The Financial Times has reported yesterday on a recent judgment of the Russian Arbitration Court in Sony v. RTC in which the court struck down a unilateral option jurisdiction clause.

The case involved two commercial companies, Sony and Russian Telephone Company (RTC). The contract included a clause which forbad the Russian party to sue in Russia while, it seems, giving much more freedom to Sony to bring proceedings. The Russian party nevertheless sued in a Russian court, which retained jurisdiction notwithstanding the jurisdiction clause.

The chief of staff of the Russian court is reported to have specifically referred to the judgment of the French supreme court which struck down a one way jurisdiction clause in September.

Update:

• A full report on the case is available here.
• See also the guest post of MM Sullivan and Maynard on the Russian judgment in today’s FT

On 16 November, a Special Commission of the Hague Conference on Private International Law approved the text of the Hague Principles on the Choice of Law in International Contracts.

The Principles, an amended version of the draft text produced by the Conference’s working group, are intended to be used (among other functions) as a model for national, regional, supranational or international instruments. They deal with the effectiveness and effect of a choice of law in cross-border trade/business contracts, but not consumer or employment contracts (Art. 1). They allow not only a choice of national law (Art. 2) but also (albeit subject to conditions that are riddled with uncertainty, obfuscation and self-serving terminology) a choice of non-national rules of law (Art. 3).

The remaining Principles address other aspects of the choice of law (express and tacit choice, formal validity, law to be applied in determining choice, severability, renvoi, scope of chosen law, assignment, mandatory provisions and public policy).

The text of the Principles (which will, in due course, be accompanied by a Commentary) is as follows:

The Preamble

1. This instrument sets forth general principles concerning choice of law in international commercial contracts. They affirm the principle of party autonomy with limited exceptions.

2. They may be used as a model for national, regional, supranational or international instruments.

3. They may be used to interpret, supplement and develop rules of private international law.

4. They may be applied by courts and by arbitral tribunals.

Article 1 – Scope of the Principles

1. These Principles apply to choice of law in international contracts where each party is acting in the exercise of its trade or profession. They do not apply to consumer or employment contracts.

2. For the purposes of these Principles, a contract is international unless the parties have their establishments in the same State and the relationship of the parties and all other relevant elements, regardless of the chosen law, are connected only with that State.

3. These Principles do not address the law governing – a) the capacity of natural persons; b) arbitration agreements and agreements on choice of court; c) companies or other collective bodies and trusts; d) insolvency; e) the proprietary effects of contracts; f) the issue of whether an agent is able to bind a principal to a third party.

Article 2 – Freedom of choice

1. A contract is governed by the law chosen by the parties.

2. The parties may choose (i) the law applicable to the whole contract or to only part of it and (ii) different laws for different parts of the contract.

3. The choice may be made or modified at any time. A choice or modification made after the contract has been concluded shall not prejudice its formal validity or the rights of third parties.

4. No connection is required between the law chosen and the parties or their transaction.

Article 3 – Rules of law

In these Principles, a reference to law includes rules of law that are generally accepted on an international, supranational or regional level as a neutral and balanced set of rules, unless the law of the forum provides otherwise.

Article 4 – Express and tacit choice

A choice of law, or any modification of a choice of law, must be made expressly or appear clearly from the provisions of the contract or the circumstances. An agreement between the parties to confer jurisdiction on a court or an arbitral tribunal to determine disputes under the contract is not in itself equivalent to a choice of law. Article 5 – Formal validity of the choice of law

A choice of law is not subject to any requirement as to form unless otherwise agreed by the parties.

Article 6 – Agreement on the choice of law

1. Subject to paragraph 2, a) whether the parties have agreed to a choice of law is determined by the law that was purportedly agreed to; b) if the parties have used standard terms designating different laws and under both of these laws the same standard terms prevail, the law designated in those terms applies; if under these laws different standard terms prevail, or if no standard terms prevail, there is no choice of law.

2. The law of the State in which a party has its establishment determines whether that party has consented to the choice of law if, under the circumstances, it would not be reasonable to make that determination under the law specified in paragraph 1.

Article 7 – Severability

A choice of law cannot be contested solely on the ground that the contract to which it applies is not valid.

Article 8 – Exclusion of renvoi A choice of law does not refer to rules of private international law of the law chosen by the parties unless the parties expressly provide otherwise.

