

Link Directory for Comparative Law and PIL - “Der virtuelle Rechtsvergleicher”

The Chair for Civil Law, Private International Law and Comparative Law at the *Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder)* has created under the direction of *Prof. Dr. Dieter Martiny* a very useful website (in German/English) which contains links on comparative law, private international law, uniform law as well as European Union institutions, case law and Community legislation. Further, it contains links to institutions, case law, legislation, universities, legal journals, lawyers, legal organisations and libraries of most Member States as well as the US, Australia, Israel, Norway, Switzerland and the Ukraine.

The link directory can be found [here](#).

(Many thanks to Dr. Oliver L. Knöfel (Hamburg) for the tip-off.)

Swedish Supreme Court on Legal Basis for Jurisdiction

The Swedish Supreme Court (Högsta Domstolen) recently rendered a decision on the legal basis for its international adjudicatory authority in civil matters when the Council Regulation no 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 (hereinafter “the Brussels I Regulation”) is inapplicable. The decision rendered 15 June 2007 with case no. Ö 494-06 can be retrieved [here](#).

Parties, facts, contentions before the court

The plaintiff, BIG, a company domiciled in Sweden, served the defendant, Isle of Man Assurance Limited (IOMA), an insurance company domiciled in Isle of Man, with a subpoena in a Swedish court, asking that court to force IOMA to pay BIG

48 million Swedish Kroner on the basis of BIG having acquired the rights and obligations of the original policyholders' insurance agreement with IOMA entered into in November 1991. The background for that agreement was allegedly that BIG in 1991-92 had offered goods to customers while issuing certificates promising to repay customers the sum of the purchase price 10 years after purchase. BIG contended IOMA in accordance with an insurance agreement had promised to recompense BIG for the sum equivalent to that of the sum claimed in accordance with the said certificates. The judgment of the First Instance was appealed to the Swedish Court of Second Instance (Hovrätten för Övre Norrland) whose judgment was appealed to the Swedish Supreme Court.

Ratio decidendi of the Swedish Supreme Court

First, the Swedish Supreme Court questioned whether there was legal basis for attributing adjudicatory authority to Swedish courts.

Second, the Swedish Supreme Court stated that Swedish law did not have any general rules for determining Swedish adjudicatory authority in international civil and commercial disputes, which, by contrast exist in the Brussels I Regulation and the Lugano Convention. The former is, within its scope of application, directly applicable in Sweden and is applicable in disputes involving parties domiciled in the EU, whereas the latter is adopted and implemented by incorporation as law in Sweden and is applicable in international civil and commercial matters between persons domiciled within EFTA-States, and between persons domiciled in an EFTA-State and an EU-State.

Third, the Swedish Supreme Court asserted that in accordance with the Brussels I Regulation and the Lugano Convention, when the defendant is domiciled in a Member State or Contracting State, the plaintiff may, in accordance with the main rule of jurisdiction in Article 2, sue the defendant at the place of the defendant's domicile. By contrast, if the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State or Contracting State, the international adjudicatory authority is as a main rule to be determined by national law, including also disputes relating to insurance. Since the defendant, IOMA, was domiciled in Isle of Man where IOMA pursued its business activities, and Isle of Man neither is a Member of the EU nor is a contracting State to the Lugano Convention, it follows that the question of international adjudicatory of Swedish courts must be determined by national Swedish rules.

Fourth, the Swedish Supreme Court stated there did not exist any particular rules in Swedish national law determining international adjudicatory authority of Swedish courts. Under such circumstances, the Court reasoned, this question is to begin with determined by analogical application of the forum-rules in Chapter 10 of "Rättegångsbalken", which in this case did not support the attribution of adjudicatory authority to Swedish courts.

