Keitner on Kiobel and the future of the Alien Tort Statute

The following post, cross-posted on Opinio Juris, continues to analyze the import of the Second Circuit's recent decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, holding that corporations may not be sued under the Alien Tort Statute for violations of customary international law. Our thanks to Professor Keitner for sharing her thoughts.

Not Dead Yet: Some Thoughts on Kiobel

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The Second Circuit's recent panel opinion in *Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum* has justifiably spurred much talk in the blogosphere, including posts by Trey Childress https://conflictoflaws.de/2010/is-it-the-end-of-the-alien-tort-statute/, Ken Anderson

http://opiniojuris.org/2010/09/17/extra-thoughts-on-todays-2nd-circuit-ats-decision /, Julian Ku

http://opiniojuris.org/2010/09/17/goodbye-to-ats-litigation-second-circuit-rejects-c orporate-liability-for-violations-of-customary-international-law/, and Kevin Jon Heller http://opiniojuris.org/2010/09/18/a-tentative-thought-on-kiobel/. Here are my preliminary thoughts.

First, it is premature to hail the "end of the ATS." It may be true that some plaintiffs have sought to hold corporations accountable for their complicity in human rights abuses under the ATS's jurisdictional grant. But not all ATS litigation is about corporate liability. To the contrary, the Second Circuit's landmark opinion in *Filartiga v. Pena-Irala* involved an individual human rights violator, and cases against individuals continue to be filed under the ATS and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991. It is important not to lose sight of these cases, which the Supreme Court explicitly approved in *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain* (2004).

Second, whether or not the ATS is good policy, the jurisdictional grant it embodies must be interpreted within the context of U.S. law. This does not mean that U.S. law governs all aspects of ATS litigation—in my 2008 article on

Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases http://uchastings.edu/hlj/archive/vol60/Keitner_60-HLJ-61.pdf, I argued that international law provides the "conduct-regulating" rules applied under the ATS, whereas U.S. law governs other aspects of ATS litigation. Although I focused on the standard for aiding and abetting, I also suggested that "the most coherent approach would look to U.S. law on the question of personal jurisdiction, including the type of entity against which a claim can be asserted, [while] international law would supply the substantive, conduct-regulating rules that apply to private actors" (p. 72).

Kiobel misconstrues language in Sosa about whether private actors can violate international law to conclude that corporations cannot be held liable for certain conduct in U.S. courts. In terms of my proposed framework, Kiobel miscategorizes the question of whether corporations can be named as defendants as a conduct-regulating rule akin to aiding and abetting. This is wrong because aiding and abetting liability, unlike corporate liability, does not involve the attribution of the principal's conduct to the accomplice by virtue of a preexisting legal relationship. Rather, it prohibits the accomplice's conduct in providing substantial assistance to the principal. Consequently, under the ATS, the accomplice's (and the principal's) conduct is governed by international law. By contrast, whether or not the accomplice's (or the principal's) conduct can be attributed to a corporate entity is governed by U.S. law. Corporate liability is thus possible under the ATS whether or not corporate entities have themselves been subject to the jurisdiction of international tribunals or found liable for international law violations by such tribunals.

Kiobel indicates that "[t]he singular achievement of international law since the Second World War has come in the area of human rights, where the subjects of customary international law—i.e., those with international rights, duties, and liabilities—now include not merely states, but also individuals" (p. 7). In fact, this is not such a novel development: the paradigm violations of piracy, violations of safe conducts, and offenses against ambassadors identified in Sosa also would typically have been committed by private actors, rather than by states (see Conceptualizing Complicity http://uchastings.edu/hlj/archive/vol60/Keitner_60-HLJ-61.pdf, p. 70). The ATS's jurisdictional grant should be understood in this context. In an amicus brief filed on behalf of professors of federal jurisdiction and legal history in Balintulo v.

Daimler AG (2d Cir., No. 09-2778-cv), my colleague William Dodge documents that "[l]egal actions for violations of the law of nations were not limited to natural persons in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries" (p. 15), and that "no distinction would have been drawn between individual and corporate defendants" (p. 14) in these early cases. Any serious consideration of jurisdiction under the ATS needs to grapple with these historical foundations, and with the relationship between the law of nations and U.S. law, not simply "international law" in the abstract.

Looking at the big picture, there certainly need to be—and are—robust mechanisms to contain cases that are non-meritorious or vexatious, that impinge excessively on the Executive's conduct of foreign relations, or that should be heard in a non-U.S. forum that is willing and able to provide redress. At the front end, I would hazard that, although the increasing involvement of plaintiffs' law firms (as opposed to human rights lawyers associated with non-profits, or attorneys working strictly *pro bono*) in bringing ATS cases may have some benefits in terms of reaching a greater swath of deleterious conduct, it may foster less coherence and restraint in case selection. At the back end, certain judges may be tempted to overcompensate by creating doctrinal barriers to entire categories of cases. This impulse might be understandable, but it does not justify judicial rewriting of the ATS.

A Study on the Private International Law Aspects of International Surrogacy Agreements

A message from Paul Beaumont and Katarina Trimmings:

In July 2010, the Nuffield Foundation awarded a grant of £112.000 to Professor Paul Beaumont and Katarina Trimmings to conduct a study into private

international law aspects of international surrogacy arrangements. The work on the project commenced on 1 August and the award is tenable for two years. The ultimate goal of the research is to explore possible types of international regulation of surrogacy arrangements, and to prepare a document that would serve as a basis for a future international Convention on aspects of surrogacy arrangements. The project is carried out in collaboration with the Hague Conference. A website detailing the project will be set up in the near future, and a note with the link to the website will then be posted. The research team is very much interested in getting input from interested parties. Therefore, if you have any relevant information about international surrogacy, please do not hesitate to contact the research team (see contact details below). Your assistance will be very much appreciated!

