co-directors of the 2020 Centre (Prof. Giuditta Cordero-Moss (University of Oslo) & Prof. Diego Fernández Arroyo (Sciences Po, Paris)) invite applications from researchers including students in the final phase of their doctoral studies, holders of advanced degrees in law, political science, or other related disciplines, early-stage professors and legal practitioners. Applicants should identify the specific topic on which they intend to write. Participants will be selected during the spring of 2020, and will convene at The Hague from August 17 to September 4, 2020, to finalize their papers. The best articles will be included in a book to be published in the fall of 2021.

Further information is available here.




Arbitration and Protest in Hong Kong

Authors: Jie (Jeanne) Huang and Winston Ma

Following the promulgation of the judicial interpretation by the Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”) on 26 September 2019, Arrangement Concerning Mutual Assistance in Court-ordered Interim Measures in Aid of Arbitral Proceedings by the Courts of the Mainland and of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (“Arrangement”) signed by Mainland China and Hong Kong on 2 April 2019 came into effect in Mainland China from 1 October 2019. This Arrangement provides mutual recognition and enforcement of interim measures between Hong Kong and Mainland China. It has generated broad coverage.[1] This post tries to add to the discussion by providing the first case decided under the Arrangement on 8 October 2019, and more broadly, the reflections on the continuing protests in Hong Kong and arbitration under “One Country, Two Systems’.

  1. Mutual recognition and enforcement of interim measures between Hong Kong and Mainland China

Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance has long been allowing parties to arbitral proceedings in any place to apply to the courts of Hong Kong for interim measures. Interim measures include injunction and other measures for the purpose of maintaining or restoring the status quo pending determination of the dispute; taking action that would prevent, or refraining from taking action that is likely to cause, current or imminent harm or prejudice to the arbitral proceedings; preserving assets; or preserving evidence that may be relevant and material to the resolution of the dispute. However, in contrast to the liberal Hong Kong counterpart, people’s courts in Mainland China are conservative. Chinese law limits interim measures to property preservation, evidence preservation and conduct preservation. More important, Mainland courts generally only enforce interim measures in support of arbitration administered by domestic or foreign-related arbitration institutions of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This is because Article 272 of Chinese Civil Procedure Law provides that where a party applies for a preservation measure, the foreign-related arbitral institution of PRC shall submit the party’s application to the intermediate people’s court at the place of domicile of the respondent or at the place where the respondent’s property is located. Article 28 of Chinese Arbitration Law states that if one of the parties applies for property preservation, the arbitration commission shall submit to a people’s court the application of the party in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Law. Article 10 of Chinese Arbitration Law restricts arbitration institutions to those registered with the judicial administrative department of the relevant province, autonomous region or municipalities directly under the Central Government.[2]

There are few exceptions to the Mainland conservative approach. First, since 2017, ad hoc arbitration has been permitted in China’s pilot free trade zones.[3] Therefore, Mainland courts are likely to issue interim measures in support of such ad hoc arbitration. Second, a party to a maritime arbitration seated outside of Mainland China can apply for property preservation to the Chinese maritime court of the place where the property is located.[4] However, the property to be preserved was limited to vessels, cargos carried by a vessel, and fuel and supplies of a vessel.[5]

The third exception is created by the recent Arrangement. Arbitral proceedings commenced both before and after 1 October 2019 are potentially caught by the Arrangement, under which property, evidence and conduct preservation orders could be granted by the courts in Mainland China to assist the Hong Kong arbitration.

The scope of the Arrangement confines to arbitral proceedings seated in Hong Kong and administered by institutions or permanent offices meeting the criteria under Article 2 of the Arrangement. Six qualified institutions have been listed on 26 September 2019, being Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (“HKIAC”), ICC Hong Kong, CIETAC Hong Kong, Hong Kong Maritime Arbitration Group, eBRAM International Online Dispute Resolution Centre and South China International Arbitration Centre (Hong Kong). Future applications will also be considered and the list may be subject to alteration.