Fifth, BIG contended that Swedish courts were competent to adjudicate, insisting, first, that the insurer, in accordance with Brussels I Regulation (and the relevant provisions in the Lugano Convention) may be sued not only in the courts of the State where the insurer is domiciled (Article 9.1.a), but also, in case of actions brought by the policyholder, the insured or a beneficiary, in the courts for the place where the plaintiff is domiciled (Article 9.1.b), and, second, that the insurer, in accordance with Brussels I Regulation Article 10 (and the relevant provisions in the Lugano Convention) may be sued in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred. Further, BIG contended - with reference to the Swedish Supreme Court decision in NJA 1994 p. 81, where the Court had stated that "the Lugano Convention must be seen as expressing international accepted principles on conflicts of competence between courts of different States" - that the rules of the Brussels I Regulation and the Lugano Convention should be applicable in order to attribute adjudicatory authority to Swedish courts regardless of the said regulations not being directly applicable. In answering those contentions, the Swedish Supreme Court pointed out, first, that the Court had stated that cited phrase in a dispute between two Swedes in relation to a better right to foreign patent claims, and, second, that the cited phrase was occasioned by the circumstance that the Lugano Convention on exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerned with certain patent claims did not give better rights for the seeking of a patent invention, and by consequence was not an argument for the lack of Swedish adjudicatory authority. Further, the Swedish Supreme Court pointed out that the reasoning in NJA 1994 p. 81 - that Swedish courts in that case had adjudicatory authority in accordance with the main principle that defendants shall be sued in the courts of the State where they are domiciled - was not to be conceived as an expression of a general principle so that the rules of the Brussels I Regulation (and the Lugano Convention) were applicable by analogy in cases where the question of adjudicatory authority is to be determined in accordance with national law. Furthermore, in support of such lack of a general principle, the Swedish Supreme Court referred to NJA 2001 p. 800.

Sixth, having concluded that the Brussels I Regulation and the Lugano Convention neither were expressions of general principles, nor were applicable by analogy, the Swedish Supreme Court emphasized that those regulations nevertheless could serve as an important basis for the assessment of whether there should be sufficient ground to attribute adjudicatory authority to Swedish courts even in situations when these regulations were not directly applicable.

Seventh, in recognizing that the Brussels I Regulation and the Lugano Convention expressly are based on the main principle that defendants shall be sued in the courts of the State where they are domiciled, the Swedish Supreme Court stated that one consequence thereof is that exceptions to the main rule are to be interpreted restrictively, also including the rules of jurisdiction in matters of insurance. Further, the Court stated that if the Brussels I Regulation and the Lugano Convention were to serve as legal basis for adjudicatory authority in accordance with Swedish law, it had to be required that adjudicatory authority could have been attributed to Swedish courts if the Brussels I Regulation and the Lugano Convention were applicable.

Eighth, responding to BIG's contention that Article 10 of the Brussels I Regulation attributed adjudicatory authority to Swedish courts, the Swedish Supreme Court stated, first, that liability insurance is in general considered as an insurance covering responsibility of damage in relation to a third party, and, second, that the insurance at hand in this case could not be qualified to count as liability insurance. Consequently, the Court reasoned, the Brussels I Regulation Article 10 is inapplicable and could therefore not serve as legal basis for attributing adjudicatory authority to Swedish courts.

Ninth, responding to BIG's contention that Article 9.1.b of the Brussels I Regulation attributed adjudicatory authority to Swedish courts, the Swedish Supreme Court stated, first, that Article 9.1.b presupposes either the policyholder, the insured or a beneficiary to serve the defendant with a subpoena and start court proceedings, which was not the circumstances of the case since the insurance agreement was not entered into between the plaintiff, BIG, and the defendant, IOMA, but was rather an insurance agreement where BIG had acquired the rights and obligations of the original policyholders. Therefore, the Swedish Supreme Court doubted that BIG could be qualified to count as "insurer" within the meaning of Article 9.1.b of the Brussels I Regulation. Having regard to the purpose of that Article, which is to protect the weaker party to the agreement

(referring to point 13 of the Preamble of the Brussels I Regulation), its primary purpose is usual standard types of insurance agreements, which in the case at hand deviated there from. Against this background, the Swedish Supreme Court concluded that the Brussels I Regulation Article 9.1.b would not be a strong argument for attributing adjudicatory authority to Swedish courts (referring in parenthesis to the European Court of Justice, Judgment of 13 July 2000, Group Josi Reinsurance Company vs Universal Insurance Company).

Tenth, the Swedish Supreme Court went on to comment, that in determining how and to what extent the Brussels I Regulation and the Lugano Convention should and could be legal basis for attributing adjudicatory authority to Swedish courts in accordance with Swedish national law, the Court stated that both regulations also contain rules on recognition and enforcement of judgements, and that the rules on jurisdiction had been formed in relation to the obligations following from the rules on recognition and enforcement of judgements (and with a view to a common legal market), which especially was the case with insurance disputes.

