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The latest issue of “Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht - The Rabel Journal of Comparative and International Private Law” (RabelsZ) has recently been released. It contains the following articles:

- *Reinhard Zimmermann, Text and Context - Introduction to the Symposium on the Process of Law Making in Comparative Perspective*, pp. 315-328(14)

On 29 June 2013, on the occasion of the annual meeting of the Association of Friends of the Hamburg Max Planck Institute, a symposium took place on the topic of “The Process of Law Making”. This essay is based on the lecture introducing that symposium. First, it provides an overview of the position in Germany: the procedure to be adopted, the different actors involved, and the documents produced in the various stages of law making by means of legislation. Secondly, the essay analyzes the role and influence of legal scholarship in the process of law making by means of legislation. And, thirdly, it reflects on the fact that the application of a statute normally involves two stages. A statute is a text that has been formulated at a specific time by specific persons and in response to, or in contemplation of, specific problems or challenges. It needs to be understood against that background and in that context. This implies a historical approach. Such understanding provides a reliable basis for a critical reflection of that text from today’s perspective, and in view of the challenges and problems with which the modern lawyer is faced.

- *Jörg Schmid, The Process of Law Making in Switzerland*, pp. 329-345(17)

This paper explores the importance of the law-making process from the Swiss perspective. After explaining the term “preparatory works” (*Gesetzesmaterialien*, “legislative materials”, i.e. materials which document the process of the formation of a new act or section) and distinguishing different types thereof, the article presents the formative players in Swiss legislation. In Switzerland, these are the Federal Council (government)

and the Federal Assembly (parliament). The Federal Council submits bills to the Federal Assembly which are explained in the Federal Council's Dispatch (*Botschaft des Bundesrates*). The Federal Assembly (with its two chambers: the National Council and the Council of States) is the formal legislative power on the federal level. The Federal Council's drafts and explanations are debated by the Federal Assembly and are often explicitly or implicitly approved. In other cases the texts are modified and the Federal Assembly creates its own rationale. As an exception, a statutory rule does not derive from parliament, but from a majority of the electorate and the cantons (approved popular initiative). As there are no law commissions in Switzerland, it is academic opinion and jurisprudence which indicate the need for legal reforms. The article furthermore explores the meaning of the law-making process for the interpretation and gap-filling of statutes. Firstly, the author explains how Swiss law is interpreted in general. Secondly, he examines how the Federal Supreme Court applies a purposive approach particularly when interpreting recently enacted statutory law. However, the Federal Supreme Court employs the purposive approach in a rather "result-oriented" way (called "pluralism of methods"). Thirdly, the author argues that unpublished preparatory documents (i.e. preparatory works that are not open to the public) must not be taken into account for the interpretation of the law.

- *Guillaume Meunier, Les travaux préparatoires from a French Perspective: Looking for the Spirit of the Law*, pp. 346-360(15)

The French Constitutional Supreme Court attributes a constitutional value to the objective of making the law more accessible and more understandable, in order to facilitate its acceptance by the country's citizens. The European Court of Human Rights has also ruled that the law must be adequately accessible and that a norm cannot be regarded as "law" unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable citizens to regulate their conduct. Yet, it is admitted that when the letter of the law is obscure, ambiguous, or incomplete, denying the judge the power to search for the *ratio legis* may be considered to be a denial of justice. But where can we find the *ratio legis*, if not in the *travaux préparatoires*?

The identification of a theory of *travaux préparatoires* requires, first of all, a definition of that term. This, in turn, requires an overview of the

legislative process, from the informal ministerial drafting phase to the formal phase involving the debates before the two chambers of Parliament. The true spirit of the law, i.e. the will of Parliament, can only, of course, be established by documents that are accessible to the public. The principle of secrecy overshadowing parts of the legislative process presents a considerable obstacle.

The merits of interpreting a statute by reference to its *travaux préparatoires* are disputed. A comprehensive investigation into the legislative history of a statute, including its historical context, takes more time than busy practitioners often have. None the less, the *travaux préparatoires* have established themselves as an important interpretative tool when courts have to determine the conformity of a national statute with an international Treaty, or with the Constitution.

- *Jens M. Scherpe, The Process of Statute Making in England and Wales*, pp. 361-382(22)

English statutory drafting has traditionally taken the position that the words “for the avoidance of doubt” should not appear in a statutory provision, because to do so implies that without it the words might generate doubt. This article addresses how the traditional approach to statutory drafting can and should continue in England. It first describes the “technical” side of the drafting of statutes in England, by looking in particular at the role of Parliamentary Counsel, bill teams and the Law Commission. Then it examines the interpretation of statutes and especially the roles that Parliamentary debates as recorded in Hansard, explanatory notes and Law Commission papers play in this. The article concludes that while the English system of legislative drafting might have been very effective in the past, this appears not to be the case anymore. The speed with which legislation needs to be drafted and the workload of the individuals involved means that this system in its current form might not be fit for the 21st century.

- *Hans-Heinrich Vogel, The Process of Law Making in Scandinavia*, pp. 383-414(32)

In all Scandinavian Countries (in Denmark with the Faroe Islands and

Greenland, in Finland with the Åland Islands, in Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) legislative materials are regarded as very important documents – so important that lawyers sometimes forget that the law primarily has to be identified by means of the enacted text of the statute and not the materials. Law-making procedures are streamlined and similar in all Scandinavian countries and so are the main documents emanating from them. The series of documents usually starts with a report of a government-appointed committee, which will be circulated for comment. Report and comment will be considered by the government, and a government bill will be drafted, which after extensive internal checks and necessary adjustments will be sent to parliament. Members of parliament may propose changes, and their motions will be considered together with the bill by one of parliament’s standing committees. The committee will report on the matter to the full house and submit its recommendations for a formal vote. Then, the house will debate the report and the recommendations and will finally vote on the recommendations as such – not on any reasons for or against the legislation. Both the debate and the vote will be recorded in minutes. And finally, parliament will notify the government of its decision. The government then will publish the adopted act in the Official Gazette. Nowadays almost all key documents (committee reports, hearing results, government bills, reports of parliamentary committees, minutes of parliamentary debates, and adopted acts) are highly standardized. All are published, with only very rare exceptions. Extensive publication on internet sites of both the government and parliament is the rule in all Scandinavian countries. Through these interlinked sites all key documents are easily available and accessible for everyone. Professional legal research has traditionally been made easy by footnotes or endnotes to published documents, now elaborate linkage systems across internet sites facilitate it even more. As a consequence, legislative materials have gained enormous importance even for everyday legal work. The methodological difficulties, which their use had caused earlier and which jurisprudence traditionally had to deal with, are more or less evaporating by means of the ease of use of *travaux préparatoires* in Scandinavia today. But the advice has to be honored that the law must be identified primarily by means of the enacted text.

- *Oliver Unger, The Process of Law Making as a Field for Comparative*

Research, pp. 415-428(14)

Whereas legal literature considering the legislative process traditionally had more regard to formal parliamentary laws, the recent past has seen the emergence of a comprehensive and more contoured conception of treatises, taking into account the diverse forms that legal provisions assume in modern times (e.g. regulations, by-laws, administrative rules). The role to be played by comparative scholarship in this inquiry is still very much in its early stages of definition. Whereas studies can be found for most European legal systems as regards the various stages of law making and the legislative materials created in this process, comparative analyses that go beyond providing merely a descriptive overview are relatively rare. Such efforts are generally limited to isolated proposals for the reform of a given legal system, aiming at the drafting of “better” laws. Thus, the topics explored at the symposium “The Development of Legal Rules in Comparative Perspective” (“Die Entstehung von Gesetzen in rechts vergleichender Perspektive”), held on 29 June 2013 at the Max Planck Institute in Hamburg, posed distinct challenges for the comparative scholars in attendance. The present paper makes a first attempt at addressing the matter in a systematic manner and should at the same time serve to summarize the conference findings and inspire further work. The article considers six different aspects of law-making which would appear to have particular relevance within a comparative framework: the role of governmental institutions, the role of interest groups and private stakeholders, the language of the law, the relevance of legislative materials, the role of academia and the importance of comparative research.

The Stream-of-Commerce Doctrine under *McIntyre* and the First Reactions of U.S. Courts to the U.S. Supreme Court's Ruling

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How the U.S. Supreme Court Has Relinquished Reciprocity in Jurisdiction in Cross-Border Products Liability Cases and Possible Future U.S. Federal Legislation on the Matter

Products liability is the area of law in which manufacturers, distributors, suppliers, retailers, and others who make products available to the public are held accountable for the injuries caused by those products. As Justice Kennedy points out at the outset of his opinion in *J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro et. al.*, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011), whether a natural or legal person is subject to jurisdiction in a State is a question that frequently arises in products liability litigation. This question arises even with an out-of-forum defendant, i.e. despite the fact that the defendant was not present in the State, either at the time of suit or at the time of the alleged injury, and did not consent to the exercise of jurisdiction. Before the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in *McIntyre*, the issue of specific *in personam* jurisdiction of U.S. courts over out-of-forum defendants in products liability cases was addressed several times by the U.S. Supreme Court, and particularly in *International Shoe Company v. Washington*, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), *World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson*, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) and *Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano Cty*, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). With its decisions, the Court framed the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and introduced the stream-of-commerce doctrine. As the Court held, in products liability cases over an out-of-forum defendant it is the defendant's purposeful availment that makes jurisdiction constitutionally proper and notably consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice; moreover, the Court held that the transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant targeted the forum. It is not enough that the defendant might have

predicted that its goods would reach the forum State. However, in *Asahi's* plurality opinion, the Court developed two separate branches in the stream-of-commerce analysis. Holding that in a products liability case, constitutionally proper jurisdiction may only be established over an out-of-forum defendant where the defendant purposefully availed himself of the market in the forum State; merely placing the product or its components into the stream of commerce that swept the products into the forum State was insufficient to meet the minimum contacts requirement. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Powell and Scalia, drafted what is commonly known as the "foreseeability plus" or "stream-of-commerce plus" theory of minimum contacts. In a concurring opinion Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun, appeared to accept the principle that sales of large quantities of the defendant's product in a U.S. State, even indirectly through the stream of commerce, would support jurisdiction in that State, depending on the nature and the quantity of those sales. However, in Justice Brennan's opinion, even simply placing a product into the stream of commerce with knowledge that the product will eventually be used in the forum State constitutes purposeful availment for jurisdictional purposes. Regardless of the fact that eventually the Justices agreed that a constitutionally proper specific *in personam* jurisdiction could not be established in *Asahi* over the out-of-forum defendant, inconsistency has developed among the lower courts in regards to how the foreseeability test should be applied.

