

Issue 2012.2 Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht

The second issue of 2012 of the Dutch journal on Private International Law, *Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht* includes the following articles on Recognition of (Dutch) Mass Settlement in Germany, the CLIP Principles, the European Patent Court and case note on Brussels I and the Unknown Address (Lindner):

Axel Halfmeier, Recognition of a WCAM settlement in Germany, p. 176-184. The abstract reads:

The Dutch 'Wet Collectieve Afwikkeling Massaschade'(WCAM) [Collective Settlements Act] has emerged as a noteworthy model in the context of the European discussion on collective redress procedures. It provides an opportunity to settle mass claims in what appears to be an efficient procedure. As the WCAM has been used in important transnational cases, this article looks at questions of jurisdiction and the recognition of these court-approved settlements under the Brussels Regulation. It is argued that because of substantial participation by the courts, such declarations are to be treated as 'judgments' in the sense of the Brussels Regulation and thus are objects of recognition in all EU Member States. Written from the perspective of the German legal system, the article also takes the position that the opt-out system inherent in the WCAM procedure does not violate the German ordre public, but is compatible with fair trial principles under the German Constitution as well as under the European Human Rights Convention. The WCAM therefore appears as an attractive model for the future reform of collective proceedings on the European level.

Mireille van Eechoud & Annette Kur, Internationaal privaatrecht in intellectuele eigendomszaken – de 'CLIP' Principles, p. 185-192. The English abstract reads:

The European Max Planck Group on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property (CLIP) presented its Principles in November 2011 to an international group of legal scholars, judges, and lawyers from commercial practice, governments and international organisations. This article sets out the objectives and principal characteristics of the CLIP Principles. The Principles are informed by instruments

of European private international law, but nonetheless differ in some important respects from the rules of the Brussels I Regulation on jurisdiction and the Rome I and II Regulations on the law applicable to contractual and non-contractual obligations. This is especially so in situations where adherence to a strict territorial approach creates significant problems with the efficient adjudication of disputes over intellectual property rights or undermines legal certainty. The most notable differences are discussed below.

M.C.A. Kant, A specialised Patent Court for Europe? An analysis of Opinion 1/09 of the Court of Justice of the European Union from 8 March 2011 concerning the establishment of a European and Community Patents Court and a proposal for an alternative solution, p. 193-201. The abstract reads:

Attempts have been made for decades to establish both a Community patent and a centralised European court which would have exclusive jurisdiction in this matter. However, none of these attempts has ever been fully successful. In its Opinion 1/09 from 8 March 2011, the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter CJEU) held, inter alia, that the establishment of a unified patent litigation system as planned in the draft agreement on the European and Community Patents Court would be in breach of the rules of the EU Treaty and the FEU Treaty. However, it is argued in this paper that also in view of Opinion 1/09 the creation of a unified court has not become per se unattainable. After clarifying in whose interest effective patent protection in Europe should primarily be formed, different constellations of judicial systems shall be discussed. The author will deliver his own proposal for a two-step approach in structure and time, comprising, in a first step, the creation of a specialized chamber of the CJEU for patent litigation, and in a second step the creation of a central EU Court for all EU intellectual property litigation. The paper will finish with an analysis of how the requirements for a unified patent litigation system (indirectly) set up by the CJEU in its Opinion 1/09 could be taken into consideration, and with some further deliberations on effective patent protection and enforcement.

Jochem Vlek, De EEX-Vo en onbekende woonplaats van de verweerder. Hof van Justitie EU 17 november 2011, zaak C-327/10 (Lindner) (Case note), p. 202-206. The English abstract reads:

The author reviews the decision of the ECJ in the case of Hypotecni banka/Udo Mike Lindner in which the ECJ ruled on the application of the jurisdictional rules

of the Brussels I Regulation in the case of a consumer/defendant with an unknown domicile. Several issues are highlighted: first, the existence of an international element in the case of a defendant with unknown domicile whose nationality differs from the state of the court seized; secondly, the application of Article 4(1) Brussels I Regulation if the domicile of the defendant is unknown and (since the ECJ does not apply Article 4(1) in this regard) the interpretation of Article 16(2) Brussels I Regulation; thirdly, the requirement that the rights of the defence are observed, as also laid down in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. Additionally, the article briefly mentions the subsequent case of G/Cornelius de Visser, in which a German Court resorted to public notice under national law of the document instituting the proceedings in the case of a defendant with an unknown address.

Conference Announcement: Collective Redress in Cross-Border Context

Conference on Collective Redress in the Cross-Border Context

In the framework of the Henry G. Schermers Fellowship Programme<<http://www.hiil.org/henry-g-schermers-fellowship>>, held this year by Professor S.I. Strong, the Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law (Hiil) and the Netherlands Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS)<<http://www.nias.nl/Pages/NIA/2/764.bGFuZz1FTkc.html>> announce a workshop on the theme 'Collective Redress in the Cross-Border Context: Arbitration, Litigation and Beyond.'

The workshop aims to explore the various means that can be used to resolve collective legal injuries that arise across national borders. The types of dispute resolution mechanisms to be discussed range from class and collective arbitration, mass arbitration and mass claims processes, class and collective litigation, and large-scale settlement and mediation. The workshop will bring together practitioners, academics, and representatives of non-governmental

organisations, all of whom have an interest and expertise in public and private resolution of collective redress in the international realm.

For the first time, NIAS and HiiL are offering a works-in-progress conference in association with the Henry G. Schermers workshop. This conference is designed to allow practitioners and scholars who are interested in this area of law to discuss their work and ideas in the company of other experts in the field.

Confirmed speakers for the Schermers workshop include:

* Jan Willem Bitter, Simmons & Simmons LLP/Netherlands Arbitration Institute (The Netherlands) * Christian Borris, Freshfields/German Arbitration Institute (Germany) * Laura Carballo Piñeiro, University of Santiago de Compostela (Spain) * Christopher R. Drahozal, University of Kansas (USA) * Gregory A. Litt, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (USA) * Daan Lunsingh Scheurleer, NautaDutihl (The Netherlands) * Gerard Meijer, Nauta Dutihl/Erasmus University Rotterdam/PRIME Finance (The Netherlands) * Rachel Mulheron, University of London, Queen Mary (UK) * Victoria Orłowski, ICC International Court of Arbitration (France) * Geneviève Saumier, McGill University (Canada) * Garth Schofield, Permanent Court of Arbitration (The Netherlands) * S.I. Strong, Henry G. Schermers Fellow, HiiL/NIAS, University of Missouri (USA)

The three-day event will be held June 20-22, 2012, at the NIAS site in Wassenaar, twenty minutes outside of the Hague. The events are free to the public, but registration is required. For more information on the event, including the full programme for both the Schermers workshop and works in progress event, see the [HiiL website](http://www.hiil.org) at: <http://www.hiil.org/events/hiil-nias-workshop-collective-redress>. Questions may also be directed to Professor S.I. Strong at strongsi@missouri.edu <<mailto:strongsi@missouri.edu>>.

Tang on Consumer Collective Redress in European PIL

Zheng Sophia Tang (Leeds University) has posted Consumer Collective Redress in European Private International Law on SSRN.