Eleventh, having regard to the foregoing considerations, the Swedish Supreme Court concluded that without legal support in Swedish law in general, it was out of the question to attribute adjudicatory authority to Swedish courts in insurance disputes as the Brussels I Regulation, independent of the object of the insurance agreement, who the policyholder or insured is, or where the insurer is domiciled or has his place of business. Such special circumstances, which could occasion the attribution of adjudicatory authority to Swedish courts in the present case had not been presented to the Court. Hence, the Swedish Supreme Court concluded that Swedish courts lacked adjudicatory authority.

Third Issue of 2007's *Journal du Droit International*

The last issue of the *Journal du Droit International* contains three articles dealing with conflict issues. They are all written in French.

The first is authored by Cecile Legros, who lectures at the Faculty of Law of Rouen. It deals with Conflicts of Norms in the Field of International Contracts for Carriage of Goods (*“Les conflits de normes en matière de contrats de transport internationaux de marchandises”*). The English abstract reads:

The originality of the international conventions in the field of international transport contracts comes from their comprising, in addition to rules regarding the international transport contract concerned, provisions on jurisdictional competence, arbitration, and sometimes even on recognition and enforcement. The present study aims at analysing these original provisions as well as their links with other international instruments. Could the existence of competence, enforcement and arbitration rules in different sources turn to a conflict of regulations or can such rules coexist? Such are the questions discussed in this study.

The first part of this essay will analyse these original rules on competence and enforcement, in order to afterwards be able to consider their relation to European Union instruments. The second part of this article will be published in the next issue of the Journal.

The second article with conflict implications is authored by Professor Manlio Frigo, who teaches at the University of Milan. The article studies The Role of Rules of Conduct Between Art Law and Regulation (*“Le role des règles de déontologie entre droit de l’art et régulation du marché”*). The English abstract reads:

*In the field of international protection of cultural property, and of rules applicable to art work trading, beside the norms contained in international agreements, in the last years one can witness a proliferation of spontaneous or quasi-spontaneous rules that may be approximately classified in the category of rules of conduct. Whether we are dealing with rules capable of creating obligations at least of contractual nature, or with rules lacking true binding nature, we can nonetheless acknowledge a meaningful likeness with the rules having developed in the commercial domain also by means of the *lex mercatoria*. In both cases indeed we are faced with a group of rules of conduct created by the same subjects to which they are addressed, functioning as instruments by which professionals milieux and categories involved self-*

regulate themselves. This study takes into account the main codes of conduct drafted by international organisations, international institutions and national institutions, both public and private, federations and associations, in order to attempt a first survey of their influence on international commerce as instruments of art market regulation.

Finally, Professor Yasuhiro Okuda, of Chuo University in Tokyo, offers a survey of the recent reform of international private law in Japan (“*Aspects de la réforme du droit international privé au Japon*”). The English abstract reads:

The Japanese statute on private international law that was well known as the Horei has been largely revised in 2006 and newly retitled as Act on the general rules on the application of laws. The new Act came into force on January 1st, 2007 and brings major changes in the field of contractual and non contractual obligations. This article deals with the comparison of these revised provisions and European laws, as well as the interpretation to be discussed before Japanese courts in the future. The text of this Act is translated in French as an appendix to this article.

An English translation of the Act by Professor Okuda can be found [here](#).

Articles appearing in the *Journal du droit international* cannot be downloaded.

Proskauer on International Litigation and Arbitration: A Review

Proskauer Rose LLP has just announced the release of its new E-Guide: “Proskauer on International Litigation and Arbitration: Managing, Resolving and Avoiding Cross-Border Business and Regulatory Disputes.” It is a welcome compendium of information for all sorts of practitioners – both litigation-centered

and transactional – and brings together a wide array of topics under the common heading of cross-border legal issues.

To cover these issues, the E-Guide is divided into three sections dedicated to “International Litigation,” “International Arbitration,” and “International Issues in Select Substantive Areas.” The litigation section is broad and comprehensive, tackling matters that arise at the outset of a suit (e.g., securing U.S jurisdiction, venue and service outside the U.S.), and during the prosecution of a suit (e.g., choice of law, discovery, and trial), but also issues that are not commonly discussed in the traditional model of private international law texts. The chapters on government investigations and government immunity, U.S. abstention doctrine, the role of comity in U.S. courts, and anti-suit injunctions are particularly helpful to the practitioner aiming, in the authors’ words, to “present clients with strategic choices.” Later chapters on litigation ancillary to arbitration, and fighting to compel *or* avoid arbitration, have a similar practical focus.