By granting certiorari on the petition from the New Jersey Supreme Court in *J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro et al.* (in which the N.J. Supreme Court found personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer), the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged the need to tackle the question of the stream-of-commerce doctrine, and particularly the issues left open by the lack of a majority opinion in *Asahi*. Nonetheless, on June 27, 2011, a - once again - deeply divided U.S. Supreme Court handed down its opinion in *McIntyre*, holding that, because a machinery manufacturer never engaged in activities in New Jersey with the intent to invoke or benefit from the protection of the State's laws, New Jersey lacked personal jurisdiction over the company under the Due Process Clause. As the plurality opinion held, a foreign company that markets a product only to the United States generally, but does not purposefully direct its product to an individual State, is not subject to specific jurisdiction in the State where its product causes an injury.

Unfortunately, the *McIntyre* decision failed to provide a comprehensible framework for practitioners and lower courts faced with specific *in personam* jurisdiction questions. In a sharply fragmented plurality opinion - where six Justices voted to overrule the lower court's decision, but only four joined the lead opinion, and a dissenting opinion was filed by Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan - *McIntyre* marks a strong narrowing down of the stream-of-commerce doctrine. Justice Kennedy's plurality made clear that the stream of commerce, per se, does not support personal jurisdiction, and that something more is required. While the concurrence did not fully support Justice Kennedy's opinion, they too apparently rejected Justice Brennan's view in *Asahi* that a product is subject to jurisdiction for a products liability action, so long as the manufacturer can reasonably foresee that the distribution of its products through a nationwide system might lead to those products being sold in any of the fifty States. The U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in *McIntyre* undoubtedly results in a positive development for foreign companies and a truly unfavorable outcome for U.S. plaintiffs in products liability cases.

At the outset of her dissenting opinion in *McIntyre*, Justice Ginsburg provocatively asks:

*A foreign industrialist seeks to develop a market in the United States for machines it manufactures. It hopes to derive substantial revenue from sales it makes to United States purchasers. Where in the United States buyers reside does not matter to this manufacturer. Its goal is simply to sell as much as it can, wherever it can. It excludes no region or State from the market it wishes to reach. But, all things considered, it prefers to avoid products liability litigation in the United States. To that end, it engages a U.S. distributor to ship its machines stateside. Has it succeeded in escaping personal jurisdiction in a State where one of its products is sold and causes injury or even death to a local user? Under this Court's pathmarking precedent in *International Shoe Co. v. Washington*, and subsequent decisions, one would expect the answer to be unequivocally, 'No.' But instead, six Justices of this Court, in divergent opinions, tell us that the manufacturer has avoided the jurisdiction of our State courts, except perhaps in States where its products are sold in sizeable quantities.*

In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg seems to suggest that under Article 5(3) of the

Brussels I Regulation the courts of the United Kingdom would have had no hesitation in asserting their jurisdiction over the case, if J. McIntyre had been a U.S. manufacturer and Nicastro a UK resident and had the accident occurred in the United Kingdom. Based upon the fact that, pursuant to Article 2, the Brussels I Regulation applies to defendants domiciled in the EU and that pursuant to Article 4(1) when “the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, the jurisdiction of the courts of each Member State shall, subject to Articles 22 and 23, be determined by the law of that Member State”, the argument could be raised that the hypothetical suggested by Justice Ginsburg (where the defendant is a U.S. manufacturer, *i.e.* a non-EU domiciliary), would not fall in the scope of application of the Brussels I Regulation. As for England and Wales, the Civil Procedure Rules of England and Wales would apply, instead, and notably CPR 6.20(8), whereby the courts of England and Wales may assume jurisdiction in tort claims where the damage was sustained in England, or the damage sustained resulted from an act committed within England. Accordingly, the difference in the applicable statute does not weaken the final point made by Justice Ginsburg in her dissent. In the hypothetical put forward by Justice Ginsburg, the courts of England and Wales would indeed have had no hesitation in asserting their jurisdiction over the U.S. manufacturer.

Moreover, the European solution in this area of law goes even further. Article 3(1) and (2) of the EEC Directive 85/374/EEC on Product Liability provides:

Article 3

1. ‘Producer’ means the manufacturer of a finished product, the producer of any raw material or the manufacturer of a component part and any person who, by putting his name, trade mark or other distinguishing feature on the product presents himself as its producer.

2. Without prejudice to the liability of the producer, any person who imports into the Community a product for sale, hire, leasing or any form of distribution in the course of his business shall be deemed to be a producer within the meaning of this Directive and shall be responsible as a producer.

As a result of, respectively, Articles 2, 5 and 60 of the Brussels I Regulation, there will always be a defendant domiciled in the Internal Market: the importer deemed to be the producer.

Hence, the conclusion may be drawn that with *McIntyre* the U.S. Supreme Court has relinquished reciprocity in jurisdictional issues in cross-border torts and notably in products liability cases, to the disadvantage of United States plaintiffs who seek to acquire jurisdiction over foreign defendants who caused them an injury in the plaintiffs' home State.

The need for legislation in this area was recognized in 2009 by the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary "Leveling the Playing Field and Protecting Americans," which subsequently introduced the Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act of 2009 (see here Trey Childress' post on this blog). This bill required foreign manufacturers of products imported into the United States to establish registered agents in the United States who are authorized to accept service of process against such manufacturers, and for other purposes. The Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act of 2010 was a re-introduction of the 2009 bill; but, again, it was not enacted. In 2011, the bill was re-introduced a third time as the Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act of 2011. The bill is assigned to a Congressional committee, which will now consider it before possibly sending it on to the House of Representatives and then to the Senate. Hopefully, the uncertainties that stem from the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in *McIntyre* will be taken into due consideration by the U.S. legislators when addressing the possible enactment of this bill.

The First Reactions of U.S. Courts to McIntyre

As expected, objections and critiques are now being raised by U.S. courts against the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling. In *Weinberg et al. v. Grand Circle Travel LLC*, 2012 WL 4096611 (D.Mass.), the estate of a Florida resident, who died in a hot air balloon crash in the Serengeti, and the deceased's fiancée, who was also a Florida resident and who sustained severe bodily injuries in the crash, brought a negligence action against the travel agent (a Massachusetts company) and the Tanzanian company that operated the hot air balloon. The balloon company moved to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction. In drawing its conclusions, and regretfully granting the motion to dismiss, the District Court of Massachusetts stated:

It seems unfair that the Serengeti defendants can reap the benefits of obtaining American business and not be subject to suit in our country. It is perhaps unfortunate that recent jurisprudence appears to "turn the clock back to the

days before modern long-arm statutes when a [business], to avoid being haled into court where a user is injured, need only Pilate-like wash its hands of a product by having [agents] market it.," Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 531, 555 (1995), and that, in many circumstances, American consumers "may now have to litigate in distant fora - or abandon their claims altogether," Arthur R. Miller, Inaugural University Professorship Lecture: Are They Closing the Courthouse Doors? 13 (March 19, 2012) (criticizing the plurality opinion in J. McIntyre Mach. v. Nicastro), but this Court must follow the law as authoritatively declared.

The fact that in *Weinberg* the accident occurred in the defendant's State (unlike in *McIntyre*, where the accident occurred in New Jersey, where the plaintiff was also resident), inevitably weakens the constitutional soundness of the District Court's jurisdictional power over the foreign defendant. Nonetheless, regardless of such a weakened power, it appears that the District Court - siding with Justice Ginsburg's dissent - felt the urge to emphasize the fact that foreign defendants can benefit from American business without the risk of being brought to court in the U.S., and suggested that this issue should be reviewed in order to ensure access to justice to U.S. plaintiffs in cross-border tort claims.

Finally, in *Surefire LLC v. Casual Home Worldwide, Inc.*, 2012 WL 2417313 (S.D.Cal.), the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California refused to apply the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in *McIntyre* in a patent infringement claim against an out-of-forum defendant, stating that a Supreme Court plurality opinion is not binding law.

One can only hope that it will not take a further quarter of a century for the U.S. Supreme Court to sort out - possibly with a stronger awareness of the ramifications of the assessment of jurisdiction in cross-border matters and especially with a view to international private relations - the confusing picture that the lack of a majority in *McIntyre* has left behind and with which courts and legal practitioners must cope.