Collective redress is a cost-sharing and procedure-consolidating mechanism. In the area of consumer litigation, it is introduced primarily to compensate the weakness of expensive and time-consuming court proceedings in small claims in order to increase consumers' access to justice. Consumer contractual claims are characterised as of small value, which largely discourages individual consumers from resorting to judicial action to protect their legal rights. Collective redress combines separate consumer claims against the same defendant based on the similar circumstances into one single action. It is helpful to resolve the litigation difficulty, to promote consumers' access to redress and to improve good commercial performance. A recent survey shows 76% of European consumers would be more willing to defend their rights in court if they could join other consumers. It is also believed that collective redress could offer businesses an opportunity to resolve an issue once rather than having repeated proceedings.

The concept of collective redress is not new. Some common law countries, such as US, Canada and Australia have already established mature and widely used 'class action' mechanism, which enables one or more individuals to bring an action on behalf of putative claimants against the same defendant. Each putative claimant is presumed to consent being presented in the action and being bound by the judicial decision, unless he actively gives notice to opt out. The US-style class action does not exist in Europe, though the revised versions with similar elements exist in the Netherland and Sweden. Currently, thirteen Member States have adopted collective redress mechanisms for consumer claims. Although practices in these countries vary largely, they could be generally categorised into three groups: (1) group action, where exactly defined claimants bring actions in one procedure to enforce their similar claims together. Each group litigant is a party in the litigation; (2) representative action, where an organisation, an authority or an individual brings actions on behalf of a group of individuals, who are not the real party of the litigation; (3)

test case procedure, under which mass individual claims are filed, and a leading decision is given to one case, which decides the common factual and legal issues of similar legal actions, and serves as an example for other similar cases.

Collective redress in Europe is at an experimental stage and the existing collective redress mechanisms in most Member States are largely domestic tools, the effect of which is primarily limited to domestic claims. There is no common standard in the EU as to the functioning and regulation of collective actions. With the consumer-oriented culture, increasing consumers' access to justice has attracted much attention. In its Consumer Policy Strategy for 2007-2013, the European Commission announced that it would consider the feasibility of an EU initiative on collective action in protecting consumers' access to justice. In November 2008, the European Commission has published a Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, which provides four proposals for the possible development of consumer collective redress in Europe, two of which might be of particular interest to conflicts lawyers: (1) to require Member States having a collective redress mechanism to open up the mechanism to consumers from other Member States (option 2 of the Green Paper), and (2) to initiate a non-binding or binding EU measure to ensure that a collective redress judicial mechanism exists in all Member States (option 4). The European Commission specifically points out that these two options with clear cross-border features could generate conflict of laws difficulties.

This research focuses on the jurisdiction problems in cross-border collective redress in Europe. The European jurisdiction rules have two characteristics: firstly, protective jurisdiction is available for consumer contractual claims. Section 4 of the Brussels I Regulation provides that if a contract falls within the protective scope, a consumer is always entitled to sue a business defendant in the consumer's domicile. This approach is incompatible with the nature of cross-border collective redress, where consumers may come from different Member States. Secondly, special jurisdiction rules are designed according to the 'classification' of the claim. There is no special jurisdiction rule designated for the 'collective redress' (Art 6 concerns multiple defendants instead of multiple claimants) and it is necessary to see whether any of the existing jurisdiction provisions can be properly applicable to a collective action.

These characteristics determine the difficulties to apply the Brussels rules in cross-border collective redress. In a representative action, the representative

individual(s) or association brings the lawsuit on behalf of all represented consumers, where the real litigating party is the representative instead of the represented consumers. If the protective jurisdiction does not apply, one needs to study whether the action is a matter relating to contract under Art 5(1). There is no doubt that each putative claimant that has been represented has a contractual claim, but should Article 5(1) require the existence of a contractual claim between the 'litigating parties?' Even if the group action is classified as a matter relating to contract, applying the jurisdiction rules of Article 5(1) can be difficult in a representative action where the goods are delivered to, or services are provided for, consumers domiciled in different Member States.

In group action or test case procedure, each consumer is the real litigant and could individually enforce the decision. Since the Brussels I Regulation does not provide specific jurisdiction rules for these mechanisms, it is necessary for a court to consider jurisdiction over the claim of each consumer in the collective action. A consumer in a contract that falls within the scope of protective jurisdiction is entitled to sue a business defendant either in the court of the defendant's domicile or in the court of the consumer's domicile. According to this rule, where the consumers are domiciled in more than one Member State, only the courts of the defendant's domicile could have jurisdiction. The courts of any one of the consumers' domicile can only hear the action brought by the claimant consumer who has his domicile within this country.

It is concluded that under the current Brussels I Regulation, cross-border consumer collective redress can only be brought in the court of a defendant's domicile, unless all the consumers are domiciled in one Member State. However, it does not mean that the current approach is definitely a barrier to cross-border collective redress. On one hand, it brings disadvantages to those consumers domiciled in a country where very few consumers have transactions with the business and it prevents collective action from being brought where a business's commercial activities are spreading over many Member States and the number of consumers in each State is not high. On the other hand, it brings certainty to business defendants, especially small and medium sized companies, and reduces litigation costs. The research will continue to analyse the socio-economic impact of the current jurisdiction rule, and to consider whether it is necessary to reform the Brussels I Regulation by introducing an innovative provision specifically for collective redress.

The paper was published in the *Journal of Private International Law* in 2011.

Call for Proposals

Please see below for a call for proposals for a conference to be held 20-22 June 2012

Call for Proposals - Collective Redress in the Cross-Border Context

Large-scale international legal injuries are becoming increasingly prevalent in today's globalized economy, whether they arise in the context of consumer, commercial, contract, tort or securities law, and countries are struggling to find appropriate means of providing collective redress, particularly in the cross-border context. The Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law (HiiL), along with the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS), will be responding to this new and developing challenge by convening a two-day event on the theme "Collective Redress in the Cross-Border Context: Arbitration, Litigation, Settlement and Beyond." The event includes two different elements - a workshop on 21-22 June 2012 comprised of invited speakers from all over the world as well as a works-in-progress conference on 20-21 June 2012 designed to allow practitioners and scholars who are interested in the area of collective redress to discuss their work and ideas in the company of other experts in the field. Both events are organized by the Henry G. Schermers Fellow for 2012, Professor S.I. Strong of the University of Missouri School of Law.

Persons interested in being considered as presenters for the works-in-progress conference should submit an abstract of no more than 500 words to Professor S.I. Strong at strongsi@missouri.edu on or before 1 May 2012. Decisions regarding accepted proposals will be made in early May, and those whose proposals are accepted for the works-in-progress conference will need to submit a draft paper by 4 June 2012 for discussion at the conference. All works-in-progress submissions should explore one or more of the various means of resolving

collective injuries, including class and collective arbitration, mass arbitration and mass claims processes, class and collective litigation, and large-scale settlement and mediation, preferably in a cross-border context. Junior scholars in particular are encouraged to submit proposals for consideration.

Persons presenting at the works-in-progress conference will have to bear their own costs, since there is no funding available to assist with travel and other expenses. The works-in-progress conference will be held on 20 and 21 June 2012 at NIAS, Meijboomlaan 1, 2242 PR Wassenaar, The Netherlands. Wassenaar is approximately 20 minutes from The Hague by car. The workshop of invited speakers will be held on 21 and 22 June, also at NIAS.

Both the Schermers workshop and the works-in-progress conference are open to the public, although advance registration is required. More information on both events is available at the HiiL website (www.hiil.org) or from Professor Strong at strongsi@missouri.edu.

