The Cost of Transnational Accidents: Evolving Conflict Rules on Torts

Antonio Nicita (Professor of Economic Policy at University of Siena) and *Matteo Winkler* (LLM, Yale Law School; Ph.D., Bocconi University) have written an interesting paper on the economic analysis of the conflict of laws rules concerning transnational accidents, in particular domestic and supranational rules on tort liability. A preliminary version of the paper ("**The Cost of Transnational Accidents: Evolving Conflict Rules on Torts**") was presented on September 13th at the annual conference of the European Association of Law & Economics (EALE), held in Copenhagen.

An abstract has been kindly provided by the authors:

> *The paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, the authors show the main conflict rules concerning torts at the domestic level: loci commissi delicti (place of accident), lex loci laesionis (place of injury), forum shopping and forum non conveniens, parties' freedom of choice (before and after the accident), victim's freedom of choice. Then, the authors describe the problems pertaining to each of these rules. In the second part, they analyse two cases, Bhopal and Amoco Cadiz, and conclude that when State courts are called to settle disputes concerning transnational accidents, they tend to protect their own community from the accident's consequences, if negative, or alternatively, to discharge the accident's negative externalities to other States' community. Both approaches raise problems from the standpoint of externalities regulation: they lead either to underregulation or overregulation.*
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> *In particular, Nicita and Winkler maintain that when, like in Bhopal, State courts strictly enforce the lex loci rule, they might both favor the flux of investment towards developing countries – although the damages in favor of these countries' victims are likely to be undercompensated, or protect the delocalized activities of multinational enterprises, while when courts refer to the lex loci laesionis rule, they are likely to regulate the transnational activity and therefore to increase the costs of compliance borne by multinational*

enterprises.

As a third case study, finally, the authors examine the EC Regulation on the law applicable to torts, Rome II. According to this Regulation, they point out that there are some underlying policies, that attempt to supersede the policies enforcement by State courts.

The paper is available on the EALE Conference's website, and will be revised by the authors according to the observations coming from the conference's public.

On the economic analysis of conflict of laws, see also some of our previous posts at the following links: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.