Articles 3-5 of the Arrangement set out the procedural requirements for applying to the courts in Mainland China for interim measures. Since time is of essence, application can be made by a party to the arbitration directly to the relevant Mainland Chinese court before an arbitration is accepted by an arbitration institution.[6] If the arbitration has been accepted, the application should be submitted by the arbitration institution or representative office.[7]

Article 8 of the Arrangement further reflects the importance of timeliness by demanding the requested court to make a decision after examining the application “expeditiously”. Nevertheless, the Arrangement is silent on the specific time limit applicable to the court’s examination process. Pursuant to Article 93 of the Chinese Civil Procedure Law, the court is to make an order within 48 hours after receiving an application for property preservation prior to the commencement of arbitration; Furthermore, Article 4 of the Provisions of the SPC on Several Issues concerning the Handling of Property Preservation Cases by the People’s Courts demands the court to make an order within 5 days after the security is provided, and within 48 hours in cases of emergency.

The first case decided under the Arrangement demonstrates how “expeditiously” a people’s court can make a decision. In the morning of 8 October 2019, the Shanghai Maritime Court received a property preservation application submitted by HKIAC. In this case, the arbitration applicant is a maritime company located in Hong Kong and the respondent is a company in Shanghai. They concluded a voyage charter party which stated that the applicant should provide a vessel to transport coal owned by the respondent from Indonesia to Shanghai. However, the respondent rescinded the charter party and the applicant claimed damages. Based on the charter party, they started an ad hoc arbitration and ultimately settled the case. According to the settlement agreement, the respondent should pay the applicant USD 180,000. However, the respondent did not make the payment as promised. Consequently, the respondent brought an arbitration at the HKIAC according to the arbitration clause in the settlement agreement. Invoking the Arrangement, through the HKIAC, the applicant applied to the Shanghai Maritime People’s Court to seize and freeze the respondent’s bank account and other assets. The Shanghai Court formed a collegial bench and issued the property preservation measure on the same date according to the Arrangement and Chinese Civil Procedure Law.

 

  1. Protests in Hong Kong

 

As the first and so far the only jurisdiction with the special Arrangement through which parties to arbitration can directly apply to Mainland Chinese courts for interim measures, Hong Kong has been conferred an irreplaceable advantage while jockeying to be the most preferred arbitration seat for cases related to Chinese parties. Arbitration that is ad hoc or seated outside Hong Kong cannot enjoy the benefits of the Arrangement. Parties to an arbitration seated in Hong Kong are encouraged to select one of the listed institutions to take advantage of the Arrangement. Meanwhile, the Arrangement also attracts prominent international arbitration institutions to establish permanent offices in Hong Kong.

One may argue that the Arrangement is the necessary consequence of the “One Country, Two Systems” principle and the increasingly close judicial assistance between Mainland China and Hong Kong. Especially in the context of China’s national strategy to develop the Greater Bay Area, the notion of “one country, two systems, three jurisdictions” makes Hong Kong the only common-law jurisdiction to deal with China-related disputes.[8]

However, to what extent may the recent protests negatively impact on the arbitration industry in Hong Kong? Notably, London and Paris have also experienced legal uncertainly (Brexit in the UK) and protests (Yellow vests movement in France) in recent years. Nevertheless, the Hong Kong situation is more severe than its western counterparts in two aspects. First, currently, the protestors have impacted on the traffic inside Hong Kong. Last month, they even blocked the Hong Kong airport. It is not surprising that parties may want to move the hearings outside of Hong Kong just for the convenience of traffic, if the arbitration is still seated in Hong Kong. Second, the continuation of protests and the uncertainty of the Chinese government’s counter-measures may threaten parties’ confidence in choosing Hong Kong as the seat for arbitration. The Arrangement brings an irreplaceable advantage to Hong Kong to arbitrate cases related with Chinese parties. However, this significance should not be over-assessed. This is because by choosing a broad discovery and evidence rule, parties and tribunals have various means to deal with the situation where a party wants to hide a key evidence. Arbitration awards can be recognized and enforced in all jurisdictions ratified the New York Convention. Therefore, the value of the Arrangement is mainly for cases where the losing party only has assets in Mainland China for enforcement.

The flourish of arbitration in Hong Kong is closely related to Mainland China. However, Hong Kong, if losing its social stability due to the protests, will lose its arbitration business gradually. In the Chinese Records of the Grand Historian (Shiji by Han dynasty official Sima Qian), there is a famous idiom called “cheng ye xiao he bai ye xiao he”.[9] It means the key to one’s success is also one’s undoing. It is the hope that Mainland China and Hong Kong can find a solution quickly so that the arbitration industry in Hong Kong can continue to be prosperous. This is more important than the implementation of the Arrangement.

 

 

Authors:

Jie (Jeanne) Huang is an associate professor at University of Sydney Law School, Australia, jeanne.huang@sydney.edu.au.