Contact: Prof. S.I. Strong at strongsi@missouri.edu

Deadline for proposals: 1 May 2012

For more on the Henry G. Schermers Fellowship at HiiL/NIAS, see: <http://www.hiil.org/organ-bios/prof-s-i-strong>

Jurisdiction of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal in the Converium Settlement Case

[Guest post written by Thijs Bosters LL.M., a PhD Researcher (Private International Law and Collective redress) at Tilburg University.]

After the *Morrison v. NAB* decision of last June, the question was raised how and where an f-cubed case should be filed in the future. It has been proposed that, for

example, the Canadian class action or the Dutch collective settlement procedure could serve as alternatives in cross-border securities mass disputes. What makes the Dutch collective settlement procedure such an interesting alternative is that a settlement can be declared binding by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal on all persons to which it applies according to its terms. In this way, all plaintiffs can be covered and a mass dispute can be resolved through a single action (for more information on the Collective Settlement Act (*Wet collectieve afwikkeling massaschade*), see the The Global Class Actions Exchange report of Stanford Law School). With the 2009 Shell collective settlement, the Dutch Act proved that it can be instrumental in the resolution of cross-border securities mass disputes. The *Shell* case, however, was only a partially f-cubed case, as quite many of the investors involved were Dutch.

Converium

On 12 November 2010, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal assumed preliminary jurisdiction in the “full f-cubed” *Converium* case (the Dutch text can be found [here](#)). This case revolves around the Swiss reinsurance company Converium Holding AG (currently known as SCOR Holding AG). In late 2001, Zürich Financial Services Ltd, of which Converium was a full subsidiary, sold its shares through an initial public offering. The shares were listed on the SWX Swiss Exchange in Switzerland and as American Depositary Shares (ADSs) on the New York Stock Exchange. Between 7 January 2002 and 2 September 2004, Converium made several announcements which led people to believe that Converium had deliberately underestimated the insurance risks when floating its reinsurance unit. The existing reserve deficiency forced Converium to announce that it would take a charge of between \$ 400 and \$ 500 million to increase its reserve. This, combined with the downgrade of the company’s credit rating by Standard & Poor’s in response to the reserve increase, caused a massive drop of the share value.

In October 2004, the first of several securities class action complaints was filed against Converium, ZFS, and certain of Converium’s officers and directors. Eventually, the filed class actions were consolidated before the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. This court, however, excluded from the class action all non-U.S. persons who had purchased Converium shares on any non-U.S. exchange, leaving them empty-handed.

Because of the positive way the Shell case was being resolved in the Netherlands, Converium and ZFS agreed that a settlement would be sought for these non-U.S. purchasers through the Dutch collective settlement system.

Converium, ZFS, the special Converium Securities Compensation Foundation (which represents the group of individual purchasers that were excluded from the U.S. class), and the Dutch Investors Association agreed on a settlement on 8 July 2010. These parties subsequently filed an application with the Amsterdam Court of Appeal to declare the settlement binding. Because there were only approximately 200 known Dutch individual purchasers (out of a total of 12,000), who formed the most important link to use the Dutch system, the Court first wanted to decide whether this link was enough to assume jurisdiction over the case.

Jurisdiction Amsterdam Court of Appeal

The Court first examined whether it could assume jurisdiction to effectuate the settlement and subsequently whether it was also competent to bind all the purchasers named in the settlement. This would prevent plaintiffs from filing a claim for damages in the future.

As the settlement only takes effect if it is made binding, it is not possible to directly use Article 5(1) Brussels I/Lugano to determine which court has jurisdiction because the place of performance, the main requirement of this provision, is unknown. However, in *Effer v. Kantner*, the court also based its jurisdiction on Article 5(1) Brussels I/Lugano in a dispute concerning a contract which had not been concluded yet, so the place of performance was unknown as well. Because the Converium settlement is aimed at a certain performance that will take place in the Netherlands, namely, payment of damages by the Dutch special compensation foundation, the Dutch Court of Appeal can assume jurisdiction.

To prevent parallel and irreconcilable litigation, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal based its jurisdiction to declare the settlement binding on Article 6(1) Brussels I/Lugano. The Court stated that the claims of the various purchasers are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and decide on them together. As the Court already had jurisdiction over the Dutch purchasers, Article 6(1) Brussels

I/Lugano makes it possible to assume jurisdiction in the combined case.

Although the majority of the purchasers are domiciled in one of the Brussels I Regulation/Lugano Convention member states, there are also purchasers that are not. In these cases, the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure decides whether a Dutch court has jurisdiction. According to this Code, a court can assume jurisdiction over cases in which one or more purchasers are domiciled in the Netherlands. In the *Converium* case, the Compensation Foundation and the Investors Association are domiciled in the Netherlands. Moreover, because the settlement will be executed in the Netherlands, there is a sufficient connection with the Dutch jurisdiction for the Amsterdam Court of Appeal to also assume jurisdiction for those cases which involve non-Brussels I/Lugano purchasers.

Based on the above-mentioned provisions, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal may assume jurisdiction in the *Converium* case. Article 6 ECHR and the principle of *audi alteram partem*, however, prevent the Court from making a final decision on its competence. As not all the purchasers have been summoned yet, the Court will be forced to stay the proceedings (Article 26(2) Brussels I/Lugano) till they have been given proper notice. Until then, the ruling will be provisional. During the fairness hearing, which still has to be scheduled but will probably take place in the second half of 2011, the purchasers may still advance a different view on the jurisdiction issue.

A “View from Across” (in the Other Direction)

Horatia Muir Watt is a Professor at the School of Law of Sciences Po, Paris.

From the standpoint of an outside observer with « a view from across », the practical result reached in the Morrison case seems reasonable. It is highly probable that in a similar situation – that is, supposing jurisdiction could be secured under the relevant rules applicable before, say the courts of Member States as against foreign-third-State-domiciled defendants AND imagining private

attorney general actions for violations of trans-European securities regulations – courts over this side of the Atlantic (and for realistic symmetry, we'd need to think in terms of the rulings by the Court of Justice of the European Union as relayed by the courts of the Member States) would not (whatever the reasoning involved) have extended the scope of domestic economic regulation to an “F-cubed” action. However, the concrete result reached in this particular case is clearly not the point in issue. Nor indeed is there any reason not to adhere to the important policy objective of discouraging global forum-shoppers (or their lawyers) attracted by the well-known magnetic properties of US civil procedure in purely financial matters when private punitive-damage-actions are available. The real question is the *approach* adopted by the Supreme Court in its first decision relating to the ambit of the Securities and Exchange Act in an international setting.