My most sincere gratitude goes to Prof. Dr. Burkhard Hess for his very insightful inputs.

My appreciation also goes to Adrienne Lester-Fitje for kindly editing this text.

Any errors are, of course, mine.

What will the Supreme Court do with the Alien Tort Statute?

What a strange day at the Supreme Court. If you didn't know you were before a court of law, you might have thought you were a fly on the wall at a legislative bill drafting commission. Indeed, as the oral argument in the *Kiobel* case developed, it was pretty clear that the Court was focused on two choices. First, it could hold that the ATS does not apply extraterritorially and thus encourage Congressional action—as the Court did in the *Morrison v. National Australia Bank* case. Second, it could undertake some saving construction of the ATS and thus encourage another several years of ATS litigation and academic commentary. Whatever the Court decides, it is likely to encourage what I am calling in a current work in process (which I hope to have done in the next month or so) a “brave new world of transnational litigation” where federal, state, and foreign courts compete through their courts and law to adjudicate transnational cases.

To me, one of the most intriguing aspects of the oral argument was the focus on the interest of the United States in adjudicating the case. In the first couple of minutes, Justice Kennedy asked: “What effects that commenced in the United States or that are closely related to the United States exist between what happened here and what happened in Nigeria?” Why did he ask this? Because he, and others, are concerned that allowing a U.S. court to hear a case where there is little or no nexus to this country potentially allows the courts of other countries to hear cases against U.S. corporations where they too have little nexus to the case at bar. So, one series of concerns is directed at reciprocity—if the Court permits U.S. courts to hear these cases against foreign corporations, then foreign courts may hear these cases against U.S. corporations. The question is how might the Court leave open the ATS without subjecting U.S. corporations to expansive jurisdiction in other countries?

Another concern is foreign affairs, and there were a series of questions directed at whether the State Department could sort out some of these issues by requesting dismissal. I have looked at this issue in some detail in the context of international comity. It is not clear to me, however, based on the oral argument that this approach can get a majority.

So, if the Court is not inclined to apply the presumption against extraterritoriality in a robust way but is concerned about a broad construction of the ATS, what might it do? Justice Sotomayor took up the suggestion of an amicus brief filed by the European Commission to lay the ground work for a compromise position. As it had in *Sosa*, the Commission argued that ATS cases should be permitted only where the plaintiff has exhausted local and international legal remedies, or demonstrates that such remedies are unavailable or futile. The Commission defines “local” as “those states with a traditional jurisdictional nexus to the conduct,” which would mean, I think, those jurisdictions where the conduct or injury occurred and the home jurisdiction of the defendant. It might also include the home jurisdiction of the plaintiff, if the plaintiff were not a domiciliary of any of these other places.

The key for this exhaustion requirement, as explored by Justice Kagan, is that it not only requires exhaustion of local remedies at the place of conduct or injury, as does the Torture Victims Protection Act, but also other potential fora that may have a closer connection to the case. So, in this case, exhaustion of remedies in at least Nigeria, the Netherlands, and the U.K. would be required before a U.S. court could hear the case. Armed with such an exhaustion requirement, a defendant could argue for dismissal in favor of various foreign fora.

Note, however, that exhaustion of remedies is generally an affirmative defense. Thus, if a defendant forgets to plead it or makes the decision to waive it, then the U.S. court would hear the case, as many TVPA cases illustrate. A defendant might make this tactical decision to waive where it determines that the U.S. court has the best law and procedure to litigate the case. So, the Court may need a secondary fix for these cases—perhaps *forum non conveniens*? Furthermore, requiring exhaustion means that many ATS-like cases will be filed in foreign courts, proceed to judgment, and then return as enforcement actions in the United States. So, there is some potential that these cases will return to U.S. courts, albeit under a constrained standard of review, down the road. As I examine in a forthcoming piece in the *Virginia Journal of International Law*, if

there is a strong likelihood that the foreign judgment will be enforced in the United States, why should the U.S. court dismiss the case outright and tie its hands when the later enforcement proceeding is brought?

At bottom, a rewrite of the ATS by the Court has the potential to open up a Pandora's box of new issues for courts and commentators to deal with. Here is just a taste of what the future may bring.

Proposal for a Spanish International Cooperation (Civil Matters) Act

The Spanish Civil Procedure Act (*Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil*), adopted in 2000, required the Government to send to Parliament a bill of international legal cooperation in civil matters. Soon after, the private international law Department of the Universidad Autónoma of Madrid (UAM) drafted a law proposal on the subject intending to provide guidance to the government. More than a decade later, the legal imperative contained in the Civil Procedure Act has not yet been fulfilled. The original proposal needed to be updated and adapted to the existing normative framework. UAM Professors Miguel Virgós Soriano, Iván Heredia Cervantes, and Francisco José Garcimartín Alférez, together with the Spanish registrar and current president of the International Commission on Civil Status (CIEC) Spanish section Juan María Díaz Fraile, have undertaken the task with a twofold purpose: to be a point of reference in the development of a future law, and to promote a critical and public debate on the topic. The Spanish *Boletín Oficial del Ministerio de Justicia* has just published their work, reproducing the last version of the Proposal and including a detailed explanatory memorandum which exposes the draft's essential features. The article can be downloaded from the website of the newly born *Spanish Forum of Private International Law*, the approval of a future International Legal Cooperation Act being one of the issues on which the Forum intends to focus its immediate activity.

Latest Issue of RabelsZ: Vol. 76, No. 1 (2012)

The latest issue of “Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht - The Rabel Journal of Comparative and International Private Law (RabelsZ)” has just been released. It contains - among others - articles on the recent Chinese and Japanese Codifications on Private International Law. The table of contents reads as follows:

Articles:

Knut Benjamin Pissler, The New Private International Law of the People’s Republic of China: Cross the River by Feeling the Stones, pp. 1-46

Abstract:

On October 28, 2010, the “Law of the Application of Law for Foreign-related Civil Relations” was promulgated in the People’s Republic of China. The law aims to consolidate the Chinese conflict of laws regime and signals a new step towards a comprehensive codification of civil law in China. Drafting of the law started in the early 1990s and produced an academic model law in the year 2000. The Chinese legislator was reviewing a first draft in 2002. However, due to other priorities, it has only been since the beginning of 2010 that conflict of laws has been at the top of the legislative agenda. It comes, therefore, with little surprise that the law has some deficiencies and has been welcomed with mixed feelings by Chinese academics, who had only limited influence in the last stage of the drafting process.

The promulgated law emphasizes party autonomy and the closest connection as general principles. The law furthermore replaces nationality with habitual residence as the principal connecting factor for personal matters in Chinese private international law. However, some lacunas remain and new questions arise from the law. The legislative gaps concern the form of legal acts, the maintenance duties after divorce as well as the assignment and transfer of

rights and duties in general. New questions arise from the provisions in the law establishing alternative connecting factors. In some cases the law requires application of the law which favours a particular party (in parent-child relationships, maintenance and guardianship). Chinese courts will therefore be confronted with the demanding task of comparing the legal regimes of different states in this respect. In other cases the law does not stipulate how to choose between the alternative connecting factors and it remains to be seen on which principles courts will render their decisions. Regarding the free choice of law with regard to rights in movable property provided by the law, it is additionally questionable how the rights of third parties are protected where they are not aware of such a choice of law. The decision of the legislator to exclude renvoi will force Chinese courts to apply foreign law even if the foreign private international law refers back to Chinese law.

Some of the particular provisions in the law are also a source for further problems: This concerns the application of the lex fori in divorce cases, the conflict of laws rule on trusts and arbitration clauses as well as on agency. Another point of uncertainty stems from older provisions of private international law that can still be found in several laws such as the Maritime Commercial Law, the Civil Aviation Law or the Contract Law. Those norms are still in force formally, but their relation to the new law is not sufficiently clarified. This uncertainty is particularly pronounced given that the relation of the new law to several provisions in the General Principles of Civil Law and the Inheritance Law is expressly regulated whereas the others are not even mentioned. Relating to international contract law and tort law, the Supreme People's Court had issued some judicial interpretations in the past to solve certain questions, but it also remains uncertain whether these interpretations still apply after the enactment of the new law. It is expected that the Supreme People's Court will issue a further judicial interpretation on private international law in the near future to help Chinese courts applying the new law.

Qisheng He, The EU Conflict of Laws Communitarization and the Modernization of Chinese Private International Law, pp. 47-85

Abstract:

Since 2007 the EU has adopted the Rome I, Rome II and Rome III Council Regulations codifying and unifying the respective conflict of laws rules in contract, tort and divorce and legal separation. The EU conflict of laws communitarization has attained great achievements. In 2010, China also adopted a self-contained statute - the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Application of Law to Civil Relationships Involving Foreign Interests - which marks a significant step forward in the codification of Chinese private international law (PIL). However, the sources of Chinese PIL are still scattered and diverse because the PIL rules in existing commercial statutes have not been incorporated into this separate PIL statute. In contrast with the EU PIL, there are three issues on which China should devote special attention in further developing its PIL: Firstly, because of a mixed mode of legislation and the scattered sources of Chinese PIL, maintaining harmony between the new statute and the other sources still remains an important task. It remains very important for China to enact PIL provisions in future commercial law legislation. Secondly, the draft of the new statute includes no documents or materials which suggest that the Chinese legislative authority appreciated the tension and need for equilibrium between certainty and flexibility. Thus, the new statute manifests some problems in this regard. Lastly, current Chinese PIL is mainly focused on jurisdiction-selection rules, meaning that the formulation of reasonable content-preference rules is still an important task necessary for the modernization of Chinese PIL.

