

German Federal Court of Justice on Surrogacy and German Public Policy

By Dina Reis, Albert-Ludwigs-University Freiburg (Germany)

In its ruling of 10 December 2014 (Case XII ZB 463/13), the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof – BGH) had to decide whether, despite the domestic prohibition of surrogacy, a foreign judgment granting legal parenthood to the intended parents of a child born as a result of a surrogacy arrangement should be recognized.

The appellants, a same-sex couple habitually resident in Berlin, are German citizens and live in a registered partnership. In August 2010, they concluded a surrogacy contract with a woman in California. The surrogate mother, a citizen of the United States, is habitually resident in California and was not married during the surrogacy process. In accordance with the contract, the child was conceived by way of assisted reproduction technology using appellant no. 1's sperm and an anonymously donated egg. Prior to the child's birth, appellant no. 1 acknowledged paternity at the German Consulate General in San Francisco with the surrogate mother's consent, and by judgment of the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Placer, legal parenthood was assigned exclusively to the appellants. In May 2011, the surrogate mother gave birth in California; thereafter, the appellants travelled with the child to Berlin where they have been living since. After the civil registry office had refused to record the appellants as the joint legal parents of their child, they brought proceedings for an order requiring the civil registry office to do so, which was denied by the lower courts.

The BGH held that recognition of the Californian judgment could not be refused on the grounds of violation of public policy and ordered the civil registry office to register the child's birth and state the appellants as the joint legal parents. The Court found that German public policy was not violated by the mere fact that legal parenthood in a case of surrogacy treatment was assigned to the intended parents, if one intended parent was also the child's biological father while the surrogate mother had no genetic relation to the child.

Public policy exception within the scope of ‘procedural’ recognition

First, the Court outlined that, contrary to a mere registration or certification, the Californian judgment could be subject to a ‘procedural’ recognition laid down in §§ 108, 109 of the German Act on the Procedure in Family Matters and Matters of Non-contentious Jurisdiction (FamFG), which enumerate limited grounds for denying recognition. The Court noted that the Californian decision was based on a substantive examination of the validity of the surrogacy agreement and the resulting status issues, which was not to be reviewed (prohibition of *‘révision au fond’*). According to § 109(1) No. 4 FamFG, recognition of a judgment will be refused where it leads to a result which is manifestly incompatible with essential principles of German law, notably fundamental rights (public policy exception). The Court stated that, in order to achieve an international harmony of decisions and to avoid limping status relationships, the public policy exception was to be interpreted restrictively. For this reason, a mere difference of legislation did not imply a violation of domestic public policy; the contradiction between the fundamental values of domestic law and the result of the application of foreign law in the case at hand had to be intolerable.

Paternity of one intended parent

With regard to the legal parenthood status of appellant no. 1, the Court pointed out that no violation of public policy could be found because the application of German law would produce the same result as the decision of the Superior Court of the State of California: Due to the fact that the surrogate mother was not married at the time of the child’s birth and appellant no. 1 had acknowledged paternity with her prior consent, German substantial law (§§ 1592 No. 2, 1594(2) German Civil Code) would also regard appellant no. 1 as the legal father of the child.

Assigning legal parenthood to the registered partner of the biological father not contrary to public policy

With regard to the legal parenthood status of appellant no. 2, the Court argued that the outcome of the Californian judgment in fact deviated from the domestic determination of parenthood. However, this divergence would not violate public policy if one of the intended parents, unlike the surrogate mother, was genetically related to the child.

Deviation from German substantive law

Commercial as well as altruistic surrogacy are prohibited under § 1(1) No. 7 German Embryo Protection Act and § 14b Adoption Placement Act, which penalize the undertaking of surrogacy and commercial activities promoting surrogacy such as placement of surrogate mothers. However, the surrogate mother and the intended parents are not punished. The scope of the provisions is limited to acts committed within German territory (§ 7 German Criminal Code).

In addition to the penal aspects, § 1591 German Civil Code defines the woman who gives birth as the mother of a child and excludes the motherhood of another woman even if the latter is the child's genetic mother. The provision respects the social and biological bond between child and birth mother and aims at avoiding 'split' motherhood resulting from surrogacy treatment, including cases where the latter is performed abroad. The BGH outlined that German law provided neither for joint legal parenthood of two men acknowledging paternity nor for assigning legal parenthood to the registered partner of a parent by operation of law; same-sex partners could establish joint legal parenthood solely by means of adoption.

