

Hamburg Lectures on Maritime Affairs 2010

The International Max Planck Research School for Maritime Affairs and the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) organize this year's Hamburg Lectures on Maritime Affairs.

The lectures will be held in **Hamburg from 7 October to 10 November** and are open to the public. However, registration in advance is required.

The programme as well as information on the venue and registration and can be found [here](#).

New references for preliminary rulings before the CJEU

Drawn to my attention by the Conflictus Legum are two recent requests for preliminary rulings on interpretation of the EU instruments in the filed of private international law which are now pending before the Court of Justice of the EU.

One reference (C-315/10 *Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional, Csn Cayman Ltd v Unifer Steel SL, BNP-Paribas (Suisse), Colepccl SA, Banco Português de Investimento SA (BPI)*) was submitted by the Portuguese court on 1 July 2010, including the following questions:

1. Does the fact that the Portuguese judicial authorities have declared that they lack jurisdiction by reason of nationality to hear an action concerning a commercial claim constitute an obstacle to the connection between causes of action referred to in Articles 6(1) and [28] of Regulation No 44/2001, where the Portuguese court has another action pending before it, a Paulian action brought against both the debtor and the third-party transferee, in this case the transferee of a debt receivable,

and the depositaries of the subject-matter of the claim assigned to the third-party transferee, the latter having their seats in Portugal, in order that they may all be bound by the *res judicata* decision to be given?

2. In the event of a negative response, may Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 be freely applied to the case?

The questions seem somewhat unclear, particularly in relation to declining jurisdiction on the basis of nationality and reference to Art 28. The reference is perhaps due to the same wording used in the two provisions, but might not have a direct connection with the case. The Portuguese court is evidently dealing with the action which is under the Portuguese law called “*impugnação pauliana*” (Arts. 610 et seq. of the Portuguese Civil Code). It is used to reverse the fraudulent conveyance of property, which is frequently resorted to by debtors on the eve of their insolvency. It might be relevant to know whether the debtor in this case is actually insolvent. Because certain information is missing, regardless of inquiries with some Portuguese colleagues, the situation cannot be fully appreciated for the time being.

The other reference (C-400/10 *J. McB. v L. E.*) of 6 August 2010 originates from the Irish court in relation to (wrongful) removal of a child in case of father not married to the mother of the child. The question reads:

Does Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 th November 2003 on the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, whether interpreted pursuant to Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union or otherwise, preclude a Member State from requiring by its law that the father of a child who is not married to the mother shall have obtained an order of a court of competent jurisdiction granting him custody in order to qualify as having ‘custody rights’ which render the removal of that child from its country of habitual residence wrongful for the purposes of Article 2.11 of that Regulation?

Vacancies at the Secretariat of the ICC

The Secretariat of the ICC International Court of Arbitration is currently recruiting two deputy counsels, one to deal principally with parties from Eastern Europe, another to deal principally with Europe, Africa and the Middle East.

The closing dates for applications are October 4th for the first position, October 11th for the second.

More details can be found [here](#).

Robertson on Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice

Cassandra Burke Robertson, who is an associate professor at Case Western University School of Law, has published *Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice* in the last issue of the Boston Law Review. The abstract reads:

When U.S. corporations cause harm abroad, should foreign plaintiffs be allowed to sue in the United States? Federal courts are increasingly saying no. The courts have expanded the doctrines of forum non conveniens and prudential standing to dismiss a growing number of transnational cases. This restriction of court access has sparked considerable tension in international relations, as a number of other nations view such dismissals as an attempt to insulate U.S. corporations from liability. A growing number of countries have responded by enacting retaliatory legislation that may ultimately harm U.S. interests. This Article argues that the judiciary's restriction of access to federal courts ignores important foreign relations, trade, and regulatory considerations. The Article applies institutional choice theory to recommend a process by which the three

branches of government can work together to establish a more coherent court-access policy for transnational cases.

It can be freely downloaded [here](#).

The United States Supreme Court to Take a Fresh Look at Personal Jurisdiction

Today, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in two cases that involve the so-called “stream-of-commerce” theory of personal jurisdiction. Under that theory, a United States court may assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign company defendant when that company’s products find their way into U.S. markets, even though the foreign company has not targeted that specific market for commerce. Many non-U.S. readers will find such a theory of personal jurisdiction startling, especially given that recent advances in the law of jurisdiction in Europe in particular have favored the place of a defendant’s domicile (or place of incorporation) as the key principle in asserting jurisdiction. It will be interesting to see if the United States Supreme Court resolves these cases in favor of a bright-line rule or a more flexible approach to personal jurisdiction.

