# Chinese courts made decision taking into account of the Hague Choice of Court Convention

China has signed the Hague Choice of Court Convention on 12 September 2017, but has not yet ratified this Convention. The Hague Choice of Court Convention has not entered into force in China. However, Shanghai High Court has already relied on the Hague Choice of Court Convention to make decision.

In Cathay United Bank v Gao, Shanghai High Court, (2016) Hu Min Xia Zhong No 99, the appellant, a Taiwan commercial bank, and the respondent, a Chinese citizen resident in Shanghai, entered into a Guarantee contract. It included a clause choosing Taiwan court as the competent court to hear disputes arising out of the contract. This clause did not specify whether it was exclusive or not. Chinese law does not provide how to decide exclusivity of a choice of court agreement. Facing the legal gap, Shanghai High Court took into account Article 3 of the Hague Choice of Court Convention 2005 and decided that choice of court agreements should be exclusive unless the parties stated otherwise. The Shanghai High Court thus declined jurisdiction in favour of Taiwan Court.

This decision was made on 20 April 2017, even before China signed the Hague Choice of Court Convention. Since the Hague Choice of Court Convention has not entered into force in China, it should not be directly applied by Chinese courts in judicial practice. The question is whether Chinese courts could 'take into account' of international conventions not being effective in China to make decision. Although Article 9 of the Chinese Supreme Court's Judicial Interpretation of Chinese Conflict of Laws Act allows the Chinese courts to apply international conventions, which have not entered into effect in China, to decide the parties' rights and obligations, such an application is subject to party autonomy. In other words, parties should have chosen the international convention to govern their rights and obligations. Article 9 does not apply to international judicial cooperation conventions that do not deal with individuals' substantive rights and are not subject to party autonomy. Perhaps, a more relevant provision is Article 142(3) of the PRC General Principle of Civil Law, which provides that international customs or practice may be applied to matters for which neither the

law of the PRC nor any international treaty concluded or acceded to by China has any provisions. Arguably, the Hague Choice of Court Convention represents common practice adopted internationally and forms a source to fill the gap in the current Chinese law.

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# EU Member State sees opportunities in Brexit: Belgium is establishing a new English-language commercial court

Expecting higher demands for international commercial dispute resolution following Britain's departure from the EU, Belgium plans to set up a new English-language commercial court, the Brussels International Business Court (BIBC), to take cases away from the courts and tribunals in London. This decision was announced on 27 Oct 2017. This BIBC is designed to address disputes arising out of Brexit and major international commercial disputes. The court will take jurisdiction based on parties' choice, and will do the hearing and deliver judgments in English. The parties would have no right to appeal. BIBC combines elements of both traditional courts and arbitration. See comments here.

Although Brexit may cause uncertainty to litigants in the UK, a survey suggests that the EU judicial cooperation scheme is not the main reason for international parties choosing London to resolve their disputes. The top two factors that attract international litigants to London are the reputation and experience of English judges and combination of choice of court clauses with choice of law clauses in favor of English law,  followed by efficient remedies, procedural effectiveness, neutrality of the forum, market practice, English language, effective UK-based counsel, speed and enforceability of judgments. Furthermore, Brexit will not affect the New York Convention and would less likely affect London as an

arbitration centre. It may be more reasonable to suggest that the main purpose of BIBC is not to compete with London at the international level, but to offer additional judicial tool and become a new commercial dispute resolution centre within the EU to attract companies and businesses to Brussels.

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# CJEU on the place of the damage under Article 7(2) of Brussels Ia as regards violation of personality rights of a legal person

*First personal impressions presented by Edina Márton, LLM, PhD (Saarbruecken)*

For jurisdictional purposes, the localisation of cross-border violations of personality rights under European instruments, such as Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (Brussels Ia), has attracted the attention of a considerable number of scholars and often led to different legal solutions in the national judicial practice. At EU level, besides Shevill (C-68/93; ECLI:EU:C:1995:61) as well as eDate and Martinez (C-509/09 and C-161/20; ECLI:EU:C:2011:685), since 17 October 2017, a third judgment in case Bolagsupplysningen (C-194/16; ECLI:EU:C:2017:766) has given further clarification in this area. In the recently delivered judgment, the ECJ specified one of the two limbs of the connecting factor "where the harmful event occurred or may occur" under Article 7(2) of Brussels Ia, namely the place of the alleged damage.

