

Argentina's Diplomatic Immunity in Belgium and France

Should waivers of diplomatic immunity in financial contracts be taken  seriously? Should they be interpreted as narrowly as possible? Should it be specifically the case for states close to bankruptcy? For the same reasons, should the scope of diplomatic immunity be interpreted broadly?

These questions arise after two judgments delivered in the same case by the French supreme court and the Court of appeal of Brussels last summer interpreted differently the same contractual clause whereby the Republic of Argentina had waived its sovereign immunity in a financial contract.

Background

On Christmas 2001, the gift of Argentina to its creditors was to declare a moratorium on payments of its external debt. One such creditor was NML Capital Ltd, which was the beneficial owner of bonds issued by Argentina in year 2000. As the relevant financial contracts contained a clause granting jurisdiction to New York courts, the creditor sued Argentina before a U.S. federal court, and obtained in 2006 a judgment for USD 284 million.

In the summer 2009, NML Capital initiated enforcement proceedings in Europe. It had enforcement authorities carry out provisional attachments over banks accounts of the Argentine embassies (and of various other Argentine public bodies or missions to international institutions such as UNESCO) both in France and in Belgium.

Argentina challenged the validity of these provisional attachments on the ground that they violated its diplomatic immunity.

Argentina's Waivers of Sovereign Immunities

The relevant financial contracts contained clauses whereby the Republic waived all immunities for the purpose of enforcing a judgment ruling against it in the context of the relevant contracts. Each of the clauses in the different financial contracts then provided for exceptions, i.e. assets over which enforcement of the

judgment could not be sought. The first exception was the reserves held by the central bank of Argentina. The second and third exception were two categories of public assets on Argentina's territory. The fourth were certain assets related to the budget of Argentina as defined by a particular Argentine statute.

This looked like carefully drafted clauses. None of them mentioned diplomatic immunity, or diplomatic assets. At the same time, the only assets which the clauses excluded from the waiver were located in Argentina, which suggested that diplomatic assets were covered by the waiver clause.

Belgium

In a judgment of 21 June 2011, the Brussels Court of Appeal dismissed Argentina's challenge and held that the bank accounts could be attached by the plaintiff.

With respect to the scope of the waiver clause, the court found that the 1961 Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations only provides for one requirement for waiver of the diplomatic immunity: it should be express. The court ruled that the waiver in the financial contract was express. It rejected the argument that the diplomatic immunity could only have been waived by a clause providing specifically that diplomatic immunities were also waived, as there is no such requirement in the 1961 Vienna Convention.

France

In a judgment of 28 September 2011, the French supreme court for private and criminal matters (*Cour de cassation*) held that Argentina still benefited from its diplomatic immunity, and that the provisional attachments carried out in France were thus void.

With respect to the scope of the waiver clause, the court held that waivers of diplomatic immunities must not only be express, but also special, i.e. provide specifically that they cover diplomatic assets. As it was perfectly aware that the second requirement is absent from the Vienna Convention, the court relied on customary international law. The judgment, however, is as cryptic as all judgments of the court, and thus does not explain how the court comes to this conclusion about the content of customary international law, and whether particular sources were considered.

With respect to the scope of the diplomatic immunity, the Vienna Convention also raised an issue, as it does not mention bank accounts among the assets covered by the diplomatic immunity. Again, the court held that, under customary international law, the diplomatic immunity extended to the accounts of embassies. On this point, the Brussels Court of appeal had reached, reluctantly it seems, the same conclusion.

Further readings

The enforcement of the judgment was also sought, and challenged, in the United Kingdom. The UK Supreme Court ruled on the case in a judgment of July 2011.

Issue 2011.2 Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht

The second issue of 2011 of the Dutch journal on Private International Law, *Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht* includes the following articles on the Brussels I Recast (contributions on Provisional Measures and Arbitration), Service of Documents and the new Chinese Private International Law Act:

Jolien Kruit, Voorlopige maatregelen: belangrijke wijzigingen op komst voor de (natte) praktijk!?, p. 271-279. The English abstract reads:

In its proposal to amend the Brussels I Regulation (COM(2010) 748), the European Committee has proposed several changes to the current rules on provisional, including protective, measures, as set out in Article 31 of the Brussel I Regulation and the case law of the European Court of Justice. Most strikingly, the Committee has proposed (1) that an obligation be implemented for the preliminary judge to cooperate with the Court where proceedings are pending as to the substance; and (2) that provisional measures, including – subject to certain conditions – measures which have been granted ex parte, are to be enforced and recognized, if they have been granted by a Court having jurisdiction on the substance of the case. This paper discusses these suggested changes and their

consequences for daily practice. It is argued that if the proposed changes are implemented as suggested, serious problems may arise and that the Courts will have to give a reasonable interpretation to the provisions in order to create a practicable and useful regime.