Then the Court held, first, that assigning joint legal parenthood to same-sex partners did, in itself, not violate public policy because, according to the ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court on so-called 'successive adoption' – a practice granting a person the right to adopt a child already adopted by their registered partner –, married couples and couples living in a registered partnership were considered as equally suited to provide conditions beneficial to the child's upbringing [German Federal Constitutional Court 19.02.2013, Case 1 BvL 1/11 and 1 BvR 3247/09, para 80 with further references = FamRZ 2013, 521, 527].

Secondly, the Court pointed out that the general preventive aims underlying the provisions mentioned above needed to be distinguished from the situation where surrogacy had been nevertheless – lawfully – carried out abroad, because now the welfare of the child as a legal subject with independent rights had to be taken into account. A child, however, could not be held responsible for the circumstances of his or her conception. And while on the one hand a violation of the fundamental rights of the surrogate mother or the child could imply a public policy infringement, the Court stressed that, on the other hand, fundamental rights could also argue for a recognition of the foreign judgment.

Birth mother's human dignity not *per se* violated by surrogacy: drawing a parallel to adoption

With regard to the surrogate mother, the Court argued that the mere fact that surrogacy had been undertaken was, in itself, not sufficient to ascertain an infringement of human dignity. That applied, *a fortiori*, in respect of the child who owed his or her existence to the surrogacy process. The Court emphasized that the surrogate mother's human dignity could be violated if it was subject to doubt whether her decision to carry the child and hand it over to the intended parents after birth had been made on a voluntary basis. However, the Court found that if the law applied by the foreign court imposed requirements to ensure a voluntary participation of the surrogate mother and the surrogacy agreement as well as the circumstances under which the surrogacy treatment was performed had been examined in proceedings that complied with the standards of the rule of law, then, in the absence of any contrary indications, the foreign judgment provided reasonable assurance of the surrogate mother's voluntary participation. According to the surrogate mother's declaration before the Superior Court of the State of California, she was not willing to assume parental responsibilities for the child. The Court held that in this case, the surrogate mother's situation after childbirth was comparable to that of a mother giving her child up for adoption.

Focus on the best interests of the child

Given those findings, the Court concluded that the decision whether to grant recognition to the foreign judgment should be guided primarily by the best interests of the child. For this purpose, the Court referred to the guarantee of parental care laid down in Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 6(2) first sentence of the German Constitution, which grants the child a right to be assigned two legal parents [cf. German Federal Constitutional Court 19.02.2013, Case 1 BvL 1/11 and 1 BvR 3247/09, paras 44, 73 = FamRZ 2013, 521, 523, 526], and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on Art. 8(1) ECHR concerning the child's right to respect for his or her private life: The European Court of Human Rights had ruled that the latter encompassed the right of the child to establish a legal parent-child-relationship which was regarded as part of the child's identity within domestic society [ECtHR of 26.06.2014, No. 65192/11 – *Mennesson v. France*, para 96].

Here, the Court stressed that not only was the surrogate mother not willing to

assume parental responsibilities, but she was, in fact, also not available as a parent on a legal basis: An assignment of legal motherhood to the surrogate mother, which could only be established under German law, would have no effect in the surrogate mother's home state because of the opposing foreign judgment.

Under those circumstances, the Court found that depriving the child of a legal parent-child-relationship with the second intended parent who – unlike the surrogate mother – was willing to assume parental responsibilities for the child, violated the child's right laid down in Art. 8(1) ECHR. According to the Court's view, the limping status relationship between the surrogate mother and the child failed to fulfill the requirements laid down in Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 6(2) of the German Constitution and Art. 8(1) ECHR.

The Court agreed with the opinion of the previous instance that adoption would be an appropriate instrument in the case at hand because, unlike a judgment based on the foreign legislature's general assessment of surrogacy cases, the adoption procedure included an individual examination of the child's best interests. However, the Court pointed out that in cases of stepchild adoption, the outcome of this individual evaluation would usually be favourable and thus coincide with the Californian decision, leading to legal parenthood of the biological parent's registered partner. The consistent results clearly argued against a violation of public policy. Moreover, the Court observed that adoption would not only encounter practical difficulties in the child's country of birth, where the appellants were already considered the legal parents, it would also pose additional risks for the child: It would be left to the discretion of the intended parents whether they assumed parental responsibilities for the child or changed their minds and refrained from adoption; for example, if the child was born with a disability.