Two key factual elements of Bolagsupplysningen differentiate this case from Shevill, as well as eDate and Martinez. First, one of the alleged victims is a legal person established under Estonian law and has business activities in Sweden (paras 9 and 10). Secondly, the case concerned *"the rectification of allegedly incorrect information published on … [the] website [of the Swedish defendant], the deletion of related comments on a discussion forum on that website and compensation for [the entire] harm allegedly suffered"* (para 2; emphases

omitted; words in square brackets added).

Regarding the determination of the jurisdictionally relevant place of damage, the ECJ basically ruled that a legal person asserting that its personality rights have been violated through the Internet may bring an action for rectification and removal of the allegedly infringing information, and compensation for all the damage occurred before the courts of the Member State in which its centre of interests is situated. In addition, it also stated that the courts of each Member State in which the contested online information is or was accessible are not competent to hear actions brought for rectification and removal of that information.

In the present author's view, one of the most significant aspects of the judgment is that the ECJ treated the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage equally for determining the jurisdictionally relevant place of damage (para 36). In addition, the ECJ applied the "centre of interests" connecting factor introduced in eDate and Martinez to this case and identified it vis-à-vis a legal person pursuing business activities in a Member State other than in the Member State in which its registered office is located (paras 40 ff.). The decisive element for this identification seems to be the pursuit of business activities. As a side note, it is worth questioning how to define this approach for entities that do not carry out such activities (cf. the centre of interests of a natural person generally coincides with his/her habitual residence in eDate and Martinez, para 49). Finally, and, in the opinion of the present author, most importantly, regarding claims for rectification and removal of allegedly infringing online information, the ECJ disregarded the so-called mosaic principle (paras 45 ff.).

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# Is "la réserve héréditaire" part of French international public policy

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Through two decisions (Civ. 1ère, 27 sept. 2017, n° 16-17198 et 16-13151) both issued on September 27th, The French *Cour de cassation* finally gave an answer to one of the most discussed question of French Succession law: Is *la réserve héréditaire* part of French international public policy?

The circumstances of both cases are very similar. Two French composers living in California, where they had most of their assets, got married respectively in 1984 and 1990. They put their assets in a trust and designated their wives as beneficiaries. In both cases, the settlers did not designate the children they had from previous relationships as beneficiaries of the trust. After the death of their fathers, the latter turned to French courts in order to obtain part of the inheritance. They argued that the Californian law applicable to the succession should be declared contrary to French international public policy for not including a *réserve héréditaire* for certain heirs.

According to Article 912 §1 of the French Civil Code, *la réserve hérédiataire* or the reserved portion « *is that part of the assets and rights of the succession whose devolution, free of charge, the law assures to certain heirs, called forced heirs, if they are called to the succession and if they accept it* ». In other words, under French succession law, a person cannot freely dispose of all of his or her assets. French law set boundaries by putting aside a reserved portion of the deceased's property. However, he or she can freely dispose of the disposable portion (*quotité disponible*) which is defined as « *that part of the assets and rights of the succession that is not reserved by law and of which the deceased can freely dispose by liberalities* » (Article 912 § 2).

Whereas the Court of Cassation ruled that the reserved portion is mandatory in internal matters, the question of its imperative nature in international cases was yet unclear. Authors disagree. While some consider that the *réserve héréditaire* cannot be considered as such as part of French *ordre public international*, others consider that due to the fact that it is an expression of solidarity among family members as well as a guarantee of equality between heirs, it has to be part of French international public policy.

The controversy was aggravated in 2011 when the Conseil Constitutionnel

condemned le *droit de prélèvement* for amounting to a discrimination based on nationality. The *droit de prélèvement* is another specific French mechanism. It allows French heirs that have been deprived of the reserved portion from the assets located abroad to deduct the equivalent of such reserved portion from the part of the deceased's assets that are located in France. As a consequence of this decision, the reserved portion remained the only protection for heirs from the risk of disinheritance.