Yoshiaki Sakurada & Eva Schwittek, *The Reform of Japanese Private International Law*, pp. 86-130

Abstract:

Japan has reformed its Act on the Application of Laws. On 1 January 2007, the Hô no tekiyô ni kansuru tsûsoku-hô came into effect, a revised and renamed version of the Hôrei that dates from 1898. This article traces the legislative process and analyses the changes in the law, referring to the way they have been implemented in the court rulings rendered so far.

In sessions dating from May 2003 to July 2005, the Subcommittee for the Modernisation of the Act on the Application of Laws (part of the Legislative

Commission of the Ministry of Justice) worked out fundamental innovations that were approved by the Legislative Commission of the Ministry of Justice on 6 September 2005. Based on this report, the Ministry of Justice, in cooperation with the Legislative Department of the Cabinet, drafted a bill that passed the Upper House on 19 April 2006 and the House of Representatives on 15 June 2006.

The reform is comprehensive. The only parts of the law that were exempt from amendment were international family and inheritance law, those already having been reformed in 1989. The present renewal focuses on the provisions concerning international contract law (Arts. 7-12) and the international law of torts (Arts. 17-22). Both sets of rules were further differentiated in their basic principles and complemented by special rules.

As for international contract law, the basic connecting factor is still the parties' choice of law (Art. 7). A fundamental change in determining the law applicable to contracts was implemented by introducing a new subsidiary objective connecting factor in Art. 8. It provides that in the absence of a choice of law by the parties, the law of the place with which the contract was most closely connected should apply, and it specifies criteria for determining the closest connection. The newly created rules on consumer and labour contracts in Arts. 11 and 12 contain major innovations aiming at the protection of the weaker party. However, they impose upon the weaker party the burden of stipulating the effect of the protective provision in question, an aspect which was much criticised as it limits such protective effects.

The *lex loci delicti*, as the basic connecting factor for the law of torts, formerly stipulated in Art. 11(1) *Hôrei*, is maintained in Art. 17. Multilocal torts are governed by the law of the place where the results of the infringing act are produced (Art. 17 sentence 1). However, if it was not foreseeable under normal circumstances that the results would be produced at that place, the law of the place where the infringing act occurred shall apply (Art. 17 sentence 2). Special rules on product liability and on infringements of personality rights were added to the law in Arts. 18 and 19. The *lex loci delicti* as connecting factor can be deviated from in cases where a manifestly more closely connected place exists (Art. 20) or where the governing law is changed by the parties (Art. 21). The principle of double actionability, stating that Japanese law should be applied cumulatively to the applicable law regarding the grounds of and the

compensation for damages incurred by a tort, was upheld in Art. 22 against severe criticism.

Apart from the points of critique addressed above, the new law provides for a differentiated set of rules that keep pace with the latest international developments.

Anne Röthel, Family and Property in English Law: Developments and Explanations, pp. 131-160(30)

Abstract:

*In continental jurisdictions, there is still a strong link between family and property. Intestate succession, imperative inheritance rights as well as the concepts of matrimonial property regimes and in some aspects also tax law are designed to attribute property rights along personal relationships. The position of English law is often described as a contrasting concept, especially due to the deeply rooted reservations against fixed shares. However, continental lawyers often may be surprised with the actual outcome, especially in divorce cases. The article therefore explores the present state of English law concerning family and property. Is there a convergence in concepts as well? Is English law nowadays more favourable towards general normative models for the attribution of property within family relationships? Or is the 2010 decision of *Radmacher v. Granatino* another turning-point? The author argues that the inner explanation of these – at first glance – diverging steps lies in the recognition of equality in horizontal relationships. The outcome of cases like *White v. White* or *Stack v. Dowden* is only partly the effect of a generally altered view on family and property in English Law. Nonetheless, they reflect a different understanding of how and how much the state should regulate the family. Although all European legislations experience broadly similar demographic trends and social challenges, there remain decisive differences in legal concepts. The distance between English Law and the continent may be somewhat reduced – but it is far from disappearing.*

Material:

Volksrepublik China: Erlass des Präsidenten der Volksrepublik China Nr. 36: Gesetz der Volksrepublik China zur Anwendung des Rechts auf zivilrechtliche Beziehungen mit Aussenberührung vom 28. 10. 2010, pp. 161-169 (*Peoples Republic of China: Order of the President of the People's Republic of China No. 36: The Law of the Application of Law for Foreign-related Civil Relations of the People's Republic of China, 28/10/2010*)

Japan: Gesetz Nr. 78 über die allgemeinen Regeln über die Anwendung von Gesetzen (Rechtsanwendungsgesetz) vom 21. 6. 2006, pp. 170-184 (*Japan: Act No. 78 of 2006 about General Rules for Application of Laws, 21/06/2006*)

Latest Issue of “Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts” (3/2011)

Recently, the May/June issue of the German law journal “Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts” (**IPRax**) was published.

Here is the contents:

- **Catrin Behnen:** “Die Haftung des falsus procurator im IPR - nach Geltung der Rom I- und Rom II-Verordnungen” - the English abstract reads as follows:

The extensive reform of the international law of obligations by the Rome I and Rome II-Regulations raises the question of the future classification of the liability of the falsus procurator under international private law. Since the new regulations entered into force, the problem of classification has not only arisen at national law level, but also at the level of European Union Law. Most importantly, it must be questioned, whether the new Regulations contain overriding specifications regarding the classification of the liability of the falsus procurator that are binding for the Member States. This article discusses the

applicable law on the liability of an unauthorised agent and thereby addresses the issue of whether normative requirements under European Union law are extant. Furthermore, the Article illustrates how the proposed introduction of a separate conflict of laws rule on the law of agency in the Draft Rome I-Regulation impinges on this question, even though this rule was eventually not adopted.

- **Ansgar Staudinger:** “Geschädigte im Sinne von Art. 11 Abs. 2 EuGVVO”
- the English abstract reads as follows:

The present essay discusses the decision of the European Court of Justice in the case of Voralberger Gebietskrankenkasse/WGV-Schwäbische Allgemeine - C-347/08. In this case, the court was concerned with the question whether, under Article 11 Paragraph 2 of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters a social insurance agency acting as the statutory assignee of the rights of the directly injured party has the right to bring an action directly against the insurer in the courts of its own Member State. The ECJ denies such a privilege, which is the correct decision in the author’s opinion, who, after having reviewed the ECJ’s judgement, also discusses the assignability of the decision to other conventions. Afterwards he raises the question to what extent legal entities, heirs or persons who claim compensation for immaterial damages, damages resulting of shock or alimony are allowed to sue the injuring party’s insurer at their own local forum.

- **Maximilian Seibl:** “Verbrauchergerichtsstände, vorprozessuale Dispositionen und Zuständigkeitsprobleme bei Ansprüchen aus c.i.c.” -
the English abstract reads as follows:

The article firstly deals with the question as to whether and to what extent international jurisdiction can be affected by pre-trial dispositions regarding the asserted claim by the parties to a lawsuit. Secondly, it examines the consequences resulting from the new EC Regulations Rome I and Rome II to the classification of claims out of culpa in contrahendo in terms of international jurisdiction. The background of the article consists of two decisions, one by the OLG (Higher Regional Court) Frankfurt/Main and one by the OLG München. The former concerned a case in which the defendant had pursued commercial

resp. professional activities in the Member State of the consumer's domicile in accordance with Art. 15 sec. 1 lit. c) of the Brussels I Regulation at the time he concluded a contract with a consumer, but had ceased to do so before he was sued for damages in connection with the very contract. The latter - against which an appeal has meanwhile been dismissed by the BGH (German Federal High Court of Justice), cf. BGH, 10.2.2010, IV ZR 36/09 - concerned a case in which the party of a consumer contract had assigned his claim based on culpa in contrahendo to the plaintiff, so that the plaintiff could file a lawsuit against the other party of the contract. Here the question arose as to whether or not the jurisdiction norm of § 29a ZPO (German Code of Civil Procedure) - which provides a special forum for cases concerning consumer contracts negotiated away from business premises - was also applicable, if the plaintiff was not the person who had concluded the contract. The OLG München negated this question. Apart from that the court decided that jurisdiction in this case could not be based on § 29 ZPO which provides a special forum at the place of the performance of the contract, either. This part of the decision gives reason to the examination as to whether or not all claims based on culpa in contrahendo can still be subsumed under § 29 ZPO. Since these claims are now subject to Art. 12 of the Rome II Regulation, it appears to be doubtful whether the traditional German classification of culpa in contrahendo as a contractual claim in terms of jurisdiction can be upheld.

- **Ivo Bach:** “Die Art und Weise der Zustellung in Art. 34 Nr. 2 EuGVVO: autonomer Maßstab versus nationales Zustellungsrecht” - the English abstract reads as follows:

Article 34 (2) Brussels I in principle allows courts to deny recognition and enforcement of a foreign (default) judgment when the defendant was not served with the document which instituted the proceedings “in a sufficient time and in such way as to enable him to arrange for his defence”. As an exception to this principle, courts must not deny recognition and enforcement if the defendant failed to challenge the judgment in the country of origin. In its decision of 21 January 2010, the German Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) dealt with both aspects of Art. 34 (2) Brussels I. Regarding the defendant's obligation to challenge the judgment, the BGH - rightfully - clarified that the obligation exists even when the defendant does not gain knowledge of the judgment before the enforcement proceedings. In such a case the defendant may request a stay of the

enforcement proceedings while challenging the judgment in the country of origin. Regarding the time and manner of the service, the BGH relied on the formal service requirements as provided in the German code of civil procedure (ZPO) – Germany being the country where service was effected. The latter part of the decision calls for criticism. In this author’s opinion, in interpreting Art. 34 (2) Brussels I courts should not rely on national rules, but rather should look to autonomous criteria. As regards the manner of service, such autonomous criteria may be taken from the minimum standards-catalogue in Arts. 13 and 14 EEO.