Summary

Recent developments and research in the area of reproductive medicine have resulted in various treatment options becoming available to infertile couples. One of them is the use of a surrogate mother in cases where the female partner of a couple is unable to carry a child. National laws governing surrogacy differ widely between jurisdictions. The variety of domestic responses to surrogacy has led to a situation where infertile couples seeking to have a child through surrogacy travel from one country to another, purposely choosing "surrogacy – friendly" jurisdictions as their destinations. In doing so, they effectively avoid restrictions imposed on surrogacy in their jurisdiction. Cross-border travel for the purpose of hiring a surrogate mother has been termed as "procreative tourism". By and large, the majority of "procreative tourists" are childless Western couples attracted by "low-cost" surrogacy services and a ready availability of surrogate mothers in places like India, Eastern Europe and South America.

It is usually the case that the law lags behind medical advances and corresponding social developments. Unfortunately, international surrogacy is not an exception. Indeed, there is a complete void in the international regulation of surrogacy arrangements, as none of the existing international instruments contains specific provisions designed to regulate this emerging area of international family law. In the absence of a global legislative response, highly complex legal problems arise from international surrogacy arrangements. Among these problems, the most prevalent are the question of legal parenthood and the

nationality of the child. Classic practical examples are cases such as in re X and another (Children) (Parental Order:Foreign Surrogacy) [2009] Fam. 71; CA Paris, 25 October 2007 (France); and RDGRN 2575/2008, 18 February 2009 (Spain).

Another great worry springing from the unregulated character of "procreative tourism" is the potential for a "black market" preying on peoples' emotional or economic needs.

It has been widely recognised that there is an urgent need for legal regulation of surrogacy agreements at the international level. The problem was identified as an emerging international family law issue that requires further study and discussion in August 2009 at the International Family Justice Judicial Conference for Common Law and Commonwealth Jurisdictions. Thus far, however, no study has been conducted to assess the practical aspects of legal regulation of international surrogacy arrangements but this project will do so. ((It is recognised that some commentators have questioned whether, given ethical questions surrounding surrogacy, regulation is the right way forward, as it might have the unintended consequence of encouraging more international surrogacy arrangements. It is, however, submitted that in the increasingly globalised world, all attempts to impose a complete prohibition on cross-border surrogacy arrangements are doomed to failure. The only way forward is to regulate international surrogacy, especially for the sake of children born through these arrangements.))

The research will take the form of a combined empirical and library-based study. The empirical part will involve a statistical survey of international surrogacy arrangements. The aim of the survey is to map the magnitude of the problem and current patterns in international surrogacy. The empirical element of the research will also include personal interviews with surrogacy specialists from selected jurisdictions. ((Jurisdictions selected for the purposes of the empirical part of the project are India, Ukraine and the US state of California. The main reason for choosing these particular jurisdictions is their liberal approach to surrogacy. As a result of this approach, these jurisdictions have become highly popular destinations of "procreative tourists". This in turn guarantees availability of large amounts of empirical data.)) The interviews will examine practical private international law problems arising in cases of international surrogacy arrangements.

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Third Preliminary Draft of the CLIP Principles

The European Max-Planck Group for Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property has recently published the Third Drat of their Principles for Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property, which is available for download here. This version contains amended and supplemented rules contained in the First Draft of April 2009 (reported here), and the Second Draft of June 2009. The initial rules were exposed to the scrutiny of the scholars and practitioners outside the Group and the Third Draft is partially the result thereof.

Compared to the Second Draft, the Third Draft introduces changes, some just redrafts and some more substantial modifications, with respect to following issues:

Scope

General jurisdiction

Jurisdiction for infringements

Jurisdiction for multiple defendants

Jurisdiction for declaratory actions

Jurisdiction for preliminary and protective measures

General provisions on jurisdiction

Scope of injunction

Cooperation in multistate proceedings

Congruent and preliminary proceedings

Law applicable in the absence of choice

Law applicable to security interests in IP

Law applicable to ubiquitous infringements

General rule on recognition and enforcement

It is interesting to note that the Group is having profound doubts as to the choice of the choice-of-law rules for security interests in IPRs, and three versions are currently being considered.

The CLIP website still contains the invitation for all to make suggestions or

advance critical remarks to the members of the Group. However, any such comments wishing to have an effect on the text of the Principles would probably be appreciated sooner rather than later since the Group has announced the plan to publish the final version of the Principles together with comments in 2011.

Surrogate motherhood and Spanish homosexual couple (III)

You might remember my last post on surrogate pregnancy, where I informed about a 2009 decision of the Spanish Dirección General de los Registros y el Notariado ordering registration of a birth certificate issued in the USA. The document concerned the parenthood of two children born in San Diego to a surrogate mother and a homosexual Spanish couple; the entry listed the couple as father of the twins. The saga goes on: on Friday, the Tribunal de Primera Instancia No. 15 of Valencia, at the request of the Public Prosecutor, declared the entry null.

In its ruling, the judge states that children are the result of a pregnancy by substitution, which is not allowed by Spanish law; and that their filiation has to be determined by birth. In what is quoted as his own words, «La ley española prohíbe expresamente que la filiación en estos casos no se inscriba a favor de la persona que los ha parido».

With regard to the discrimination statement put forward by the lawyer of the couple, the judge points out that the children can not be registered as hers not because both parents are men, but because they were born to another person: "This legal consequence would equally apply to a homosexual- male and female-couple, man or woman alone, or a heterosexual couple, because the law does not distinguish gender in such cases". From the Spanish legal point of view, the crucial fact in order to determine filiation is the giving of birth.