However, in both decisions, the Court found that the mere fact that the foreign law does not provide for a mechanism such as the reserved portion does not amount to a violation of French international public policy. The foreign law could nevertheless be disregarded, but only if its concrete application in a specific case leads to a situation that would be incompatible with French essential principles.

Giving the particulars circumstances of the cases, the Court found that in both cases the application of Californian law was not contrary to French public policy. First, the Court outlined that the deceased had lived in California for over thirty years and that most of their assets were located there. As a consequence, both situations were not strongly connected to the French *forum*. Then, the Court pointed out that the children living in France were adults and that their economic situation will not suffer from their being deprived of the succession.

These observations lead the Court to consider that, in these situations, the Californian law is not contrary to French international public policy even though it does not provide for a reserved portion. The Court emphasis on the particular circumstances of the case, namely that the situation was mainly located in California and that none of the claimants was in need or economically instable, indicates that these circumstances weighed strongly on the outcome. It does not exclude that, in different circumstances, a foreign law that would not provide for a reserved portion could be dismissed as contrary to public policy.

Prior to the coming into force of the Succession Regulation, the solution appears in accordance with its public policy provision. Stating that courts could only refuse to apply provisions that are *manifestly* incompatible with the forum's international public policy, Article 35 allows that foreign laws be disregarded when their application could lead to serious consequences. It does not appear to be the case in the present situations.

The new discussed question is now: In which case the application of a foreign law not including a reserved portion could lead to a situation incompatible with French essential principles ?

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# Freedom of establishment after Polbud: Free transfer of the registered office

*Bastian Brunk*, research assistant and doctoral student at the Institute for Comparative and Private International Law at the University of Freiburg (Germany), has provided us with the following first thoughts on the CJEU's groundbreaking *Polbud* judgment.

**The Judgment**

In its judgment in *Polbud* (C-106/16), the CJEU again took the work out of the EU legislature's hands while further developing the freedom of establishment provided for in Articles 49 and 54 TFEU. The case was heard following a request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU by the Sad Najwyzszy (Supreme Court of Poland). In short, the CJEU had to decide on the following questions:

(1) Are Articles 49 and 54 TFEU applicable to a transfer of the registered office of a company incorporated under the law of one Member State to the territory of another Member State with the purpose of converting its legal form, when the company has no intention to change the location of its real head office or to conduct real economic activity in the latter Member State?

(2) Is a national legislation that makes the removal of a company from the commercial register and, accordingly, the out-migration of that company conditional upon its liquidation compatible with the freedom of establishment?

Answering these questions, the CJEU made *Polbud*, the company at stake, a

liberal gift and strengthened the mobility of companies within the European Single Market. First, the CJEU stated that the freedom of establishment applies to the transfer of the registered office of a company from one Member State to another even if no real business is intended to be conducted in the latter Member State. Secondly, the CJEU ruled out national legislation providing for the mandatory liquidation of a company if the company requests the removal from the initial commercial register in cases of outward migration.

**The facts**

In September 2011, the shareholders of *Polbud*, a limited liablity company established under Polish law, decided to transfer the company's registered office from Poland to Luxembourg. The resolution made no reference to a simultaneous transfer of either the real head office or the place of real economic activity. Based on that resolution, the registry court in Poland recorded the opening of the liquidation procedure. In May 2013, following a resolution adopted by a shareholder meeting in Luxembourg, the registered office of *Polbud* was transferred to Luxembourg. *Polbud* was renamed to *Consoil Geotechnik* and its legal form was changed to the *Société à responsabilité limitée (S. à r. l.)*, the Luxembourgish private limited liability company. Subsequently, *Polbud* lodged an application with the Polish registry court for its removal from the commercial register. This application was refused to be registered because, as the registry court stated, *Polbud* failed to provide evidence of the successful execution of a liquidation procedure. *Polbud* appealed against this decision, arguing that no liquidation was needed because the company continued to exist as a legal person incorporated under Luxembourgish law.