Winston Ma is an LLB student at University of Sydney Law School, Australia

 

[1] E.g. http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/07/24/arrangement-concerning-mutual-assistance-in-court-ordered-interim-measures-interpretations-from-a-mainland-china-perspective-part-i/?_ga=2.249539525.310814453.1570572449-887368654.1570572449.

[2] There are different opinions regarding whether Article 10 and 28 of Chinese Arbitration Law restrict the interim measures to arbitration administered by Chinese arbitration institutions. See the judgment of [2016] E 72 Cai Bao No. 427 issued by Wuhan Maritime Court. In this case, the Ocean Eleven Shipping Corporation initiated an arbitration in HKIAC against Lao Kai Yuan Mining Sole Co., Ltd. The applicant was a company in South Korea and the respondent a Chinese company. The parties had disputes over a voyage charter party. In order to ensure the enforcement of the coming award in Mainland China, the applicant applied to Wuhan Maritime Court to freeze USD 300,000 in the respondent’s bank account or seizure, impound or freeze other equivalent assets. The People’s Insurance Company provided equivalent insurance for the applicant’s property preservation application. Wuhan Maritime Court permitted the property preservation application according to Article 28 of Chinese Arbitration Law and Article 103 of the Civil Procedure Law. However, this case is inconsistent with majority cases where Chinese courts rejected to issue interim measures for arbitration administered by ad hoc or arbitration institutions registered outside of Mainland China.

[3] SPC Opinions on Providing Judicial Safeguard for the Building of Pilot Free Trade Zones, Fa Fa [2016] No. 34, http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-34502.html.

[4] Art. 21(2) of the Interpretation of the SPC on the Application of the Special Maritime Procedure Law of the PRC, Fa Shi [2003] No. 3.

[5] Ibid., art. 18.

[6] Art. 3 of the Arrangement.

[7] Ibid., art. 2.

[8] China has made the economic integration between the Grater Bay Area a national strategy. The Grater Bay Area includes Hong Kong, Macao and Guangdong Province https://www.bayarea.gov.hk/sc/outline/plan.html.

[9] https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%E6%88%90%E4%B9%9F%E8%90%A7%E4%BD%95%EF%BC%8C%E8%B4%A5%E4%B9%9F%E8%90%A7%E4%BD%95.




Due Process in International Commercial Arbitration– October 18, 2019 New York University

Conference on Due Process in International Commercial Arbitration will be held on 18 Oct 2019 at the New York University Lester Pollack Colloquium Room, organised by NYU Centre for Transnational Litigation, Arbitration and Commercial Law.

This event will discuss the topics addressed in the national reports drafted on the basis of a questionnaire prepared by Professors Franco Ferrari, Dietmar Czernich, and Friedrich Rosenfeld. The ultimate goal behind the national reports and the discussion that will take place at the conference is to provide the necessary background information for the preparation of a set of guidelines on due process in international arbitration. The purpose of these guidelines is twofold. On the one hand, they will identify the appropriate standard of due process that arbitrators should apply in international arbitration proceedings. On the other hand, they will contain recommendations on how arbitrators can respond to misuses of due process by recalcitrant parties. To this end, they will identify appropriate case management techniques that help to ensure the efficiency of the proceedings. For further information, please find the Due Process Conference Program October 2019.




Rethinking Choice of Law and International Arbitration in Cross-border Commercial Contracts

Written by Gustavo Becker*  

During the 26th Willem C. Vis Moot, Dr. Gustavo Moser, counsel at the London Court of International Arbitration and Ph.D. in international commercial law from the University of Basel, coordinated the organization of a seminar regarding choice of law in international contracts and international arbitration. The seminar’s topics revolved around Dr. Moser’s recent book Rethinking Choice of Law in Cross-Border Sales (Eleven, 2018) which has been globally recognized as one of the most useful books for international commercial lawyers.

On April 15th, taking place at Hotel Regina, in Vienna, the afternoon seminar involved a panel organized and moderated by Dr. Moser and composed of Prof. Ingeborg Schwenzer, Prof. Petra Butler, Prof. Andrea Bjorklund, and Dr. Lisa Spagnolo.The panel addressed three core topics in the current scenario of cross-border sales contracts: Choice of law and Brexit, drafting choice of law clauses, and CISG status and prospects.