I'll simply emphasise a few points that might be of specific interest to European observers on the Supreme Court's new “transactional test”. (I'll refrain from speculating here as to the impact of the potential new “anti-Morrison” legislation to which Gilles has just posted the links), or to the difference it might have made on the overall result had Justice Kagan, who authored the US amicus brief favoring the “substantial conduct” test, been sitting on the Court). In order to define the reach of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 (and thereby of SEC 10b-5), the Court decided that these various stringent informational/transparency requirements apply only to *transactions in securities listed on US exchanges* or otherwise sold within the US:

1. It comes as a surprise (and disappointment) to see the Supreme Court turning its back on several decades of (what looked from over here like) a widely shared and carefully tailored functional approach (initiated by the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit whose case-law is discussed extensively) to the determination of the scope of federal economic regulation, in favor of a bright-line rule based on a regression to the presumption against extra-territoriality. As the concurrence suggests, haven't we been there before? Well over here, we certainly have. Obviously, the EU is only just beginning to grapple with similar issues (first in respect of the extraterritorial scope of European competition law, then in diverse areas involving the international reach of directives, such as the Agency Directive in the controversial *Ingmar* case) but if intra-

European (as opposed to the international reach of “federal” or trans-European legislation) conflicts are anything to go by (and indeed much has been written on this point within the US on the striking parallelism between methodological approaches in international arena and in intra-federal situations) then the quest for a “simple” or “certain” conflicts rule designed to provide legal security to economics actors has proved at best elusive, at worst unfair. Whether or not one decides to adhere to a dogmatic principle of territoriality or its contrary, surely the only real issue is whether it is reasonable in functional or policy terms, given the connections between the conduct, its effects and the market the statute was designed to regulate, to extend such a statute in a given case. It is doubtful indeed that the concept of “territoriality” is of much help.

2. Of course, framed in these terms, a functional approach provides little predictability. Over here, this has been a well-known war-cry since the mid-sixties against the importation of any form of American legal realism in the sphere of the conflict of laws (let alone any weird law-and or, worse, critical legal thinking in any other sphere, domestic or global...). However, it also seems clear (from over here) that in the particular case of the reach of US Securities regulation, the courts (and the Second Circuit in particular) have, over time, attempted to refine this test – albeit, as inevitable with any judicial-interpretation-in-progress, with results that may sometimes lack coherence – so that it seems a shame that these painstaking efforts be set aside in one fell swoop. It appears then that the real debate concerns canons of statutory construction which involve far more than the sole issue of the international reach of the Exchange Act and extends to the whole sensitive question of judicial law-making when statutes are either silent or fuzzy in novel contexts. (Paradoxically, over here, the opposition between conservative originalists/fundamentalists and more policy or society-attuned liberals is considerably less violent than in the US on issues of statutory interpretation and the role of the courts, although one still comes across (in France) people who claim to believe that case-law interpreting the Code civil of 1804 is not a source of law, etc.; there are also signs of renewed debate on the role of the courts in the context of the new Constitutional review procedure in the French courts (the “QPC” 2010), over whether new Constitutional review should extend or not to judicial constructions of statutes). One is however struck by the fact that although the previous policy-based, conducts-and-effects

approach practiced by the courts is stigmatized as having no textual foundation, one may also wonder, in turn, where exactly the dogma of territoriality comes from.

3. So we've been there before (I think). But even if we accept that bright-line rules and dogmatic presumptions have their virtues, and may indeed work adequately if the courts are allowed sufficient margin to set them aside, these issues on statutory interpretation do not address the crucial question of building an appropriate response to the various dysfunctions of global markets. Of course, as the Court very rightly points out, financial markets are the object of very different national conceptions of regulation: there is no shared/uniform answer to the question of what a securities fraud actually is (I'd personally go further, of course, to say that there is no uniform answer to anything, but that is no doubt quite beside the point). But the existence of "true" conflicts of economic relation is not new. In the area of antitrust, the Court's appeal to positive comity in such a context, in *Empagran*, seems more attractive from this side of the Ocean. More importantly, in a world that is complex and messy (as Hannah has excellently pointed out), would it not be more judicious to devote energy to defining the requirements of reasonableness in the scope given to domestic regulation rather than asserting the primacy of a "principle of territoriality" which is not only culturally conditioned in the common law tradition (as I have often explained elsewhere), undefinable as a general matter, and totally maladjusted to contemporary interconnected markets. Indeed, the concurring opinion of Justices Stevens and Ginsburg provides an excellent hypothetical to illustrate the way in which the court's territorial, transaction-based test is likely to create a loophole for many types of securities fraud.
4. My last point will be a hotch-potch of observations which may only interest the European private international lawyer-observer. First, as I have often tried to make clear in a tradition of legal thinking in which the public/private distinction is still deeply ingrained, it is very hard here to contend that this is a conflict of "private" interests or private laws, notwithstanding the private actions/actors involved. Second, contrary to much that has been written, often misguidedly, over here on the *Vivendi* class litigation, this decision is not necessarily going to "protect foreign (French) interests" (whatever one may suppose them to be) nor prevent trans-Atlantic class actions including European investors as claimants or

European firms as defendants, as long as the new transactional criteria are satisfied. Third, it seems a little strange that at a time when the US Supreme Court is prudently retreating from extraterritoriality (whatever its reasons), the EU is doing exactly the reverse. Its policy appears to be to extend the effects of EU legislation to situations which are largely connected to third countries (after *Owusu*, see the new Alimentary Obligations Regulation or the Succession draft proposal). Finally, as I have already had the opportunity to point out elsewhere, considerable energy is currently being put into the reform of the Brussels I Regulation, following hard on the heels of Rome I and II. That is of course all very well. But the Morrison litigation shows that our models are no doubt already out of date (methodologically, epistemologically). Instead of doing things like promoting party autonomy in contract throughout the world (the latest initiative of the Hague Conference on PIL!?) ought we not to be thinking ahead to the massive new types of difficulties that (for instance) cross-border/global securities fraud is now raising?

Latest Issue of “Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts” (2/2010)

Recently, the March/April issue of the German law journal “Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts” (**IPRax**) was published.

This issue contains some of the papers presented at the Brussels I Conference in Heidelberg last December. The remaining papers will be published in the next issue.

Here is the contents:

- **Rolf Wagner:** “Die politischen Leitlinien zur justiziellen Zusammenarbeit in Zivilsachen im Stockholmer Programm” – the English abstract reads as

follows:

Since the coming into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 the European Community is empowered to act in the area of civil cooperation in civil and commercial matters. The “Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens” is the third programme in this area. It covers the period 2010-2014 and defines strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom, security and justice. This article provides an overview of the Stockholm Programme.

▪ **Peter Schlosser:** “The Abolition of Exequatur Proceedings – Including Public Policy Review?”

The – alleged – basic paper to which reference is continuously made when exequatur proceedings and public policy are discussed is a so-called Tampere resolution. The European Council convened in a special meeting in the Finnish city in 1999 to discuss the creation of an area of security, freedom and justice in the European Union. The outcome of this meeting was not a binding text which would have been adopted by something like a plenary session of the heads of States and Governments. Instead, the document is titled “presidency’s conclusion” and is a summary drafted by the then Finish president. It is a declaration of intention for the immediate future, pre-dominantly concerned with criminal and asylum matters and not binding on any European legislator. As far as “civil matters” are concerned, the “presidency’s conclusion” reads as follows: “In civil matters the European Council calls upon the Commission to make a proposal for further reduction of the intermediate measures which are still required to enable the recognition and enforcement of a decision or judgment in the requested state. As a first step, these intermediate procedures should be abolished for titles in respect of small consumer or commercial claims and for certain judgments in the fields of family litigation (e.g. on maintenance claims and visiting rights). Such decisions would be automatically recognized throughout the Union without any intermediate proceedings or grounds for refusal of enforcement. This could be accompanied by the setting of minimum standards on specific aspects of civil procedural law.” The conclusion does not say whether it would be advisable to generally abolish intermediate procedures. It only states that intermediate procedures should be further “reduced”. If one takes the view that the “first step” of reduction should be