As for the argument that registration must be allowed in the best interests of the children, the court admits it is not irrelevant, but states that "the end does not

justify the means, and the Spanish legal system has sufficient instruments to achieve consistency".

The couple has decided to appeal the ruling before the Audiencia Provincial.

Kenneth Anderson on Kiovel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum

Many thanks to professor Kenneth Anderson for authorizing this post, meant as a suite of Trey's.

As both Trey and professor Anderson state, the most important holding of the Court seems to be that the ATS does not embrace corporate liability at all:

Plaintiffs assert claims for aiding and abetting violations of the law of nations against defendants—all of which are corporations—under the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, a statute enacted by the first Congress as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789. We hold, under the precedents of the Supreme Court and our own Court over the past three decades, that in ATS suits alleging violations of customary international law, the scope of liability—who is liable for what—is determined by customary international law itself. Because customary international law consists of only those norms that are specific, universal, and obligatory in the relations of States inter se, and because no corporation has ever been subject to any form of liability (whether civil or criminal) under the customary international law of human rights, we hold that corporate liability is not a discernable—much less universally recognized—norm of customary international law that we may apply pursuant to the ATS. Accordingly, plaintiffs' ATS claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

Being very much interested myself on this subject, I reproduce here under a comment by professor Anderson in The Volokh Conspiracy blog and Opinio Iuris - where you will find also comments from Kevin Jon Heller and Julian Ku.

"I've now had a chance to read a little more closely the decision, majority and concurrence, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum (issued today by a 2nd Circuit panel of Judge Cabranes writing for himself and Judge Wood, and a concurrence in the judgment by Judge Leval). On second reading, it still looks to me like a blockbuster opinion, both because of the ringing tone of the Cabranes decision and the equally strong language of a concurrence that, on the key point of corporate liability, amounts to a dissent. With circuits having gone different directions on this issue, this perhaps tees up a SCOTUS review that would revisit its last, delphic pronouncement on the Alien Tort Statute in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. Here are a few thoughts that add to, but also partly revise and extend, things I said in my earlier post today.

Let me start by trying to sum up the gist of the majority opinion and its reasoning. (I am reconstructing it in part, in my own terms and terminology, and looking to basic themes, rather than tethering myself to the text of the opinion here.) The Cabranes opinion sets out the form of the ATS, that single sentence statute, as having a threshold part, which is established by international law (treaties of the United States and the law of nations, or customary international law), and a substantive part, which is the imposition of civil tort liability as a matter of US domestic law. It does not use quite those terms, but it seems to me to set up the statute in a way that I've sometimes characterized as a "hinge," in which something has to "swing" between the threshold and the substantive command once the threshold is met. The question has been whether the threshold that serves as a hinge to swing over to connect and kick start the substantive part of the ATS, so to speak, the US domestic tort law substance, must be international law.

The ATS cases in various district courts and circuit courts have gone various directions on this, and indeed some of the early cases did not seem to recognize that there is a threshold part and a substance part. One sizable group of more recent cases have gone the direction of saying that even if the threshold has to be the law of nations or treaties of the United States, it is satisfied if there is some body of conduct that constitutes a violation of it (and further meets the requirements under Sosa). Call this conduct the "what" of this threshold requirement in the ATS. But what about the "who" of the conduct? Do the legal qualities of the alleged perpetrator of the violative conduct matter? Two possible answers are:

One is: if there is conduct, then the status under international law of whoever is alleged to have done it is not relevant. The existence of a "what" is enough, and the "who" is merely to show that this named defendant did it; further consideration of the juridical qualities of the defendant is irrelevant.

Alternatively, but to the same result of allowing a claim to go forward, even if it does matter, it is answered by looking to US domestic law in order to determine that it is an actor that can be held liable under the ATS. Thus, under this latter view, a corporation could be such a party alleged to have engaged in conduct violating international law (and further meeting the Sosa standard). Why? Because it is enough that US civil law recognizes that a corporation is a legal person that can be held to legal accountability. So, for example, Judge Weinstein declared flatly in the Agent Orange litigation that notwithstanding weighty opinion that corporations are not subjects of liability in international law, well, as a matter of policy, they are so subject in US domestic law and that fact about US law will be enough to meet the threshold of the ATS international law violation. Put in my terminology, the "hinge" to an ATS claim can be met by an actor determined to be liable under US, rather than international law, standards. If there is conduct — the "what" under international law, such as genocide or slavery, meeting the Sosa standard — the question of "who" is subject to the ATS will be determined by the rules of US domestic law. The US domestic rules accept the proposition of a corporation being so subject, hence a claim will lie under the ATS.

The Second Circuit majority sharply rejects that view. It says that in order for the threshold of the ATS to be met, there must be a violation of international law. Conduct might very well violate international law, but for there to be a violation, it must be conduct by something that is recognized as being subject to liability in international law. If it is not something that is recognized or juridically capable of violating international law and being liable for it, then the conduct — whatever else it might be — is not actually a violation of international law by that party. States can violate international law, are subjects of international law, and can be liable under international law. Individuals under some circumstances can violate (a relatively narrow list of things in) international law, can be subjects of it, and can be liable under international law. But what about juridical persons, artificial persons — corporations? The opinion says flatly that corporations are not liable under international law — not even to discern a rule, let alone a rule that would

meet the standards of Sosa. To reach this conclusion, the opinion walks through the history of arguments over corporate liability since WWII, ranging from Nuremberg to the considered refusal of the states-party to include corporations in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

By that point, the court has done two things. One, it has rejected the view that it is enough to find that US domestic law accepts corporate liability, and that it can be used to satisfy the threshold of an international law violation in the ATS. The hinge has to be international law; the threshold must answer both "what" and "who" as a matter of international law, with no reach to US domestic law. Hence, given that you can't rely on US domestic law to reach it, then to satisfy the threshold, you have to show that it exists in international law as a treaty or customary norm (and then add to that the further burden of Sosa). Two, then, as to that latter requirement, the court says, no, it is not the case that a corporation meets the requirements of liability under the current state of customary international law or treaty law. The majority opinion accepts that if the international law threshold is met, then US domestic law in the ATS itself flips into civil tort mode. But you can't get there without an international law violation on its own terms — and that means that there must be a "what" of conduct that violates international law and a "who" in the sense of an actor that, on international law's own terms, is regarded as juridically capable of violating it.