The conference started with a video presentation in which Michael Mcllwrath (Baker Hughes, GE) addressed his perspectives on how Brexit might impact decisions from companies regarding choice of law clauses in international contracts, its effects on the recognition of London as the leading seat for dispute resolution, and the position of English law as the most applicable law in international contracts.

In Mr. Mcllwrath’s perspective, in spite of Brexit, London will still remain a significant place for international dispute resolution as it adoptsglobally recognized commercial law principles, is an arbitration friendly state and enjoys a highly praised image as a safe seat for international cases. However, in order to try to predict the impact of Brexit in international dispute resolution, Mr. Mcllwrath collected data released by arbitral institutions and found that in the years leading up to the Brexit vote, London did not grow as a seat of arbitration significantly. Considerable growth nonetheless has been seen outside the traditional centers of international arbitration. Therefore, the big issue involving Brexit, in Mr. Mcllwrath’s view, is the uncertainty that companies will face with the UK’s unsettled political future. For this reason, the revision of contract policies is now likely to be undertaken and the choice of English law in international contracts might be affected.

Prof. Schwenzer pointed out that the whole discussion about Brexit and its effects on international dispute resolution depends primarily on the type of Brexit that will be chosen and the agreements between Europe and Great Britain. In her point of view, one of the main questions is whether the UK will join the Lugano Convention, which would make the enforcement of English court decisions easier in European State-members. Prof. Schwenzer also highlighted that, in terms of choice of law, there will be uncertainty issues regarding the regulations that have been imported from Europe and are now part of the English legal system. The problem might be how these rules will be developed further as the Court of Justice of the European Union will no longer be responsible for interpreting this part of English law.

Furthermore, Prof. Bjorklund stated that, whilst the choice of English law will require more caution after Brexit, the well-recognized security related to arbitration in the UK is likely to continue as long as the New York Convention, the English Arbitration Act, and the arbitration friendly character of English commercial courts will not likely change. However, in the point of view of an international arbitration counsel, certainly, the “risks of arbitrating in the UK” will leave some room for parties to choose arbitration in other places rather than in London or – at least – to start rethinking the classic choice for English-seated arbitration.

Concerning the choice of English law, Prof. Butler reminded the audience of two important regulations which should be analyzed in the context of Brexit: Rome I for deciding which contract law is applicable in international cases, and the Brussels Regulation to define which court is entitled to decide a case and how to enforce and recognize foreign decisions within the EU. According to Prof. Butler, under the first Brexit bill, the statutes signed within the EU regime would still apply. However, subject to confirmation from the English government, the development of these laws might no longer be applicable.

Dr. Spagnolo added that whether a country joins an international instrument sometimes has little to do with rational factors and are often “emotional”. In this sense, one of the arguments that the political environment seems to emphasize nowadays under the notion of nationalism is the maintenance of sovereignty. According to Dr. Spagnolo, this is a dangerous consideration to be emphasized in an environment that relies on commercial sense and needs basic guarantees of international harmonization, such as the enforcement of foreign awards or the application of a uniform law.

Regarding the topic “drafting choice of law clauses”, Mr. Mcllwrath highlighted the “emotional” features involving the choice of law. In his opinion, as Dr. Moser has demonstrated in his book, many choices of law decisions are driven by factors such as how many times a specific law had already been applied by a law firm or what law the attorneys involved in that contract were already familiar with. Considering this, Mr. Mcllwrath understands that Brexit can make lawyers rethink the application of English law, even though this might be dependant upon whether financial institutions and companies currently based in London will or will not move away from the UK.

Prof. Schwenzer highlighted that what Dr. Moser has found in his research regarding the emotional aspect of the choice of law is a proving fact of what she has experienced in practice: choice of law decisions are mostly emotionally charged and seldom rational. One example is that even though Swiss law is arguably the second most chosen law in international contracts, in Prof. Schwenzer’s view, Swiss law is not predictable: in core areas of contract law, such as limitation of liability, Swiss law is not advantageous for commercial contracts in her opinion. Prof. Schwenzer added that this shows that lawyers seldom analyze the pros and cons of laws deeply before applying them in international commercial contracts.

Concluding the panel discussions, Dr. Moser brought up the topic “CISG status and prospects”.  While discussing this matter, all the panelists agreed upon the urgent need of global initiatives to increase awareness and improve knowledge of the CISG for both young lawyers who are sitting for the bar exam, and for judges who will face international commercial cases and might not be familiar with the CISG or even prepared to apply its set of provisions.

 

*With contributions from Gustavo Moser