followed by a second or third one, one could refer to the regulation on “Creating a European Enforcement Order for Uncontested Claims” and to the regulation on “Creating a European Order for Payment Procedure”. Not a single word mentions that at the end of all steps taken together the intermediate procedure or any control whatsoever in the requested state shall become obsolete and that even the most flagrant public policy concern shall become irrelevant. The need for a residuary review in the requested state is powerfully demonstrated by a recent ruling of the French Cour de Cassation: A woman resident in France had been ordered by the High Court of London to pay to the Lloyd’s Society no less than £ 142,037. The judgment did not give any reasons for the order except for stating that “the defendant had expressed its willingness not to accept the claim and that the judge accepted the claim pursuant to rule 14 par. 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules.” The relevant text of this provision is drafted as follows: “Where a party makes an admission under rule 14.1.2 (admission by notice in writing), any other party may apply for judgment on the admission. Judgment shall be such judgment as it appears to the court that the applicant is entitled for on the admission.” The judgment neither revealed at all the dates of the respective admissions made during the proceedings although the defendant had expressed its willingness to defend the case nor referred to any document produced in the course of the proceedings. One cannot but approve the ruling of the French Cour de Cassation confirming the decision of the Cour d’Appel of Rennes. The courts held that the mere abstract reference to rule 14 of the Civil Procedure Rules was tantamount to a total lack of reasons and that the recognition of such a judgment would be incompatible with international public policy. Further, that the production of documents such as a copy of the service of the action could not substitute the lacking reasoning of the judgment. The importance of the possibility to invoke public policy when necessary to hinder recognition of a judgment was evident also in the earlier Gambazzi case of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In that case the defendant was penalized for contempt of court by an exclusion from further participation in the proceedings. The reason for the measure was the defendant’s violation of a freezing and disclosure order. The ECJ ruled that in the light of the circumstances of the proceedings such a measure had to be regarded as grossly disproportionate and, hence, incompatible with the international public policy of the state where recognition was sought. In its final conclusions, general advocate Kokott emphasized that a foreign judgment cannot be recognized if the underlying proceedings failed to conform to the

requirement of fairness such as enacted in Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It is worth noting that also Switzerland refused to enforce the English judgment. The Swiss Federal Court so decided because after having changed its solicitor, Gambazzi's new solicitor was refused to study the files of the case. Even in the light of the pertinent case law regarding a very limited review in the requested state and the known promptness and efficiency of exequatur proceedings, the Commission still intends to abolish this "intermediate measure". In its Green Paper it literally states: "The existing exequatur procedure in the regulation simplified the procedure for recognition and enforcement of judgment compared to the previous systems under the 1968 Brussels Convention. Nevertheless, it is difficult to justify, in an internal market without frontiers that citizens and businesses have to undergo the expenses in terms of costs and time to assert their rights abroad." The context reveals that the term "the expenses" relates to the expenses of the exequatur procedure. However, the European Union is not the only internal market covering multiple jurisdictions. How is the comparable issue dealt with in other integrated internal markets? This is to be shown in the first part of this contribution. In the second part, I shall analyze in more detail and without any prejudice the ostensibly old-fashioned concept of exequatur.

- **Paul Beaumont/Emma Johnston:** "Abolition of the Exequatur in Brussels I: Is a Public Policy Defence Necessary for the Protection of Human Rights?"

The principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions and the creation of a genuine judicial area throughout the European Union was endorsed in Tampere in October 1999. Thus, one of the primary objectives of the Brussels I is to enhance the proper functioning of the Internal Market by encouraging free movement of judgments. It is clear that in Tampere the European Council wanted to start the process of abolishing "intermediate measures" ie the declaration of enforceability (exequatur). It went further and said that in certain suggested areas, including maintenance claims, the "grounds for refusal of enforcement" should be removed. It did not specifically require the abolition of intermediate measures in relation to Brussels I and certainly did not require the abolition of the "grounds for refusal of enforcement" in Brussels I. The European Council in Brussels in December 2009, after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and with the adoption of the Stockholm Programme, is still

committed to the broad objective of removing “intermediate measures”. This is a process to be “continued” over the 5 years of the Stockholm Programme from 2010-2014 but not one that has to be “completed”. The European Council no longer says anything about abolishing the “grounds for refusal of enforcement”. Article 73 of the Brussels I Regulation obliged the European Commission to evaluate the operation of the Regulation throughout the Union and to produce a report to the European Parliament and the Council. In 2009 the Commission produced such a Report and a Green Paper on the application of the Regulation, which proposes a number of reforms. One of the main proposals concerns the abolition of exequatur proceedings for all judgments falling within the ambit of the Regulation. Brussels I is built upon the foundation of mutual trust and recognition and these principles are the driving force behind the proposed abolition of exequatur proceedings. Article 33 of Brussels I states that no special procedure is required to ensure recognition of a judgment in another Member State. At first glance this provision seems to imply that recognition of civil and commercial judgments within the EU is automatic. The reality is however, somewhat more complex than that. In order for a foreign judgment to be enforceable, a declaration of enforceability is required. At the first instance, it involves purely formal checks of the relevant documents with no opportunity for the parties or the court to raise any of the grounds for refusal of enforcement. An appeal against the declaration of enforceability by the judgment debtor will trigger the application of Articles 34 and 35 which provide barriers to the recognition and enforcement of judgments. According to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), any such obstacle must be interpreted narrowly, “inasmuch as it constitutes an obstacle to the attainment of one of the fundamental objectives of the [Regulation]” The overwhelming majority of cases are successful and if the application is complete, then the decision is likely to be made within a matter of weeks. The Commission is of the view that given the high success rate of applications, the exequatur proceedings merely hinder free movement of judgments at the expense of the enforcement creditor and provide for delays for the benefit of the male fides judgment debtor. It is with this in mind that the Commission asks whether, in an Internal Market without frontiers, European citizens and businesses should be expected to sacrifice time and money in order to enforce their rights abroad. It is argued that in the Internal Market, free movement of judgments is necessary in order to ensure access to justice. Exequatur proceedings can create tension between Member States, creating suspicion and ultimately destroying mutual trust. It will be seen

however, that total abolition of exequatur proceedings would effectively mean judgments must be recognised in every case with no ground for refusal unless the grounds for refusal are moved to the actual enforcement stage. Total abolition of the grounds for refusing enforcement would result in an unfair bias in favour of the judgment creditor to the detriment of the judgment debtor. The Commission on the one hand proposes to abolish the exequatur procedure provided by Brussels I but on the other hand, suggests that some form of “safeguard” should be preserved. The Green Paper tentatively suggests that a special review a posteriori could be put in place which would in effect create automatic recognition of a judgment reviewable only after becoming enforceable. Such an approach would enhance judicial co-operation and aid progressive equivalence of judgments from other Member States. Yet it is questioned whether allowing an offending judgment to be enforced in the first place, only to review it a posteriori is the most effective way of dealing with the problem. It is instead argued that a provision similar to that of Article 20 of the Hague Child Abduction Convention could strike a fair balance between the interests of the judgment creditor and debtor. As Brussels I stand it is open to the judgment debtor to appeal the declaration of enforceability. The appellant may claim a breach of public policy or lack of due process in the service of the documents instituting proceedings which may amount to a breach of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The grounds to refuse recognition of a foreign judgment are restrictive and under no circumstances may the “substance” of the judgment be reviewed. Such a review of the substance would seriously undermine the mutual trust between courts of the European Union. However, the public policy exception does allow States to uphold essential substantive rules of its own system by refusing to enforce judgments from other EU States that infringe the fundamental principles of its own law. The question is whether Member States will be prepared to abandon the “public policy” defence and thereby give up this right to protect the fundamental principles of their substantive law? Will they be content to have a defence that simply focuses on protecting the fundamental rights of the defendant?