Jacomijn J. van Haersolte-vanHof, *The Commission's Proposal to amend the arbitration exception should be embraced!*, p. 280-288. An excerpt from the introduction reads:

This contribution will first address the current state of the law, based on the present text of Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the 'Regulation') and the main case law of the European Court of Justice. Furthermore, the background and contents of the Commission Proposal¹ will be discussed. This leads to an overview of the main reasons why the Commission's Proposal for a review of this Regulation should be accepted. (...) this contribution is based on the role attributed to the author at the Colloquium held on 25 January 2011 in The Hague, organized by the T.M.C. Asser Institute and the Stichting Dutch Legal Network for Shipping Transport, namely to defend the Commission's Proposal. In fact, this role had been designated even before the Commission's point of view had been published. The author was happy to defend this position, also when the Commission's Proposal was released. At the same time, it should be noted that, initially, the author hoped for and supported a more exhaustive solution for arbitration to be incorporated into the Regulation. Nevertheless, a partial solution at this stage is to be preferred over the complete absence of any solution. But, as this contribution will show, it is not easy to provide for a partial solution. Hopefully, the legislative process will allow certain amendments and fine-tuning further to improve the present Proposal.

Vesna Lazic, *The amendment to the arbitration exception suggested in the Commission's Proposal: the reasons as to why it should be rejected*, p. 289-298. The conclusion reads:

The solution suggested in the Commission's Proposal is both disproportionate and inadequate to meet the needs of the commercial parties. There is a clear discrepancy between the 'problem' allegedly intended to be resolved and the amendments suggested in the Proposal for doing so. The suggested measure of transferring the court intervention in the pre-arbitration phase from one

jurisdiction to another can hardly be explained by reasons such as ‘enhancing the effectiveness of arbitration agreements’ and enhancing the attractiveness of arbitrating in the EU. Particularly erroneous and inadequate is the suggested and presumed binding nature of the decision on the validity of an arbitration agreement, without providing for at least a minimal level of uniformity. It is exactly because the 1958 New York Convention regulates only some instances of court ‘intervention’ that it is preferable to have a separate instrument within which all relevant aspects would be dealt with. Such an instrument would serve as a genuine supplement to the 1985 New York Convention. It would be a proper means to overcome the undesirable effects of those provisions that proved outdated and, as such, unsuitable for modern business or that have given rise to difficulties and discrepancies in interpretation by national courts. Such a carefully drafted instrument would truly enhance the attractiveness of arbitrating within the EU. Partial solutions in the form of poorly drafted and vaguely worded amendments are counterproductive as they will only be driving away potential users from arbitrating in Europe. Unfortunately, it does not seem likely that the Commission will follow that path and address all the issues in one EU instrument. Numerous interventions, commentaries on the Green Paper and clear preferences for not dealing with issues concerning the interface between arbitration and litigation within the Regulation have obviously been ignored. Thus, it is unrealistic to expect that any comments and suggestions to that effect will have any relevance in the future. Yet if the Commission wishes to pursue the approach of a ‘(partial) deletion of the arbitration exception’ it is perhaps not too much to expect that the context and the wording of the amendment will be substantially reconsidered and revised. Thereby an approach comparable to Article VI(3) of the European Convention may be a suitable solution. This may be combined with prima facie control over the validity of arbitration agreements by the court seised when no arbitration has yet been initiated. Such an approach would ensure the full effectiveness of arbitration agreements.

