

House of Lords EU Committee on Judicial Cooperation post-Brexit

On 20 March 2017 the European Union Committee of the House of Lords has published its Report on Judicial cooperation post-Brexit (“Brexit: Justice for families, individuals and Businesses?”). The full Report is available [here](#). The summary reads as follows (emphasis added):

“The Brussels I Regulation (recast)

1. We acknowledge and welcome the UK’s influence over the content of these three EU Regulations which are crucial to judicial cooperation in civil matters and reflect the UK’s influence and British legal culture. We urge the Government to keep as close to these rules as possible when negotiating their post-Brexit application. (Paragraph 23)

2. The predictability and certainty of the BIR’s reciprocal rules are important to UK citizens who travel and do business within the EU. We endorse the outcome of the Government’s consultations, that an effective system of cross-border judicial cooperation with common rules is essential post-Brexit. (Paragraph 37)

3. We also note the Minister’s confirmation, in evidence to us, that the important principles contained in the Brussels I Regulation (recast) will form part of the forthcoming negotiations with the remaining EU Member States. (Paragraph 38)

4. While academic and legal witnesses differed on the post-Brexit enforceability of UK judgments, it is clear that **significant problems will arise for UK citizens and businesses if the UK leaves the EU without agreement on the post-Brexit application of the BIR.** (Paragraph 52)

5. The evidence provided to us suggests that the **loss of certainty and predictability resulting from the loss of the BIR and the reciprocal rules it engenders** will lead to an inevitable increase in cross-border litigation for UK based citizens and businesses as they continue to trade and interact with the remaining 27 EU Member States. (Paragraph 53)

6. We are concerned by the Law Society of England and Wales’ evidence that the

current uncertainty surrounding Brexit is already having an **impact on the UK's market for legal services and commercial litigation, and on the choices businesses are making as to whether or not to select English contract law as the law governing their commercial relationships.** (Paragraph 54)

7. The Government urgently needs to address this uncertainty and take steps to mitigate it. We therefore urge the Government to consider whether any interim measures could be adopted to address this problem, while the new UK-EU relationship is being negotiated in the two year period under Article 50. (Paragraph 55)

8. The evidence we received is clear and conclusive: **there is no means by which the reciprocal rules that are central to the functioning of the BIR can be replicated in the Great Repeal Bill, or any other national legislation. It is therefore apparent that an agreement between the EU and the UK on the post-Brexit application of this legislation will be required, whether as part of a withdrawal agreement or under transitional arrangements.** (Paragraph 60)

9. The Minister suggested that the Great Repeal Bill will address the need for certainty in the transitional period, but evidence we received called this into question. **We are in no doubt that legal uncertainty, with its inherent costs to litigants, will follow Brexit unless there are provisions in a withdrawal or transitional agreement specifically addressing the BIR.** (Paragraph 61)

10. The evidence suggests that jurisdictions in other EU Member States, and arbitrators in the UK, stand to gain from the current uncertainty over the post-Brexit application of the BIR, as may other areas of dispute resolution. (Paragraph 69)

11. With regard to arbitration, we acknowledge that the evidence points to a gain for London. But, we are also conscious of the evidence we heard on the importance of the principles of justice, in particular openness and fairness, underpinned by the publication of judgments and authorities, which are fundamental to open law. It is our view that greater recourse to arbitration does not offer a viable solution to the potential loss of the BIR. (Paragraph 70)

The Brussels IIa Regulation and the Maintenance Regulation

12. In dealing with the personal lives of adults and children, both the Brussels IIa Regulation and the Maintenance Regulation operate in a very different context from the more commercially focused Brussels I Regulation (recast). (Paragraph 81)

13. These Regulations may appear technical and complex, but the practitioners we heard from were clear that in the era of modern, mobile populations they bring much-needed clarity and certainty to the intricacies of cross-border family relations (Paragraph 82)

14. We were pleased to hear the Minister recognise the important role fulfilled by the Brussels IIa Regulation and confirm that the content of both these Regulations will form part of the forthcoming Brexit negotiations. (Paragraph 83)

15. We have significant concerns over the impact of the loss of the Brussels IIa and Maintenance Regulations post-Brexit, if no alternative arrangements are put in place. We are particularly concerned by David Williams QC's evidence on the loss of the provisions dealing with international child abduction. (Paragraph 92)

16. To walk away from these Regulations without putting alternatives in place would seriously undermine the family law rights of UK citizens and would, ultimately, be an act of self-harm. (Paragraph 93)