- **Horatia Muir Watt:** “Brussels I and Aggregate Litigation or the Case for Redesigning the Common Judicial Area in Order to Respond to Changing Dynamics, Functions and Structures in Contemporary Adjudication and

Litigation”

Recent litigation relating to the recognition and enforcement of US class action judgments or settlements under Member States’ common private international law (still applicable to relationships with third States), along with current trends in their domestic legislation towards the acceptance of representative, class or group actions, herald a whole set of new issues linked to the appearance of collective redress within the common area of justice. It is the thesis of this paper that the Brussels I Regulation in its present form is ill-equipped to deal with the onslaught of aggregate claims, both in its provisions on jurisdiction and as far as the free movement of judgments and settlements is concerned. It may well be that the same could be said for the conflict of laws rules in Regulations Rome I and Rome II, which were also designed to govern purely individual relationships. Indeed, one may wonder whether the difficulties which arise under this heading are not the sign of an at least partial obsolescence of the whole European private international law model, insofar as it rests upon increasingly outdated conceptions of the dynamics, function, structure and governance requirements of litigation and adjudication. Although this conclusion may seem radical, it is in fact hardly surprising. Indeed, as it has been rightly observed, within the civilian legal tradition which is the template for the conceptions of adjudication and jurisdiction underlying the Brussels I Regulation (like the other private international law instruments applicable in the common area of justice), the recourse to group litigation, which is now beginning to appear in the European context as one of the most effective means of improving ex post accountability of providers of mass commodities freely entering the market, represents a “sea-change” in legal structures, away from exclusive reliance on public enforcement.

▪ **Burkhard Hess:** “Cross-border Collective Litigation and the Regulation Brussels I”

The European law of civil procedure is guided by the “leitmotiv” of two-party-proceedings. Litigation is generally regarded as taking place between one specific plaintiff and one specific defendant. Especially Article 27 JR (JR = Brussels I Regulation) which concerns pendency and Articles 32 and 34 No. 3 JR which address res judicata and conflicting judgments, are based on this concept. However, the idea of collective redress is not entirely new to European

cross border litigation. Article 6 No. 1 JR explicitly states that several connected lawsuits can be brought to the courts of a Member State where one of the defendants is domiciled. When related actions are pending in different Member States, the court which was seized later may stay its proceedings. By providing for a discretionary stay, Article 28 JR also includes situations of complex litigation. Several cases concerning the JR have dealt with collective redress. The most prominent case is VKI ./ Henkel. In this case, an Austrian consumer association sought an injunction against a German businessman. Another example is the Lechouritou case, where approximately 1000 Greek victims of war atrocities committed during WW II sued the German government for compensation. The famous Mines de Potasse d'Alsace case involved damages caused to dozens of Dutch farmers by the pollution of the river Rhine. It goes without saying that in addition to the case law presented, several cross-border collective lawsuits have been filed in the Member States. These lawsuits mainly deal with antitrust and (less often) product liability issues. Finally, the Injunctions Directive 98/27/EC permits consumer associations from another state to institute proceedings for the infringement of consumer laws in the Member State where the infringement was initiated. However, this directive has not been very successful. It has only been applied in a few cross-border cases.

▪ **Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo:** "Choice of Court and Arbitration Agreements and the Review of the Brussels I Regulation"

Similarities and differences between choice of court and arbitration agreements in the perspective of the review of Regulation (EC) 44/2001 Choice of court agreements and arbitration agreements have much in common. Both involve the exercise of party autonomy in the designation of the judicial or arbitral forum for the settlement of disputes and have the effect of ousting the default jurisdiction. Both aim to ensure predictability and to allow the parties to choose the forum they consider best suited to adjudicate their dispute. The importance of these goals is by now largely acknowledged especially in international commercial transactions. Although it has not always been a foregone conclusion that parties could exclude the jurisdiction of local courts in favor of foreign ones or of arbitration, today most systems recognize the role of procedural party autonomy in this context. Also the policy reasons for favoring party autonomy in the choice of forum are largely similar for both types of

agreements. Because of the broad recognition of the crucial role of these agreements, there is a growing concern that their effects are not sufficiently guaranteed in the European Union. It is not uncommon that proceedings are brought before a court of one member State in alleged violation of a choice of the courts of another member State or of arbitration by litigants who appear to attempt to circumvent these agreements by exploiting the perceived inefficiencies of some courts, or their reluctance to enforce such agreements effectively. In a number of well known, the European Court of Justice has found itself unable – quite correctly, in light of the existing text of Regulation (EC) 44/2001 (the “Brussels Regulation”) – to accept interpretations aimed at preventing such situations, foremost amongst which anti-suit injunctions. Partly for these reasons forum selection and arbitration agreements (and more generally arbitration) are amongst the topics on which the Commission has invited comments in the Green Paper on the review of the Regulation.

- **Urs Peter Gruber:** “Die neue EG-Unterhaltsverordnung” – the English abstract reads as follows:

Actually, the relevant rules on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations are contained in the Brussels I Regulation. In the near future, a new Regulation, which specifically deals with maintenance obligations, will apply. This new Regulation will bring about several significant changes. It will considerably strengthen the position of the maintenance creditor, in particular in the field of recognition and enforcement of decisions. It will contain rules on issues, which up to now have been left to the national legislators. Therefore, it can be said that the new Regulation marks a new level of integration in the field of European civil procedure.

- **Ansgar Staudinger:** “Streitfragen zum Erfüllungsortsgerichtsstand im Luftverkehr” – the English abstract reads as follows:

In case of carriage of passengers by air the Bundesgerichtshof has to interpret article 5 (1) lit. b Brussels I-Regulation. In the author’s view the grounds as well as the conclusion deserve absolute consent. However there persist several questions: The location of the place of the arrival or departure in the state,

where the defendant carrier is domiciled or in a Non Member State of the EU does not a priori exclude the application of article 5 (1) lit. b Brussels I-Regulation including its passenger's voting right. The customer factual only stay an option for that place, which neither corresponds with the defendants domicile nor a EU-Non Member State. Are both connection factors located outside the Member State, remains a recourse to article 5 (1) lit. a Brussels I-Regulation. Waiving the courts jurisdiction for the place of performance of the obligation in question by a standard form contract through the carrier and stipulating an exclusive conduct of a case in the Member State of his domicile seems to be improper in terms of the Council Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts respectively §§ 307 (1), 310 (3) no. 3 of the "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch" opposite to consumers, which are domiciled in the EU-Member State of the arrival or departure. This applies particularly when claims according to the Regulation (EC) No. 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights are concerned.