Chr. F. Kroes, Bij nader inzien: de Hoge Raad komt terug van zijn opvatting dat bij de kantoorbetekening ex artikel 63 Rv ook het Haags Betekeningsverdrag moet worden gevolgd, p. 299-302 [Annotation to Hoge Raad 4 februari 2011, nr. 10/04456, LJN: BP0006 (NIPR 2011, 222) en nr. 10/05104, LJN: BP 3105 (NIPR 2011, 223)]. The English abstract reads:

Until recently, the Supreme Court held that national service at the office address

of a party's counsel in the first instance ('office service') was not sufficient if the defendant had his/her domicile in a Member State of an international instrument on service abroad (an EU Regulation or a treaty). In such a case, the plaintiff should also adhere to the requirements for service under that instrument. The Supreme Court has now completely reversed its position. With regard to the Service Regulation II, it decided on 18 December 2009 that, in case the Service Regulation II would otherwise be applicable, office service is sufficient. On 4 February 2011, the Supreme Court handed down two decisions that make clear that the same applies in cases where defendants have their domicile in Member States of the Hague Convention on Service in Civil and Commercial Cases 1965. No doubt, these decisions are pragmatic. However, there are objections. First, it is unclear what effort a party's counsel must make in order to make sure that the document that has been served actually reaches his client. In most cases, this will not be a problem, but if counsel has lost contact, it certainly will be. Such an inability to reach the client will go unnoticed by the court that will then simply proceed by default. Secondly, problems with recognition and enforcement outside of the Netherlands may result from such an office service.

Ning Zhao, The first codification of choice-of-law rules in the People's Republic of China: an overview, p. 303-311. The conclusion reads:

Given the continued economic growth and the ever-increasing number of foreign-related civil relations in the PRC, the enactment of the Statute is certainly a timely one. With this Statute, the legislator has succeeded in achieving the goals of codifying substantial parts of choice-of-law rules, and keeping them in line with major developments achieved in international and national codifications and reforms in this field. In spite of the influence of other codifications, the Chinese legislator has made this Statute suitable for Chinese social reality. From the foregoing, it is clear that the Statute gives preference to legal certainty and conflicts justice over flexibility and substantive justice. The Statute incorporates many of the most advanced developments in the field of choice of law, in that it modernizes and systematizes the rules that are currently in force. Parties in dispute and practitioners will certainly benefit from the clear and transparent rules prescribed in the Statute, and those rules will also facilitate the adjudication of international civil disputes by Chinese courts. Thus, as the first codification of choice-of-law rules in China, the Statute opens a new page for Chinese private international law. It is probably too early to draw a conclusion as to the

effectiveness of the Statute, as only practice will put the advantages and inconvenience of the Statute into perspective. Nevertheless, the Statute seems to have the potential to succeed as a basic body of law in regulating choice-of-law problems in foreign related civil relations.

Third Issue of 2011's Belgian PIL E-Journal

The third issue of the Belgian bilingual (French/Dutch) e-journal on private international law *Tijdschrift@ipr.be / Revue@dipr.be* was just released. 

The journal essentially reports European and Belgian cases addressing issues of private international law, but it also offers academic articles. This issue includes a note by Charline Daelman commenting on the recent case of the European Court of Human Rights *Negrepointis-Giannisis v. Greece* and discussing the Interaction Between Human Rights and Private International Law.

Presentation of the CLIP Principles

Following the publication of the final Draft Principles for Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property which we reported here, the European Max-Planck Group on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property (CLIP) is now prepared to make their presentation. The conference organised for this purpose by will take place on 3-5 November in Berlin. The program is as follows:

Thursday, November 3

Welcome reception *Jürgen Basedow, Hamburg/Josef Drexler, Munich*

Friday, November 4

Introduction to the CLIP Project *Jürgen Basedow, Hamburg*

The principle of territoriality and the rules of the CLIP Principles on jurisdiction

Paul Torremans, Nottingham/Rochelle Dreyfuss, New York

The principle of territoriality and the rules of the CLIP Principles on the applicable law *Josef Drexler, Munich/Dário Moura Vicente, Lisbon*

The approach of the CLIP Principles to ubiquitous infringement *Annette Kur, Munich/Rufus Pichler, New York*

Party autonomy and contracts under the CLIP Principles *Axel Metzger, Hanover/Ivana Kunda, Rijeka*

The approach of the CLIP Principles to recognition and enforcement of judgements *Pedro de Miguel Asensio, Madrid/Stefania Bariatti, Milan*

Saturday, November 5

The impact of the CLIP Principles on courts and arbitration *Mireille van Eechoud, Cambridge (Chair)/Joachim Bornkamm, Freiburg/François Dessemontet, Lausanne/Sierd Schaafsma, The Hague/Winfried Tilmann, Düsseldorf*

The impact of the CLIP Principles on legislation and international law *Alexander Peukert, Frankfurt (Chair)/Spiros Bazinas, UNCITRAL/Friedrich Bulst, DG Competition/Marta Pertegás, Hague Conference/Christian Wichard, WIPO*