Article 9 – Scope of the chosen law

1. The law chosen by the parties shall govern all aspects of the contract between the parties, including but not limited to – a) interpretation; b) rights and obligations arising from the contract; c) performance and the consequences of non-performance, including the assessment of damages; d) the various ways of extinguishing obligations, and prescription and limitation periods; e) validity and the consequences of invalidity of the contract; f) burden of proof and legal presumptions; g) pre-contractual obligations.

2. Paragraph 1 e) does not preclude the application of any other governing law supporting the formal validity of the contract.

Article 10 – Assignment In the case of contractual assignment of a creditor’s rights against a debtor arising from a contract between the debtor and creditor – a) if the parties to the contract of assignment have chosen the law governing that contract, the law chosen governs the mutual rights and obligations of the creditor and the assignee arising from their contract; b) if the parties to the contract between the debtor and creditor have chosen the law governing that contract, the law chosen governs (i) whether the assignment can be invoked against the debtor, (ii) the rights of the assignee against the debtor, and (iii) whether the obligations of the debtor have been discharged.

Article 11 – Overriding mandatory rules and public policy (ordre public)

1. These Principles shall not prevent a court from applying overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the forum which apply irrespective of the law chosen by the parties.

2. The law of the forum determines when a court may or must apply or take into account overriding mandatory provisions of another law.

3. A court may only exclude application of a provision of the law chosen by the parties if and to the extent that the result of such application would be manifestly incompatible with fundamental notions of public policy (ordre public) of the forum.

4. The law of the forum determines when a court may or must apply or take into account the public policy (ordre public) of a State the law of which would be applicable in the absence of a choice of law.

5. These Principles shall not prevent an arbitral tribunal from applying or taking into account public policy (ordre public), or from applying or taking into account overriding mandatory provisions of a law other than the law chosen by the parties, if the arbitral tribunal is required or entitled to do so.

Article 12 – Establishment If a party has more than one establishment, the relevant establishment for the purpose of these Principles is the one which has the closest relationship to the contract at the time of its conclusion of the contract.

Matthew Happold is Professor of Public International Law at the University of Luxembourg and an associate tenant at 3 Hare Court, London.

Cross posted at EJILTalk!

Another chapter has begun in the saga of NML Capital Ltd’s attempts to collect on its holdings of Argentinean bonds (see here for earlier reporting on this blog and here for earlier reporting on EJILTalk!) with the initiation of inter-State proceedings by Argentina against Ghana under the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of the Sea. 

It will be recalled that on 2 October 2012, whilst on an official visit, the Argentinean naval training vessel the ARA Libertad was arrested in the Ghanaian port of Tema.  Its arrest was ordered by Justice Richard Adjei Frimpong, sitting in the Commercial Division of the Accra High Court, on an application by NML to enforce a judgment against Argentina obtained in the US courts (see here for the decision of the US Court of Appeals for the 2^nd Circuit).   The judge considered that the waiver of immunity contained in the bond documents, which provided that: 

To the extent the Republic [of Argentina] or any of its revenues, assets or properties shall be entitled … to any immunity from suit, … from attachment prior to judgment, … from execution of a judgment or from any other legal or judicial process or remedy, … the Republic has irrevocably agreed not to claim and has irrevocably waived such immunity to the fullest extent permitted by the laws of such jurisdiction (and consents generally for the purposes of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to the giving of any relief or the issue of any process in connection with any Related Proceeding or Related Judgment).

 extended to lift the vessel’s immunity from execution.  Argentina has strongly resisted this assertion of jurisdiction, claiming that it violates the immunity enjoyed by public vessels, which cannot be impliedly waived.  It appears that the vessel remains under the control of a skeleton crew, who have prevented any efforts by the Ghanaian authorities to move the vessel, whilst being preventing themselves from leaving port. 

Both States being parties to UNCLOs, on 29 October 2012 Argentina instituted arbitration proceedings against Ghana under Annex VII UNCLOS (Ghana not having made a declaration under Article 287 UNCLOS: see Article 287(3)).  On 14 November 2012 Argentina applied to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea for the prescription of provisional measures prior to the constitution of the Annex VII tribunal (see ITLOS press release here).

The prescription of provisional measures by ITLOs is covered by Article 290(5), which provides that:

Pending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal to which a dispute is being submitted under this section, any court or tribunal agreed upon by the parties or, failing such agreement within two weeks from the date of the request for provisional measures, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea … may prescribe … provisional measures in accordance with this article if it considers that prima facie the tribunal which is to be constituted would have jurisdiction and that the urgency of the situation so requires.

