Yesterday, the opinion by Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in case C-339/07 (Rechtsanwalt Christopher Seagon als Insolvenzverwalter über das Vermögen der Frick Teppichboden Supermärkte GmbH v Deko Marty Belgium N.V.) has been released.

The case concerns the delimitation of Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 (Insolvency Regulation) and Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 (Brussels I Regulation) or – more precisely – the question of whether Art. 3 (1) Insolvency Regulation covers actions to set a transaction aside in the context of insolvency, although they are not mentioned explicitly.

The background of the case is as follows: The debtor, a German private limited company, paid an amount of 50.000 EUR to a Belgian company (defendant). Even though it was a Belgian company having its registered office in Belgium, the money was paid into an account in Germany. The day after, the debtor applied successfully for the opening of the insolvency proceedings at a German local court. In the following, the insolvency administrator (claimant) reclaimed the 50.000 EUR from the defendant by means of an action to set a transaction aside.

The Regional Court (LG Marburg, 2 August 2005 – 2 0 209/04) as well as the Higher Regional Court (OLG Frankfurt, 26 January 2006 – 15 U 200/05) held that the Brussels I Regulation had to be applied and consequently stated that German courts lacked international jurisdiction since the defendant’s registered office was in Belgium.

In the following, the German Bundesgerichtshof, regarding the interpretation of Art. 3 (1) Insolvency Regulation and Art. 1 (2) lit. b) Brussels I Regulation as being ambiguous, referred – with decision of 21 June 2007 (IX ZR 39/06) – the following questions to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling:

On interpreting Article 3(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings and Article 1(2)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, do the courts of the Member State within the territory of which insolvency proceedings regarding the debtor’s assets have been opened have international jurisdiction under Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 in respect of an action in the context of the insolvency to set a transaction aside that is brought against a person whose registered office is in another Member State?

If the first question is to be answered in the negative:

Does an action in the context of the insolvency to set a transaction aside fall within Article 1(2)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001?

Art. 3 (1) Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 has to be interpreted as meaning that the court of a Member State before which insolvency proceedings are pending has jurisdiction with regard to an action in the context of insolvency to set a transaction aside against an addressee of avoidance having its registered office in another Member State.

The full text of the opinion can be found, inter alia, in Italian, French and Spanish at the ECJ’s website.

See with regard to the reference and the background of the case also our previous post which can be found here and our previous post on a related article which can be found here.

Today, the ECJ delivered its judgment in case C-353/06 (Grunkin and Paul) which has been awaited with high interest.

As reported in previous posts, the background of the case is as follows: The case concerns a child who was born in Denmark having, as well as his parents, only German nationality. The child was registered in Denmark – in accordance with Danish law – under the compound surname Grunkin-Paul combining the name of his father (Grunkin) and the name of his mother (Paul), who did not use a common married name. After moving to Germany, German authorities refused to recognise the surname of the child as it had been determined in Denmark, since according to German private international law (Art.10 EGBGB) the name of a person is subject to the law of his/her nationality, i.e. in this case German law, and according to German law (§ 1617 BGB) parents who do not share a married name shall choose either the father’s or the mother’s surname to be the child’s surname.

The Local Court (Amtsgericht) Niebüll which was called to designate the parent having the right to choose the child’s surname, sought a preliminary ruling of the ECJ on the compatibility of Art.10 EGBGB with Articles 12 and 18 EC-Treaty. However, the ECJ held that it had no jurisdiction to answer the question referred since the referring court acted in an administrative rather than in a judicial capacity (judgment of 27 April 2006, C-96/04). In the following, the parents applied again – without success – to have their son registered with the surname Grunkin-Paul. The parents’ challenge to this refusal was heard, by virtue of German procedural law, by the Amtsgericht Flensburg. The Amtsgericht Flensburg held that it was precluded from instructing the registrar to register the applicants’ son under this name by German law. However, since the court had doubts as to whether it amounts to a violation of Articles 12 and 18 EC-Treaty to ask a citizen of the European Union to use different names in different Member States, the court referred with decision of 16th August 2006 (69 III 11/06) the following questions to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling:

In light of the prohibition on discrimination set out in Article 12 of the EC Treaty and having regard to the right to the freedom of movement for every citizen of the Union laid down by Article 18 of the EC Treaty, is the provision on the conflict of laws contained in Article 10 of the EGBGB valid, in so far as it provides that the right to bear a name is governed by nationality alone?