Conclusion

The Court's decision has been received with approval within German academia and legal practice [see the notes by *Helms*, FamRZ 2015, 245; *Heiderhoff* NJW 2015, 485; *Mayer*, StAZ 2015, 33; *Schwonberg*, FamRB 2/2015, 55; *Zwißler*, NZFam 2015, 118]. Before this judgment, lower courts had shown a tendency to regard public policy as violated by the mere fact that surrogacy had been performed [cf. Higher Regional Court Berlin 01.08.2013, Case 1 W 413/12, paras 26 *et seqq.* = IPRax 2014, 72, 74 *et seq.*; Administrative Court of Berlin

05.09.2012, Case 23 L 283.12, paras 10 *et seq.* = IPRax 2014, 80 *et seq.*]. In recent years, however, some scholars had advocated a more cautious and methodical handling of the public policy exception [see especially *Heiderhoff*, NJW 2014, 2673, 2674 and *Dethloff*, JZ 2014, 922, 926 *et seq.* with further references]. Instead of resorting to a diffuse disapproval of surrogacy as a whole, the ruling of the BGH is essentially based on an accurate analysis of the concrete alternatives at hand and a critical evaluation of the possible outcomes in the present case.

However, it has rightly been pointed out that, within the complex field of surrogacy, the situation in the case at hand was fairly straightforward: The surrogate mother was not married so that the biological father could acknowledge paternity without complications, there was no conflict between the intended parents and the surrogate mother because the latter did not want to keep the child, and the legal parenthood of the intended parents had been established in a judicial procedure where the rights of the child and the surrogate mother, especially her voluntary participation, had been subject to review [cf. *Heiderhoff*, NJW 2015, 485].

The BGH expressly left open whether a different finding would have been appropriate if neither of the intended parents had been the child's biological parent or if the surrogate mother had been also the genetic mother [para 53]. Neither did the court discuss the issue of 'recognition' of civil status situations and documents. Furthermore, surrogacy arrangements that are undertaken in countries with poor human rights standards and a lower degree of trust in the administration of justice may not fulfill the requirements for a recognition established by the BGH. Insofar, the judgment could have a deterrent effect as regards seeking surrogacy treatment in countries that do not meet the required standards [*Heiderhoff*, NJW 2015, 485].

Advocate General's Opinion on Art. 34 para. 1 of Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001

On 3 March 2015, Advocate General Szpunar delivered its opinion in the case C-681/13 (*Diago Brands BV*) concerning the interpretation of Art. 34 para. 1 of Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 (former Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012), in a case where recognition of a judgment of one Member State is sought in another Member State. In his Opinion, the Advocate General held that the mere fact that a judgment given in the State of origin is contrary to EU law does not justify the refusal of the recognition of this judgment on public policy grounds in the State in which recognition is sought. According to his Opinion, a mere error of national or EU law cannot justify refusal of recognition as long as it does not constitute a manifest breach of an essential rule of law in the State in which recognition is sought.

The full text of the Opinion can be accessed [here](#).

French Same-Sex Marriage, a Strange International Public Policy

By Dr. François Mailhé, maître de conférences, Paris II

Last month, on January 28, the French Cour de cassation decided on a new "Same-sex Marriage" Act international case. After "Thalys babies" in September, the issue was about the authorization to wed a French and a Moroccan nationals, the last of whom citizen of a country prohibiting same-sex marriages.

THE DECISION

The facts were simple indeed. Two men, Dominique, French, and Mohammed, Moroccan, wanted to get married in Jacob-Bellecombette, in the suburbs of Chambéry, France, the city of the 1968 Winter Olympics. The Same-sex Marriage Act had just been passed in Parliament, and it was understood as having created a “right to marry” for all, that is for homosexual as well as heterosexual couples (the Act is also known as the “Marriage for all” Act), and for foreigners and French alike. Indeed, Article 202-1 Civil code (C.Civ.) read, at the time:

“The qualities and conditions necessary to be able to contract marriage are governed, for each spouse, by his personal law.