**The precedents**

Articles 49 and 54 TFEU provide for the freedom of establishment. According to the CJEU case-law, the concept of "establishment" within the meaning of these Articles is a very broad one, allowing a Union national to participate, on a stable and continuous basis, in the economic life of another Member State and to profit therefrom (CJEU in *Gebhard*, C-55/94, para. 25 and *Almelo*, C-470/04, para. 26). It involves the actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed establishment in another Member State for an indefinite period (CJEU in *Factortame and Others*, C-221/89, para. 20 and *Commission v. United Kingdom*, C-246/89, para. 21). In order to claim freedom of establishment, it is generally necessary to have

secured a permanent presence in the host Member State (CJEU in *Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer*, C-386/04, para. 19 and *Schmelz*, C-97/09, para. 38). This case law can, generally speaking, be translated as "no freedom of establishment without establishment".

On the other hand, the CJEU generously extended the application of Articles 49 and 54 TFEU to letterbox companies without "fixed establishment" and/or "permanent presence" in their home Member State. In *Centros* (C-212/97) the Court ruled that EU law is applied to the set-up of subsidiaries, branches and agencies in other Member States and, in that regard, it is immaterial that the company was formed in one Member State only for the purpose of establishing itself in another Member State, where its main, or indeed entire, business is to be conducted (*Centros*, para 17).

The CJEU then used its 2009 *Cartesio* judgment (C-210/06) as an opportunity to, *obiter dictu*, set guidelines for cross-border transfers of seat. It stated that, on the one hand, a Member state has the power to define both the connecting factor required of a company if it is to be regarded as incorporated under the law of that Member State and, as such, capable of enjoying the right of establishment, and that required if the company is to be able subsequently to maintain that status (thus treating companies as legal creatures of their country of origin). On the other hand, freedom of establishment comprises the right of a company to move from one Member State to another. If domestic legislation of the Member State of origin requires the liquidation of the company, thereby preventing it from converting itself into a legal person governed by the law of the target Member State, such a measure cannot be justified under the rules on freedom of establishment (*Cartesio*, paras. 110 ff.).

This jurisdiction was complemented by the CJEU in *Vale* (C-378/10) where the Court clarified the legal position of the Member State of destination. If a Member State allows for the conversion of companies governed by national law, it must also grant the same possibility to foreign EU companies (*Vale*, para. 46). In the absence of relevant EU-law, the target Member State may set up procedural rules to cover the cross-border conversion but must ensure that they are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by the European Union legal order (principle of effectiveness) (*Vale*, para. 48).

## The Opinion of AG Kokott

In her *Opinion* of 4 May 2017 (see here), AG *Kokott* took up a distinct position emphasizing the need for actual establishment for the application of Articles 49 and 54. This criterion is sufficiently met, as AG *Kokott* states, if, at least, the company *intends* to set up an actual establishment in the sense of conducting at least a nominal economic activity in the target Member State (*Opinion*, para 36). The AG underlines her position citing the above mentioned CJEU case-law in *Factortame and Others* (C-221/89), *Commission v. United Kingdom* (C-246/89), *Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer* (C-386/04) and *Schmelz* (C-97/09). She concludes that the freedom of establishment "*gives economic operators in the European Union the right to choose the location of their economic activity, it does not give them the right to choose the law applicable to them*" (*Opinion*, para. 38).

## Implications of the *Polbud* judgment for the internal market

The CJEU now takes a different point of view: Once formed in accordance with the legislation of a Member State, companies enjoy the full range of that freedom. Nothing new, so far, as *Geert van Calster* suggests in his comment (see here). But what makes Polbud (r)evolutionary?

First, the CJEU creates legal certainty in an area that is particularly important for the functioning of the European Single Market. In its *Cartesio* judgment, the Court allowed for the cross-border conversion of EU companies in general but did little to shape the relationship between the involved Member States. Therefore, it was widely thought, that, just like AG *Kokott* propounds, the conversion of a company from one Member State to another required a genuine economic link with the State of destination. In *Polbud*, the CJEU clarifies that the regulatory power of a Member State ends when a company converts itself into a company governed by the law of another Member state. It is for the latter State to determine the legal and/or economic conditions that have to be satisfied by the company in order to bring the conversion into effect (paras 33 ff.). Under Articles 49 and 54 TFEU, the State of origin is only allowed to provide legislation for the protection of public interests (such as the protection of creditors, minority shareholders and employees) but cannot impose mandatory liquidation.