Thus, the referring court essentially asked whether Artt. 12, 18 EC preclude authorities of a Member State from refusing to recognise a surname which has been determined and registered in a second Member State in which the person – who has only the nationality of the first Member State – was born and has been resident.

The Court now answered the question referred by the Amtsgericht Flensburg as follows:

In circumstances such as those of the case in the main proceedings, Article 18 EC precludes the authorities of a Member State, in applying national law, from refusing to recognise a child’s surname, as determined and registered in a second Member State in which the child – who, like his parents, has only the nationality of the first Member State – was born and has been resident since birth.

In its reasoning, the Court first (para. 16) states that the case falls within the scope of the EC-Treaty. The Court stresses that even though the rules governing a person’s surname fall within the competence of the Member States, the latter have to, when exercising their competence, comply with Community law (unless the case concerns an internal situation without any link with Community law).

In the following, the Court holds with regard to Art. 12 EC, that the child is not discriminated against on grounds of nationality (para. 19 et seq.).

However, with regard to Art. 18 EC, the Court states that “[h]aving to use a surname, in the Member State of which the person concerned is a national, that is different from that conferred and registered in the Member State of birth and residence is liable to hamper the exercise of the right, established in Article 18 EC, to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.” (para. 22)

The Court refers in this context to its judgment in Garcia Avello and sets forth that – also in the present case – serious inconveniences may be caused due to the discrepancy in surnames (para. 23 et seq.). Thus, according to the Court “[…] every time the child concerned has to prove his identity in Denmark, the Member State in which he was born and has been resident since birth, he risks having to dispel doubts concerning his identity and suspicions of misrepresentation caused by the difference between the surname he has always used on a day-to-day basis, which appears in the registers of the Danish authorities and on all official documents issued in his regard in Denmark, such as, inter alia, his birth certificate, and the name in his German passport.” (para. 26)

This obstacle to free movement could only be justified if it was based on “objective considerations and was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued” (para. 29). This is, however, according to the Court, not the case. Thus, the Court does not regard the arguments brought forward by the German Government such as, inter alia, that the connecting factor of nationality constituted “an objective criterion which makes it possible to determine a person’s surname with certainty and continuity” (para. 30) as sufficient. Rather the Court states that “[n]one of the grounds put forward in support of the connecting factor of nationality for determination of a person’s surname, however legitimate those grounds may be in themselves, warrants having such importance attached to it as to justify […] a refusal by the competent authorities of a Member State to recognise the surname of a child as already determined and registered in another Member State in which that child was born and has been resident since birth.” (para. 31)

See with regard to this case also our previous post on Advocate General Sharpston’s opinion which can be found here as well as our post on the referring decision of the Amtsgericht Flensburg which can be found here and the post on the first judgment in this case (then known as Standesamt Stadt Niebüll) which can be found here.

The British Institute of International and Comparative Law is seeking to appoint a Senior Research Fellow in International Private Law.

The advertisement can be found here and a full job description can be found here. The post is a research post, with no teaching duties. The fellow will be appointed for five years and be expected to lead the Institute research and events programme in international private law.

The closing date for applications is November 10.

We do not usually report on uniform law, but Japan was one of the few major trading powers which had not acceded to the CISG.  

The report of the United Nations Information Service is here.

Is the UK next?

On 8 October 2008, Commissioner Meglena Kuneva (DG Health and Consumers) presented a new Proposal for an EC directive on consumer rights (COM(2008) 614) (see the Consumer Acquis webpage).

The proposal aims to revise four existing directives on consumer contracts (the cornerstones of EC legislation in the field: Dir. 85/577/EEC on contracts negotiated away from business premises, Dir. 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts, Dir. 97/7/EC on distance contracts, Dir. 1999/44/EC on consumer sales and guarantees) merging them into a single horizontal instrument based on full-harmonisation (i.e. Member States cannot maintain or adopt provisions diverging from those laid down in the Directive), which regulates the common aspects “in a systematic fashion, simplifying and updating the existing rules, removing inconsistencies and closing gaps”.

The minimum harmonisation approach (i.e. Member States may maintain or adopt stricter consumer protection rules), adopted in the previous EC legislation in the field, was abandoned in order to avoid fragmentation in the level of consumer protection in the Member States (Impact Assessment Report, p. 8 ):

The effects of the fragmentation are felt by business because of the conflict-of law rules, and in particular the Rome I Regulation, which obliges traders not to go below the level of protection afforded to foreign consumers in their country. As a result of the fragmentation and Rome I, a trader wishing to sell cross-border into another Member State will have to incur legal and other compliance costs to make sure that he is respecting the level of consumer protection in the country of destination. These costs reduce the incentive for businesses to sell cross-border, particularly to consumers in small Member States. Such costs are eventually passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices or, worse, businesses refuse to sell cross-border. In both cases consumer welfare is below the optimum level.