It is important to note that this is all logically prior to Sosa's requirements. What the Second Circuit has held here regarding corporate liability is not driven by Sosa at all. Sosa says that even if a claim satisfies the requirement of a violation of international law, the nature of the violation must meet a set of additional criteria — criteria that are established not as a matter of international law, but as matter of US Constitutional law imposed by the Court upon international law as considered in US courts to ensure, for domestic law reasons, that these ATS claims are, so to speak, really serious ones. The Second Circuit holding on corporate liability does not rest on the Sosa criteria; it never gets to them because it says that, quite apart from being "really serious" kinds of international law violations, the party alleged to have violated them must in the first place be a party capable in international law itself of violating them, in the sense of bearing legal liability. Only if the "who" is met, in other words, do the Sosa requirements come up as a further, domestic-law burden on the "what" of the claims.

This leaves an important point, however — one that is not so relevant to this case,

but which will presumably be deeply relevant in other settings, perhaps in a SCOTUS case on this. On this I am somewhat less certain as to the court's meaning, and will re-read the case and perhaps revise my views. At this point however, I'd say this. As the opinion observes, the nature of the ATS is to create in US domestic law a civil action in tort, premised upon meeting an international law threshold. However, it is a liability in tort — a remedy in tort — for violations that have to be international law violations themselves. We are now back at the "what." The violations have to be international law violations (done by a "who" capable of being liable); once those violations of international law are met (and then further meeting the Sosa burdens as a kind of further threshold requirement in domestic law), then a tort remedy is available.

Even if the "who" is an individual person — capable of violating at least some actionable things in international law, including meeting the Sosa standard — as a matter of international law today, all the violations are criminal. They are all international crimes. International law recognizes no regime of civil liability in international law imposed upon persons; the violations that exist are such criminal acts as war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and a few others that would meet the Sosa requirements.

To cut to the chase, the point is that nowhere in this list is there anything that looks like an environmental tort, because there is no international law of tort. And what many ATS cases seek to do is create out of the putty of American tort law a regime of international civil liability that, alas, does not exist. The court seems to recognize this implicitly, I think, although the holding about corporate liability does not turn on it. Let me step beyond the case, however, to the implication of this second point in practical terms.

Where ATS plaintiffs seek to state a claim (and even leaving aside the question of "who") there is a large and logically independent problem, in many instances, of how plaintiffs can succeed in plausibly pleading a "what," given the short list of things for which individuals can be liable. First off, they are all criminal. Particularly following Sosa, they are all criminal and all at the approximate level of serious war crimes and genocide. Whereas the actual substantive acts that plaintiffs wish to sue over, if they could be honest about it in the pleadings, are environmental torts — perhaps very serious ones, but not genocide or war crimes. The only way into the ATS, given that the threshold "what" are all the most serious international crimes in the canon, has the perverse result that plaintiffs

or, anyway, their lawyers, today utterly and routinely submit pleadings alleging war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, etc., at every turn.

Speaking for myself, anyway, this is not a good thing from the standpoint of convincing anyone outside the US civil tort process that the US is serious about these crimes. Trying to leverage the ATS into a global civil liability system in a sort of jerry-rigged, spliced together, bits of US and bits of international law, arrangement that has precedential value only in US District Courts, and only by citing each other — well, it seems like a bad idea. I'm no fan of creating such a global system of civil tort liability, heaven knows, but if I were, I'd think this perhaps the worst of all worlds as a way of going about it.

But given the "whats" that can be plead, the result is inevitably a form of defining deviancy down. Defendants in these suits from outside the United States in particular seem often stunned that American courts so freely entertain allegations of the most serious crimes possible. In my personal experience, corporate defendants, in particular, often believe that they must fight to the wall even for things that in other circumstances they might be willing to negotiate as "ordinary" issues of labor rights, environmental claims, etc. Part of it is simply calculation — if they settle, they risk being forever characterized as having settled claims of ... genocide, crimes against humanity, etc., in what was actually a fairly routine labor rights dispute in the developing world. But part of it, again in my experience, is that senior executives take this really personally; it is a slur on them and they won't settle, not if the claims are war crimes rather than argument over ground water contamination. I agree with them and think that those who see the ATS as somehow promoting the universal rule of law should consider the many ways in which it instead promotes cynicism about international human rights claims in their most serious form, or at least the meaning of human rights claims in US courts.

That said on my own part, the Cabranes opinion is careful to emphasize that the Second Circuit has accepted that in appropriate cases, there can be aiding and abetting and secondary liability. The standard is a demanding one, to be sure, under the Second Circuit's own holdings. In addition, the opinion emphasizes that individuals are, of course, liable in international law for certain serious crimes. Which goes to a question that Kevin Jon Heller posed in the comments, and on which I do not regard myself as expert. What is the big deal about this decision on corporate liability, if the same claims can simply be refiled against corporate

officers and executives and other individuals? Why is the loss of corporate level liability such a big deal? I don't regard myself as sufficiently expert in litigation to say definitively, and I welcome expert answers. However, for what it is worth, everyone I've dealt with with — plaintiff side or defendant side — in these cases thinks it is a very big deal, in terms of what has to be proved as well as damages. I leave this to those more knowledgeable than I — but I have never had any sense that anyone in this practice area thought it was a red herring, although perhaps people will re-think it.