Nevertheless, two persons of the same sex may contract marriage when, for at least one of them, either his personal law, or the law of the State within which he has his domicile or his residence, permits it”.

Obviously, since Dominique was French and they both lived in France, the condition of Article 202-1 C.civ. was fulfilled. Unfortunately, it was not applicable to the case. Indeed, France and Morocco have signed a bilateral convention, on August 10, 1981, concerning personal and family status and judicial cooperation. Sure enough, this “right to wed” therefore knew exceptions, those compelled by the pyramid of norms: where there existed provisions of international source providing solutions for conflict of marriage law, these solutions would prevail over Article 202-1 C.civ. It had actually even been expressly written down in the draft Act, only to be later written off by the Senate on the ground that the principle of hierarchy of norms enshrined in Article 55 of the Constitution made it irrelevant.

That was until January 28, 2015. In a highly advertised decision, the Cour de cassation decided that:

« [...] if, according to Article 5 of the Franco-Moroccan Convention [...] substantial conditions such as prohibitions to marriage, are governed for each future spouse by the law of the State he is a citizen of, its Article 4 outlines that one of the contracting States laws may be set aside by the courts of the other State if it is manifestly incompatible with its public policy ; [...] that is the case of the applicable Moroccan law opposed to the marriage of two persons of the same-sex when, for at least one of them, either his personal law, the law of the State of his domicile or that of his residence allows it ».

Dominique and Mohammed are therefore allowed to wed. What now?

AN ANALYSIS

At first glance the decision may appear complex but on the whole quite conventional. The Court, after all, only uses the public policy exception allowed by the Convention itself. The solution, therefore, would be specific to the Convention itself, and Morocco only could be concerned by the decision.

The originality of this exception, though, is surprising. This public policy exception is not an absolute exception. It doesn't purport to create an absolute "right to wed". Instead, it depends upon the recognition of same-sex wedding in one of the following States: that of the domicile, the residence or the nationality of at least one of the spouses. This originality calls for three observations, the first about conflict of norms, the second about the scope of this exception, the last about the nature and development of this kind of exception in Europe.

1/ The first observation concerns the phrasing of the public policy clause at play. Indeed, if the Cour de cassation refers to Article 4 of the Convention to justify this surprising exception, its wording is actually grounded in Article 202-1 C.civ. itself. Comparing both this paragraph of the decision and the second paragraph of Article 202-1 C.civ. makes the relationship quite obvious: the exact same words were employed for both of them. Of course, one could say any public policy exception is the political safety valve that Courts may design as they think fit. Why not designing on the basis of Article 4 of the Convention what is now written in Article 202-1 C.civ.? The blog format is perfect for such an assertion since this seems open to debate, but I would like to propose a negative answer.

In its letter, first, Article 4 is designed as a quite classical public policy exception. *"The law of one of both States applicable under the Convention may only be set aside by the Courts of the other State if it is manifestly incompatible with its public policy"*. Words have some weight, though, and it seems necessary to notice that it requires a "manifest" incompatibility. The discussion of this word's value in the context of Article 21 Rome I Regulation should at least raise the attention. And anyway, how can a violation of a public policy exception be "manifest" if it requires checking a potentially foreign law?

In its spirit, second, the solution is nothing less than a levelling of the situations. The Cour de cassation refused to differentiate situations according to the

applicable norms when, apart from the nationality of the parties, the situations don't differ. But isn't it the purpose of such conventions to treat citizens differently when their States together agreed to do so? Should the teleological rationale of such mechanism (to exclude the applicable law to defend certain values) eventually level down any and all such clauses, even those more restrictive than the others?

2/ This leads me to the second observation: this exception cannot be limited to the Franco-Moroccan convention. France has ratified identical bilateral conventions with Poland, Vietnam and the former Yugoslavia (which now concerns Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro). Laos, Cambodia, Tunisia, Madagascar and Algeria have each also entered into similar conventions and though this last group of conventions has no public policy clause, it is still considered available in the silence of the texts. Citizens from all these countries now benefit from this "right to wed", even if their countries either ignore or even penalize homosexuality: the policy reasons for which Article 202-1 C.civ. took the guise of the convention are not specific to French-Moroccan relations.