Quite interestingly, under a conflict-of-laws perspective, one of the main concerns of the Commission was to achieve a sound coordination between the proposed directive and the Rome I Regulation.

All the policy options which were assessed to draft the proposed legislation took into account the recent adoption of the regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations (see the 6 options listed in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Commission, p. 5, and analysed in the Impact Assessment Report, p. 16 ff., and in the Annexes, p. 18 ff.):

Policy option 1: Status Quo or baseline scenario, including the effects of Rome I and forthcoming legislation.

Policy option 2: Non legislative approaches, including information campaigns and financial contributions and the effects of Rome I.

Policy  option  3: Minimum  legislative  changes  (harmonisation  of  basic concepts where benefits clearly outweigh costs), including the effects of Rome I.

Policy option 4: Medium legislative changes (including PO 3 plus and the effects of Rome I).

Policy  option  5: Maximum  legislative  changes  (including  PO  4  plus far-reaching proposals granting new consumer rights as well as the effects of Rome I).

Policy  option  6: Minimum  legislative  changes  (PO  3)  or  Medium legislative changes  (PO  4)  combined  with  an  internal  market  clause  applying  to  the non-fully harmonised  aspects  (such as general contract law aspects outside the scope of the Consumer Acquis).

The latter option (insertion of an internal market clause) was excluded, since it was considered to be in contrast with the protective conflict rule of Art. 6 of the Rome I Regulation (Impact Assessment Report, p. 24):

[A]n alternative to full harmonisation was put forth in the form of a minimum harmonisation approach combined with an Internal Market clause. This approach has been discussed during the consultation process.

Such an Internal Market clause could have taken the form of a mutual recognition clause or of a clause on the country of origin principle for the aspects falling within the scope of a future Directive and not subject to full harmonisation. A mutual recognition clause would give Member States the possibility to introduce stricter rules in their national law, but would not entitle a Member State to impose its own stricter requirements on businesses established in other Member States in a way which would create unjustified restrictions to the free movement of goods or to the freedom to provide services. A clause based on the country of origin principle would give Member States the possibility to introduce stricter consumer protection rules in their national law, but businesses established in other Member States would only have to comply with the rules applicable in their country of origin.

Both variants of the Internal Market clause met considerable opposition from several categories of stakeholders. […] Regulatory fragmentation combined with the Internal Market clause would achieve legal certainty for traders, but not for consumers, who would be subject to different laws with different levels of protection.

Finally, an Internal Market clause which would systematically subject the contract to the law chosen by the parties (which will normally be the law designated as applicable under the trader’s standard contract terms) or to the law of the country of origin (i.e. the country where the trader is established) goes against the newly-adopted Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations. Indeed the clause would contrast with Article 6(1) of the Rome I Regulation, which provides that the law applicable to consumer contracts, in the absence of a choice made by the parties, is the law of the country where the consumer has his habitual residence (i.e. the law of the country of destination). It would also be in contrast with Article 6(2) of the Regulation which provides that the law chosen by the parties (e.g. the law of the country of the trader) cannot deprive the consumer of the protection granted by the law of his country of residence. Such an Internal Market clause would not be acceptable by the great majority of Member States, as evidenced by the public consultation on the Green Paper.

The text of the new directive, in the current version proposed by the Commission, should not, prima facie, interfere with the application of the conflict rules of the Rome I Regulation, avoiding problems such as those arising from the e-commerce directive or from clauses inserted in the previous consumer directives (see for instance Art. 6(2) of Directive 93/13 on unfair contractual terms). See Recital no. 10 and no. 59:

(10) The provisions of this Directive should be without prejudice to Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I);

(59) The consumer should not be deprived of the protection granted by this Directive. Where the law applicable to the contract is that of a third country, Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) should apply, in order to determine whether the consumer retains the protection granted by this Directive.

The third issue of French Revue Critique de Droit International privé for 2008 will be released shortly. It will include four articles, all relating to conflict issues.