However, even given the rather low hurdle to be vaulted, it is perhaps doubtful whether the first criterion (‘that prima facie the tribunal which is to be constituted would have jurisdiction’) can be satisfied.  Article 287(1) UNCLOS provides that such a tribunal ‘shall have jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention’, and it is unclear whether the dispute falls within the provisions of UNCLOS.  Argentina may well have the law on its side as regards State immunity for warships.  It may be, however, that ITLOs and an UNCLOS Annex VII arbitral tribunal are not the right fora for the settlement of its dispute with Ghana. 

It may well be, as argued by Argentina in its request for the indication of provisional measures (see here), that the Libertad is a warship for the purposes of Art 29 UNCLOs.  However, Article 32 then states:

With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes.

Subsection A of Section 3 of Part II of UNCLOs deals with the rules applying to all ships concerning innocent passage in the territorial sea.  Articles 30 and 31 respectively cover non-compliance with warships of the laws and regulations of a coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea, and flag State responsibility for any loss or damage to a coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea.  Put simply, therefore, the Convention states that it says nothing about the immunities of warships in the territorial sea (Article 32 falling within Part II of UNCLOs dealing with the legal regime of the territorial sea – despite the provision’s blanket terms another provision does exist (Article 95) concerning the immunities of warships on the high seas), still less about the immunities of warships in internal waters (which no provision of UNCLOs covers), leaving the matter to be dealt with elsewhere. 

In addition to relaying on Article 32, Argentina also refers to the right of innocent passage and freedom of navigation (Articles 18(1)(b), 87(1)(a) and 90).  However, the Libertad was arrested whilst in port, within Ghanaian internal waters (Article 11 UNCLOS), so that it does not seem apt to see its seizure as impeding its right of innocent passage, still less its freedom of navigation.  If so, any arrest pursuant to judicial proceedings would be a similar violation.   It is also difficult to see the Libertad’s official visit to Tema as an incident of innocent passage.  Indeed, Argentina, in its request for provisional measures (paragraph 4), argues that the visit was specifically governed by an agreement between the two States, which would seem unnecessary were the vessel simply exercising an already-existing right.  Moreover, Article 28 UNCLOs provides that although a coastal State can only levy execution against or arrest a ship for the purpose of civil proceedings in respect of obligations or liabilities assumed or incurred by the ship herself in the course or for the purpose of her voyage through the waters of the coastal State, this limitation is without prejudice to the right of a coastal State:

in accordance with its laws, to levy execution against or to arrest, for the purpose of any civil proceedings, a foreign ship lying in the territorial sea, or passing through the territorial sea after leaving internal waters

which strongly suggests that the limitation itself only applies to vessels exercising their right of innocent passage within the coast State’s territorial sea, not those within its internal waters (as does the location of Article 28 within Part II of UNCLOS).  It is not Ghana’s assertion of a general jurisdiction to arrest ships within its ports and harbours that Argentina objects to, but its exercise of that jurisdiction with regard to a vessel which Argentina argues is immune from it.  In reality, the dispute revolves around whether, as a matter of international law, Ghana should accord State immunity to the ARA Libertad.  Argentina’s request, by spending 18 out of its 22 paragraphs of legal grounds on the matter, makes this point clearly. 

The other criterion for the prescription of provisional measures set out in Article 290(5) (‘urgency’) might be thought less problematic.  The provisional measures sought by Argentina, however, are that Ghana ‘unconditionally enables’ the Libertad  to leave Tema and Ghana’s jurisdictional waters, and to be resupplied to that end (paragraph 72bis, Argentina’s request for provisional measures).  Provisional measures are intended ‘to preserve the respective rights of the parties to the dispute … pending the final decision’ (Article 290(1)).  It cannot be said that the measures requested by Argentina do anything to preserve any rights Ghana might have.  Indeed, it prescribed, they would seem essentially to settle the dispute.  A case can be made for the release of the vessel, not least because NML has already made it clear that it would permit it on payment of US$20 million, but not, at this stage, unconditionally.    