- **Rolf Wagner:** "Die Entscheidungen des EuGH zum Gerichtsstand des Erfüllungsorts nach der EuGVVO - unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Rechtssache Rehder" - the English abstract reads as follows:

The article deals with the place of performance as a base for jurisdiction. There has been a lot of case law by the ECJ concerning Art. 5 No. 1 Brussels Convention: According to this case law, in general the place of performance had to be determined for each obligation separately (de Bloos-rule) according to choice of law rules of the forum (Tessili-rule). This system, however, has been strongly criticised. Thus, after long discussions during the negotiations concerning the revision of the Brussels Convention, a new wording was found for Art. 5 No. 1 Brussels Regulation, even though it was a compromise: The Brussels Regulation now defines at least the place of performance for the majority of contracts in international trade, i. e. for contracts for the sale of goods and contracts for the provision of services. Therefore it does not come as a surprise that the ECJ has been asked to give guidance in the interpretation of this definition. The present article comments on three important judgments by the ECJ connected to this question. In particular the author analyses in depth the judgment given in Rehder: In this case, the ECJ determined the place of performance with regard to contracts for the transport of passengers. Thus the

author concludes that the European legislator neither could nor will be able to find a perfect solution. Therefore, patience is required with regard to the interpretation of the new definition because there are still open questions which have to be answered by the ECJ.

▪ **Gilles Cuniberti:** “Debarment from Defending, Default Judgments and Public Policy”

The origin of the Gambazzi case is to be found in the collapse of a Canadian investment company, Castor Holding Ltd., at the beginning of the 1990s. Castor had been incorporated in Montreal in 1977. Its first president was a German-born Canadian businessman named Karsten von Wersebe. In the 1980s, however, its main manager became a German national named Otto Wolfgang Stolzenberg. Marco Gambazzi was a Swiss lawyer who had specialized in assets management. He first invested in Castor, and was then offered to become a member of the board of directors of the company. In 1992, however, Castor was declared insolvent. Dozens of suits followed. First, the trustee (syndic) sought to challenge payments made by Castor before 1992. He focused on a Can\$ 15 million distribution of dividends to shareholders at the end of 1990, which he was eventually able to claim back after establishing that the company was already insolvent in 1990. More importantly, many investors sued the auditors of Castor, Coopers & Lybrand, who had certified its accounts between 1978 and 1991. After more than ten years of litigation, there was still no judgment on the merits, which led the Montreal Court of appeal to conclude that “it is not exaggerated to say that the Castor Holding case has been an exceptional one in Canadian legal history, a genuine judicial derailment”. In 1996, a remarkable decision was made by a handful of Canadian investors. DaimlerChrysler Canada and certain pension and other benefit funds that it had established for its employees decided to initiate proceedings in London against four individuals formerly involved in the management of Castor (Stolzenberg, Gambazzi, von Wersebe and Banziger) and more than thirty corporate entities allegedly related to them. The plaintiffs argued that they had been defrauded by the defendants in Canada, and thus sought restitution. The reason why the proceedings were brought to England is unclear. There was virtually no connection between the case and the United Kingdom. The only exception was that Stolzenberg once owned a house in London, as he owned others in Paris and, it seems, Germany, Canada and South America. But even that house,

which was the sole connecting factor which was likely to give jurisdiction to the English court over the entire case and the thirty-six defendants, was sold before the defendants were served with the writ instituting the proceedings in March 1997. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the jurisdiction of the English court was challenged. The case went up to the House of Lords which eventually ruled that the date which mattered to appreciate whether one defendant was domiciled in England and could thus be the anchor allowing to drag an infinite number of co-defendants to London was the time when the writ was issued by the English court. In this case, that meant May 1996, because the English court had permitted the plaintiffs to postpone service of the writ in order to enable them, first, to conduct *ex parte* hearings of several days for the purpose of convincing the court that it should grant a world wide freezing order, and, second, to carefully prepare simultaneous service so that none of the defendants could escape the English trial by initiating parallel proceedings elsewhere. The only reasonable explanation for choosing to bring the case to England is the availability of powerful interim measures which have turned London into a magnet forum for international fraud cases. English world wide freezing orders and, even more importantly, English disclosure orders seem to be remarkably and uniquely efficient in the process of tracing stolen assets, so much so that an English court once called them one of the two nuclear weapons of English civil procedure. If other jurisdictions have not been able to tackle as efficiently the issue of international frauds, alleged victims cannot be blamed for seeking justice where it can effectively be achieved. But the quest for justice, or for making England the jurisdiction of choice, cannot justify everything. In this case, available nuclear weapons were used to their full capacity. This certainly enabled plaintiffs to secure a decisive victory. But this was at the costs of the fairness that the English legal system ought to have afforded to the defendants.

- **Herbert Roth** on the ECJ's judgment in case C-167/08 (Draka NK Cables Ltd.): "Das Verfahren über die Zulassung der Zwangsvollstreckung nach Art. 38 ff. EuGVVO als geschlossenes System"
- **Christian Heinze**: "Fiktive Inlandszustellungen und der Vorrang des europäischen Zivilverfahrensrechts" - the English abstract reads as follows:

Some EU Member States' national procedural laws allow or used to allow service on defendants domiciled in another EU Member State by a form of

“fictitious” service within the jurisdiction. Under these provisions and certain further requirements, service may be deemed to take effect at the moment when a copy of the document is lodged with a national authority or at the time when it is sent abroad for service, irrespective of the time when the recipient actually receives the copy. Even if the national law deems this form of service to take effect within the jurisdiction, the following article argues that the practice is incompatible with Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents, because it impairs the effectiveness of the European rules, in particular as concerns the date of service.

- **Yuanshi Bu:** “Danone vs. Wahaha – Anmerkungen zu Schiedsverfahren mit chinesischen Parteien” – the English abstract reads as follows:

The legal feud between Danone and Wahaha, both being leading beverage manufacturers in the Chinese market, had developed into one of the most significant investment disputes in the history of the People’s Republic of China. A number of arbitration proceedings and civil actions were filed inside and outside China. In particular, several arbitration proceedings pending before the Swedish Chamber of Commerce since May 2007, the outcome of which was supposed to largely decide that of the disputes between the two parties, had drawn considerable public attention. Despite the surprising settlement shortly before the arbitration tribunals rendered their decisions, the disputes between Danone and Wahaha offer a valuable opportunity to inquire into the law and practice of arbitration relating to foreign investments in China. This case note will first comment on the award of a Chinese domestic arbitration proceeding dealing with one of the major issues of the whole disputes – the ownership of the trademark “Wahaha” – and then discuss questions that were relevant to the proceeding in Stockholm.

- **Boris Kasolowsky/Magdalene Steup:** “Insolvenz in internationalen Schiedsverfahren – lex arbitri oder lex fori concursus” – the English abstract reads as follows:

The article deals with a recent English Court of Appeal decision which addresses the effects of the insolvency of a party to pending arbitration proceedings. The Court of Appeal concluded that the effects were to be

determined by reference to English law and considered that the arbitration tribunal acted well within its jurisdiction when it ordered the proceedings to be continued. In reaching this Conclusion the Court of Appeal just as the arbitral tribunal and the High Court relied on the European Insolvency Regulation which forms part of English law. Being the first major court of an EU Member State to address the question of the insolvency of a party to pending arbitration proceedings by reference to the European Insolvency Regulation, the judgment is likely to serve as a signpost for what is to be expected in other Member States. The article further considers the likely impact of this particular decision on the future practice of choosing arbitration seats, and possibly also the timing for commencing arbitration proceedings. In doing so, the authors will consider in particular the decision of the Swiss Bundesgericht which, by contrast to the English Court of Appeal judgment, concludes that the relevant company law/the lex concursus (i.e. the provisions of law applicable to the party that happens to have become insolvent in the course of the proceedings) are decisive for the purposes of determining the effects of the insolvency of one of the parties on the continuation of the proceedings.