The majority opinion as well as Judge Leval's concurrence both say quite a lot about the parlous issue of authority in answering the vexed questions of what constitutes customary international law. The role of experts, scholars, and "publicists" in the traditional term is discussed in both opinions. Certainly in the majority, professors do not come off so well, despite the fact that the Cabranes opinion leans heavily on declarations by Professor James Crawford and then-Professor (now Justice) Christopher Greenwood in speaking to the content of customary international law. Without saying so in so many words, it seems clear that the court took into account that these are both globally important defenders of "international law" in its received sense, and not merely American academics; the court seemed implicitly to use them as an anchor for suggesting that international law needed to be tested, not merely within the parochial precincts of the US District Courts, citing each other in a gradually upward cascade of precedents, increasingly sweeping but also increasingly removed from sources of "international" law outside themselves, but against something genuinely international.

One can, of course, dispute whether Crawford and Greenwood are the right sources for that. But the opinion perhaps seemed to sense that ATS doctrines are increasingly sweeping but increasingly issued in a hermetically sealed US ATS system with less and less recourse to international law as the rest of the world sees it. I don't know how else one takes a magisterial declaration by Judge Weinstein that it would simply be against public policy not to have corporate liability in a US court, irrespective of the authority for the proposition, or not, in actual international law. Maybe that is just me seeing what I want, to be sure; I think it is a correct concern, in any case.

Ironically, then, for those who would argue that the Cabranes opinion undermined "international law," I would say that a view held more widely than one might

guess (looking only to the sympathies that often lie with these claims) among international law experts outside the United States is that ATS jurisprudence actually undermines international law by contributing to its fragmentation among "communities of authority and interpretation," as I've sometimes called it. International law is fracturing into churches and sects that increasingly do not recognize the existence or validity of others. The existence of more and more courts and tribunal systems contributes greatly to this fragmentation, I believe, because unlike the traditional ways of seeing international law as a pragmatic fusion of diplomacy, politics, and law in a loose sense — with the implied ability to see other points of view and accept them in a pluralist way — tribunals thrive in large part by asserting their own authority, on their internal grounds, in ways that achieve maximum authority inside their own systems precisely by denying the validity of other views. After all, if you're going to lock up some defendant at the ICC, you have maximum claims to legitimacy for the holding if you take zero account of any other community of interpretation that thinks there is no ground to do so. The authority of courts, by contrast to the authority of Ministries of Foreign Affairs, is very much one that maximizes legitimacy by going "inside." I've talked about this a lot in my own work — the fractious question of "Who owns international law?"

I do not want to try and characterize Judge Leval's eloquent and passionate opinion; I don't understand it as well at this point, and being less sympathetic to its point of view, I fear that without more careful study, I would characterize it unfairly. But I would note that the disputes between his opinion and that of the majority over experts and professors might best be settled by getting rid of us professors pretty much in toto. I am pleased to say that I said so in my own expert declaration in the Agent Orange case; I thought it incumbent on me to tell Judge Weinstein that I didn't think that professors' opinions merited much weight if any, including my own.

And now a final thought, one that reaches far outside the case. It seems to me that this Second Circuit opinion is moving toward a much more confined ATS. There were other ways in which the court reserved on ways in which it might be curtailed still further — in passing, the court noted but declined to take a view on whether the ATS might have no extraterritorial application, limiting it to conduct within the United States. Once corporations were understood as targets, once everyone understood that neither plaintiff nor defendant required any traditional

connection to the United States, as parties, in conduct, nothing, and once the plaintiffs bar saw opportunities to join forces with the NGOs and activists, the trend of the ATS has been to turn into a kind of de facto tort forum for the world. Whatever else it might be legally, politically this is a role suited for a hegemonic actor able to make claims against corporations stick on a worldwide basis. What happens if the hegemon goes into decline?

What happens, that is, when plaintiffs in Africa decide to start using the ATS to sue Chinese multinationals engaged in very, very bad labor or environmental practices in some poor and far away place? Does anyone believe that China would not react — in ways that others in the world might like to, but can't? Does anyone believe that the current State Department would not have concerns — or more precisely, the Treasury Department? So let me end by asking whether a possible long run effect of this Second Circuit opinion, if followed in other circuits, and by SCOTUS, and perhaps other things that confine the ATS, is not over the long run an ATS for a post-hegemonic America?

Update: An international lawyer friend in Europe sent me an email commenting on this. This lawyer, who preferred not to be identified, said that despite agreeing with the opinion on corporate liability, both majority and concurrence once again exhibited that peculiarly American tendency to rely far too much on Nuremberg cases. Even if a Nuremberg panel had held that some German firm could be held liable, international lawyers generally would not take that as very weighty evidence of the content of customary international law today. Rather, one should look to the way in which things had evolved over a long period of time to see what states did as a customary practice from a sense of legal obligation. A finding that a court long ago had ruled this or that was a peculiarly American way of re-configuring an inquiry into the content of customary international law into a common law inquiry.

Americans thought that was okay; not very many international lawyers outside the US agreed with that, said my friend, as a method of inquiry into customary international law. And they thought that American lawyers almost always overemphasized Nuremberg cases, treated them as hallowed ground — rather than looking to the path of treaties and state practice in the sixty years since. Even if a Nuremberg case had held there was corporate liability, nothing else since then supported the idea, and far more relevant, this lawyer friend concluded, was the affirmative consideration and rejection of the proposition in

Is it the End of the Alien Tort Statute?