Secondly, the CJEU obliges the State of origin to observe the *principle of equivalence*. This principle, already known from the *Vale* decision (see above),

was generally considered as obliging only the target Member State in cross-border conversion cases to legally treat domestic and foreign companies equally. By contrast, the State of origin was only thought to be bound by the general prohibition of restrictions (i.e. the prohibition of rules hampering or rendering less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms, see CJEU in *Kraus*, C-19/92, para. 32). In *Polbud*, the CJEU, without being explicit on this point, extends the scope of application of the principle of equivalence to the Member State of origin by stating that "*the imposition, with respect to such a cross-border conversion, of conditions that are more restrictive than those that apply to the conversion of a company within that Member State itself*" is not acceptable (para. 43).

Finally, recapitulating its jurisdiction in *Daily Mail* and *National Grid Indus* (C-371/10), the CJEU points out that exercising the freedom of establishment for the purpose of enjoying the benefit of the most favourable legislation, does not, in itself, amount to an abuse of rights (para. 62). The Court further explains its position saying that "*the mere fact that a company transfers its registered office from one Member State to another cannot be the basis for a general presumption of fraud and cannot justify a measure that adversely affects the exercise of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty*" (para. 63).

**Assessment**

As already observed, *Polbud* encouragingly facilitates the cross-border mobility of companies but, on the other hand, leaves the reader with open questions.

It was high time to free cross-border conversions from the requirement of a genuine economic link with the Member State of destination. The legal situation before *Polbud*, that allowed letterbox companies to conduct their business in other Member States (which can be compared to initial choice of law) but prevented the formation of letterbox companies through the transfer of an existing company's registered office to another Member State (which can be compared to subsequent choice of law), was somewhat arbitrary from a legal and economic point of view.

On the other hand, the extension of the scope of application of the principle of equivalence to the Member State of origin can only be seen as inconsistent with the legal doctrine of the freedom of establishment provided for in Articles 49 and 54 TFEU. Heretofore, only EU-foreigners could enjoy the right to non-

discrimination, whereas, in regard to EU law, Member States were free to impose (relatively) stricter rules to its own citizens. This principle finds its expression, for example, in the above-mentioned treatment of companies as creatures of their state of origin that the CJEU established in its *Cartesio* judgment. As the principle of equivalence corresponds to the prohibition of discrimination, it is even more astonishing that the CJEU permits exemptions for overriding reasons in the public interest. These unwritten exemptions generally apply only in cases of restrictions of the freedom of movement (see Kraus, para. 32 and *Gebhard*, para. 37). On the contrary, discriminations require the strict observance of the catalogue of justifications set out in Article 52 TFEU. In future decisions, the CJEU should recall this clear distinction and cease to further the linguistic ambiguity.

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# Conference Report: Annual meeting of the Alumni of the Hague Academy of International Law/Hamburg 2017 – Thorn and Lasthaus on Brexit and Private International Law

*By Stephan Walter, Research Fellow at the Research Center for Transnational Commercial Dispute Resolution (TCDR), EBS Law School, Wiesbaden, Germany, and attendee of the 2017 Summer Courses on Private International Law at the Hague Academy of International Law*

On 13 October 2017, the Alumni of the Hague Academy of International Law/Hamburg, the German section of Attenders and Alumni of the Hague Academy of International Law, A.A.A., hosted their annual meeting. At the invitation of Professor Karsten Thorn (Bucerius Law School, Hamburg), who

lectured a Special Course on “The Protection of Small and Medium Enterprises in Private International Law” at the Academy during the 2016 Summer Courses, the meeting was held at Bucerius Law School, Hamburg. The academic programme consisted of four presentations, two of them dealt with issues of Private International Law after Brexit.