In the first article, Charalambos Pamboukis, who is a professor at the university of Athens, Greece, explores the renewal and metamorphosis of recognition as a method to address conflicts problems (La renaissance-métamorphose de la méthode de la reconnaissance). The English abstract reads:

The recent renewal of a methodology of recognition is the result of two factors. First, a political factor. Globalisation requires international coherence for private relationships, while the construction of Europe reconstitutes a community of laws. A paradigm change emerges. Second, a technical factor. Traditional conflict rules are not adapted to the recognition of legal relationships which already exist. The characteristic of the method of recognition is its function of confirmation and reception, and its object, which is a concrete, pre-existing legal relationship. It excludes any recourse to the conflict rule, but it does not necessarily represent an underhand form of lex forism nor does it signify reverse discrimination. But its scope is still uncertain, since it covers relationships which have been consecrated by an official but created by private actors. The latter distinction could contribute to clarify the much debated issue.

In the second second article, Marie-Elodie Ancel wonders what the Rome I Regulation will change for distribution contracts (Les contrats de distribution et la nouvelle donne du règlement Rome I). The author, who is a professor of international private law at Paris Val-de-Marne (Paris XII) university, has kindly provided the following abstract:

According to French case law, distribution contracts are governed by the law of the manufacturer in the absence of a choice of law and the forum contractus is determined under Article 5.1 a) of the Brussels I Regulation. This study examines how the French Cour de cassation has been led to these solutions and how Article 4.1 and Recital 17 of the Rome I Regulation take the opposite course.

The third article is a comprehensive study of the Rome II Regulation by Geneva professor Thomas Kadner Graziano (Le nouveau droit international privé communautaire en matière de responsabilité extracontractuelle).

Finally, the fourth article is an essay on class actions in international private law building on the American Vivendi Universal case (Régulation de l’économie globale et l’émergence de compétences déléguées : sur le droit international privé des actions de groupe (à propos de l’affaire Vivendi Universal)). Its author is Horatia Muir Watt, who teaches at Paris I university.

At the present time, I do not have an English abstract for the last two pieces.

The French publisher Dalloz has recently published a very rich collection of essays in honor of Hélène Gaudemet-Tallon, Professor Emeritus at the University of Paris II and Associate Member of the Institut de Droit International, one of French leading scholars in the field of conflicts of laws and jurisdictions (among her recent works, see Le pluralisme en droit international privé, Richesses et faiblesse (le funambule et l’arc en ciel), General Course held in 2005 at the Hague Academy of International Law, and the forthcoming fourth edition of her authoritative book on the Brussels I reg., Compétence et exécution des jugements en Europe).

The volume, Vers de nouveaux équilibres entre ordres juridiques. Liber amicorum Hélène Gaudemet-Tallon, includes 50 articles on almost all fields of Private International Law, written by leading academics.

Here’s the table of contents:

LE PLURALISME NORMATIF: DE LA COMPARAISON A LA COORDINATION

• Ancel, Jean-Pierre, L’invocation d’un droit étranger et le contrôle de la Cour de cassation
• Basedow, Ju?rgen, La recherche juridique fondamentale dans les instituts Max Planck
• Bermann, George A., La concertation réglementaire transatlantique
• Borra?s, Alegri?a, La fragmentation des sources de droit international privé communautaire, le cas de la responsabilité nucléaire
• Fauvarque-Cosson, Be?ne?dicte, Droit international privé et droit comparé : brève histoire d’un couple à l’heure de l’Europe
• Foyer, Jacques, Diversité des droits et méthodes des conflits de loi
• Herzog, Peter E., Le début de la ” révolution ” des conflits de lois aux États-Unis et les principes fondamentaux de la proposition ” Rome II “, y a-t-il un ” parallélisme inconscient ” ?
• Idot, Laurence, À propos de l’internationalisation du droit, réflexions sur la Soft Law en droit de la concurrence
• Kessedjian, Catherine, Le droit entre concurrence et coopération