- **Erik Jayme** on the meeting of the European Group for Private International Law in Padua in September 2009: “Die Vereinheitlichung des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts in der Europäischen Union: Tendenzen und Widerstände Tagung der „Europäischen Gruppe für Internationales Privatrecht“ (GEDIP) an der Universität Padua”
- **Marc-Philippe Weller** on the Heidelberg symposium on the occasion of the 75th birthday of Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Erik Jayme: “Symposium zu Ehren von Erik Jayme”

October 2007 Round-Up: International Tort Claims, “Forum

Non” Dismissals and Punitive Damages

This installment of significant developments will focus on salient issues that have been the subject of frequent, past posts on this website.

First, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided a compendium of Alien Tort Claim cases that raise an interesting question at the intersection of domestic and international law: that is, when determining whether a corporate defendant has “aided and abetted” a violation of international law, what law defines the test for “aiding and abetting.” *Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank* and *Ntsebeza v. DaimlerChrysler* (available [here](#)) concern the tort claims of a class of persons alive in South Africa between 1948 and 1993 who were affected by the apartheid regime. The defendants are 50 multinational corporations, and the claimed damages total over \$400 billion. The basic theory of the case is that defendants’ indirectly caused plaintiffs’ injuries by perpetuating the apartheid system (e.g. by providing loans to a “desperate South African government”), and that they indirectly profited from those acts which violated recognized human rights standards, but not necessarily the law of the place where those acts took place. The District Court dismissed the case as a non-justiciable political question, but also because “aiding and abetting” human rights violations – the gravamen of the indirect causation and indirect harm claims – provided no basis for ATCA liability. A split panel of the Second circuit reversed. Amongst the other decisions intertwined in the 146 page opinion, the court determined that the appropriate test for aiding and abetting liability under the ATCA is set out in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – that is, one is guilty if one renders aid “for the purpose of facilitating the commissions of a . . . crime.” This is a far more stringent test than the one argued by Plaintiffs, founded on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b), which pins liability if one “gives substantial assistance or encouragement” to another’s actions which he “knows” to “constitute a breach of duty.” While the case was kept alive and remanded for further consideration, commentators have begun to wonder whether Plaintiffs have won a pyrrhic victory: “[i]f the Rome Statute test for aiding and abetting is broadly adopted, few ATCA cases against corporations may clear summary judgment and go on trial.”

In a second notable case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

Circuit considered does a forum non conveniens dismissal of foreign plaintiffs in favor of Italian courts put the remaining American plaintiffs “effectively out of court” so as to justify appellate review of the dismissal? The panel held that it does. In *King v. Cessna Aircraft Co.*, the personal estates of 70 deceased individuals sued defendant for a tragic air accident in Milan, Italy. Sixty-nine of those plaintiffs were European, with one being American. The district court dismissed the claims of the European plaintiffs on forum non conveniens grounds, and stayed the action of the American plaintiff pending resolution by the Italian courts (because, in its view, the American plaintiff was entitled to “a presumption in favor of its chosen forum”). All plaintiffs appealed. Because one may not generally appeal a decision to stay proceedings, appellate jurisdiction turned on whether the American plaintiff was “effectively out of court” by the imposition of the stay. The Court held that that plaintiff:

“has for all practical effects been put out of court indefinitely while litigation whose nature, extent, and duration are unknown, is pending in Italy. The district court has held its hand while Italian courts assume or continue what amounts to jurisdiction over the merits of the lawsuit. Their decision of Italian law issues will be followed by the district court. The stay order does have the legal effect of preventing [the American plaintiff] from proceeding with his claims in federal court for an indefinite period of time, potentially for years. Because he has been effectively put out of court, we have jurisdiction to review the order that did put him out. We do not mean that there are no differences between federalism and international comity for purposes of evaluating the merits of a stay order, as distinguished from deciding whether appellate jurisdiction exists to review the stay order . . . : “The relationship between the federal courts and the states (grounded in federalism and the Constitution) is different from the relationship between federal courts and foreign nations (grounded in the historical notion of comity).” . . . Those important differences do not, however, affect the extent to which a plaintiff is placed “effectively out of court,” which is the measure that defines our appellate jurisdiction over stay orders.”

On the merits, the court vacated the stay as improvident because “there is no indication when, if ever, the Italian litigation will resolve the claims raised in this case, and whether [the American plaintiff] will have a meaningful opportunity to participate in those proceedings.” The court did not consider the merits of the

European plaintiff's appeal of the *forum non conveniens* decision, preferring instead to remand the entire case for reconsideration in the event that the vacation of the stay, and the continuation of the lone American case here in the U.S., affects that decision.

Finally, in the latest salvo into the propriety and extent of punitive damage awards, the Supreme Court just granted certiorari in *Exxon Shipping Co., et al., v. Baker, et al.* (07-219). This case concerns a \$2.5 billion punitive damages award against Exxon Mobil Corp. and its shipping subsidiary for the massive oil spill in Alaska's Prince William Sound in 1989. In agreeing to hear Exxon's appeal, the Court will decide whether the company should be subject to punitive damages solely upon judge-made maritime law, which is in apparent contradiction of decades of legal history and subject to considerable discordance in the federal courts. The case also raises the question of whether, if maritime law does govern, this specific award is too high because it is said to be "larger than the total of all punitive damages awards affirmed by all federal appellate courts in our history." The appeal also included the question of whether a verdict of that size was unconstitutional; separating this case from recent ones (see [here](#)), the Court did not agree to hear that last question. Nevertheless, this decision will have significant ramifications for international maritime concerns. Early reactions can be found [here](#), [here](#), and [here](#). SCOTUSblog has a brief discussion and links to the briefs as well [here](#).

Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law after the Class Action Fairness Act

Samuel Issacharoff (*New York University School of Law*) has made his forthcoming article in the *Columbia Law Review*, "**Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act**", available for download on SSRN. The abstract reads as follows:

This Essay examines the pressure placed upon choice of law doctrine by the newly enacted Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"). The core argument is that current choice of law doctrine, which assumes fidelity to the forum state choice of law rules as its basic premise, corresponds poorly to the national scope of economic activity in cases brought into federal court under CAFA. The Essay argues that there needs to be some conformity between the national scale of contemporary economic activity and the state-by-state presumption of inherited conflict of laws doctrine in order to provide some sensible legal oversight of national market conduct. Because of the multiplicity of potential forums for litigation of national market activity, the inherited doctrines of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. and Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins do little to provide settled expectations about the substantive laws governing broad-scale economic conduct.

The Essay offers an approach that should guide choice of law rules in the context of national market cases based on the need to facilitate common legal oversight of undifferentiated national market activity. The claim here is that conduct that arises from mass-produced goods entering the stream of commerce with no preset purchaser or destination should be treated as just that: goods in the national market. In the absence of national choice of law rules, this Essay suggests that courts should, as a default rule, apply the laws of the home state of the defendant to all standardized claims, regardless of the situs of the final injury. The upshot of this approach is to suggest a path for future development of national market cases that have been brought into the federal courts as a result of CAFA.

The full article can be downloaded from [here](#).