The CLIP Principles and the parallel projects of the American Law Institute and Waseda/KOPILA *Graeme Dinwoodie, Oxford (Chair)/Jane Ginsburg, New York/Toshiyuki Kono, Fukuoka*

Farewell address *Josef Drexler, Munich*

Fourth Asia-Pacific Conference of the Hague Conference

From 26 to 28 October 2011, the Hague Conference on Private International Law held its fourth Asia-Pacific Conference in Manila, Philippines, to discuss



the relevance, implementation and practical operation of a number of important Hague Conventions within the Asia Pacific Region.

The Manila Conference focused on the areas of family law and legal co-operation and litigation, with particular emphasis on the *Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption* and the *Convention of 5 October 1961 Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents* (Apostille Convention). It also considered private international law aspects of temporary and circular economic migration.

The Conclusions and Recommendations of the conference can be downloaded [here](#).

New Issue of Arbitraje. Revista de arbitraje comercial y de inversiones

The latest issue of *Arbitraje. Revista de arbitraje comercial y de inversiones* (2011, vol. 3), has just been released. I would like to highlight some of its contents:

C. Kröner, "Crossing the Mare Liberum: the Settlement of Disputes in an Interconnected World" (in english)

P. Perales Viscasillas, "La reforma de la Ley de Arbitraje (ley 11/2011, de 20 de mayo)"

M. Ceñedo Hernán, "La intervención judicial en el arbitraje en la Ley 11/2011 y en la Ley Orgánica 5/2011, de reforma de la legislación arbitral"

N. P. Castagno, "International Commercial Arbitration and Punitive Damages" (in English)

V. Andreeva Andreeva, "Resolución extrajudicial de conflictos relacionados con los contratos con consumidores celebrados en los mercados financieros internacionales"

I. Iruretagoiena Agirrezabalga, "El arbitraje de inversión en el marco de los APRI celebrados entre dos Estados miembros de la unión: los APRI intra-UE y el Derecho de la Unión"

A. Fernández López, "Algunos criterios relevantes sobre el arbitraje de Costa Rica tras la Ley nº 8937 de 2011"

C. Jarrosson, "Les principales tendances du nouveau droit français de l'arbitrage international" (in French)

M.E. Ancel, "Le nouveau droit français de l'arbitrage: le meilleur de soi-même" (in French)

Also, the magazine includes legal texts, Spanish and foreign case law (sometimes annotated), comments on selected bibliography, and news of interest to the world of arbitration.

New Book on Parental Responsibility and Child Protection

Dorothea van Itersson: "Ouderlijke verantwoordelijkheid en kinderscherming"
(Parental Responsibility and Child Protection)

On 1st May 2011 the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention entered into force in the Netherlands. Consequently the Netherlands joined the group of countries where this Convention is in force alongside the Brussels II bis

Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003). The Regulation has been operative in the EU (with the exception of Denmark) from 1 March 2005.

A new book, entitled “Ouderlijke verantwoordelijkheid en kinderscherming” (Parental Responsibility and Child Protection), aims to give guidance on the way the two instruments are to be applied together and in conjunction with other instruments such as the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention. It describes similarities and differences between the instruments and identifies areas for uniform interpretation. The themes dealt with are: scope, co-operation, jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, enforceability and enforcement. The rules of the Convention and the Regulation on each theme are compared. A comparative table summarizes the subject matter discussed in each chapter. The author reviews case law of the EC/EU Court of Justice and the Dutch courts from 2005 onwards, illustrating the operation of the international instruments and the statutory provisions implementing them in the Netherlands. Special attention is given to administrative and judicial co-operation. These aspects have become an intrinsic element of Dutch legal practice.

The volume (260 pages) was written by Dorothea van Iterson. It is part of the series “Praktijkreeks IPR” (chief editors: L.Strikwerda and P.Vlas). It was published on 1st September 2011 by MAKLU Publishers, www.maklu.nl.

More information as well as the table of contents can be found on the publisher’s website.

Van Den Eeckhout on Private International Law as a Conductor

for Achieving Political Objectives

This opinion is contributed by Professor Veerle Van Den Eeckhout, who teaches international private law at the universities of Leiden and Antwerp.

Private International Law, *quo vadis*

PIL as a perfect conductor for achieving political objectives?