The text of the E-guide is presented simply and effectively, grazing the surface to focus more detailed research when necessary, and providing necessary details itself when appropriate. The authors believe that Proskauer on International Litigation and Arbitration is a “useful tool in . . . efforts to confront, resolve, and even avoid the issues that arise when a commercial or regulatory dispute jumps – or should jump – national borders.” A useful tool it certainly is.

It is available in its entirety [here](#).

General Motors Corp v Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Group

General Motors Corporation v Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance (2007) EWHC 2206 (Comm) is a rather convoluted case on whether a consent order, in the circumstances of the case, amounted to an exclusive jurisdiction agreement in favour of the English courts, and whether an application for an anti-suit injunction

could therefore be granted. Here's the Lawtel summary for the details:

The applicant insurers (R) applied for an anti-suit injunction to restrain the respondent Delaware corporation (G) from pursuing proceedings in Delaware. A large number of claims for alleged asbestos related injury and environmental liability had been made against G in the United States. G contended that its liability for claims and defence costs was covered by insurance policies issued by a US insurer (U), formerly a subsidiary of R, and that R were also liable as the alter ego of U or because R had tortiously interfered with the contracts between U and G. G commenced proceedings in Michigan, where its principal place of business was, against U and R. The Michigan proceedings were then split with the coverage issues to be decided first. G also commenced English proceedings against R. By a consent order the English proceedings were stayed pending the outcome of the coverage claims in Michigan. R then withdrew its motion to dismiss the Michigan proceedings on grounds of forum non conveniens and G's claim in those proceedings was voluntarily dismissed as against R in favour of the English action. U then obtained summary disposition in the Michigan proceedings on grounds that the claims were time-barred. In the meantime R had proposed withdrawing from US business and had sold U. G then commenced proceedings against R in Delaware. R submitted that the consent order properly construed reflected the parties' intention to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the English courts to determine the claims against R.

David Steel J. held, (1) In construing the consent order, the background was very important. The Michigan proceedings had been split with the claims against R being postponed and stayed and with R being given leave to renew its motion to dismiss on forum grounds if the stay was discharged. That had prompted G to commence the English proceedings. There were the added advantages from G's perspective that the claim would thereby proceed in the forum where execution could be readily achieved and further that the issue of limitation would not be exacerbated by any further delay in the US. By the same token it was advantageous to R both to obtain its release from the Michigan proceedings and to obtain G's participation in proceedings in the English courts. In the circumstances the consent order reflected a package whereby the parties intended to settle on proceedings in England as regards the claims against R in due course but to await the outcome of the Michigan proceedings and to be bound thereby. There was no apparent purpose in agreeing to be bound by the

outcome of the Michigan proceedings in respect of coverage, together with withdrawal of the claims against R, save on the basis that the English courts should have exclusive jurisdiction. In the circumstances the consent order had the effect of constituting an exclusive jurisdiction agreement. (2) On the basis that there was an exclusive jurisdiction agreement G failed to show any strong reason for not restraining its Delaware proceedings and R was entitled to an anti-suit injunction, *Trafigura Beheer BV v Kookmin Bank Co* (2006) EWHC 1921 (Comm) applied. Application granted.

The full judgment is available to Lawtel subscribers.

Study on the Application of Brussels I in the Member States Completed

The Study on the Application of the Brussels I Regulation in the Member States which has been carried out by the Institute for Private International Law at the University of Heidelberg under the direction of *Prof. Dr. Burkhard Hess*, *Prof. Dr. Thomas Pfeiffer* (both Heidelberg) and *Prof. Dr. Peter Schlosser* (Munich) on behalf of the European Commission has been completed now.

The aim of the study has been to prepare a report of the Commission according to Art. 73 Brussels I. For this purpose, for the first time since the entry into force of the Brussels I Regulation, statistical, empirical and legal data on the application of the Regulation has been collected in all former 25 Member States (with the exception of Denmark). The comprehensive survey has been executed with the assistance of national reporters from the respective Member States by means of numerous personal interviews with lawyers, judges and other legal practitioners, written consultations as well as an extensive evaluation of case law on the basis of questionnaires elaborated by the general reporters.

Based on the information submitted by the national reporters, a report has been

drawn up by the general reporters which gives an overview of the experiences made with the Regulation in the Member States, examines problems and contains several suggestions for future amendments of the Regulation.

This general report has now been published on the website of the European Commission. The individual national reports will be publicly available in the near future as well.