L’UNIVERSALISATION DU DROIT ET DU CONTENTIEUX

• Ancel, Bertrand; Watt, Horatia Muir, Les jugements étrangers et la règle de conflit de lois, chronique d’une séparation
• Audit, Bernard, Observations sur la convention de La Haye du 30 juin 2005 relative aux accords d’élection de for
• Cachard, Olivier, La force obligatoire vis-à-vis du destinataire des clauses relatives à la compétence internationale stipulées dans les connaissements : plaidoyer pour un renouveau des conside?rations maritimistes
• Cadiet, Loi?c, Les sources internationales de la procédure civile française
• Dutheil de la Roche?re, Jacqueline, Sanctions internationales contre les personnes et respect des droits fondamentaux
• Fallon, Marc, L’applicabilité du règlement ” Bruxelles I ” aux situations externes après l’avis 1/03
• Gannage?, Le?na, À propos de l'” absolutisme ” des droits fondamentaux
• Gannage?, Pierre, Regards sur les compétences judiciaires exclusives
• Guinchard, Serge, Entre identité nationale et universalisme du droit : l’idée et le processus d’introduction d’un recours collectif en droit français
• Huet, Andre?, Le nouvel article 15 du Code civil
• Jessurun d’Oliveira, Hans Ulrich, Turmoil Around a Naturalisation Decree, or, How the Dutch Cabinet stumbled over a Pebble
• Kerameus, Konstantinos D., La convention de Bruxelles et l’harmonisation par la jurisprudence en Europe: libres propos sur la convention de Bruxelles
• Kreuzer, Karl, International Instruments on Human Rights and “Shariah” Law
• Loon, Hans van, Vers un nouveau modèle de gouvernance multilatérale de la migration internationale: re?flexions a? partir de certaines techniques de coope?ration de de?veloppe?es au sein de la Confe?rence de La Haye
• Niboyet, Marie-Laure, Contre le dogme de la lex fori en matière de procédure
• Pataut, E?tienne, Notifications internationales et règlement ” Bruxelles I “
• Vareilles-Sommie?res, Pascal de, La compétence internationale de l’Espace judiciaire européen

LA PRESERVATION DES VALEURS LOCALES

• Gautier, Pierre-Yves, La contrariété à l’ordre public d’une décision étrangère, échec à sa reconnaissance ou son exequatur
• Kinsch, Patrick, La “sauvegarde de certaines politiques législatives”, cas d’intervention de l’ordre public international ?
• Mayer, Pierre, L’étendue du contrôle, par le juge étatique, de la conformité des sentences arbitrales aux lois de police

L’INTEGRATION REGIONALE, ESPACE D’EXPERIMENTATION DU PLURALISME

• Lagarde, Paul, La reconnaissance, mode d’emploi
• Lequette, Yves, De Bruxelles à La Haye : re?flexions critiques sur la compe?tence communautaire en matie?re de droit international prive?
• Pironon, Vale?rie, Les pratiques commerciales déloyales entre droit international privé et droit communautaire
• Pluyette, Ge?rard; Moneger, Franc?oise, Quelques aspects récents de la jurisprudence de la Première chambre civile en matière de droit communautaire international
• Pocar, Fausto, Faut-il remplacer le renvoi au droit national par des règles uniformes ?
• Poillot-Peruzzetto, Sylvaine, Le défi de la construction de l’espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice
• Re?mery, Jean-Pierre, Aspects maritimes du droit international privé communautaire
• Struycken, Teun, L’ordre public de la Communauté européenne
• Vrellis, Spyridon, “Abus” et “fraude” dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des Communautés européennes

LE CONTRAT ET LA FAMILLE AU CŒUR DES EQUILIBRES ENTRE ORDRES JURIDIQUES

• Azzi, Tristan, L’office du juge dans la mise en œuvre de la convention de Rome du 19 juin 1980 sur la loi applicable aux obligations contractuelles
• Bogdan, Michael, Foreign Public Law and Article 7 (1) of the Rome Convention : Some Reflections from Sweden
• Bucher, Andreas, L’intérêt de l’enfant pénètre la convention sur l’enlèvement
• Courbe, Patrick, L’influence des réformes du droit de la famille sur le droit international privé
• Hartley, Trevor C., The Proposed “Rome I” Regulation : Applicable Law in the Absence of Choice (Article 4)
• Jacquet, Jean-Michel, Le principe d’autonomie entre consolidation et évolution
• Lando, Ole, Choice of “Lex Mercatoria”
• Morse, Robin, Choice of Law, Territoriality and National Law : the Case of Employment
• Pauknerova?, Monika, The “contrat  sans loi” in Czech and European Private International Law
• Revillard, Marie-L., L’harmonisation du droit international privé de la famille dans la pratique notariale
• Siehr, Kurt, Divorce of Muslim Marriages in Secular Courts
• Teyssié, Bernard, La loi applicable aux accords transnationaux d’entreprise ou de groupe

Title: Vers de nouveaux équilibres entre ordres juridiques – Liber amicorum Hélène Gaudemet-Tallon. May 2008 (886 pages).

ISBN : 978-2-247-07910-0. Price: EUR 98. Available from Dalloz.