Interestingly, on 26 October 2012, just prior to commencing arbitration proceedings against Ghana, Argentina withdrew, ‘with immediate effect’ its declaration under Article 298 UNCLOs exempting disputes falling within Article 298(1)(a), (b) and (c) from the compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions  provided for in section 2 of Part XV of UNCLOS insofar as it concerned ‘military activities by government vessels and aircraft engaged in noncommercial service’.  Article 298(1)(b), which covers: ‘Disputes concerning military activities, including military activities by government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial service …’  This may have been ex abundanti cautela.  Although the training of naval cadets could be seen as a military activity, a goodwill visit to Tema perhaps could not, still less the arrest, following a court order, of a vessel on such a visit.    

As yet, Ghana’s attitude to the proceedings has not been revealed.  Argentina’s request for provisional measures (paragraph 39) indicates that the Ghanaian Government did argue before Justice Frimpong that the Libertad was immune from the jurisdiction of the Ghanaian courts.  However, acts of the Ghanaian courts are equally acts of the Ghanaian State and it is the court’s opinions which have prevailed and which Argentina complains about.  In general, it would seem that the Government is between a rock and a hard place.  It cannot overrule its court’s decisions without breaching domestic law. Indeed, it might even be, given NML’s penchant for litigation, that any interference with the judicial process leading to the Libertad’s release could give rise to a claim for denial of justice by NML under the UK-Ghana BIT.

The fourth issue of French Journal du droit international (Clunet) for 2012 was just released. It contains two articles addressing issues of private international law and several casenotes. A full table of content is accessible here.

In the first article, Walid Ben Hamida, who lectures at Evry University, discusses the application of the UNIDROIT Principles in arbitration proceedings involving states or international organizations (Les principes d’UNIDROIT et l’arbitrage transnational : L’expansion des principes d’UNIDROIT aux arbitrages opposant des États ou des organisations internationales à des personnes privées).

Originally destined to international commercial contracts, UNIDROIT principles are now experiencing a remarkable growth in transnational relationships. Due to their neutrality, universality and quality, they have been well received by the arbitrators and the parties in many arbitrations opposing private parties to States or international organizations. In this article, the author makes an inventory of the references to UNIDROIT principles in transnational arbitral jurisprudence and analyzes the reasons of their application. He analyses both traditional transnational arbitration based on classical arbitration clauses and unilateral transnational arbitration resulting from the acceptance by the private party of an offer of arbitration expressed by a State or by an international organization.

In the second article, Olivier Dubos, who is a professor of public law at the University of Bordeaux, explores the issues raised by the different interpretations of Article 33 of the Montreal Convention adopted by French and American courts (Juridictions américaines et juridictions françaises face à l’article 33 de la Convention de Montréal : un dialogue de sourds ?).

Article 33 of the Montréal Convention « for the Unification of certain rules for International Carriage by air », gives the victims of an air transport accident an « option » to bring their action for damages before different fora that the aforementioned article designates. The French Supreme Court (Cour de cassation) recently considered that this freedom of option took on an imperative character and accordingly considers that the French jurisdictions are not available if the plaintiff first chose a jurisdiction of another State (the USA in the latter case). On the other hand, for some American jurisdictions, article 33 can be combined with the theory of « ‘forum non conveniens » which allows them to refuse to adjudicate a claim grounded on the Montreal convention. However, such an interpretation of article 33 does not win unanimous support amongst American judges. The victims who, in accordance with article 33, have chosen to take their case before the American jurisdiction could find themselves in a deadlock…

I am grateful to Dr. Dafina Sarbinova, an advocate to the Sofia Bar, for this report.

In a judgment of of 2 September 2011 (Judgment No. 71 in commercial case No. 1193/2010 ), the highest Bulgarian court – the Bulgarian Supreme Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber – struck down a one way arbitration/choice of court clause in a loan agreement (only in favour of the lender) as void. The Bulgarian court’s arguments to hold that are very similar to those of the French Supreme Court published last month, i.e. it was held that such clauses may be interpreted as purporting to establish by way of contractual arrangements a “potestative right” (that is, a right whereby a person may unilaterally affect the legal rights of another person/counterparty) which is not permitted under Bulgarian law, because such rights may only be established by an act of parliament in Bulgaria.