3/ The third observation is more about of this very "specific clause of public policy" (Rigaux and Fallon, n°7.54) that was first developed in Belgium (Article 46, Private International Law Act, 2004) and served as an inspiration to the French Act.

There is an ambiguity as to the nature of this clause. In France, some have characterized it as a positive public policy exception, defending the "right" implemented in the law instead of negatively protecting some values of the society. Noting that Article 202-1 C.civ. does not stop at setting aside the prohibitive law but actually gives the exact answer to the problem, some have characterized it as a substantive provision, not a conflict one. Actually, the debate doesn't seem of great importance : it may be both. Since the effect of the rule is an exclusion of the applicable law to be replaced by the Court's *lex fori*, it is a public policy exception. Since the effect of the rule is to make sure same-sex marriages are not declared void or prevented in France on this specific ground, it is a substantive rule. When a substantive provision may exclude the application of an opposite foreign solution, the border between notions gets blurred.

But whatever the characterization of the clause, its originality needs to be emphasized. Because they defend what is perceived as a sort of individual right

still very variously regarded abroad, Article 202-1 C.civ. as well as Article 46 Belgian law are not absolute in their rejecting prohibitive foreign laws. They require a connection to a State which defends the same right. It looks, therefore, like an application of *Inlandsbeziehung*. But this is a very special one, since *Inlandsbeziehung* requires a unilateral connection with the State of the forum. Here the connection is bilateral, with any State which accepts same-sex marriages. It is as if the French and Belgian legal systems defended that solution only insofar as it gets support from a State that is connected to the case. Truly enough, this State will most often be the French State itself, since the several connecting factors listed in Article 202-1 C.civ. will frequently lead to that country. But a French judge asked to decide on the alleged invalidity of a same-sex marriage of two Moroccan nationals, residing and married in the Netherlands, would have to set aside Moroccan law on this public policy ground because *Dutch law* recognizes same-sex marriages. If this clause is a real public policy clause, and public policy clauses defend values of the connected legal order, then this clause doesn't defend *French* values. It defends the values of an international community, and stands as a sort of truly international public policy, a transnational public policy...

Food for thoughts, and I hope for reactions on this blog.

Annexes I and II Brussels Recast

Quick post to inform about the publication, on the OJ L 54, 25.02.2015, of the Commission delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/281, of 26 November 2014, replacing Annexes I and II of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.

[Click here to access the text.](#)

Tort jurisdiction and pure economic loss - Request preliminary ruling

Written by Laura van Bochove, Erasmus University Rotterdam

In January, the Dutch Court of Cassation referred several questions on Article 5(3) Brussels I Regulation to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling (Case C-12/15), including the questions how a court should establish 1) whether an economic loss is an 'initial loss' or a 'consequential loss' and 2) in which country economic losses occur.

Briefly stated, the facts of the case are as follows. In 1998, Universal Music International Ltd (part of the Universal Music Group) and Czech record company B&M agreed upon the purchase of 70 per cent of the shares of B&M by companies within the Universal Music Group. In addition, parties agreed that in 2003, Universal would buy the remaining 30 per cent. In the draft version of the Letter of Intent, the intended purchase price of all shares equalled five times the annual profit of B&M. For the drafting of the definitive share option agreement regarding the 30 per cent of the shares, the Universal Music Group turned to Czech law firm A. On 5 November 1998, a share option agreement was concluded by Universal Music International Holding B.V. (hereafter: Universal Music), seated in the Netherlands, B&M and its shareholders. However, due to an alleged mistake of A.'s employee in the drafting of the agreement, the price Universal had to pay for the shares was increased radically. In 2003 Universal Music bought, as agreed, the remaining 30 per cent of the shares. It calculated, on the basis of the intended purchase price, that it should pay about 313,000 euros. B&M's shareholders, however, calculated the price of the shares on the basis of the formula in the final agreement, resulting in an amount of more than 30 million euros. Parties went to arbitration and in 2005 Universal Music and B&M's shareholders settled their dispute for 2.6 million euros.