- **Rolf A. Schütze:** “Der gewöhnliche Aufenthaltsort juristischer Personen und die Verpflichtung zur Stellung einer Prozesskostensicherheit nach § 110 ZPO” – the English abstract reads as follows:

Under § 110 ZPO (German Code of Civil Procedure) the court – on application of the defendant – has to make an order for security for costs if the claimant is resident abroad but not resident in an EU or EWR Member State. The ratio of this provision is that the defendant who successfully defends a baseless claim should be able to enforce a cost order against the claimant. Residence means the place where a person habitually and normally resides. The decision of the Oberlandesgericht Munich rules that a company (or other legal entity) is ordinarily resident in a place if its centre of management is at that place. Whilst the former Reichsgericht and the Bundesgerichtshof rule that the amount of the security must cover the possible claim of the defendant for recompensation of costs for all possible instances, the Oberlandesgericht Munich states that only the costs for the current instance and the appeal up to the time when the defendant can file a new application for security can be included in the calculation. The decision in both of its aspects is in accordance with the ratio of § 110 ZPO.

- **Peter Mankowski/Friederike Höffmann:** “Scheidung ausländischer gleichgeschlechtlicher Ehen in Deutschland?” – the English abstract reads as follows:

Same-sex marriages are on the rise if seen from a comparative perspective. In contrast, German constitutional law strictly reserves the notion of “marriage” to a marriage celebrated between man and woman. This must also have its impact

in German PIL. Same-sex marriages are treated like registered partnerships and subjected to the special conflicts rule in Arts. 17b EGBGB, not to the conflicts rules governing proper marriage as contained in Art. 13-17 EGBGB. Hence, a proper divorce of a same-sex marriage can as such not be obtained in Germany but ought to be substituted with the dissolution of the registered partnership inherent in the so-called “marriage”. Although theoretically a principle of recognition might be an opportunity (if one succumbs to the notion of such principle at all), the limits of such recognition would be rather strict in Germany nonetheless.

- **Alexander R. Markus/Lucas Arnet:** “Gerichtsstandsvereinbarung in einem Konnossement” – the English abstract reads as follows:

In its decision 7 Ob 18/09m of 8 July 2009 the Austrian Supreme Court of Justice (Oberster Gerichtshof, OGH), judged as substance of the case, the validity of an agreement conferring jurisdiction incorporated in a bill of lading, its character as well as its applicability to a civil claim for damages resulting from a breach of the contract of carriage on which the bill of lading was based. Aside from that, questions concerning the relation between the Lugano-Convention (LC) and the Brussels I Regulation arise in this judgement. An agreement conferring jurisdiction included in a bill of lading issued unilaterally by the carrier fulfils the requirements established in art. 17 par. 1 lit. c LC since in the international maritime trade the incorporation of agreements conferring jurisdiction in bills of lading can clearly be considered to be a generally known and consolidated commercial practice. Concerning the (non-)exclusivity of the agreement conferring jurisdiction (art. 17 par. 1/par. 4 LC) the OGH makes a distinction from its earlier case law and bases the decision on the European Court of Justices judgement of 24 June 1986, case 22/85, Rudolf Anterist ./ Credit Lyonnais. According to the in casu applicable Swiss Law the prorogatio fori in the bill of lading covers the contract of carriage as well, although in principle the contract does not depend on the bill of lading. Lastly, to identify the relation between the LC and the Brussels I Regulation, the analogous application of art. 54b par. 1 LC is decisive.

- **Götz Schulze:** “Vorlagebeschluss zur intertemporalen Anwendung der Rom II-VO” – the English abstract reads as follows:

The Engl. High Court in Homawoo v. GMF has referred the question concerning the interpretation of Art. 31 and 32 of the Rome II-Regulation to the European Court of Justice for a Preliminary Ruling according to Art. 267 TFEU. Judge Slade recommends to specify Art. 31 Rome II-Regulation (entry into force) by the date of application on 11 January 2009 set out in Art. 32 Rome II-Regulation. Judge Tomlinson in Bacon v. Nacional Suiza prefers a strict literal interpretation with an entry into force on 20 August 2007 and a procedural understanding of Art. 32 Rome II-Regulation.

- **Bettina Heiderhoff:** “Neues zum gleichen Streitgegenstand im Sinne des Art. 27 EuGVVO” - the English abstract reads as follows:

The Austrian High Court (OGH) found that two actions do not involve the same cause of action when an identical claim is based on two different rules from different national laws and these rules stipulate different requirements. The decision is in conformity with the Austrian dogma that identity of the actions and lis pendens do not apply where a party bases a second claim on new facts. In other words, the identity of the cause of action depends on the facts presented to the court, unlike in Germany where the identity depends on the objective factual situation, no matter whether the claimant has presented all facts to the court in the first action or not. This Austrian point of view threatens uniform jurisdiction in the EU. It allows repetitive actions in different member states and, consequently, may lead to contradicting judgements. It encourages forum shopping. Therefore, it is a pity that the OGH did not present the case to the ECJ under Art. 267 TFEU.

- **Carl Friedrich Nordmeier:** “Divergenz von Delikts- und Unterhaltsstatut bei tödlich verlaufenden Straßenverkehrsunfällen: österreichischer Trauerschadensersatz und brasilianisches pretium doloris vor dem Hintergrund der Europäisierung des Kollisionsrechts” - the English abstract reads as follows:

Claims for compensation based on the loss of a maintenance debtor in transborder cases demand the coordination of the law applicable to tort and the law applicable to maintenance obligations. In the present case of the Austrian Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof), concerning a fatal traffic accident in Austria, whose victims were Brazilian nationals, Austrian tort law and Brazilian

maintenance law had to be applied. From the Austrian perspective, the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents has priority over the national conflict of law rules and over the Rome II Regulation. This raises questions relating to the possibility of a choice of law in cases that fall within the scope of application of the Convention. Austrian law does not provide a pension for the compensation of grief suffered by relatives of a victim of a fatal traffic accident. A pretium doloris of the Brazilian law is to be qualified as a question of tort and was rightly not awarded.

- **Arkadiusz Wowerka:** “Polnisches internationales Gesellschaftsrecht im Wandel” - the English abstract reads as follows:

The Polish applicable international private law provides no specific regulations on the international private law of companies. Also the judicature has up till now delivered no decisions in this matter. The essential principles of the international private law of the companies were developed by the doctrine. Within the frame of the planned reform of the international private law the government has presented the draft of a new regulation on the international private law which, with its provisions on the legal entities and organised entities, should fill the current gap in the subject area. The present article gives an overview on the autonomous international private law of the companies and its current evolution, dealing with the issues of the definition of the company, rules for determination of the law governing the companies, scope of the law governing the companies and finally the question of recognition of companies, in each case with references to the proposals of the government draft regulation.

- **Christel Mindach:** “Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Drittlandsschiedssprüchen in Handelssachen in den GUS-Mitgliedstaaten” - the English abstract reads as follows:

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly founded States, establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), had to build a completely new legal system. Quite naturally the legislation of international commercial arbitration played a secondary role during the first years of transformation, apart from the CIS Members Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. In the course of legislation process the most CIS States couldn't base on own legal traditions or

experiences in this field. This insufficient situation changed in principle only just, when these States decided about the accession to the New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. With the exemption of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan the New York Convention came in force for all CIS Members in the meantime. The following article describes in a concise manner some of the fundamental requirements for the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in commercial matters rendered in the territory of a State other than a CIS State under the appropriate national laws of CIS States including the procedure of compulsory enforcement.

- **Erik Jayme** on the conference on the Proposal for a Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and authentic instruments in matters of succession and the creation of a European Certificate of Succession, which took place in Vienna on 21 October 2010: “Der Verordnungsvorschlag für ein Europäisches Erbkollisionsrecht (2009) auf dem Prüfstand - Tagung in Wien”
- **Stefan Arnold:** “Vollharmonisierung im europäischen Verbraucherrecht - Tagung der Zeitschrift für Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht (GPR)” - the English abstract reads as follows:

On the 4th and 5th of June 2010, the Zeitschrift für Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht (Journal for EU-Private Law, JETL) and the Frankfurter Institut für das Recht der Europäischen Union (Frankfurt Institute for the Law of the European Union, FIREU) hosted a conference on „Full Harmonisation in European Consumer Law“ at the Europa-Universität in Frankfurt (Oder). Prof. Dr. Michael Stürner (Frankfurt/Oder) had invited to the conference. The speakers addressed not only the concept of full harmonisation but also the European framework for the harmonisation of Private Law and the consumer protection achieved by the the rules on Conflict of Laws. Moreover, the Draft Common Frame of Reference and the effect of full harmonisation on specific fields of law were discussed. The participants also debated the practical effects of possible full harmonisation measures.