(Many thanks to Gilles Cuniberti and Etienne Pataut)

The European Court of Justice handed down judgment in Hassett v South Eastern Board on 2nd October 2008. It doesn’t make for particularly interesting reading, so I’ll be brief. The Irish Supreme Court referred the following question to the ECJ:

Where medical practitioners form a mutual defence organisation taking the form of a company, incorporated under the laws of one Member State, for the purpose of providing assistance and indemnity to its members practising in that and another Member State in respect of their professional practice, and the provision of such assistance or indemnity is dependent on the making of a decision by the Board of Management of that company, in accordance with its Articles of Association, in its absolute discretion, are proceedings in which a decision refusing assistance or indemnity to a medical practitioner practising in the other Member State pursuant to that provision is challenged by that medical practitioner as involving a breach by the company of contractual or other legal rights of the medical practitioner concerned to be considered to be proceedings which have as their object the validity of a decision of an organ of that company for the purposes of Article 22, [point] 2, of [Regulation No 44/2001] so that the courts of the Member State in which that company has its seat have exclusive jurisdiction?

Which the ECJ took to mean:

By that question, the national court is essentially asking the Court whether point 2 of Article 22 of Regulation No 44/2001 is to be interpreted as meaning that proceedings, such as those at issue before the referring court, in the context of which one of the parties alleges that a decision adopted by an organ of a company has infringed rights that it claims under that company’s Articles of Association, concern the validity of the decisions of the organs of a company within the meaning of that provision.

And to which they answered:

Point 2 of Article 22 of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters is to be interpreted as meaning that proceedings, such as those at issue before the referring court, in the context of which one of the parties alleges that a decision adopted by an organ of a company has infringed rights that it claims under that company’s Articles of Association, do not concern the validity of the decisions of the organs of a company within the meaning of that provision.

The reasoning, such that it was, centred on the fact that allowing all disputes involving a decision by an organ of a company to come within Article 22(2) of the Brussels I Regulation (which is primarily there, so says the Jenard Report, to prevent conflicting judgments) would mean that it would apply to those disputes where conflicting judgments would not arise. That is beyond the scope of Article 22(2). As the doctors had not challenged the validity of a decision before the national courts (they were instead challenging the process (or lack thereof) of that decision, and so did not come within the defined scope of Art 22(2). Fair point, really.

(Hat-tip to Andrew Dickinson.)

The Anuario Español de Derecho Internacional Privado is an annual magazine specialized in Private International law. It was born in 2000 on an ambitious initiative of Prof. Dr. José Carlos Fernández Rozas (Complutense University, Madrid), in order to provide the Spanish scientific community with accurate and updated information about conflicts of laws in a wide range of subjects, such as commercial arbitration, procedural law, contracts law, tort law, property rights or family and succession law. Besides doctrinal contributions, every volume includes reference to the latest legislative reforms, both Spanish or relating to the Community, and to the international agreements signed by our country in the field of Private International Law. Punctual news of the work in progress or achieved in different international forums (UNIDROIT, UNICUTRAL, The Hague Conference, etc) are also enclosed, as well as deep and critical studies of the jurisprudence and of the administrative Spanish practice on PIL.

The publication is constructed in different sections, some of which are fixed. Each issue begins with an ambitious doctrinal title that gathers relevant scientific contributions from Spanish and foreign authors -translated into Spanish. It is usually followed by a section on legislation (Textos legales), and  another, quite exhaustive one, on case law (Jurisprudencia: each volume systematizes several hundreds of decisions of the Spanish courts). A third section reproduces practices materials (Materiales de la práctica española). The Anuario also reports on national and international congresses, meetings and seminars, and gives notice of the whole Spanish bibliography on PIL (research monographs as well as editorials),  appeared throughout the year.

Contents of the Anuario’s latest issue:

Juan Antonio CARRILLO SALCEDO: IN MEMORIAM JULIO D. GONZÁLEZ CAMPOS

DOCTRINA

• Santiago ÁLVAREZ GONZÁLEZ
  LA LEY DE ADOPCIÓN INTERNACIONAL. REFLEXIONES A LA LUZ DE SU TEXTO, DE SUS OBJETIVOS Y DE LA COMUNIÓN ENTRE AMBOS
• Gloria ESTEBAN DE LA ROSA
  LA ADAPTACIÓN DE LOS CONTRATOS EN EL COMERCIO INTERNACIONAL