Universal Music then commenced legal proceedings before the court of Utrecht (the Netherlands) against the law firm and its employee for the amount of 2.7 million euros, being the difference between the intended price of the shares and the settlement plus the costs for the arbitration proceedings and the settlement. The defendants argued that the Utrecht court did not have jurisdiction. In first instance, the court denied jurisdiction, on the basis that none of the facts giving rise to the damage occurred in the Netherlands and that the connection with the Netherlands was too weak to accept jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal followed this decision and held that the court of the place where pure economic loss was suffered cannot accept jurisdiction on the basis of Article 5(3) Brussels I Regulation. Universal Music then filed an appeal in cassation.

The Court of Appeal's ruling is in line with the majority opinion long held in Dutch scholarship that the place of (initial) pure economic loss cannot be considered the place where the damage occurred or the 'Erfolgsort'. Although one could argue that the CJEU already in its 2004 decision in *Kronhofer* (C-168/02) suggested otherwise, the Dutch Court of Cassation deemed it necessary to ask for a preliminary ruling on this topic. However, taking into consideration the recent CJEU decision in *Harald Kolassa v. Barclays Bank plc* (C-375/13), which was published after the Court of Cassation referred its questions to the CJEU, it is likely that the matter will be viewed as an '*acte éclairé*', since the CJEU rules that the court of the place where pure economic loss occurred as a direct consequence of misleading information in a prospectus, can establish jurisdiction on the basis of Article 5(3) Brussels I Regulation. The *Kolassa* judgment also provides an affirmative answer to one of the other questions of the Court of Cassation, namely whether the court in deciding on its jurisdiction should also take into account the defendant's arguments regarding jurisdiction.

However, the two remaining questions referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling have not yet been answered. The Court of Cassation informs how a national court should establish whether the damage should be considered initial economic loss or consequential economic loss, and how a national court should establish whether the economic damage has occurred in its territory. In the case at hand, the question is whether the difference between the intended share price and the settlement eventually paid and the costs related to arbitration and settlement should be regarded as initial economic loss, and if so, if the Netherlands should be considered the place where the damage occurred, since these costs were paid at the expense of Universal Music's assets (bank account) located in the

Netherlands.

Since the boundaries between initial and consequential economic loss can be hard to delineate and the localisation of pure economic loss often raises problems, it would be useful if the CJEU would provide courts with more guidance. It will be interesting to see whether the CJEU is willing to extend its ruling in Kolassa to all pure economic loss cases and adopt as a general rule that in cases of pure economic loss the Erfolgsort is the place where the victim suffers the loss to its assets, in this case the bank account from which the amount was transferred. Yet, the CJEU could also rule that the Kolassa judgment should be interpreted restrictively and that it only applies to private investors suffering economic damage on their investments due to misinformation.

To be continued...

German Federal Labor Court refers Questions relating to Art. 9 and 28 Rome I to the CJEU

On February 25, the German Federal Labor Court referred three questions relating to the interpretation of Art. 9 and 28 Rome I Regulation to the CJEU. They relate to the temporal scope of application of the Rome I Regulation on the one hand, and the (highly) disputed issue whether and to what extent Member States courts are required to apply foreign overriding mandatory provisions in general and overriding mandatory provisions of other Member States in particular. The following is an unofficial translation based on the court's press release:

1. Does the Rome I Regulation in accordance with Art. 28 exclusively apply to (employment) contracts if the contract was concluded (for the first time) after 16 December 2009 – or does it also apply if the parties agreed after 16 December 2009 to continue a previously concluded contract

(without any changes)?

2. Does Art. 9(3) Rome I Regulation (merely) exclude the direct application of overriding mandatory provisions of third states where the obligations arising out of the contract have not to be or have not been performed – or does it also exclude their indirect consideration in the law of the state whose laws govern the contract?
3. Does the principle of cooperation embedded in Art. 4(3) TEU affect the decisions of national courts to apply overriding mandatory provisions of other Member States (directly or indirectly)?

Background:

The claimant is a Greek national and employed by the Greek State at the Greek primary school in Nuremberg (Germany). From October 2010 through December 2012 the Greek State reduced his salary in accordance with the Greek Saving Laws No 3833/2010 und 3845/2010. The claimant asks for payment of the sums withheld. With its preliminary questions the German Federal Labor Courts wants to know whether and to what extent it is bound to apply the Greek Saving Laws.

The court's press release is available here (in German).