Today, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit entered an important decision in *Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum* regarding whether corporations may be sued under the Alien Tort Statute. The upshot of the opinion is that corporations cannot be sued under the Alien Tort State for violations of customary international law because "the concept of corporate liability . . . has not achieved universal recognition or acceptance of a norm in the relations of States with each other." Slip op. at 49.

The impact this decision will have cannot be understated. First, the decision comes out of the Second Circuit-the same circuit that started the modern era of ATS litigation in 1980 in the Filartiga case. Second, the opinion provides the most clearly articulated view, backed up with international legal analysis, concluding that corporations cannot be sued as a matter of international law. This analysis will likely be incredibly influential throughout the federal courts. Third, corporations now have the support of caselaw to dismiss ATS cases filed against them.

Given the fact that the majority of ATS litigation in recent years has been directed at corporations, this case may prove to be the end of the expansive use of the ATS. Rest assured, plaintiffs will likely seek en banc and Supreme Court review, and thus we will have to wait and see whether the Second Circuit has fired a warning shot or sounded the death knell for modern ATS litigation.

Conference on Party Autonomy in PIL

The eighth regional scientific conference on private international law is scheduled to take place in Opatija, Croatia, today and tomorrow (16 and 17 October 2010). The conference titled "The Role of Party Autonomy in Contemporary Private International Law: A Study of International Instruments" is organised by the University of Rijeka Faculty of Law, with the support of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Society for Technical Cooperation, GTZ) and the Croatian Comparative Law Association.

The topic of the conference is regarded to belong to one of the most dynamic areas of PIL development. As Professor Šarcevic noted in one of his articles published in the beginning of the 1990s, the party autonomy in private international law is constantly being broadened, and at the same time it is being subjected to new restrictions. Appreciating the fact that international legal instruments in the field, including also the European ones, have significant impact on the national laws, these instruments are put in the focus of the conference. Additionally, the sections on national reports are envisaged as the fora where local issues related to party autonomy are discussed. Generally, the conference is divided into two sessions, one devoted to the choice of court clauses, and the other to the choice of applicable law. The conference program is available here.

The last conference in this series was announced here.

Conference on Cross Border Successions

On 15 October 2010, the European Commission will organise in Brussels a joint conference with the Council of the Notariats of the European Union on cross-border successions. The conference will be an opportunity to discuss different

aspects of the Commission proposal for a Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and authentic instruments in matters of succession and the introduction of a European Certificate of Succession.

Information on the conference can be found here.

The event is free. There are only a few places left.

Vacancy at The Hague Conference

Vacancy at the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference

By reason of a vacancy as a result of the expected retirement of one of the staff members as of 30 June 2011, a post as a staff member at the diplomatic level will be open at the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, beginning between 15 May and 1 July 2011 for a lawyer with good knowledge of private international law.

The number of Secretaries to the Permanent Bureau has been raised to five since 2008.

The Netherlands Standing Government Committee, instituted by Royal Decree of 20 February 1897, with a view to promoting the codification of private international law, has begun the procedure for recruitment of a highly qualified new official and for this purpose has drawn up a profile for the candidacy, which can be found below for information.

Written applications with an extensive curriculum vitae including publications, should be addressed to the Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, before 1 October 2010, at the address indicated below.

The candidates whose applications are retained will be invited to an interview with the members of a special committee named by the President of the Netherlands Standing Government Committee.

Permanent Bureau | Bureau Permanent

6, Scheveningseweg 2517 KT The Hague | La Haye The Netherlands | Pays-Bas telephone | téléphone +31 (70) 363 3303 fax | télécopieur +31 (70) 360 4867 e-mail | courriel secretariat@hcch.net website | site internet http://www.hcch.net

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Vacancy at the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference (beginning between 15 May and 1 July 2011)

Lawyer of high level, with good knowledge of private international law

- Law school education in private law, including conflicts of laws, preferably in the common law tradition, familiarity with comparative law (substantive and procedural law). Knowledge of public international law including the law of treaties and human rights law desirable.
- Excellent drafting capabilities are important (e.g. dissertation, law review or other publication experience will be taken into account).
- At least 10 to 15 years experience or experience in practice of law desirable. Experience of international negotiations an advantage.
- Excellent command, preferably as native language and both spoken and written, of at least one of the working languages of the Hague Conference (French and English), with good command of the other; knowledge of other languages desirable.
- Personal qualities to contribute to: a good, co-operative working atmosphere both within the Permanent Bureau and in relation with representatives of Members; the administration of the Permanent Bureau; representation of the Hague Conference with other international organisations.
- The job requires more or less frequent travel to both neighbouring and distant countries.
- Medical clearance required.
- The position contemplated for the staff member corresponding to the profile

would be in one of the steps of A3/4 of the international co-ordinated organisations.

The person appointed will be expected to take a leadership role in respect of particular areas of work within the Permanent Bureau. Applications will be particularly welcome from persons with experience in the field of international family law and international child protection.

European Parliament Resolution on Brussels I

On September 7th, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution on the Implementenation and the Review of the Brussels I Regulation.