II SEMINARIO INTERNACIONAL: “LA NUEVA REGULACIÓN DE LA LEY APLICABLE A LAS OBLIGACIONES EXTRACONTRACTUA-LES” (MADRID, 21 y 22 DE FEBRERO DE 2008)

• José Luis IGLESIAS BUHIGUES
  EL LARGO CAMINO DEL REGLAMENTO “ROMA II”
• Rafael GIL-NIEVAS
  EL PROCESO NEGOCIADOR DEL REGLAMENTO “ROMA II”: OBSTÁCULOS Y RESULTADOS
• Marc FALLON
  LA RELACIÓN DEL REGLAMENTO “ROMA II” CON OTRAS NORMAS DE CONFLICTO DE LEYES
• Stefan LEIBLE
  EL ALCANCE DE LA AUTONOMÍA DE LA VOLUNTAD EN LA DETERMINACIÓN DE LA LEY APLICABLE A LAS OBLIGACIONES CONTRACTUALES EN EL REGLAMENTO “ROMA II”
• Francisco J. GARCIMARTÍN ALFÉREZ
  UN APUNTE SOBRE LA LLAMADA “REGLA GENERAL” EN EL REGLAMENTO “ROMA II”
• Miguel AMORES CONRADI y Elisa TORRALBA MENDIOLA
  DIFAMACIÓN Y “ROMA II”
• Luigi MARI
  LA SUBROGACIÓN EN EL REGLAMENTO (CE) Nº 864/2007: ASPECTOS PROBLEMÁTICOS
• Iván HEREDIA CERVANTES
  LAS DEFICIENCIAS DE LA REGLA DE RESPONSABILIDAD MÚLTIPLE DEL REGLAMENTO “ROMA II”
• Pilar JIMÉNEZ BLANCO
  EL RÉGIMEN DE LAS ACCIONES DIRECTAS EN EL REGLAMENTO DE “ROMA II”
• Rafael ARENAS GARCÍA
  LA REGULACIÓN DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD PRECONTRACTUAL EN EL REGLAMENTO “ROMA II”
• José Blas FUENTES MAÑAS
  LA REGLA LEX LOCI DELICTI COMMISSI Y NORMAS LOCALIZADORAS ESPECIALES EN EL REGLAMENTO “ROMA II”
• Diana SANCHO VILLA
  EXCLUSIÓN DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD DEL ESTADO POR ACTOS IURE IMPERII EN RO-MA II: CONSIDERACIONES SOBRE LA APLICACIÓN DEL REGLAMENTO A LA RES-PONSABILIDAD DEL ESTADO POR ACTOS IURE GESTIONES
• Leonel PEREZNIETO CASTRO
  LA RESPONSABILIDAD EXTRACONTRACTUAL EN MÉXICO Y LAS NUEVAS LEYES SOBRE LA MATERIA
• Pedro DE MIGUEL ASENSIO
  LA LEX LOCI PROTECTIONIS TRAS EL REGLAMENTO “ROMA II”
• Tito BALLARINO
  EL DERECHO ANTITRUST COMUNITARIO Y EL ART. 6 DEL REGLAMENTO “ROMA II” (RÉGIMEN CONFLICTUAL Y TERRITORIAL, EFECTO DIRECTO)
• Benedetta UBERTAZZI
  EL REGLAMENTO CE SOBRE LAS PRUEBAS Y LA DESCRIPCIÓN DE LA VIOLACIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS DE PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL
• Elena RODRÍGUEZ PINEAU
  LEY APLICABLE A LA RESPONSABILIDAD DERIVADA DE ACTOS CONTRARIOS A LA LIBRE COMPETENCIA
• Laura CARBALLO PIÑEIRO
  DERECHO DE COMPETENCIA, INTERESES COLECTIVOS Y SU PROYECCIÓN PROCESAL. OBSERVACIONES A PROPÓSITO DEL ART. 6 DEL REGLAMENTO “ROMA II”
• Luis GARAU JUANEDA
  LA CONVENIENCIA DE UNA DENUNCIA POR PARTE DE ESPAÑA DEL CONVENIO DE LA HAYA DE 1971 SOBRE RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL DERIVADA DE LOS ACCIDENTES DE CIRCULACIÓN
• Ángel ESPINIELLA MENÉNDEZ
  ACCIDENTES DE CIRCULACIÓN POR CARRETERA: DEL CONVENIO DE LA HAYA DE 4 DE MAYO DE 1971 AL REGLAMENTO (CE) Nº 864/2007 (“ROMA II”)
• Amalia URIONDO DE MARTINOLI
  ACCIDENTES DE CIRCULACIÓN POR CARRETERA EN EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO ARGENTINO
• Gilberto BOUTIN I.
  EL RÉGIMEN DE LAS OBLIGACIONES QUE SE CONTRAEN SIN CONVENIO – QUASI EX CONTRACTUS – EN EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO PANAMEÑO Y EN EL CÓDIGO BUSTAMANTE
• Nicolás ZAMBRANA
  DERECHO INTERNACIONAL, DERECHOS HUMANOS Y RESPONSABILIDAD EXTRACON-TRACTUAL
• Bertrand ANCEL
  EL REGLAMENTO “ROMA II”: APRECIACIÓN DE CONJUNTO