Conference: “The Economic Dimension of Cross-Border Families: Planning the Future” (Milan, 13 March 2015)

✖ The University of Milan will host on **13 March 2015** a conference on “**The Economic Dimension of Cross-Border Families: Planning the Future**”. The sessions will be held in English and Italian. Here's the programme (available as a .pdf file):

14h00 Welcoming addresses

- *Gianluca Vago* (Rector, University of Milan)
- *Laura Ammannati* (Director of the Department of International, Legal, Historical and Political Studies)
- *Ilaria Viarengo* (Coordinator of the PhD course on International and European Law, University of Milan)

Chair: *Stefania Bariatti* (University of Milan)

14h15 Revision of Brussels IIa: Current State of Play

- Joanna Serdyska (Civil Justice Policy, DG Justice, European Commission)

14h45 Property Rights of International Couples and Registered Partnerships: The Role of Parties' Autonomy

- *Cristina González Beilfuss* (Universitat de Barcelona)
- *Ilaria Viarengo* (University of Milan)

15h30 The Coordination of the EU Legislation on Divorce, Maintenance and Property

- *Maria Caterina Baruffi* (University of Verona)
- *Francesca Villata* (University of Milan)

16h00 Discussion

16h30 The Interaction Among Succession and Property

- Anatol Dutta (MPI Hamburg – Universität Regensburg)

16h50 Planning the Future: Practical Issues

- *Gloria Servetti* (Judge, Chair IX Sezione Tribunale Milano)
- *Franco Salerno Cardillo* (Notary, Palermo)

17h30 Discussion

18h00 Closing Remarks: *Stefania Bariatti*

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Attendance is free of charge but registration is required. Further information and the registration form are available on the conference's webpage.

(Many thanks to Prof. Ilaria Viarengo for the tip-off)

Conflict of Laws Lectureship at Cambridge

The Faculty of Law, Cambridge University, is advertising a three year lectureship in Conflict of Laws sponsored by Clifford Chance. The closing date is 13th March 2015. More detail is available [here](#).



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If anyone would like to discuss the details of this post, please contact Richard Fentiman (rgf1000@cam.ac.uk), Pippa Rogerson (pjr1000@cam.ac.uk) or Louise Merrett (lm324@cam.ac.uk) all of whom research and lecture in conflict of laws in Cambridge.

H/T: Gilles Cuniberti

Testing the Stress of the EU: EU Law After the Financial Crisis

The University of Bayreuth (Germany) and the *Asociación Española de Profesores de Derecho Internacional y Relaciones Internacionales* (Spain), with support from the DAAD, will host a joint conference under the heading "Testing the stress of

the EU: EU law after the financial crisis” next 8 May 2015 (venue: Escuela Diplomática, Paseo Juan XXIII, 5. 28040 Madrid). Click [here](#) to see the program.

Registration:

Admission to the conference (including coffee breaks) is free of charge.

In order to attend, please register **by 15 April 2015** via e-mail to: **Zivilrecht1@uni-bayreuth.de**.

Please provide your full name and the number of your ID card/passport (required in order to access to the conference venue).

Conference Report: CISG Basel Conference, 29 and 30 January 2015, University of Basel

The CISG entered into force around 35 years ago – reason enough to celebrate and discuss the state of this instrument. Under the auspices of the University of Basel, in cooperation with UNCITRAL and the Swiss Association for International Law, a large number of experts convened on 29 and 30 January 2015 in order to present current trends and problems.

Panel 1 dealt with the economic analysis of the CISG (Prof. Dr. B. Piltz, Dr. L. Spagnolo, G. Moser and Prof. P. Winship). The core question was whether and to what extent the CISG does in fact what it promises which is to reduce transaction costs. A lot of skepticism and reservations, in particular from the US-American speaker, about economic analysis were articulated but the overall impression was that it is more efficient to have the CISG than not to have it even though it is

hardly possible to substantiate, let alone quantify, this impression. However, compared to alternatives, for example the selection of a national law by choice-of-law clauses including the numerous limitations to party autonomy, it appears plausible to believe that instruments like the CISG have beneficial effects. Any less favorable result would of course have been somewhat impolite on a birthday party for the CISG.