- **Erik Jayme** on the congress in Palermo on the occasion of the bicentenary of Emerico Amari’s birth: “Rechtsvergleichung und kulturelle Identität - Kongress zum 200. Geburtstag von Emerico Amari

Levi on Transnational Libel

Lili Levi, who is a professor at the University of Miami Law School, has posted [The Problem of Trans-national Libel](#) on SSRN.

Forum shopping in trans-national libel cases - “libel tourism” - has a chilling effect on journalism, academic scholarship, and scientific criticism. The United States and Britain (the most popular venue for such cases) have recently attempted to address the issue legislatively. In 2010, the U.S. passed the SPEECH Act, which prohibits recognition and enforcement of libel judgments from jurisdictions applying law less protective than the First Amendment. On March 15, 2011, the British Ministry of Justice proposed a draft Defamation Act 2011 with provisions designed, inter alia, to discourage libel tourism. This Article questions the extent to which the SPEECH Act and the proposed Defamation Act 2011 will accomplish their stated aims. The SPEECH Act provides little protection for hard-hitting investigative and accountability journalism by professional news organizations with global assets. The proposed British bill has important substantive limits and, controversial in Britain, may well not be adopted. Even if Parliament approves it, the site of libel tourism may shift to other claimant-friendly jurisdictions. Global harmonization of libel law is neither realistically feasible nor desirable. Instead, this Article proposes a two-fold approach. On the legal front, it supports the procedural focus of Britain’s proposed bill, but also calls for foreign courts to apply a governmental interest analysis to choice of law in trans-national defamation cases threatening core political speech in the United States. On the policy front, it calls for: 1) measures to improve the way in which the press does its job in order to reduce the number of trans-national libel cases; and 2) new approaches to help defend the claims when they are brought. The recommended press-improvement measures include expanded access to, and efficient use of, documents, journalistic self-criticism, and best-practices education. The defense measures explored include the development of alternative, community-based support for

libel defense funds; the formation of pro bono libel review consortia; and the promotion of the availability of libel insurance by means designed to help insurers more accurately assess libel risk.

The paper can be freely downloaded [here](#).

Journal of Private International Law Conference 2011 (Milan) - Programme and Registration

The editors of J.Priv.Int.L are very pleased to announce that the **4th Journal of Private International Law Conference will take place in the University of Milan from Thursday 14th April 2011 at 2pm until Saturday 16th April at 5pm**. Over 50 early career papers are expected in parallel sessions on Thursday afternoon and Friday morning and 24 papers from experienced academics on Friday afternoon and Saturday.

▪ The fees for the conference are:

1. full price: 100 euros;
2. academics: 50 euros
3. students (undergraduate and postgraduate) and speakers: free

- The price for the dinner on Friday evening is 60 euros
- The price range for University accommodation per night is between 45-100 euros
- The price range for hotel accommodation per night is between 125-220 euros.

Accommodation has been reserved until the end of February 2011 and will be allocated on a first come first service basis. For registration to the conference and for further details, as well as to book any University accommodation, please

contact Dr Giuseppe Serranò and Paola Carminati at jpil_2011@unimi.it. For any other accommodation, please directly contact the hotel at issue, quoting the participation in the *JPIL 2011 conference*.

Programme

Thursday 14 April 2011: 14.00-15.45

Group 1 - Treatment of Foreign Law, Preliminary Questions, PIL Treaties

- C. Azcárraga Monzonís, The urgent need of harmonization of the application of foreign laws by national authorities in Europe
- A. Gardella, Foreign law in member States' courts and its relationship with European Union law
- S. Gössl, The Preliminary Question in European Private International Law
- S. Grossi, An international convention on conflict of laws: the path to Utopia?
- T. Kyselovská, Bilateral (Multilateral) Treaties on Legal Aid as Sources of Law in the European Judicial Area

Group 2 - Jurisdiction in civil and commercial cases

- A. Arzandeh, Twenty five years of Spiliada
- U. Grusic, Jurisdiction in complex contracts under the Brussels I Regulation
- J. Kramberger Škerl, A. Jurisdiction over third party proceedings: articles 6/2 and 65 of the Brussels I Regulation and the countries in-between
- U. Maunsbach, New Technology, new problems and new solutions - Private International Law and the Internet Revisited

Group 3 - Family law - Adults

- J. Borg-Barthet, Family Law in Europe: Should Civil Rights be Divorced from Questions of Sovereignty?
- M. Harding, The public effect of marriage and the un-oustable jurisdiction of the English Matrimonial Courts over the financial consequences of marriage
- M. Melcher, An EU Regulation on the law applicable to registered

relationships

- A. Sapota, What happened with Regulation Rome III? Seeking the way for unifying the rules on applicable law in divorce matters.
- S. Shakargy, Local Marriage in a Globalized World: Choice of Law in Marriage and Divorce

16.15-18.00

Group 4 - General PIL

- V. Macokina A new bill of Polish private international law - double edged sword?
- C. Staath, Human Rights Protection in Private International Law: the role of access to justice
- E. Tornese, Mandatory rules within the European legal system
- T. Kozlowski, Ever Growing Borders in the Ever Closer Union of the EU

Group 5 - Choice of Law in Contract

- A. Dyson, Interpreting Article 4(3) of the Rome I Regulation: Something Old, Something Borrowed or Something New?
- M. Erkan, Examining the Overriding Mandatory Rules under the Rome I Regulation and the Turkish Private International Law Perspective
- E. Lein, The Optional Instrument for European Contract Law and the Conflict of Laws
- W. Long, Mandatory Rules in Cross-Border Contracts: Is China Looking Towards the EU?

Group 6 - Recognition and enforcement of judgments

- P. Mariani, The free movement of judgements in the European Union and the CMR
- C. Nagy, Recognition and enforcement of US judgments involving punitive damages in Europe
- W. Zhang, A Comparative Research on the Exequatur Procedure within the EU and China
- G.B. Özçelik, Application of the Brussels I Regulation and property disputes in Cyprus: reflections on the Orams case

Friday 15 April 2011: 09.00-10.30

Group 7 - Choice of Law in Tort/Delict

- J. Papettas, Rome II, Intra-Community Cross Border Traffic Accidents and the Motor Insurance Directives
- D. Krivokapic, Potential impact on the US Speech Act: Influence of the Speech Act on Ongoing PIL Debate within EU and Third Countries
- J.J. Kuipers, Towards a European approach in cross-border infringement of personality rights
- T. Thiede, The protection of personality rights against supra-national invasions by mass-media

Group 8 - Family Law - children

- P. Jimenez Blanco, The Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union and international child abduction
- I. Kucina, K. Trimmings, P. Beaumont, Loopholes in the Brussels IIbis Child Abduction Regime
- A. Muñoz Fernández, Recognition of guardianships that were established abroad and preventive powers of attorney granted abroad
- F. S. Şahin, S. Ünver, Affiliation in surrogate motherhood in private international law perspective
- M. Wells-Greco, Cross-border surrogacy and nationality: achieving full parent status

Group 9 - Competition Law and Intellectual Property

- M. Danov, Cross-border EU competition law actions: should private international law be relied upon by the EU legislator in the European context?
- P. Dolniak, The rule in Article 6 of the Rome II Regulation as a „clarification” of general rule specified in Article 4
- S. Neumann, The infringement of intellectual property rights in European private international law - meeting the requirements of territoriality and private international law
- B. Ubertazzi, Intellectual Property Rights, Exclusive (Subject-Matter) Jurisdiction and Public International Law
- N. Zhao, China's Choice-of-law Rules in International Copyright and

11.00 - 12.30

Group 10 - Trusts and insolvency

- N. Zitkevits, Recognition of trusts in the European Union countries
- R. Yatsunami, The Choice of Law Rules on Trust in Japan
- Z. Crespi Reghizzi, Jurisdiction, recognition of judgments and law applicable to reservation of title in insolvency proceedings
- A. Leandro, EU cross-border insolvency: a free zone for the anti suit injunctions?

Group 11 - Choice of Court and Arbitration

- V. Salveta, The Enforceability of Exclusive Choice-of-Court Agreements
- L. Manigrassi, Arbitration Exception and Brussels I -Time for Change? An appraisal in light of the review of the Brussels I Regulation
- N. Zambrana Tévar, A new approach to applicable law in investment arbitration
- B. Yüksel, The relevance of the Rome I regulation to international commercial arbitration in the European Union

Group 12 - Class actions, Property and Succession

- V. Ruiz Abou-Nigm, Maritime Liens in the Conflict of Laws Revisited
- M. Casado, The investigation of the debtor's assets abroad
- K. Svobodova, Relation Between Succession Law Determined under the EU Draft Regulation on Succession and the Lex Rei Sitae
- B. Glaspell, Global Class Actions Prosecuted in Canadian Courts

12.30 - 14.00 Lunch break

14.00-15.45

PLENARY SESSION

Theory of PIL and party autonomy

- R. Michaels, What Private International Law Is About

- T. Kono, P. Jurys, Institutional Perspective to Private International Law
- M. Keyes, Party autonomy in private international law beyond international contracts
- A. Mills, Party Autonomy in Non-Contractual Private International Law Disputes

15.45-16.15 Coffee break

16.15 -18.00

Connecting Factors, Law Reform and Model Laws

- E. Schoeman, The connecting factor in private international law: neglected in theory, yet key to just solutions
- I. Canor, Reform of Choice-of-Laws in Torts in the Israeli Legal System - A Normative Perception and a Comparative Perspective
- D. E. Childress III, Courts and the conflict of norms in private international law
- J.A. Moreno Rodríguez, M.M. Albornoz, The Contribution of the Mexico City Convention to the Reflection on a New Soft Law Instrument on Choice of Law in International Contracts