Professor Karsten Thorn’s presentation on “European Private International Law after Brexit” was divided into two parts. In the first part he discussed direct legal consequences of Brexit on Private International Law in relations between the United Kingdom (in particular England) and Germany. He highlighted the importance of Union Law and especially the duties to recognise derived from the fundamental freedoms for the rise of England as a legal hub. Therefore, Brexit would have grave consequences for the attractiveness of England in a number of legal areas. This would apply, for example, to company law. Whereas under Union Law the recognition of a company established in accordance with the law of one Member State must not be refused by another Member State, each Member State would apply its own rules on this issue post-Brexit. This could also impact companies established before Brexit, although it was disputed whether this would infringe their legitimate expectations and if so, whether this protection was subject to a certain time limit. In any event, the companies should act rather sooner than later to avoid any legal uncertainty. Comparable issues would arise in insolvency law. First and foremost, there would be – in contrast to the current legal situation – no duty for a Member State’s court to recognise a decision of an English court on the existence of the centre of the debtor’s main interests (COMI) in England anymore. Again, each Member State would apply its national rules on the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings. Secondly, an English scheme of arrangement, a court-approved private debt restructuring solution, would likely not be recognised by the Member States after Brexit. By contrast, fewer negative consequences would arise with regard to the right to a name because even now Article 21 TFEU only guaranteed the recognition of a name rightfully obtained in the EU citizen’s State of nationality or residence and this freedom is further limited by the Constitution of the recognising Member State. Finally, he highlighted the negative impact of Brexit on procedural law. Post-Brexit, English decisions will no longer benefit from mutual trust in the EU Member States. A revival of bilateral treaties with Member States or instruments of the Hague Conference could only serve as sectoral solutions. Under these conditions, he presumed an increased usage of arbitration in the UK post-Brexit, not least

because the United Kingdom is a Contracting State to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Moreover, he pointed out that English courts would return to traditional instruments of the English procedural law such as anti-suit injunctions. The second part of his presentation dealt with indirect consequences of Brexit on the European Private International Law. Firstly, he submitted that a number of provisions in EU legislation can be regarded as legal transplants from English law. This applies, e.g., to Article 9 paragraph 3 Rome I Regulation and Article 6 lit. a EU Succession Regulation. In his opinion, post-Brexit at least the former provision will be discarded after a revision of the respective EU legislation. Secondly, he turned to the question of the usage of English as working language of the EU bodies. He stated that most EU legislation was drafted in English. Because legal English was very different to the legal language used in all other Member States this was still noticeable in the official translations. Therefore, English shaped the spirit of the EU legislation. Although he believed that English would still be the dominant language in the EU bodies after Brexit, he argued that the continental legal thinking could gain more significance.

In her presentation on "Pluralism of Legal Sources with regard to International Choice of Court Agreements", Caroline Lasthaus (Bucerius Law School, Hamburg) examined – after a brief overview of the interplay between the German autonomous national rules on jurisdiction, the Brussels I Regulation Recast, the 2007 Lugano Convention and the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention –options of the United Kingdom to foster the enforcement of choice of court agreements in favour of UK courts post-Brexit. An accession to the 2007 Lugano Convention would require either the membership of the United Kingdom in the European Free Trade Association or a unanimous agreement of the Contracting Parties. However, both options were, in her opinion, unlikely. Furthermore, the rules of the 2007 Lugano Convention would be outdated and the United Kingdom would have to accept the CJEU's jurisdiction over questions of interpretation of the Convention. Therefore, she scrutinised whether an accession to the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention could be a suitable solution. The accession itself would not raise any difficulties, since the United Kingdom could accede to the Convention unilaterally. Hence, the decisive question was whether the Convention would serve the needs of the United Kingdom. Lasthaus argued that neither the applicability of the Convention only to international exclusive choice of court agreements nor the exclusion of agreements with a consumer would

make the Convention less attractive for the United Kingdom. Moreover, both the Brussels I Regulation Recast and the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention would allow the choice of a neutral forum. However, she stressed that the Convention was rather strict with regard to the formal requirements of an agreement, whereas the Brussels I Regulation Recast followed a much more flexible approach. Even though a violation of formal requirements would not lead to the agreement to be null and void by virtue of the Convention, the Convention's rules on recognition and enforcement would not apply to judgements rendered based on such an agreement. Finally, one crucial downside of the Convention would be the necessity of an exequatur procedure with regard to the judgements rendered based on a choice of court agreement. This would lead to higher costs for the litigants and to a longer procedure. As a result, she conceded that an accession to the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention could not mend all the consequences of the non-applicability of the Brussels I Regulation Recast post-Brexit. Nonetheless, an accession would still make sense for the United Kingdom and could also boost the conclusion of a worldwide Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements.