The facts may briefly be summarized as follows. A loan agreement was concluded between individuals (natural persons) in an entirely domestic situation. An arbitration clause in that agreement provided that all disputes that might arise had to be resolved by the parties amicably and if they failed to do so, the lender might initiate proceedings against the borrowers before the Court of Arbitration at the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI) or any other arbitration institution, or before the Regional Court of Sofia. A dispute arose and the lender brought an action before the Court of Arbitration at BCCI, which in turn, found that it was competent to hear the dispute and ruled that the borrowers under the agreement were jointly liable to pay a principal amount as well as the applicable interest rate. The borrowers initiated proceedings to set aside the arbitration award before the Supreme Court of Cassation claiming that the Court of Arbitration at BCCI lacked jurisdiction. They argued that the arbitration clause was against the good morals (a contract contra bonos mores) and thus illegal. Furthermore, the borrowers asserted that the arbitration clause breached the principle of parties’ equality in the process (which is a general principle under the Bulgarian civil procedural law).

According to the Supreme Court of Cassation the right of the lender in that case to choose at its own discretion the dispute solving body before which to exercise its public right to bring a claim falls within the category of “potestative” rights. The essential characteristic of a “potestative” right is the entitlement of one person (or a group of persons) to affect unilaterally the legal position of another person (or a group of persons), where the latter are obliged to bear with the consequences. Due to the intensity and potentially detrimental effects of “potestative” rights on third parties, they exist only by virtue of law and are not subject to contractual arrangements. On the basis of these arguments, the court concluded that a clause which in violation of law entitled one of the parties to unilaterally decide which dispute resolution body (an arbitration institution or a court) has a jurisdiction to resolve a particular dispute, is void pursuant to art.26, par.1 of the Bulgarian Contracts and Obligations Act. According to this provision, all contracts that violating or evading the law, as well as all contracts in breach of good morals, are void.

The arbitration/choice of court clause in that case was incorporated in a contract without an international element. However, the general character of the court’s arguments makes them equally applicable to agreements with an international element (if Bulgarian law applies towards the arbitration clause or even if a foreign law applies towards the arbitration clause).

The judgment of the Bulgarian court discussed here, may be open to criticism. Furthermore that judgment, as well as other judgments of the highest Bulgarian courts, does not have the power of a precedent binding all other courts to decide subsequent cases in the same manner. Nevertheless, the tendency of sticking down arbitration clauses with such reasoning (bearing in mind the similar French case) is a concerning one.

On November 2-3, 2012, the Private International Law Interest Group of the American Society of International Law (ASIL) is hosting its conference at Duke Law School, together with the Center for International and Comparative Law, and the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law.

WHAT IS PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW?

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 2012

1:15 Welcome / Introduction: Ralf Michaels

1:30 Panel 1: Philosophical Foundations of Private International Law
– John Linarelli, Theories of Justice and Private International Law
– Sagi Peari, The Choice-Based Perspective of Choice-of-Law
– Robert S. Wai, Already Transnational Private Law
Chair and Commentator: Trey Childress

3:45 Panel 2: The Goals of Private International Law
– Louise Ellen Teitz, The Future of the Hague Conference
– Alex Mills, The Identities of Private International Law – Lessons from the US and EU Revolutions
– Stéphanie Francq, Hierarchy of Norms—the Missing Tool of Private International Law?
Chair and Commentator: Chris Whytock

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 2012

9:00 Panel 3: Constitutional and Democratic Aspects of Private International Law
– Jacco Bomhoff, The Constitution of the Conflict of Laws
– Charles T. Kotuby, General Principles and International Due Process as Sources of Private International Law
– Mark Fathi Massoud, Private International Law in Authoritarian Regimes: International Arbitration and the Outsourcing of the Rule of Law
– Annelise Riles, After New Governance: International Financial Governance and the Surprising Attraction of a Conflict of Laws Approach
Chair and Commentator: Julie Maupin

11:15 Panel 4: Private International Law and Legal Pluralism
– Cristián Gimenez Corte, Pushing the Limits: The Function of Private International Law in the Era of Globalization and the Need to Review its Theoretical Foundations
– Yao-Ming Hsu, Pluralistic Justice and Private International Law
– Dwight Newman, Global Legal Pluralism, Collective Rights, and Private International Law
Chair and Commentator: Ralf Michaels

1:00 Lunch: 3rd floor Mezzanine
ASIL prize presentation

2:00 Wrap-up panel
All participants

Pluralismo y multiculturalidad: Tribunal arbitral musulmán y consejos islámicos (Sharia courts) en el Reino Unido is the title of the last paper by professor V. Camarero Suárez and professor F. Zamora Cabot, both from the University of Castellón. The paper, written in Spanish, has been published in the Anuario de Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado, 2012; professor Zamora will kindly send a pdf copy to those interested (just send him an email to this address: zamora@dpr.uji.es)