A Tale of Lost Innocence

Before long a new book will be added to the Dutch Civil Code: on 1 January 2012 Book 10 will enter into force (1). Book 10 codifies Dutch private international law ('PIL').

PIL lawyers may be sorely tempted to devote all their energy to the *presentation* and *interpretation* of the rules of Book 10, because it seems reasonable to assume that the lengthy codification process has also involved a process of reflection on PIL. Even so, the completion of the codification process marks the perfect time to make an appeal to both PIL lawyers and non-PIL lawyers to reflect on PIL once again, albeit *from a special angle*: if PIL is studied as a discipline that is *not* isolated from other branches of law but that interacts with these other branches; if it is recognised how PIL is occasionally 'used' as a vehicle to achieve policy objectives or *may* at least make a difference; if it is revealed that PIL may act as a 'hinge', and if it is recognised that interaction with PIL may make a difference in various debates in which PIL initially did not seem to be an essential factor, then, the burning question arises how PIL should be 'used' in the future and what our attitude should be towards future PIL developments.

And despite its codification, PIL *will* continue to evolve in the years ahead. If only as a result of the ongoing Europeanization of PIL, PIL rules may change at a fast rate in the next few years.

What is more: the very phenomenon of the Europeanization of PIL is illustrative of the 'discovery' of PIL by European institutions as a discipline that 'matters' – particularly when it comes to encouraging the exercise of European freedoms, such as the free movement of persons, the freedom of establishment and the free movement of services ? and it is also illustrative of the application of PIL by many

policymakers and of the occasional attempts to use PIL as a policy instrument for achieving objectives beyond the scope of PIL itself.

A recent example illustrating the dynamics of the 'discovery' of PIL at the *Dutch* national level is the attempt to base rules of international marriage law on migration targets (2). It turns out that in the view of the Dutch legislator, PIL could have a role to play in the current migration and integration debate.

By now, the significance of PIL rules has become apparent in *various* current debates, as is shown by topics such as the regulation of international posting of workers within Europe or the liability of multinationals for environmental pollution outside Europe or international corporate social responsibility (3); in addition, both these topics are perfectly suitable as case studies exploring the role of PIL rules in decisions on whether to permit companies to take advantage of differences between legal systems. These case studies may also give a picture of the potential of PIL for the advocates of 'social justice'.

By now, the role PIL rules could play in addressing situations of 'competing norms' in a globalising world is attracting increasing international attention (4).

But what *is* or *should be* the role of PIL? Does it have a 'neutral' role? Is PIL 'neutral' in the sense that PIL rules are supposed to result in the application of the legal system that is 'most closely connected' in any case – following on from the 'neutral PIL' as expounded by Von Savigny? Or is PIL 'neutral' in quite a different sense by now, namely that PIL is apparently unable to resist attempts to use this branch of law instrumentally and to mould it into a shape that best suits the result needed? Is PIL degenerating into a political tool, with the resulting loss of its innocence? But what is the position of modern trends in PIL where there is a focus on concerns like the protection of weaker parties? Can a specific PIL trend be opted for 'à la carte', so to speak, depending on whether it suits the requirements of the case, as in a pick and choose system? *What* interests can or may PIL serve at the end of the day?

Writing from the Kamerlingh Onnes Building in Leiden, where '100 years of superconductivity' was commemorated recently and where the profile area called 'Interaction between Legal Systems' was launched recently as well, I find it hard to resist the

temptation to define the issue at hand in terms of conductivity or superconductivity and the interaction between legal systems: how good a '(super)conductor' is PIL when it comes to attempting to control the result needed; is PIL neutral once brought on the 'right' temperature, is PIL the 'path of least resistance', what is the internal resistance of PIL itself? How does PIL interact with various disciplines and how does PIL itself affect the interaction between various legal systems?

A scrutiny of some case studies- focusing, *inter alia*, on the interaction between international family law and the free movement of persons/migration law, the interaction between international labour law and European law, the interaction between international tort law and developments concerning the liability of multinationals for human rights violations- may enable a general view to be developed on the role, resistance levels and individual character of PIL. Unless one should conclude that a distinction should be made based on the characteristics of each case study: for example, a distinction based on whether PIL rules are invoked in an intra-Community context, or a distinction based on the question whether or not the pressure exercised by European freedoms on PIL rules drives PIL in the same direction.