Both presentations were followed by lively discussions among the speakers and participants. It was agreed that the implementation of existing EU legislation into domestic law could not cushion the consequences of Brexit, especially because the fundamental freedoms would no longer apply to the United Kingdom. Additionally, it became clear once more that the final outcome of Brexit is still uncertain. In this vein, it is noteworthy from a Private International Law point of view that there was some disagreement on whether the United Kingdom would need to accede to the Convention at all or if it would still be a Contracting State of the Convention after Brexit by way of a succession of State.

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# Conference on International Sales,

# London, 16-17 April 2018

King’s College School of Law is organising a conference on **Unity and Diversity in the Law of the International Sale of Goods.** This conference will bring together prominent academics and practitioners from all over the world to discuss pressing issues pertaining to international sales transactions.The focus will be on the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. The speakers will explore the current state of the law of sale of goods by examining how sales contracts, particularly those used in international trade, are governed in the modern world. The central theme concerns two competing forces within the sale of goods law:

- Those leading to disintegration,
- Those pushing towards uniformity, consolidation and standardisation.

The conference will take place on 16-17th of April 2018 at King’s College London. For more information and the programme, please click here.

For the registration page, please click here.

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# Conferenza annuale: Corti europee e giudici nazionali

On 30 October 2017 the Jean Monnet Module on European Civil Procedure will host its annual conference on ‘Corti europee e giudici nazionali’ in Milan. The conference language is Italian. For further information see here.

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# Cross-Border Business Crisis: a Conference in Rome

On 3-4 November 2017 the LUISS «Guido Carli» University School of Law, with the support of the International Law Association (Italian Branch) and the auspices of the International Insolvency Institute, will host in Rome a conference on «Cross-Border Business Crisis: International and European Horizons».

Three bilingual (English/Italian) sessions are scheduled: I) International and European Policies on Business Crisis (Chairperson: Luciano Panzani); II) Regulation 2015/848 within the European System of Private International Law (Chairperson: Stefania Bariatti); III) Cross-Border Insolvency and Italian Legal Order: Old and New Challenges (Chairperson: Sergio M. Carbone).

Speakers include academics and practitioners (Massimo V. Benedettelli, Giorgio Corno, Domenico Damascelli, Luigi Fumagalli, Anna Gardella, Lucio Ghia, Francisco J. Garcimartín Alférez, Antonio Leandro, Maria Chiara Malaguti, Fabrizio Marongiu Buonaiuti, Alberto Mazzoni, Paul Omar, Antonio Tullio, Robert van Galen, Francesca Villata, Ivo-Meinert Willrodt).

Most of them are members of the ILA-Italy Study Group on «Cross-Border Insolvency and National Legal Orders» and will discuss the findings of their research during the conference.

Program and details on registration are available here

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# Out now: Encyclopedia of Private International Law!

Hard to believe, but true: The Encyclopedia of Private International Law, published by Edward Elgar and edited by Jürgen Basedow (Max Planck Institute Hamburg), Franco Ferrari (NYU Law School), Pedro de Miguel Asensio

(Universidad Complutense de Madrid) and me, has finally been released end of September. Bringing together more than 180 authors from 57 countries the Encyclopedia sheds light on the current state of Private International Law around the globe and provides insights into how the discipline has been affected by globalization and increased regional integration over the last decades.

The Encyclopedia  is available both in print and via Elgaronline and consists of four volumes. The first two volumes describe topical aspects of Private International Law in form of 247 alphabetically sorted entries. The third volume describes the Private International Law regimes of 80 countries in form of national reports. The fourth volume contains a collection of national codifications and provisions of Private International Law in English translation. More information is available here and here.

I take the opportunity to thank everybody who has helped  to make the Encyclopedia come true, notably the authors and translators (many of them editors or readers of this blog), my fellow editors, my team at the University of Jena and last but not least the team over at Edward Elgar!

Should you be interested in receiving a review copy please send an email to reviews@e-elgar.co.uk.