Here is the abstract:

  This study explores the interface between legal pluralism and multiculturality, taking as reference  british muslim minority nomoi groups and the alternative means of solution of controversies embodied in the Sharia Councils  and the Muslim Arbitral Tribunal (MAT). However, before dealing with this matter in the United Kingdom, our study makes insights from a comparative point of view both in Canada and the United States, where, in spite of no minor similitudes, the status of the aforesaid means of alternative solution of controversies is, at present time, far more different, given a deeper degree of religious pluralism and more reliance in arbitration at large in the United States. These two factors, and the widely known pragmatism and tolerance of the United Kingdom result, although there have been rounds of controversy about it, in the acceptance in that Country of the workings of the Sharia Councils and the MAT, in the twilight of British law- in the first case- or taken under the rule of that law, covered by the Arbitration Act of 1996, in the case of the MAT. Conceived on these terms, we agree on the acceptation of these types of controversies’s solutions – specially in case of the MAT- that we think are in full accordance with the modern State’s duty to preserve  minorities’ rights and freedom of religion and beliefs as examples of a genuine commitment towards the fulfillment of Human Rights.

Private International Law

Inaugural Lecture

29 July
Transnational Commercial Law and Conflict of Laws: Institutional Co-operation and Substantive Complementarity
Herbert KRONKE, Professor at Heidelberg University

General Course

5-16 August
Le rôle du politique en droit international privé
Patrick KINSCH, Lawyer, Visiting Professor at the University of Luxemburg

Special Courses

29 July-2 August
Conflict among Enforcement Regimes in International Economic Law
Hannah BUXBAUM, John E. Schiller Chair in Legal Ethics, Indiana University

Efficiency in Private International Law
Toshiyuki KONO, Professor at Kyushu University

Le statut juridique des standards publics et privés dans les relations économiques internationales
Jan WOUTERS, Professor at the University of Leuven

5-9 August
“Trusts” in Private International Law
David John HAYTON, Judge at the Caribbean Court of Justice

Les méthodes du droit international privé à l’épreuve du droit du travail
Étienne PATAUT, Professor at Sorbonne Law School, Paris I University

12-16 August
International Commercial Arbitration, a Comparative Approach with Special Focus on Russia
Alexey KOSTIN, Head of the Private International Law Department, Moscow State Institute of International Relations

Protection internationale des droits de l’homme et activités des sociétés transnationales
Fabrizio MARRELLA, Professor at the University of Venice

More information is available here.

A Liber Amicorum was published earlier this year to celebrate the 65th birthday of Athanassios Kaissis, who is a professor at the Law Faculty of Aristotle University of Thessaloniki.

It includes the following contributions.

Konsolidierung des Europäischen Zivilverfahrensrechts
Jens Adolphsen

Das Anti-Counter-Feiting Trade Agreement vom 3.12.2010 – Zivilrechtliche Maßnahmen und deren Durchsetzung
Hans-Jürgen Ahrens

Unvereinbare Entscheidungen, drohende Rechtsverwirrung und Zweifel an der Kernpunkttheorie – Webfehler im Kommissionsvorschlag für eine Neufassung der Brüssel I-VO?
Christoph Althammer

Der österreichische Zivilprozess – bemerkenswerte Schwerpunkte der Reformen im neuen Jahrtausend
Oskar J. Ballon

Gibt es ein europäisches Rechtsschutzbedürfnis?
David-Christoph Bittmann

Der amicus curiae und die alten Formen der Beteiligung Dritter am Rechtsstreit. Neue Tendenzen nach brasilianischem Recht
Antonio Cabral

Die tödliche Verletzung im Deliktsrecht
Michael Coester

Der Erfüllungsort im internationalen Zivilprozessrecht
Dagmar Coester-Waltjen

Das neue schweizerische Arrestrecht – ausgewählte Probleme
Tanja Domej

Die Europäisierung des internationalen Zuständigkeitsrechts in Gütersachen
Anatol Dutta / Frauke Wedemann

Der Anspruch auf Rückforderung unbegründeter Zahlungen bei der Bankgarantie auf erstes Anfordern
Dietmar Ehrlich