See regarding the study also our previous post which can be found [here](#).

Swedish Supreme Court on Jurisdiction and Trademark Infringements

The Swedish Supreme Court (Högsta Domstolen) recently rendered a decision on rejection to refer a case to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the proper interpretation of Article 5.3 of the Council Regulation no 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 (hereinafter “the Brussels I Regulation”). The decision rendered 27 April 2007 with case no. Ö 210-07 can be retrieved [here](#).

Parties, facts, conclusions, legal basis for appeal, contentions before the court

The plaintiff, Aredal Foam Systems HB, a company domiciled in Sweden, served the defendant, MSR Dosiertechnik GmbH, a company domiciled in Germany, with a subpoena in a Swedish court of First Instance (tingsrätten), asking that Court to force the defendant to discontinue infringing the plaintiff’s trademark “FireDos” in Sweden, Spain, Great Britain, the Benelux-countries and France, where the plaintiff had the exclusive right to that trademark, and furthermore, to recompense the economic loss occurred in those States. The judgment of the First Instance was appealed to the Swedish Court of Second Instance (Svea Hovrätt), who attributed adjudicatory authority to Swedish courts, but only to the extent

the defendant had infringed the plaintiff's Swedish trademark. The judgement of the Court of Second Instance prompted the plaintiff to appeal to the Swedish Supreme Court (Högsta Domstolen). Before the Swedish Supreme Court, the plaintiff's object of action was to ask that Court, first, to refer the case to a new trial before the Court of First Instance based on the contention that Swedish courts were competent to adjudicate claims of the plaintiff relating to infringement and economic loss in all the said States, second, to refer the case to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the proper interpretation of Article 5.3 of the Brussels I Regulation, and, third, to render a decision that the defendant pay the plaintiff's procedural costs before the Swedish Supreme Court. This case note will solely venture into the question of adjudicatory authority.

Ratio decidendi of the Swedish Supreme Court

First, the Swedish Supreme Court identified the legal basis for conferring, delimiting and thus both attribute and exclude adjudicatory authority to Swedish courts. Since the defendant was domiciled in an EU State, the legal basis for determining the attribution of jurisdiction to Swedish courts was the Brussels I Regulation.

Second, the Swedish Supreme Court identified the relevant provisions for the case, which were the main rule of jurisdiction in Article 2 and the exception to the main rule contained in Article 5.3 of the Brussels I Regulation.

Third, the Swedish Supreme Court identified the legal question in issue. With reference to the wording of the Brussels I Regulation Article 5.3, the Swedish Supreme Court stated that the plaintiff can sue the defendant "at the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur". That wording was according to the Swedish Supreme Court, with reference to the case law of the ECJ, to be understood as meaning the place giving rise to the damage as well as the place where the damage occurred, where upon the place where the damage occurred does not encompass the place where the plaintiff alleges to have suffered an economic loss as a consequence of a direct damage initially suffered and occurred in another Member State. Therefore, the Swedish Supreme Court reasoned, the legal question in issue was where the place of the event initially causing tortious, delictual or quasi-delictual liability to incurr directly produced its harmful effects upon the person who is the victim of that event.

Fourth, in answering that question, the Swedish Supreme Court stated, with reference to legal theory, when a trademark is infringed, the direct damage occurs (beyond doubt) in the State where the trademark is registered or incorporated (*lex loci protectionis*). Against this background, and with the legal relationship not involving claims that MSR in Sweden had acted so that the foreign trademarks of Aredal had been infringed, the Swedish Supreme Court concluded it could not attribute and extend the adjudicatory authority of Swedish courts more than the Swedish Court of Second Instance could ground Swedish jurisdiction in accordance with the Brussels I Regulation Article 5.3. By consequence, the Swedish Supreme Court established there was no legal ground to send the case to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the proper interpretation of the Brussels I Regulation Article 5.3.

Christian Schulze, 'The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements', (2007) 19 SA Merc LJ 140-150

The article discusses the 2005 Hague Convention's rules on jurisdiction (of the chosen and not-chosen courts) and the recognition and enforcement of resulting judgments. It then goes on to examine the role of the new convention in comparison to other conventions and to the Brussels I Regulation. Reference is made to the different objectives of these international instruments and to the more limited scope of the Hague Convention. The article also discusses jurisdiction agreements in general, pointing out that they are common in international commercial contracts and may be regarded as a prudent step for parties to take. The author describes the distinction between exclusive and non-exclusive choice of court agreements. He concludes by stating that this convention makes litigation a more viable alternative to arbitration since it ensures the enforcement of choice of court agreements in the same fashion as the

New York Convention (1958) does for arbitration agreements. He then expresses the hope that the new convention would draw as much interest as the New York Convention.