The first case, *Goodyear Luxembourg Tires, et al., v. Brown, et al.* (10-76), involves the death of two North Carolina youths in France when a tire made overseas failed and the bus in which they were riding crashed and rolled over. The tire was made in Turkey, but the Luxembourg branch of Goodyear and branches in Turkey and France were sued in a North Carolina court over the tire’s failure. The actions sued upon had no contact with North Carolina and the defendants had never taken purposeful action to cause tires which they had manufactured to be shipped into North Carolina. Notwithstanding these facts, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that because (1) defendants did not

purposefully limit their distribution to exclude their tires from North Carolina, (2) defendants did business generally with the United States and (3) North Carolina had a strong interest in providing a forum for its citizens to seek redress for their claims, the assertion of general personal jurisdiction over the defendants was proper. The second case, *J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro, et al.* (09-1343), involves an accident in a New Jersey scrap metal facility on a machine made by McIntyre, a British company that sold the machine through an unaffiliated distributor. That lawsuit was pursued in state court in New Jersey. On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that because the defendant targeted the United States market generally and its products ended up in the state of New Jersey the assertion of personal jurisdiction by the New Jersey courts was reasonable, especially considering the radical transformations in international commerce which makes the whole world a market.

The Supreme Court's resolution of these cases should do much to correct the confusion that still exists in American courts over the doctrine of personal jurisdiction under the stream of commerce theory, especially when applied to foreign defendants.

Conference on State Insolvency and Sovereign Debts

Mathias Audit, who is a professor of law at the University of Paris Ouest - Nanterre La Défense, will organise a conference in Paris on November 10th, 2010, on State Insolvency and Sovereign Debts. 

Here is the programme:

Colloque, le 10 novembre 2010
Palais du Luxembourg - Salle Monnerville

Insolvabilité des Etats et dettes souveraines

Programme

8h30 : Accueil des participants

9h : Ouverture du colloque par M. le sénateur Philippe MARINI

9h15 : Introduction générale aux travaux

Matinée placée sous la présidence de M. Hubert DE VAUPLANE, *Directeur juridique et Conformité au Crédit agricole et professeur associé à l'Université Paris II - Panthéon Assas*

- 9h30 : **Un Etat peut-il faire faillite ? - Le point de vue économique**
par M. Jérôme SGARD, *directeur de recherches à Sciences Po/CERI et professeur associé à l'Université Paris-Dauphine*

10h : **Un Etat peut-il faire faillite ? - Le point de vue juridique**
par M. Michael WAIBEL, *British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow, Lauterpacht Centre for International Law and Downing College, University of Cambridge*

10h30 : Pause

- 11h : **La dette souveraine appelle-t-elle un statut juridique particulier ?**
par M. Mathias AUDIT, *professeur de droit à l'Université Paris Ouest - Nanterre La Défense*
- 11h30 : **Incidence des Credit Default Swaps sur les dettes des Etats : bilan et prospective**
par Me Jérôme DA ROS, *avocat à la cour*
- 12h : **Les « fonds vautours » sont-ils des créanciers comme les autres ?**
par M. Patrick WAUTELET, *professeur à l'Université de Liège*
- 12h30 : Discussion générale

13h : Déjeuner libre

Débats placés sous la présidence de M. Christian DE BOISSIEU, *professeur d'économie à l'Université Paris I – Panthéon-Sorbonne*

- 14h30 : **Agence de notation : responsabilité, régulation ou *laissez-faire* ?**

par M. Norbert GAILLARD, *docteur en économie (Sciences Po/Princeton), consultant auprès de la Banque mondiale*

- 15 h : **La régulation de l'information sur le marché des dettes souveraines**

par M. Alain BERNARD, *professeur à l'Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour*

15h30 : Pause

Débats placés sous la présidence de M. Jean-Bernard AUBY, *professeur des universités à l'Ecole de Droit de SciencesPo, directeur de la chaire « Mutations de l'Action Publique et du Droit Public » (MADP)*

- 16 h : **Les instruments de droit international public pour remédier à l'insolvabilité des Etats**

par M. Mathias FORTEAU, *professeur à l'Université Paris Ouest – Nanterre La Défense*

- 16h30 : **Les instruments de droit de l'Union européenne pour remédier à l'insolvabilité des Etats**

par M. Francesco MARTUCCI, *professeur à l'Université de Strasbourg*

- 17h : Discussion générale

- 17h30 : **Conclusion générale**

par Mme Horatia MUIR WATT, *professeur des universités à l'Ecole de Droit de SciencesPo*

It is free of charge. Registration, however, is compulsory (michele.dreyfus@u-paris10.fr).