Ausgewählte praxisrelevante Fragen in deutsch-algerischen Erbrechtsfällen
Omaia Elwan

Internationale Notzuständigkeit im polnischen Internationalen und Europäischen Zivilverfahrensrecht
Tadeusz Ereci?ski / Karol Weitz

Bruchstellen des internationalen Haftungsrechts in Europa bei vertragsnahen Pflichtverletzungen
Hilmar Fenge

Zum Begriff des gewöhnlichen Arbeitsortes i.S.d. Art. 19 Abs. 2 lit. a EuGVVO insb. bei der Verrichtung der arbeitsvertraglichen Tätigkeit an Bord eines Schiffes
Thomas Garber

Zur geplanten Reform des Gerichtsvollzieherwesens in Deutschland
Hans Friedhelm Gaul

Gerichtsstandsvereinbarung und Pflichtverletzung
Martin Gebauer

Europaweite Beachtlichkeit ausländischer Urteile zur internationalen Unzuständigkeit?
Reinhold Geimer

Der Streitgegenstand – eine Einheit in Vielfalt
Peter Gottwald

Vertraulichkeit im Zusammenhang mit Schiedsverfahren
Ulrich Haas

Juristisches Strukturdenken bei Goethe
Fritjof Haft

The notarial order for payment procedure as a Hungarian peculiarity
Viktória Harsági

Grundlagen der internationalen Notzuständigkeit im Europäischen Zivilverfahrensrecht
Wolfgang Hau

Reviewing Foreign Judgments in American Practice – Conclusiveness, Public Policy, and Révision au fond –
Peter Hay

Materieller Anspruch und Rechtshängigkeitssperre nach Art. 27 EuGVVO
Bettina Heiderhoff

Der Vorschlag der EU-Kommission zur vorläufigen Kontenpfändung – ein weiterer Integrationsschritt im Europäischen Zivilverfahrensrecht
Burkhard Hess

Koordinierung europäischer Zivilprozessrechtsinstrumente
Stefan Huber

Beschaffenheitsvereinbarung und Haftungsausschluss beim Kunstkauf – unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Falschlieferung
Erik Jayme

Der Gerichtsstand des Erfüllungsortes nach der Brüssel I-Verordnung im Licht der neueren EuGH-Rechtsprechung
Abbo Junker

Wer bestimmt das Honorar des Schiedsrichters?
Franz Kellerhals / Stefanie Pfisterer

Ungarn innerhalb des Tors des Lugano-Übereinkommens
Miklós Kengyel

“Cherry Picking” and Good Faith in German Arbitration Law: Two Recent Decisions on the Most-Favoured Treatment Clause (Article VII Para 1 NYC))
Peter Kindler

L’Arbitrage des Différends Relatifs aux Investissements en Afrique Francophone au Sud du Sahara: L’OHADA et le CIRDI
Rolf Knieper

Prozesskostenhilfe im internationalen Zivilverfahrensrecht – Grundlagen und aktuelle Probleme
Oliver L. Knöfel

Even if you steal it, it would be admissible – Rechtswidrig erlangte Beweismittel im Zivilprozess
Georg E. Kodek

Acceptable Transnational Anti-suit Injunctions
Herbert Kronke

Die Einrede vorprozessualer Verjährung als erledigendes Ereignis
Walter F. Lindacher

Das deutsche Bankgeheimnis im Steuerverfahren – Schutz der Bürger oder nur noch „Feigenblatt“? –
Karl-Georg Loritz

A patent court for Europe – status and prospects
Raimund Lutz & Stefan Luginbuehl

Kunstrecht als Disziplin – Stand, Inhalte, Methoden, Entwicklungen –
Peter M. Lynen

Zur Regelung von Sprachfragen im europäischen Internationalen Zivilverfahrensrecht
Peter Mankowski

Partei- und Anspruchsidentität im Sinne des Art. 27 Abs. 1 EuGVVO bei Mehrparteienprozessen: Ein Beitrag zur Konkretisierung des europäischen Streitgegenstandsbegriffs und der Kernbereichslehre
Heinz-Peter Mansel und Carl Friedrich Nordmeier

Schweizer Mahntitel und deren Behandlung unter dem revidierten LuganoÜbereinkommen und der EuGVVO
Alexander R. Markus

Priorität versus Flexibilität? Zur Weiterentwicklung der Verfahrenskoordination im Rahmen der EuGVO-Reform
Mary-Rose McGuire