Mexico First State to Join Hague Choice of Court Convention of 2005

According to recent news published on the website of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), on Wednesday, 26 September 2007, Mexico deposited its instrument of accession to the Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements. Pursuant to its Art. 31, one more ratification or accession will suffice to bring the Convention, which is open to all States, into force.

Further information on the Convention (status table, explanatory report and preliminary documents, translations and bibliography) can be found on the related section of the HCCH website.

(Many thanks to Pietro Franzina, University of Ferrara, for the tip-off)

Conference: PIL and Protection of Foreign Investors

University of Montenegro Faculty of Law in Podgorica, with the support of the GTZ organize the Fifth Annual Conference: "Private International Law and Protection of Foreign Investors" (*Međunarodno privatno pravo i zaštita stranih*

investitora).

The program includes the following speakers and topics:

Maja Stanivuković: Clause Concerning the Observation of All Commitments which the State Assumes Towards the Foreign Investor (the Umbrella Clause) in Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties (*Klauzula o ispunjenju svih obaveza koje je država preuzela prema stranom ulagaču (kišobran klauzula) u dvostranim ugovorima o zaštiti investicija*)

Žorž Krivokapić: Some Modern Clauses in Investment Agreements (*Neke moderne klauzule u investicionim ugovorima*)

Uglješa Grušić: Effects of Choice of Court Clauses in European, English and Serbian Law (*Dejstvo prorogacionih sporazuma u evropskom, engleskom i srpskom pravu*)

Mirela Župan: Widening Party Autonomy to Non-State Law (*Širenje stranačke autonomije na izbor ne državnog prava*)

Ivana Kunda: Internationally Mandatory Rules: Defining their Notion in European Private International Law (*Međunarodno prisilna pravila: određenje pojma u europskom ugovornom međunarodnom privatnom pravu*)

Bernadet Bordaš: Certain Issues of Resolving Investment Disputes as an Investor Protection Instrument (*Neka pitanja rešavanja investicionih sporova kao instrumenta zaštite investitora*)

Vesna Lazić: Suitability of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules for the Settlement of Investment Disputes

Michael Wietzorek: Arbitration of Investment Disputes

Toni Deskoski: The Importance of the Right to be Heard in International Arbitration Proceedings

Vladimir Savković: Internet Arbitrations as a Model for Resolving Disputes Arising Out of the Electronic Contracts – Pros and Cons (*Internet arbitraže kao model za rešavanje sporova proizašlih iz elektronskih ugovora – pro et contra*)

Christa Jessel Holst: The Directive 2005/56/EC of 26 October 2005 on Cross-

Border Mergers of Limited Liability Companies and Its Implementation in Member-States with Restrictions in the Legal Transactions of the Real Properties

Vlada Polovi?: The Status of Foreign Investors in Domestic Insolvency Proceedings (*Položaj stranih investitora u stečajnom postupku na domaćoj teritoriji*)

Milena Jovanović-Zattila: Investor Protection on the Capital Market (*Zaštita investitora na tržištu kapitala*)

Davor Babi?: Law Applicable to Takeover of Joint Stock Companies (*Pravo mjerodavno za preuzimanje dioničkih društava*)

Predrag Cvetković: International Legal Regime for Foreign Investments: The Role of the World Trade Organisation (*Meunarodno-pravni režim stranih ulaganja: o ulozi i značaju Svetske trgovinske organizacije*)

Valerija Šaula: On the Occasion of a Decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina – The Issue of Service Being Made Abroad as a Condition for Recognition of a Foreign Judgement (*Povodom jedne odluke Ustavnog suda Bosne i Hercegovine-Problem dostavljanja u inostranstvo kao uslov za priznanje presude stranog suda*)

The conference is to be held from 18 to 20 October 2007 in the Hotel Bellevue Iberostar in Bečići (Montenegro). The proceeds from the conference will be published by the Faculty of Law in Podgorica.

The contact person is:

Professor Dr. Maja Kostić-Mandić

Faculty of Law

Ul. 13. jula br. 2

81 000 Podgorica

Montenegro

tel: +381 81 481 110

e-mail: majak@cg.yu