Advocate General in Case Mirin (C-4/23): Refusal of recognition of a new gender identity legally obtained in another Member State violates the freedom of movement and residence of EU citizens

The following case note has been kindly provided by Dr. Samuel Vuattoux-Bock, LL.M. (Kiel), University of Freiburg (Germany).

 

On May 7, 2024, Advocate General Jean Richard de la Tour delivered his opinion in the case C-4/23, Mirin, concerning the recognition in one Member State of a change of gender obtained in another Member State by a citizen of both States. In his opinion, Advocate General de la Tour states that the refusal of such a recognition would violate the right to move and reside freely within the Union (Art. 21 TFEU, Art. 45 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) and the right of respect for private and family life (Art. 7 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights).

1. Facts

The underlying case is based on the following facts: a Romanian citizen was registered as female at birth in Romania. After moving with his family to the United Kingdom and acquiring British citizenship, he went through the (medically oriented) gender transition process under English law and finally obtained in 2020 a “Gender Recognition Certificate” under the Gender Recognition Act 2004, confirming his transition from female to male and the corresponding change of his forename. As the applicant retained his Romanian nationality, he requested the competent Romanian authorities (Cluj Civil Status Service) to record the change on his birth certificate, as provided for by Romanian law (Art. 43 of Law No. 119/1996 on Civil Status Documents). As the competent authority refused to recognize the change of name and gender (as well as the Romanian personal numerical code based on gender) obtained in the United Kingdom, the applicant filed an action before the Court of First Instance, Sector 6, Bucharest. The court referred the case to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on the compatibility with European law (Art. 21 TFEU, Art. 1, 20, 21, 45 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights) of such a refusal based on Romanian law. In particular, the focus is on the Cluj Civil Status Office’s demand that the plaintiff initiates a new judicial procedure for the change of gender in Romania. The plaintiff sees in this request the risk of a contrary outcome to the British decision, as the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the Romanian procedure lacks clarity and predictability (ECHR, X. and Y. v. Romania). In addition, the Romanian court asked whether Brexit had any impact on the case (the UK proceedings were initiated before Brexit and concluded during the transition period).

2. Opinion of the Advocate General

Advocate General de la Tour gave his opinion on these two questions. Regarding the possible consequences of Brexit, de la Tour drew two sets of conclusions from the fact that the applicant still holds Romanian nationality. First, an EU citizen can rely on the right to move freely within the European Union with an identity document issued by his or her Member State of origin (a fortiori after Brexit). Second, the United Kingdom was still a Member State when the applicant exercised his freedom of movement and residence. As the change of gender and first name was acquired, the United Kingdom was also still a Member State. EU law is therefore still applicable as the claimant seeks to enforce in one Member State the consequence of a change lawfully made in another (now former) Member State.

On the question of the recognition of a change of first name and gender made in another Member State, Advocate General de la Tour argues that these issues should be treated differently. The fact that the first name may be sociologically associated with a different sex from the one registered should not be taken into account as a preliminary consideration for recognition (no. 61). He therefore answers the two questions separately. Already at this point, de la Tour specifies that the relevant underpinning logic for this type of case should not be the classical recognition rules of private international law, but rather the implementation and effectiveness of the freedom of movement and residence of EU citizens (nos. 53-55).

a) Change of first name

With regard to the change of the first name, de la Tour states (with reference to the Bogendorff case) that the refusal to recognize the change of the first name legally acquired in another Member State would constitute a violation of the freedoms of Art. 21 TFEU (no. 58). Since the Romanian Government does not give any reason why recognition should not be granted, there should be no obstacle to automatic recognition. The Advocate General considers that the scope of such recognition should not be limited to birth certificates but should be extended to all entries in a civil register, since a change of first name, unlike a change of surname, does not have the same consequences for other family members (nos. 63-64).

b) Change of gender

With regard to gender change, Advocate General de la Tour argues for an analogy with the Court’s case-law on the automatic recognition of name changes, in particular the Freitag decision. Gender, like the name, is an essential element of the personality and therefore protected by Art. 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Art. 8 ECHR. The jurisprudence on names (in particular Grunkin and Paul) shows that the fact that a Member State does not have its own procedure for such changes (according to de la Tour, this concerns only 2 Member States for gender changes) does not constitute an obstacle to the recognition of a change lawfully made in another Member State (nos. 73-74). Consequently, de la Tour sees the refusal of recognition as a violation of the freedoms of Art. 21 TFEU, because the existence of a national procedure is not sufficient for such a refusal (no. 81). Furthermore, the Romanian procedure cannot be considered compatible with EU law, as the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights X. and Y. v. Romania shows that it makes the implementation of the freedoms of Art. 21 TFEU impossible or excessively difficult (No. 80). Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent Member States from introducing measures to exclude the risk of fraudulent circumvention of national rules, for example by making the existence of a close connection with the other Member State (e.g. nationality or residence) a condition (nos. 75-78).

Unlike the change of first name, the change of gender affects other aspects of personal status and may have consequences for other members of the family (e.g. the gender of the parent on a child’s birth certificate before the transition) or even for the exercise of other rights based on gender differentiation (e.g. marriage in States that do not recognize same-sex unions, health care, retirement, sports competition). Imposing rules on the Member States in these areas (in particular same-sex marriage) would not be within the competence of the Union (no. 94), so Advocate General de la Tour proposes a limitation to the effect of recognition in the Member State of origin. If the change of gender would have an effect on other documents, the recognition should only have an effect on the person’s birth certificate and the documents derived from it which are used for the movement of the person within the Union, such as identity cards or passports. The Advocate General himself points out that this solution would lead to unsatisfactory consequences in the event of the return of the person concerned to his or her State of origin (no. 96), but considers that the solution leads to a “fair balance” between the public interest of the Member States and the rights of the transgender person.

3. Conclusion

In conclusion, Advocate General de la Tour considers that the refusal to recognize in one Member State a change of first name and gender legally obtained in another Member State violates the freedoms of Art. 21 TFEU. The existence of an own national procedure could not justify the refusal. Drawing an analogy with the Court’s case-law on change of name, the Advocate General recommends that the change of first name should have full effect in the Member State of origin, while the change of gender should be limited to birth certificates and derived documents used for travel (identity card, passport).

Although the proposed solution may not be entirely satisfactory for the persons concerned, as it could still cause difficulties in the Member State of origin, the recognition in one Member State of a change of first name and sex made in another Member State should bring greater security and would underline the mutual trust between Member States within the Union, as opposed to third countries, as demonstrated by the recent decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal concerning the removal of gender markers under German law