Einstweiliger Rechtsschutz für Geldforderungen nach neuem schweizerischen Recht im Vergleich zum griechischen Recht
Isaak Meier und Sotirios Kotronis

Zulässigkeit einer Vereinbarung des Wiederverkaufs von Aktien zu einem Festpreis, um den Kreis der Aktionäre mit geringen Kosten zu beschränken?
Isamu Mori

Schiedsverfahren im Dreiländereck – Deutschland, Schweiz, Österreich –
Joachim Münch

Schiedsrichterbefangenheit und anwaltliche Versicherungsmandate
Thomas Pfeiffer

Bemerkungen zur Zusammenarbeit zwischen EuGH und Gerichten der EU-Staaten zum IPR, insbesondere in der Rechtssache C-29 / 10 Koelzsch gegen Luxemburg
Jörg Pirrung

Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung ohne Stammkapital und Einzelkaufmann mit (betrieblichem) Sondervermögen
Giuseppe B. Portale

Die Rolle des Anwalts bei der Rechtsfortbildung
Hanns Prütting

Zur Rechtsnatur der Anfechtung von Schiedssprüchen
Walter H. Rechberger

Schadenshaftung und erforderliche Vertragsanknüpfung bei Art. 15 EuGVO (LugÜ)
Herbert Roth

The Laws Applicable to the Arbitration Agreement
Helmut Rüßmann and Kinga Timár

Die prozessuale Behandlung von Honoraransprüchen freiberuflich Tätiger – Berechnung nach Arbeitszeit und dargestellt am Beispiel der Anwaltshonorierung
Peter F. Schlosser

Billigkeitsentscheidungen im internationalen Schiedsrecht auf der Grundlage von § 1051 Abs. 3 ZPO
Götz Schulze

Die Besetzung eines internationalen Schiedsgerichts und das anwendbare Recht
Rolf A. Schütze

Wann kommt in Ehesachen die EuEheKindVO, wann autonomes Recht zur Anwendung?
Daphne-Ariane Simotta

Der Beweiswert rechtgeschäftlicher Urkunden im Kollisionsrecht
Ulrich Spellenberg

Überlegungen zur Dogmatik des schiedsgerichtlichen Vergleichs und des Schiedsspruchs mit vereinbartem Wortlaut
Frank Spohnheimer

Kollektiver Rechtsschutz und Revision der Brüssel I-Verordnung
Astrid Stadler

Der Vertriebsort als Deliktsgerichtsstand für internationale Produkthaftungsklagen
Ben Steinbrück

Jurisdiction for Avoidance Claims of Insolvent Investment Undertakings – Procedural Aspects of the Phoenix Saga –
Michael Stürner

Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit im europäischen Zivilprozess
Rolf Stürner

Das Europäische Mahnverfahren und dessen Umsetzung in den Niederlanden
Bartosz Sujecki

Die Bekämpfung der Torpedoklagen durch einen europäischen Rechtskrafteinwand
Miguel Teixeira de Sousa

Internationale Schiedsverfahren zwischen Effizienzanforderungen und zunehmender Komplexität
Roderich C. Thümmel

Persönlichkeitsrechtsverletzungen im Internet Internationale Zuständigkeit am „Ort der Interessenkollision“?
Matthias Weller

Umsetzung der Zahlungsdienst-Richtlinie Nachteilige Auswirkungen für den Verbraucher
Friedrich Graf von Westphalen

Internationale Zuständigkeit und Anerkennung ausländischer Entscheidungen im chinesischen Insolvenzrecht
Mei Wu

More details can be found here.

Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Senior Lecturer in Law at the London School of Economics, has written an arcticle dealing with the much commented “Dallah v. Pakistan” case. The article has been published in The Modern Law Review 75 (2012), pp. 639-654. The abstract reads as follows:

This note analyses the reasoning of the English and French courts in Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan, in which an arbitral tribunal had accepted jurisdiction over the Government of Pakistan on the basis of an arbitration agreement concluded by a trust that was created, controlled, and then extinguished by the Government. It highlights the English courts’ clarifications on the degree to which arbitral awards should benefit from the presumption of validity at the stage of enforcement and discusses how the cultural background of the English and French judges – and of the arbitrators – drove them to come to contradictory results. Moreover, it argues that both judges and arbitrators, owing to the way the parties framed their arguments, probably missed the proper solution of the case.