Gerrit Betlem

Professor Gerrit Betlem, a close friend and colleague to many of us and a leading scholar in European Private Law, passed away on 26th July 2010. There is an obituary on Southampton's website.

Conference Announcement: Extraterritoriality in US Law

Beyond Borders: Extraterritoriality in American Law

Southwestern Law School, Nov. 12, 2010

On Friday, November 12, 2010, Southwestern Law School in Los Angeles, California is hosting a symposium titled *Beyond Borders: Extraterritoriality in American Law*.

This one-day symposium will bring together leading legal figures from throughout the country to analyze critical issues related to transnational litigation and extraterritorial regulation. Do U.S. law stop at the border? If not, when do they – or when should they – govern the conduct of people abroad? From the controversial extraterritorial application of U.S. domestic law, to the contentious uses of universal jurisdiction in the human rights context, to debates over the extent to which the U.S. Constitution applies outside U.S. territory, a flurry of recent scholarship has involved disputes over the geographic reach of domestic law.

The symposium will bring together leading scholars to discuss the history, doctrine, and current issues related to extraterritoriality. The proceedings will be published in the *Southwestern Law Review* and distributed widely. The following professors are participating in the symposium (listed alphabetically):

- Jeffery Atik, Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles

- Hannah Buxbaum, Professor of Law, Indiana Univ. Maurer School of Law
- Lea Brilmayer, Professor of Law, Yale Law School
- William Dodge, Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law
- Stephen Gardbaum, Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law
- Andrew Guzman, Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley School of Law
- Max Huffman, Associate Professor of Law, Indiana Univ. School of Law
- Chimene Keitner, Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law
- John Knox, Professor of Law, Wake Forest Univ. School of Law
- Caleb Mason, Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School
- Daniel Margolies, Professor of History, Virginia Wesleyan College
- Jeff Meyer, Professor of Law, Quinnipiac Univ. School of Law
- Trevor Morrison, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School
- Austen Parrish, Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School
- Tonya Putnam, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Columbia University
- Kal Raustiala, Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law
- Bartholomew Sparrow, Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin
- Peter Spiro, Professor of Law, Temple Univ. Beasley School of Law
- Christopher Whytock, Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law

Roosevelt on Choice of Law in US Courts

Kermit Roosevelt III, who is a professor of law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, had posted Choice of Law in Federal Courts: from Erie and Klaxon to Cafeteria and Shady Grove on SSRN.

The article offers a new perspective on choice of law in federal courts. I have argued in a series of articles that ordinary choice of law problems are best understood through application of a particular conceptual framework, which I call the two-step model. Rather than thinking of choice of law as some sort of meta-procedure, this model takes it to address two substantive questions: what are the scope of the competing states' laws, and which should be given priority if they conflict?

*My previous articles have explored the utility of this framework for tackling some perennial problems in choice of law. This one moves to a different context: choice of law in federal courts under the Erie doctrine. It argues that Erie is best understood as a straightforward application of this two-step model and that the model consequently offers a useful guide for Erie analysis. It shows how thinking about the Erie question in this way offers novel and satisfying solutions to a number of puzzles that have troubled courts and commentators in the wake of Erie. These puzzles include the effect that federal courts must give to state choice of law rules (the Klaxon issue), how Klaxon should interact with the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, and the Court's most recent venture into the Erie arena, *Shady Grove v. Allstate*. These issues have received substantial attention in the scholarly literature, but never from the two-step perspective.*

Keitner on Kiobel and the future of the Alien Tort Statute

*The following post, cross-posted on [Opinio Juris](#), continues to analyze the import of the Second Circuit's recent decision in *Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum*, holding that corporations may not be sued under the Alien Tort Statute for violations of customary international law. Our thanks to Professor Keitner for sharing her thoughts.*

Not Dead Yet: Some Thoughts on *Kiobel*

Chimène I. Keitner, UC Hastings College of the Law

The Second Circuit's recent panel opinion in *Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum* has justifiably spurred much talk in the blogosphere, including posts by Trey Childress <https://conflictoflaws.de/2010/is-it-the-end-of-the-alien-tort-statute/>, Ken Anderson

<http://opiniojuris.org/2010/09/17/extra-thoughts-on-todays-2nd-circuit-ats-decision/>, Julian Ku

<http://opiniojuris.org/2010/09/17/goodbye-to-ats-litigation-second-circuit-rejects-corporate-liability-for-violations-of-customary-international-law/>, and Kevin Jon Heller <http://opiniojuris.org/2010/09/18/a-tentative-thought-on-kiobel/>. Here are my preliminary thoughts.