20.00 Conference Dinner - After Dinner Speaker is Hans Van Loon, Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law

Saturday 16 April 2011: 09.00-10.45

Characterisation, external relations in PIL, declining jurisdiction and choice of law in contract

- G. Maher, B. Rodger, The respective roles for the lex fori, the applicable law and autonomous/harmonised concepts in international private law, with particular focus on key aspects of the law of obligations
- P. Mostowik, M. Niedzwiedz, Five Years after ECJ "Lugano II Opinion" - Its Current Developments and Further Consequences
- S. Pitel, The Canadian Codification of Forum Non Conveniens

- G. Tu, Contractual Choice of Law in the People's Republic of China: the Past, the Present and the Future

11.15-13.00

Lex mercatoria, arbitration and consumer protection

- C. Gimenez Corte, Lex mercatoria, independent guarantees and non-state enforcement
L. Radicati di Brozolo, Conflicts between arbitration and courts in the EU: free for all, harmonization or home country control?
- S.I. Strong, Resolving mass legal disputes in the international sphere: are class arbitrations an option? lessons from the United States and Canada
G. Rühl, Consumer Protection in Private International Law

Lunch break 13.00-14.00

14.00-15.30

Torts and Intellectual Property

- I. Kunda, Overriding mandatory rules in intellectual property contracts
- M. Lehmann, Where Do Pecuniary Damages Occur?
- C. O. García-Castrillón Private international law issues of non-contractual liability with special reference to environmental law claims
- E. Rodriguez Pineau, The law applicable to intra-family torts

Coffee break 15.30-15.45

15.45-17.00

Family law, succession, nationality and Europeanisation of PIL

- K. Trimmings, P. Beaumont, International Surrogacy Arrangements - An Urgent Need for a Legal Regulation at the International Level
- T. Kruger, J. Verhellen, Dual nationality = double trouble?
- J Fitchen, The Cross-Border Recognition and Enforcement of Authentic Instruments in the proposed European Succession Regulation

- L. Gillies, *The Europeanisation of the Conflict of Laws and Third States: Scottish Perspectives*
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Issue 2010/3 Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht

The third issue of the Dutch journal on Private International Law, *Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht* is dedicated to the proposal for a new Dutch Act on Private International Law that will be incorporated in Book 10 of the Dutch Civil Code. It includes a critical general review, and contributions on private international law rules on marriages and the consequences for public policy and human rights; the regulation of overriding mandatory rules; the regulation of *fait accompli*; methods of interpretation in the light of Europeanization and internationalization; and party autonomy and the law of names.

- A.P.M.J. Vonken, *Boek 10 BW: meer - incomplete - consolidatie dan codificatie van het Nederlandse internationaal privaatrecht. Een bekommernisvolle bespiegeling over een legislatieve IPR-surplace*, p. 399-409. The English abstract reads:

In recent decades European private international law (PIL) has undoubtedly made progress. This is largely due to the fact that a number of legislators have either codified part or all of their national PIL rules or adopted treaties and regulations drawn up by, e.g., the Hague Conference on Private International Law and the European Union. Recently, the Dutch legislator has also introduced a codification or, more precisely, a 'consolidation' covering an incomplete set of topics on the field of choice of law. I will argue that this Dutch project should be amended and supplemented to include the areas of international civil procedure (e.g., jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments) and to cover a more complete ruling of all kinds of choice of law issues for the sake of legal practice. Finally, I will propose some amendments and refinements to specific rules contained in this consolidation project.

- Susan Rutten, *Aanpassing van het huwelijksrecht; gevolgen voor de openbare orde en mensenrechten in het IPR*, p. 410-420. The English abstract reads:

The Dutch government is considering to take on problems of integration caused by the immigration of spouses through amending the rules governing marriage. The objective is to prevent immigrants living in the Netherlands from marrying abroad merely for the purpose of enabling their new spouse to acquire legal residence in the Netherlands. With this in mind, the government intends to raise the minimum age for marrying; to prohibit the conclusion of marriages between cousins; and to tighten the rules governing the recognition of foreign polygamous marriages. The plans will also affect rules of private international marital law, as well as the use of the public policy exception. In this article, the author examines whether the government's tentative proposals respect human rights, in particular the right to marry. Furthermore, she questions whether the public-policy exception is a suitable technique for warding off undesirable foreign marriages. The introduction and codification in the Dutch Civil Code of a new book on private international law provide an opportunity for the legislator to legally define the concept of public policy. An express reference could be made to the effect that human rights are part of our public policy, since human rights, because of their nature, are in any case seen as fundamental principles. The above proposals by the government also prompt us to be aware of the risk of public policy being used or abused for interests other than those for which the exception was intended, where it is invoked to safeguard rules of which it is less evident that they may be seen as fundamental.

- Cathalijne van der Plas, *Het leerstuk van de voorrangregels gecodificeerd in boek 10: werking(ssfeer)*, p. 421-429. The English abstract reads:

Draft book 10 of the Dutch Civil Code contains a general conflict of laws provision in Article 10:7 on super mandatory rules (lois de police). Many international instruments, in particular several Hague Conventions and the Rome I and II Regulations, provide for the application of such special rules of a mandatory nature in addition to, or in derogation from, applicable private law. It nevertheless makes sense for the Dutch legislature also to provide for a domestic

conflict of laws rule on the application of super mandatory rules, because not all areas of private law have been covered (as yet) by international instruments: notably parts of family law and the law of succession, the law of property, and of corporations. Some aspects of the application of super mandatory rules which remain uncertain in connection with the Rome I and II Regulations have been made explicit by the legislature, in particular the principle that the application of a law pursuant to rules of PIL includes super mandatory rules of that lex causae. Article 10:7 also allows for the application of super mandatory rules of third countries, which goes beyond the room for the application of such rules under Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation. It is submitted that the test which a court must apply when deciding whether the application of foreign public or administrative rules of law is justified and bears a resemblance to the tests under EU case law for determining whether some national rule infringes the free circulation of assets, capital and persons. EU case law provides examples of compelling public interests which could justify the application of a super mandatory rule in a specific situation. However, the Dutch courts will have the freedom to decide on the tests to be applied, and it remains to be seen how the new Article 10:7 will work out in specific cases.

- M.H. ten Wolde, *De mysteries van het fait accompli* en Boek 10 BW, p. 430-436. The English abstract reads:

Article 9 of draft Book 10 of the Civil Code introduces a new fait accompli (an accomplished fact) exception to be used in every area of conflict of laws: 'In the Netherlands, the same legal consequences may be attached to a fact to which legal consequences are attributed under the law which is applicable under the private international law of a foreign state, also when this contravenes the law which is applicable according to Dutch private international law, in as far as not attaching those consequences would constitute an unacceptable violation of the legitimate expectations of the parties or of legal certainty.' This provision aims to adjust the result of applying a Dutch conflict of law rule in the event that such a result is unacceptable since the parties involved assumed that a foreign conflict rule that referred the case to a different law was in fact applicable. The question arises whether the consequences attributed to a fact or act according to a foreign conflict of law rule may be accepted, even if those consequences do not arise under the law which is applicable according to Dutch conflict of law rules. In such

*a case Dutch conflict rules should yield in favour of the foreign conflict rule, but subject to the condition that the parties rightfully believed that their legal position was determined by the closely connected foreign conflict rules in question. Moreover, not granting such effects has to constitute an unacceptable violation of the legitimate expectations of the parties or of legal certainty It is remarkable that the *fait accompli* exception is codified as an universal exception to all conflict rules since it has never been regarded as such in the case law or literature. Among scholars it is mainly seen as a concept that helps to discover the applicable law. The legislator bases the exception of Article 9 on the principle of legitimate expectations as expressed in the Sabah case decided by the Supreme Court and on legal certainty. However, in the Sabah case the court dealt with a completely different problem, namely that of Dutch conflict rules succeeding each other in time. The author argues that the mentioned principle cannot, without any good reason, be extended to the question of the conflict between Dutch conflict rules and foreign conflict rules. Besides this, there is no valid reason to protect parties who deliberately cross the border to a foreign country against their unfamiliarity with the law (including conflict of law) of that country. The reality of international legal practice is that a legal position as a consequence of differing conflict rules may have a different content in one country than in another. Parties should be aware of this fact. International legal practice does not need a *fait accompli* exception. It is advisable to delete Article 9 from Book 10 Civil Code.*

- A.E. Oderkerk, Een lappendeken van interpretatiemethoden in de context van het Ontwerp Boek 10 BW - De invloed van Europeanisering en internationalisering van het IPR, p. 437-446. The English abstract reads:


In the Dutch Proposal on Private International Law (Book 10 of the Dutch Civil Code), a 'General Part' containing provisions on topics like public policy, internationally mandatory provisions, party autonomy, capacity et cetera has been included. However, unlike in some foreign private international law Acts, general provisions on interpretation and/or characterisation have been deliberately omitted. In this article it is argued that it would have been useful and possible to introduce such provisions. Useful because different methods (of a general, European or international background) of interpretation and characterisation have to be applied to different (groups of) provisions of this Book and it will not be obvious to practitioners which method will have to be applied when and how.

Possible since – as will be shown – guidelines on which methods of interpretation and characterisation are to be applied and in which context can be laid down.