The Resolution addresses many issues. On whether to abolish exequatur, the Parliament:

2. Calls for the requirement for exequatur to be abolished, but considers that this must be balanced by appropriate safeguards designed to protect the rights of the party against whom enforcement is sought; takes the view therefore that provision must be made for an exceptional procedure available in the Member State in which enforcement is sought; considers that this procedure should be available on the application of the party against whom enforcement is sought to the court indicated in the list in Annex III to the Regulation; takes the view that the grounds for an application under this exceptional procedure should be the following: (a) that recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy in the Member State in which recognition is sought; (b) where the judgment was given in default of appearance, that the defendant was not served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the defendant failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was possible for him to do so; (c) that the judgment is irreconcilable with a judgment given in a dispute between the same parties in

the Member State in which recognition is sought, and (d) that the judgment is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in another Member State or in a third State involving the same cause of action and between the same parties, provided that the earlier judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member State addressed; further considers that an application should be able to be made to a judge even before any steps are taken by way of enforcement and that if that judge rules that the application is based on serious grounds, he or she should refer the matter to the court indicated in the list in Annex III for examination on the basis of the grounds set out above; advocates the addition of a recital in the preamble to the effect that a national court may penalise a vexatious or unreasonable application, inter alia, in the order for costs;

- 3. Encourages the Commission to initiate a public debate on the question of public policy in connection with private international law instruments;
- 4. Considers that there must be a harmonised procedural time-frame for the exceptional procedure referred to in paragraph 2 so as to ensure that it is conducted as expeditiously as possible, and that it must be ensured that the steps which may be taken by way of enforcement until the time-limit for applying for the exceptional procedure has expired or the exceptional procedure has been concluded are not irreversible; is particularly concerned that a foreign judgment should not be enforced if it has not been properly served on the judgment debtor;
- 5. Argues not only that there must be a requirement for a certificate of authenticity as a procedural aid so as to guarantee recognition, but also that there should be a standard form for that certificate; considers, to this end, that the certificate provided for in Annex V should be refined, while obviating as far as possible any need for translation;
- 6. Believes that, in order to save costs, the translation of the decision to be enforced could be limited to the final order (operative part and summary grounds), but that a full translation should be required in the event that an application is made for the exceptional procedure;

Full text of the resolution after the break.

Many thanks to Jan von Hein for the tip-off.

European Parliament resolution of 7 September 2010 on the implementation and review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (2009/2140(INI))

- The European Parliament, having regard to Article 81 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters(1) (hereinafter "the Brussels I Regulation" or "the Regulation", - having regard to the Commission's report on the application of that regulation (COM(2009)0174), - having regard to the Commission's Green Paper of 21 April 2009 on the review of the Brussels I Regulation (COM(2009)0175), - having regard to the Heidelberg Report (JLS/2004/C4/03) on the application of the Brussels I Regulation in the Member States and the responses to the Commission's Green Paper,
- having regard to its resolution of 25 November 2009 on the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council An area of freedom, security and justice serving the citizen Stockholm programme(2), specifically the sections "Greater access to civil justice for citizens and business" and "Building a European judicial culture",

 - having regard to the Union's accession to the Hague Conference on private international law on 3 April 2007, having regard to the signature, on behalf of the Union, of the Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements on 1 April 2009,
- having regard to the case law of the Court of Justice, in particular Gambazzi v. DaimlerChrysler Canada (3), the Lugano opinion(4), West Tankers (5), Gasser v. MISAT (6), Ownsu v. Jackson (7), Shevill (8), Owens Bank v. Bracco (9), Denilauer (10), St Paul Dairy Industries (11) and Van Uden (12);
- having regard to the Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters(13), Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims [14], Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a European order for payment procedure [15], Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure [16], Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations [17] and Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000(18),

 - having regard to Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II)(19),
 - - having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 16 December 2009,
 having regard to Rules 48 and 119(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
- In regulation No 44/2001, with its predecessor the Brussels Convention, is one of the most successful pieces of EU legislation; whereas it laid the foundations for a European judicial area, has served citizens and business well by promoting legal certainty and predictability of decisions through uniform European rules supplemented by a substantial body of case-law, and avoiding parallel proceedings, and is used as a reference and a tool for other instruments,

 B. whereas, notwithstanding this, it has been criticised following a number of rulings of the Court of Justice and is in need of modernisation,

- B. whereas, notwithstanding this, it has been criticised following a number of rulings of the Court of Justice and is in need of modernisation,

 C. whereas abolition of exequatur the Commission's main objective would expected the free movement of judicial decisions and form a key milestone in the building of a European judicial area,

 D. whereas exequatur is seldom refused: only 1 to 5% of applications are appealed and those appeals are rarely successful, whereas, nonetheless, the time and expense of getting a foreign judgment recognised are hard to justify in the single market and this may be particularly vexatious where a claimant whishes to seek enforcement against a judgment debtor's assets in several jurisdictions,

 E. whereas there is no requirement for exequatur in several EU instruments: the European amorement order, the European small claims procedure and the maintenance obligations requiation(20),

 F. whereas abolition of exequatur should be effected by providing that a judicial decision qualifying for recognition and enforcement under the Regulation which is enforceable in the Member State in which it was given is enforceable throughout the EU; whereas this should be coupled with an exceptional procedure available to the party against whom enforcement is sought so as to quarantee an adequate right of recourse to the courts of the State of enforcement in the event that that party wishes to contest enforcement on the grounds set out in the Regulation; whereas it will be necessary to ensure that states to the necessary to ensure that states to the necessary to ensure that states to the review even not review even not reviewed and the review even and the review even and the reviewed and the review even and the review even and the reviewed and the review even and the review even and the review even and the review and the review even and the reviewed and the review
- H. whereas officials and bailiffs in the receiving Member State must be able to tell that the document of which enforcement is sought is an authentic, final judgment from a national court,

 1. whereas arbitration is satisfactorily dealt with by the 1958 New York Convention and the 1961 Geneva Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, to which all Member States are parties, and the exclusion of arbitration from the scope of the Regulation must remain in place