An examination of and reflection on PIL from *this* perspective requires answering both legal-technical and legal policy questions. These are tough questions; but an attempt to answer these may offer some guidance to those who will find themselves in the midst of the turbulent developments that will affect PIL, whether codified or not, in the years ahead.

(1) The Act of 19 May 2011 adopting and implementing Book 10 (Private International Law) of the Dutch Civil Code, Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2011, 272. Decree of 28 June 2011 fixing the time of entry into force of the Adoption and Implementation Act of Book 10, Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2011, 340.

(2) See the Proposal for a Bill on Marriage and Family Migration, TK 2009-2010, 32175. If the PIL provisions included in this bill are enacted, the provisions of Book 10 of the Dutch Civil Code on international marriage law will immediately be rendered obsolete by national developments.

(3) Incidentally, a scrutiny of the liability of multinationals for human rights violations outside Europe reveals the extent to which not only PIL rules on *applicable law* but also PIL rules on *international* jurisdiction, such as the Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, are of paramount importance in the regulation of such liability. For this reason, the current process of revision of the above regulation should be considered from this angle too.

(4) See, for example, the Guest Editorial by H. Muir-Watt, in which she highlights PIL aspects of both these topics as well as her recent call for studying PIL as 'Global Governance'.

Punishment and impecuniosity in London

The British Institute of International and Comparative Law's Private International Law series (sponsored by Herbert Smith LLP) is moving into its Autumn programme with two events on Wednesdays 2 and 9 November (17:00 to 19:00), to be held at the Institute's London headquarters (Charles Clore House, Russell Square).

The first, entitled "Punitive Damages – Europe Strikes Back?!" focuses on the reception of US punitive damages awards in European systems, looking at recent French, Spanish and Italian case law. Chaired by Professor Rachael Mulheron (Queen Mary College, University of London), the speakers include my conflictflaws.net colleague, Professor Marta Requejo Isidro (University of Santiago de Compostela), as well as Dr Maxi Scherer (Wilmer Hale, London and Sciences Po, Paris) and Dr Francesco Quarta (University of Salento).

The second, entitled "Insolvency: Current Questions in Cross-Border Scenarios" aims to do what it says on the tin, highlighting topical issues such as the inter-relation of cross-border assignment and insolvency laws, the relationship between

arbitration and insolvency proceedings, recognition and enforcement of foreign insolvency judgments and the (many) shortcomings of the Insolvency Regulation. Chaired by Sir Roy Goode CBE QC (needing no introduction), the speakers include Professor Federico Mucciarelli (University of Modena and Reggio Emilia), Dorothy Livingston (Herbert Smith LL), Dr Ann-Catherine Hahn (Baker & McKenzie, Zurich) and Look Chan Ho (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, London).

For further details, and booking information, just click on the links above.

Juif or not Juif?

Do you own an iPhone or an iPad? I don't, and so was not aware of the fact  that, if I had, I could have bought an App(lication) called "Jew or not Jew?" for less than 2 Euros.

Well, could have only, because after some French Jewish and anti-racism organizations complained in September that the App violated French law, Apple announced that it would stop making it available in France. One month later, it announced its willingness to extend its decision to the entire European Union.

There have been reports, however, that Apple would have made the App available again, in France, a few weeks later.

The New iChoice of Law Rule

Deciding to withdraw the App from the entire EU because French law might have been violated would certainly be a novel approach to choice of law.

To the question 'which law governs whether an online Application can be sold anywhere in Europe?', Apple seems to answer: French law. Or have Apple's lawyers identified an issue with European law?

An iRemedy as well?

✖ Although most French organizations were satisfied with the decision of Apple to stop making available the App, *Le Monde* reports that one, the *Ligue internationale contre le racisme et l'antisémitisme* (Licra), has decided that it was not enough and that Apple should do more: destroy from afar all applications sold before September. Licra claims that Steve Jobs (that's right, Steve Jobs himself. He was such a visionary that he was also able to predict how the law of remedies would evolve) made statements in 2008 demonstrating that this would be perfectly possible from a technical point of view.

The case was heard today by a Paris court. *Le Monde* reports that Apple's lawyers relied on French law and argued, inter alia, that such a remedy would violate the property rights of buyers of the App.

The court will deliver its judgment on November 17.

And now the World?

But that is not all! Four French organizations have filed a new suit in France against Apple Inc. and are seeking an order that Apple make the App unavailable in the rest of the world.

Hearing on November 24th.

Stay (i)tuned.