First, it is premature to hail the “end of the ATS.” It may be true that some plaintiffs have sought to hold corporations accountable for their complicity in human rights abuses under the ATS’s jurisdictional grant. But not all ATS litigation is about corporate liability. To the contrary, the Second Circuit’s landmark opinion in *Filartiga v. Pena-Irala* involved an individual human rights violator, and cases against individuals continue to be filed under the ATS and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991. It is important not to lose sight of these cases, which the Supreme Court explicitly approved in *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain* (2004).

Second, whether or not the ATS is good policy, the jurisdictional grant it embodies must be interpreted within the context of U.S. law. This does not mean that U.S. law governs all aspects of ATS litigation—in my 2008 article on *Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases* http://uchastings.edu/hlj/archive/vol60/Keitner_60-HLJ-61.pdf, I argued that international law provides the “conduct-regulating” rules applied under the ATS, whereas U.S. law governs other aspects of ATS litigation. Although I focused on the standard for aiding and abetting, I also suggested that “the most coherent approach would look to U.S. law on the question of personal jurisdiction, including the type of entity against which a claim can be asserted, [while] international law would supply the substantive, conduct-regulating rules that apply to private actors” (p. 72).

Kiobel misconstrues language in *Sosa* about whether private actors can violate international law to conclude that corporations cannot be held liable for certain conduct in U.S. courts. In terms of my proposed framework, *Kiobel* miscategorizes the question of whether corporations can be named as defendants

as a conduct-regulating rule akin to aiding and abetting. This is wrong because aiding and abetting liability, unlike corporate liability, does not involve the attribution of the principal's conduct to the accomplice by virtue of a preexisting legal relationship. Rather, it prohibits the *accomplice's conduct* in providing substantial assistance to the principal. Consequently, under the ATS, the accomplice's (and the principal's) conduct is governed by international law. By contrast, whether or not the accomplice's (or the principal's) conduct can be attributed to a corporate entity is governed by U.S. law. Corporate liability is thus possible under the ATS whether or not corporate entities have themselves been subject to the jurisdiction of international tribunals or found liable for international law violations by such tribunals.

Kiobel indicates that “[t]he singular achievement of international law since the Second World War has come in the area of human rights, where the subjects of customary international law—*i.e.*, those with international rights, duties, and liabilities—now include not merely *states*, but also *individuals*” (p. 7). In fact, this is not such a novel development: the paradigm violations of piracy, violations of safe conducts, and offenses against ambassadors identified in *Sosa* also would typically have been committed by private actors, rather than by states (see Conceptualizing Complicity http://uchastings.edu/hlj/archive/vol60/Keitner_60-HLJ-61.pdf, p. 70). The ATS's jurisdictional grant should be understood in this context. In an *amicus* brief filed on behalf of professors of federal jurisdiction and legal history in *Balintulo v. Daimler AG* (2d Cir., No. 09-2778-cv), my colleague William Dodge documents that “[l]egal actions for violations of the law of nations were not limited to natural persons in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries” (p. 15), and that “no distinction would have been drawn between individual and corporate defendants” (p. 14) in these early cases. Any serious consideration of jurisdiction under the ATS needs to grapple with these historical foundations, and with the relationship between the law of nations and U.S. law, not simply “international law” in the abstract.

Looking at the big picture, there certainly need to be—and are—robust mechanisms to contain cases that are non-meritorious or vexatious, that impinge excessively on the Executive's conduct of foreign relations, or that should be heard in a non-U.S. forum that is willing and able to provide redress. At the front end, I would hazard that, although the increasing involvement of plaintiffs' law

firms (as opposed to human rights lawyers associated with non-profits, or attorneys working strictly *pro bono*) in bringing ATS cases may have some benefits in terms of reaching a greater swath of deleterious conduct, it may foster less coherence and restraint in case selection. At the back end, certain judges may be tempted to overcompensate by creating doctrinal barriers to entire categories of cases. This impulse might be understandable, but it does not justify judicial rewriting of the ATS.