 1. whereas the rules of the New York Convention are minimum rules and the law of the Contracting States may be more flavourable to arbitrat competence and arbitration awards,

 K. whereas, mover, a rule providing that the courts of the Member State of the search of the Arbitration should have exclusive jurisdiction could give rise to considerable perturbations,

 L. whereas it appears from the intense debate raised by the proposal to create an exclusive head of jurisdiction for court proceedings supporting arbitration in the civil courts of the Member States that the Member States have not reached a common position thereon and that it would be continued to the various national procedural devices developed to protect arbitral surisdiction familiant insurations are the warm to the various national procedural devices developed to protect arbitral surisdiction familiant insurations are the warm to the various national procedural devices developed to protect arbitral surisdiction familiant insurations are the warm to the various national procedural devices developed to protect arbitral surisdiction familiant insurations are the warm to the various national procedural devices developed to protect arbitral surisdiction familiant insurations are the warm to the various national procedural devices developed to protect arbitral surisdiction familiant insurations are the warm to the various national procedural devices developed to protect arbitral surisdiction familiant insurations are the various national procedural devices developed to protect arbitral suri
- whereas the various national procedural devices developed to protect arbitral jurisdiction (anti-suit injunctions so long as they are in conformity with free movement of persons and fundamental rights, declaration of validity of an arbitration clause, grant of damages for breach of an ration clause, the negative effect of the 'Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle', etc.) must continue to be available and the effect of such procedures and the ensuing court decisions in the other Member States must be left to the law of those Member States as was the position prior to the judgment in West Tankers ,

 N. whereas party autonomy is of key importance and the application of the lis pendens rule as endorsed by the Court of Justice (e.g. in Gasser) enables choice-of-court clauses to be undermined by abusive "torpedo" acti

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- enforcement under the exceptional procedure;

 Industrial property

 22. Considers that, in order to overcome the problem of "torpedo actions", the court second seised should be relieved from the obligation to stay proceedings under the lis pendens rule where the court first seised evidently has no jurisdiction, rejects the idea, however, that claims for negative declaratory relief should be excluded altogether from the first-in-time rule on the ground that such claims can have a legitimate commercial purpose, considers, however, that issues concerning jurisdiction would be best resolved in the context of proposals to create a Unified Patent Litigation

 System:

 33. Considers that the terminological inconsistencies between Regulation No 593/2008 ("Rome 1")(23) and Regulation No 44/2001 should be eliminated by including in Article 15(1) of the Brussels I Regulation the definition of "professional" incorporated in Article 6(1) of the Rome I Regulation and by replacing the expression "contract which, for an inclusive price, provides for a combination of travel and accommodation" in Article 15(3) of the Brussels I Regulation by a reference to the Package Travel Directive 99/314/EEC(24) as in Article 6(1) of the Rome I Regulation:

 [Individual contracts of employment]

 Individual contracts of employment

 24. Calls on the Commission to consider, having regard to the case-law of the Court of Justice, whether a solution affording greater legal activation yab a studied protection for the more vulnerable party might not be found for employees who do not carry out their work in a single Member State

 (e.g. long distance lorry drivers, flight attendants);

 Robbits of the personality.

- Rights of the personality

 25. Believes that the rule in Shevill needs to be qualified; considers, therefore, that, in order to mitigate the alleged tendency of courts in certain jurisdictions to accept territorial jurisdiction where there is only a weak connection with the country in which the action is brought, a recital should be added to clarify that, in principle, the courts of that country should accept jurisdiction only where there is a regiment link with that country; considers that this would be helpful in striking a better balance between the interests at stake; Provisional measures 26. Considers that, in order to ensure better access to justice, orders aimed at obtaining information and evidence or at preserving evidence should be covered by the notion of provisional and protective measures;
- 27. Believes that the Regulation should establish jurisdiction for such measures at the courts of the Member State where the information or evidence sought is located, in addition to the jurisdiction of the courts having jurisdiction with respect to the substance;

 29. Considers that the distinction drawn in Van Uden, between cases in which the court famility the measure as jurisdiction over sections are such as the court sharing jurisdiction with respect to the substance;

 29. Considers that the distinction drawn in Van Uden, between cases in which the court famility the measure as jurisdiction over the substance of the case and cases in which the courts sharing jurisdiction of whether measures are sought in support of proceedings issued or to be issued in that Member State or a non-Member State (in which case the article 31 restrictions should apply);

 30. Urges that a recital be introduced in order to overcome the difficulties posed by the requirement recognised in Van Uden for a "real connecting link" to the territorial jurisdiction of the Member State court granting such a measure, to make it clear that in deciding whether to grant, renew, modify or discharge a provisional measure granted in support of proceedings in another Member State court should apply in a connecting link" to the territorial jurisdiction of the Member State court sentent by the Member State court sent
- 31. Rejects the Commission's idea that the court seised of the main proceedings should be able to discharge, modify or adapt provisional measures granted by a court from another Member State since this would not be in the spirit of the principle of mutual trust established by the Regulation considers, moreover, that it is unclear on what basis a court could review a decision made by a court in a different jurisdiction and which law would apply in these circumstances, and that this could give rise to real practical problems, for example with regard to costs;
 - Collective redress 32. Stresses that the Commission's forthcoming work on collective redress instruments may need to contemplate special jurisdiction rules for collective actions
- Other questions
 33. Considers, on account of the special difficulties of private international law, the importance of Union conflicts-of-law legislation for business, citizens and international litigators and the need for a consistent body of case-law, that it is time to set up a special chamber within the Court of Justice to deal with references for preliminary rulings relating to private international law,