VARIA

• Rafael ARENAS GARCÍA
  EL FORO DE LA PLURALIDAD DE DEMANDADOS ANTE EL TJCE. COMENTARIO A LA STJCE (SALA TERCERA) DE 11 DE OCTUBRE DE 2007
• Federico F. GARAU SOBRINO
  EL TJCE NUEVO LEGISLADOR COMUNITARIO (O CÓMO CREAR POR VÍA DE HECHO UN NUEVO FORO PARA LAS VÍCTIMAS DE LOS ACCIDENTES DE CIRCULA-CIÓN)
• Ana FERNÁNDEZ PÉREZ
  LOS RECURSOS DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD CONTRA LAS LEYES DE EXTRANJE-RÍA
• Rosa MIQUEL SALA
  EL LIBRO VERDE SOBRE SUCESIONES Y TESTAMENTOS: PRIMEROS PASOS HACIA EL REGLAMENTO “BRUSELAS IV”

TEXTOS LEGALES (UNIÓN EUROPEA / COMUNIDAD EUROPEA; LEGISLACIÓN ESPAÑOLA; CONVENIOS INTERNACIONALES)
JURISPRUDENCIA
FOROS INTERNACIONALES
NOTICIAS
BIBLIOGRAFÍA (NACIONAL/EXTRANJERA)
REVISTA DE REVISTAS

Which court has jurisdiction to prevent the end of the world? Any, one would think: after all, the end of the world is likely to have serious consequences pretty much everywhere.

Is that why an American retired radiation safety officer and a Spanish science writer decided to initiate proceedings in Hawaï to stop the running of the new Large Hadron Collider, a giant particle accelerator operating on the Swiss-French border near Geneva? The plaintiffs fear that the Collider might create a black hole which would spell the end of the Earth. No doubt, that would have an impact even in Hawaï.

The defendants were the European Center for Nuclear Research (CERN), the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. National Science Foundation and the U.S. Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (Fermilab). In an interview to the New York Times, one of the plaintiffs revealed that his strategy focused on American parties. He did not know whether CERN  would show up, but he had added it as a party to save expenses. In any case, part of the project was funded by the Department of Energy and the National Science Foundation, and the magnets of the Collider are supplied and maintained by Fermilab. 

The complaint argued that the defendants had failed to comply with American legislation, namely the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and also with the European precautionary principle.

As the New York Times reported, on September 26, 2008, the Hawaï District Court declined jurisdiction.

The order of the Court, which can be found here, is disappointing from a conflict’s perspective. This is because Judge Gillmor was able to dismiss the action solely on domestic grounds. In other words, she held that the court lacked jurisdiction within the American legal system, as a federal court, which is not to say that an American state court would have lacked jurisdiction. 

American federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. This means that this is for plaintiffs to demonstrate that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Here, the plaintiffs solely argued that the court had federal question jurisdiction, i.e. that this was an action “arising under” U.S. federal law. The federal law that they put forward was NEPA. However, NEPA requires that there be a “major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” (42 USC §4332 (c)). The court finds that there was no such major federal action in that case. As a consequence, it rules that there is no federal question, and that it lacks jurisdiction on this ground as a U.S. federal court.

The court further rules that no other ground for subject matter jurisdiction were put forward by the plaintiffs and that they had the burden of doing so. Thus, there might have been other grounds to found the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. For instance, neither federal party jurisdiction, nor diversity jurisdiction are discussed. 

Finally, the court rules that it does not need to address the issue of whether the plaintiffs had standing, given that their allegation of an injury was arguably “conjectural and hypothetical”. 

Meanwhile, a suit was also filed before the European Court of Human Rights (see the report of the Telegraph here). I don’t know whether this action is more likely to be successful, but Strasbourg is certainly closer to Geneva than Honolulu.