- Emilie C. Maclaine Pont, *Partijautonomie in het ‘nieuwe’ internationale namenrecht*, p. 447-455. The English abstract reads:

Recently, a bill has been prepared by the Dutch legislature in order to consolidate the rules of Dutch private international law. This ‘Book 10 of the Dutch Civil Code’ includes personal status issues. More specifically, this article focuses on surnames. In two judgments – Garcia Avello and Grunkin-Paul – the Court of Justice of the EU provided incentives for the Member States to reconsider their rules regarding surnames concerning conflict of law rules and the recognition of surnames. The question is whether the Dutch regulations as laid down in the new ‘Book 10 of the Dutch Civil Code’ are in conformity with these decisions. This article reaches the conclusion that this question must be answered in the negative and recommends some adjustments to the current bill with the introduction of a choice of law clause.

Dutch Articles on Rome I (updated)

The last issue of the Dutch review of private international law (*NIPR Nederlands internationaal privaatrecht*) includes several articles on the Rome I Regulation, including four in English. 

Michael Bogdan (Lund University): *The Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations and the choice of law by the parties*

The Rome Convention of 19 June 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (in the following ‘the Rome Convention’) will be replaced on 17 December 2009, in all Member States of the European Union except Denmark, by the EC Regulation No 593/2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual

Obligations (the Rome I Regulation) although only in relation to contracts concluded after that date. The Commission's proposal of 2005 (in the following 'The Commission's proposal'), which led to the adoption of the Rome I Regulation after a number of amendments, stated that it did not set out to establish a new set of conflict rules but rather convert an existing convention into a Community law instrument. Nevertheless, the Regulation brings about several important changes in comparison with the Rome Convention.

Luc Strikwerda (Advocate-General, Dutch Supreme Court): *Toepasselijk recht bij gebreke van rechtskeuze; Artikel 4 Rome I-Verordening*

If contractual parties have not availed themselves of the possibility to choose the law applicable to their contract (Art. 3, Rome I), the applicable law will be determined according to rules laid down in Article 4, Rome I. Similar to the equivalent provision of the 1980 Rome Convention, Article 4, Rome I is based upon the doctrine of the characteristic performance. Nonetheless, a new structure with respect to the concretization of this doctrine has been adopted, ensuring that the characteristic performance no longer functions as a presumption. Instead, Article 4 lays down the law applicable in a number of pre-determined categories (Art. 4(1)(a)-(h), Rome I). For the majority of these categories the law of the habitual residence of the party who performs the characteristic performance will be applied. These pre-determined categories form the basic structure and content of this contribution. The obvious disadvantage that this new structure leads to issues of characterisation will also be discussed.

Teun Struycken (Utrecht University and Nauta Dutilh, Amsterdam) and Bart Bierman (Nauta Dutilh, Amsterdam): *Rome I on contracts concluded in multilateral systems.*

One of the novelties of the Rome I Regulation is the special provision in Article 4(1)(h) on the law applicable to a contract entered into within a regulated market or a multilateral trading facility in the absence of a choice of a law by the contracting parties.

The authors analyse the practical significance of this provision and the relevant contracts which come into existence within a trading system. In the authors'

view, the concept of contract used in Article 4(1)(h) of Rome I, encompasses transactions within a trading system that may not be true agreements under the substantive law of the Netherlands. Furthermore, many of the relevant contractual arrangements, in particular those relating to the clearing and the settlement of securities transactions on a regulated market or multilateral trading facility, fall within the scope of the special PIL provision for designated settlement finality systems pursuant to the Settlement Finality Directive.

According to the authors, legal certainty requires that all transactions on a particular trading system be subject to the same law, regardless of the nature of the parties involved. They take the view that there should be no room for a choice of a law other than the law governing the trading system. The rule in Article 4(1)(h) should in their view become applicable to each contract concluded within a multilateral trading system. The law designated by that provision should prevail over the law chosen by the parties to a transaction: such transactions should always be governed by the law governing the system.

**Maarten Claringbould (Leiden University and Van Traa Advocaten, Rotterdam):
*Artikel 5 Rome I en vervoerovereenkomsten***

Article 5, paragraph 1, Rome I covers contracts for the carriage of goods and paragraph 2 covers - and this is new - contracts for the carriage of passengers.

In most bills of lading, sea waybills and charter parties a choice of law clause has been inserted into the documents, although only a clause paramount in a bill of lading might not be sufficient: the Hague (Visby) Rules that are incorporated into the contract only deal with the liability of the carrier and not with such items as payment for freight or the interpretation of the contract etc. and for such bills of lading Article 5(1) will determine the applicable national law. In CMR and CIM consignment notes, bills of lading for inland navigation as well as in air waybills a clear choice of national law clause is often lacking and then Article 5(1) also determines the applicable national law, sometimes with an unexpected outcome ... But first of all we have to categorise the contracts that fall under the legal term 'a contract for the carriage of goods' as mentioned in Article 5(1). We know that recital 22 considers 'single charter parties and other contracts the main purpose of which is the carriage of goods' to be a contract for the carriage of goods. The Court of Justice in its recent

judgment of 6 October 2009, ICF v. Balkenende (Case C-133/08), has interpreted this term. It concerned a contract for a shuttle train service between Amsterdam and Frankfurt for the carriage of containers. Under this contract ICF would make wagons available and it would also arrange for traction (locomotives). In my opinion this is a clear framework contract for the carriage of goods by rail as such a contract has been described in Article 8:1552 Dutch Civil Code since 2006. However, the Court of Justice (inspired by the Dutch Advocate-General Strikwerda as well as the questions formulated by the Dutch Supreme Court) started out on the wrong footing by stating in sub 2 that the contract at issue here was a charter party contract. A charter party contract means that the charterer has chartered a specifically named vessel or other means of transport (such as a truck or a complete train) including the crew. It is obvious that this was not the case for this train shuttle service: wagons were made available from time to time and ICF would arrange for traction (not mentioning specific locomotives with drivers). That is not a charter party with regard to a train; it is just a plain framework contract for the carriage of containers by rail. For that reason, the first answer by the Court of Justice should be read as merely referring to a 'contract of carriage' instead of a 'charter party'. Then the answer makes sense: 'The second sentence of Article 4(4) of the Rome Convention applies to a contract of carriage [emphasis added], other than a single voyage charter-party, only when the main purpose of the contract is not merely to make available a means of transport, but the actual carriage of goods.'

I am of the opinion that time charter parties, although under Dutch law they are considered to be contracts of carriage and now - strictly speaking - fall under the first answer by the Court of Justice as contracts of carriage, are still excluded by recital 22 from the term 'contract for the carriage of goods' as mentioned in Article 5(1). If it were otherwise, the law which is applicable to such time charters might vary from port to port, such port being 'the place of delivery agreed by the parties', Article 5(1) last sentence. That would certainly be contrary to recital 16 ('the conflict-of-law rules should be highly foreseeable'). The fact that in its first answer the Court of Justice uses - in my opinion by mistake - the term 'charter party' does not alter this.

In my opinion (and unlike Boonk and Mankowski) the contractual side of bills of lading falls under Rome I and more specifically - if a choice of law clause is

lacking - under Article 5(1). That concerns cargo claims, payment for freight and other obligations under the contract of carriage which is incorporated in the bill of lading. But the questions of who may claim under the bill of lading or who is the carrier under the bill of lading fall outside the scope of Rome I and Rome II and for that reason Article 5 of the Dutch Code on Private International Law with regard to the carriage of goods has to be retained.

Article 19(2) makes the place where the agency or branch of the carrier (the carrier always being a company) is located the habitual residence of the company. In practice, contracts of carriage are often concluded by agents of branch offices of the carrier and in such cases the place of the receipt of the goods will coincide with the 'habitual residence of the carrier' making - maybe quite unexpectedly - the law of the country where the goods are received for shipment the applicable law.

For that reason I advise air carriers carrying passengers, who seldom include a choice of national law in their tickets or general conditions, to choose as the applicable law the place where the carrier has its central administration (Art. 5(2c)) and not the place where the carrier has its 'habitual residence' which will often be the place where its agent who concluded the contract is located. I finish this article by expressing the hope and the expectation that the next time the Court of Justice has to interpret Article 5(1) Rome I, it will first properly categorise the contract of carriage at issue by starting from the correct body of facts.

Jonathan Hill (Bristol University): Article 6 of the Rome I Regulation: Much Ado about nothing

Consumer contracts are typically standard-form contracts, the terms of which are drafted by (or on behalf of) suppliers. As the consumer has no influence over the substance of the contract, one of the perceived dangers is that a supplier may include in the contract a choice-of-law clause which selects a law which favours the interest of the supplier over those of the consumer. This danger suggests that, in order to ensure that consumers are not deprived of the level of legal protection which they may legitimately expect, the choice-of-law rules applicable to consumer contracts should differ from those which apply to contracts in general (and which are founded on the principle of party autonomy).

Christian Heinze (Max Planck Institute, Hamburg): *Insurance contracts under the Rome I Regulation.*

All government, indeed every human benefit and enjoyment, every viryue, and every prudent act, is founded on compromise and barter'. these words written by Edmund Burke more then 200 years ago still seem to be a fair description of the legislative process in the democracies today. They hold particularly true at the European level where compromise is notoriously difficult, in particular if the national backgrounds are as disparate as they are in insurance law. Article 7 of the European Regulation NOo 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (hereafter abbreviated as 'Rome I'), the rule titled 'insurance contracts', is exactly that, a compromise.

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