Panel 2 discussed extending the CISG beyond sales contracts in respect to distribution contracts, contracts on natural gas, on deduction and set-off and on the statute of limitations (Prof. Dr. P. Perales Viscasillas, Dr. F. Mohs, Prof. Dr. C. Fountoulakis, Dr. P. Hachem). It became clear that long-term contracts and service contracts are of growing importance and that the unification of contract law should continue working on these types of contracts. And indeed, UNIDROIT is currently working on principles for long-term contracts that may supplement the

UPICC

(<http://www.unidroit.org/work-in-progress-studies/current-studies/long-term-contracts>). On the basis of the current state of the CISG, each of the presentations demonstrated that the distinction between external and internal lacunae is far from trivial which sometimes may contribute to doubts about the economic efficiency of unified law.

Panel 3, originally planned as the second part of the conference but postponed due to late arrivals (snow storms in New York), analysed the recent trend towards a decline of reservations to the CISG under Articles 92, 93, 95, 96 (Prof. Dr. U. Schroeter, Prof. Dr. J. Ramberg, Prof. Dr. S. Han). Reservations were described not so much as a flaw but rather as a tool for enabling uniformity, at least to the degree politically possible. It was assumed that the reservation in Article 94 for regional harmonization may play a growing role in the future, in particular in Asia.

Panel 4 again turned to the question of extending the CISG, now in respect to validity issues (Prof. Dr. S. Eiselen, Prof. L. Gama, Prof. J. Gotanda, Prof. E. Sondahl Levin), and discussed the complex relation of the CISG to the control of standard terms on fairness, to contractual limitations of liability, to the repayment of attorney's fees as damage and other issues. Contractual limitations for example could be viewed as covered by the CISG in respect to their incorporation, formal validity and interpretation whereas their validity as such, for example in light of protective or otherwise mandatory law, would have to be seen outside the scope,

but it was suggested that the general standards of the CISG such as party autonomy, reasonableness or good faith should control and, if necessary, limit the impact of the applicable national law – an approach that slightly mirrors the control by the European Court of Justice of the exercise of public policy clauses by Member State courts in European instruments of private international law.

Panel 5, under the heading of “CISG, State Action and Regionalisation” discussed whether and to what extent the CISG, in particular in comparison to the CESL, would be suitable for sales contracts with consumers (Prof. Dr. Y. Atamer), how to fill gaps in Article 78 CISG relating to default interest for late payments (Prof. Dr. J. Ramberg), how to apply the CISG to government purchases, in particular in relation to mandatory requirements of public procurement law (Dr. C. Pereira) and the relation of the CISG to OHADA (Dr. J. A. Penda Matipe). It became clear that the CISG, by adequate interpretation and standard terms control, could address many of the core issues of consumer protection.

Panel 6 continued the discussion on the regionalization of the CISG by focusing on the harmonization in the EU and its impact on the CISG, for example by the Late Payment Directive (Prof. Dr. C. Witz), on the political difficulties in the past and the currently limited, but may be not that much limited prospects of the CESL (M. Zaleski) – “replacement by modified proposal that will come to life this year”, the harmonization in Asia, in particular with regard to the potential Principles (Prof. Dr. H. Sono) and Latin America (Prof. A. Garro).

Panel 7 dealt with the issue of the fairness of the CISG as contract law, partly with a focus on (compliance requirements for) supply and distribution chains. Prof. Dr. H. W. Micklitz posed the general question what kind of standards of fairness should apply to b2b sales relations, Prof. Dr. P. Butler addressed the relation between the “CISG and human rights – an Oxymoron?”, Prof. Dr. P. Nalin discussed ethical standards in connection with international sales contracts, and Prof. Dr. A. Veneziano presented UNIDROIT’s project on agricultural production contracts and explained the particularities – e.g. risk and value chain management but also imbalances of bargaining powers – and legal tools used by the parties up to now in this intriguing type of complex and relational contracts (<http://www.unidroit.org/work-in-progress-studies/current-studies/contract-farming>).

Last not least there was a round table discussion on the general issue of the

future of unification of contract law (Prof. Dr. Ingeborg Schwenzer, Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. M. Jametti Greiner, Dr. B. Czerwenka, Dr. L. Castellani, J. A. Estrella Faria) that revolved, amongst other themes, around the growing importance of relational contracts of all kinds (e.g. service contracts, long-term contracts etc.) – an excellent round-up for a truly excellent conference!