17. It is clear that the Government's promised Great Repeal Bill will be insufficient to ensure the continuing application of the Brussels II and Maintenance Regulations in the UK post-Brexit: we are unaware of any domestic legal mechanism that can replicate the reciprocal effect of the rules in these two Regulations. We are concerned that, when this point was put to him, the Minister did not acknowledge the fact that the Great Repeal Bill would not provide for the reciprocal nature of the rules contained in these Regulations. (Paragraph 97)

18. We are not convinced that the Government has, as yet, a coherent or workable plan to address the significant problems that will arise in the UK's family law legal system post-Brexit, if alternative arrangements are not put in place. **It is therefore imperative that the Government secures adequate alternative arrangements, whether as part of a withdrawal agreement or under transitional arrangements** (Paragraph 98)

Options for the future

19. The balance of the evidence was overwhelmingly against returning to the common law rules, which have not been applied in the European context for over 30 years, as a means of addressing the loss of the Brussels I Regulation (recast). We note that a return to the common law would also not be the Government's choice. (Paragraph 114)

20. A return to the common law rules would, according to most witnesses, be a recipe for confusion, expense and uncertainty. In our view, therefore, the common law is not a viable alternative to an agreement between the EU and the UK on the post-Brexit application of the Brussels I Regulation (recast). (Paragraph 115)

21. Nonetheless, in contrast to key aspects of the two Regulations dealing with family law, Professor Fentiman was of the opinion that in the event that the Government is unable to secure a post-Brexit agreement on the operation of the Brussels I Regulation (recast), a return to the common law rules would at least provide a minimum 'safety net'. (Paragraph 116)

22. The combination of UK membership of the Lugano Convention, implementation of the Rome I and II Regulations through the Great Repeal Bill, and ratification of the Hague Convention on choice-of-court agreements, appears to offer at least a workable solution to the post-Brexit loss of the BIR. (Paragraph 126)

23. The inclusion in the Lugano Convention of a requirement for national courts to "pay due account" to each other's decisions on the content of the Brussels I Regulation, without accepting the direct jurisdiction of the CJEU, could be compatible with the Government's stance on the CJEU's status post-Brexit, as long as the Government does not take too rigid a position. (Paragraph 127)

24. This approach will come at a cost. In particular, it will involve a return to the Brussels I Regulation, with all its inherent faults, which the UK as an EU Member State succeeded, after much time and effort, in reforming. (Paragraph 128)

25. In contrast to the civil and commercial field, we are particularly concerned that, save for the provisions of the Lugano Convention on cases involving maintenance, there is no satisfactory fall-back position in respect of family law. (Paragraph 135)

26. Our witnesses were unanimous that a return to common law rules for UK- EU cases would be particularly detrimental for those engaged in family law litigation. The Bar Council also suggested that an already stretched family court system would not be able to cope with the expected increase in litigation. (Paragraph 136)

27. The Bar Council specifically called for the EU framework in this field to be sustained post-Brexit. But while this may be the optimal solution in legal terms we cannot see how such an outcome can be achieved without the CJEU's oversight. (Paragraph 137)

28. Other witnesses suggested the UK rely on the 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children. But the evidence suggests that this Convention offers substantially less clarity and protection for those individual engaged in family law based litigation. (Paragraph 138)

29. The Minister held fast to the Government's policy that the Court of Justice of the European Union will have no jurisdiction in the UK post-Brexit. We remain concerned, however, that if the Government adheres rigidly to this policy it will severely constrain its choice of adequate alternative arrangements. (Paragraph 142)

30. Clearly, if the Government wishes to maintain these Regulations post-Brexit, it will have to negotiate alternative arrangements with the remaining 27 Member States to provide appropriate judicial oversight. But the Minister was unable to offer us any clear detail on the Government's plans. When pressed on alternatives, he mentioned the Lugano Convention and "other arrangements". We were left unable to discern a clear policy. (Paragraph 143)

31. The other examples the Minister drew on, Free Trade Agreements with Canada and South Korea, do not deal with the intricate reciprocal regime encompassed by these three Regulations. We do not see them as offering a viable alternative. (Paragraph 144)

32. We believe that the Government has not taken account of the full implications of the impact of Brexit on the areas of EU law covered by the three civil justice Regulations dealt with in this report. In the area of family law, we are very

concerned that leaving the EU without an alternative system in place will have a profound and damaging impact on the UK's family justice system and those individuals seeking redress within it. (Paragraph 145)

33. In the civil and commercial field there is the unsatisfactory safety net of the common law. But, at this time, it is unclear whether membership of the Lugano Convention, which is in itself imperfect, will be sought, offered or available. (Paragraph 146)

34. We call on the Government to publish a coherent plan for addressing the post-Brexit application of these three Regulations, and to do so as a matter of urgency. Without alternative adequate replacements, we are in no doubt that there will be great uncertainty affecting many UK and EU citizens. (Paragraph 147)"